Cairo

The purpose of the flight was for the commercial pilot/owner to pick up passengers at the destination airport and return to the departure airport. The airplane was 33 miles from its destination in cruise flight at 3,300 ft mean sea level (msl) and above a solid cloud layer when the pilot declared to air traffic control (ATC) that he had the destination airport "in sight" and cancelled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance. During the 13 minutes after cancellation of the IFR clearance, the airplane's radar track made an erratic sequence of left, right, and 360° turns that moved the airplane away from the destination airport in a westerly direction. The altitudes varied between about 4,000 and 900 ft msl. Later, the pilot reestablished communication with ATC, reported he had lost visual contact with the airport, and requested an instrument approach to the destination airport. The controller then provided a sequence of heading and altitude assignments to vector the airplane onto the approach, but the pilot did not maintain these assignments, and the controller provided several corrections. The pilot expressed his inability to identify the initial approach fix (IAF) and asked the controller for the correct spelling. The radar target then climbed and subsequently entered a descending right turn at 2,500 ft msl and 180 knots ground speed near the IAF, before radar contact with the airplane was lost. Although a review of airplane maintenance records revealed that the airplane was overdue for several required inspections, examination of the wreckage revealed signatures consistent with both engines being at high power at impact, and no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the airplane's panel-mounted GPS, which the pilot was using to navigate the flight, revealed that the navigation and obstruction databases were expired. During a weather briefing before the flight, the pilot was warned of low ceilings and visibility. The weather conditions reported near the destination airport about the time of the accident also included low ceilings and visibilities. The restricted visibility conditions and the high likelihood of inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The flight's erratic track, which included altitude and directional changes inconsistent with progress toward the airport, were likely the result of spatial disorientation. After reestablishing contact with ATC and being cleared to conduct an instrument approach to the destination, the airplane's flight track indicated that the pilot was not adequately prepared to execute the controller's instructions. The pilot's subsequent loss of control was likely the result of spatial disorientation due to his increased workload and operational distractions associated with his attempts to configure his navigation radios or reference charts. Postaccident toxicological testing of samples obtained from the pilot revealed the presence of ethanol; however, it could not be determined what percentage was ingested or produced postmortem. The testing also revealed the presence of amphetamine, an opioid painkiller, two sedating antihistamines, and marijuana. Although blood level quantification of these medications and drugs could not be made from the samples provided, their combined effects would have directly impacted the pilot's decision-making and ability to fly the airplane, even if each individual substance was only present in small amounts. Based in the reported weather conditions at the time the pilot reported the airport in sight and canceled his IFR clearance, he likely was not in a position to have seen the destination airport even though he may have been flying between cloud layers or may have momentarily observed the ground. His decision to cancel his IFR clearance so far from the destination, in an area characterized by widespread low ceilings and reduced visibility, increased the pilot's exposure to the hazards those conditions posed to the successful completion of his flight. The pilot showed other lapses in judgment associated with conducting this flight at the operational, aircraft, and the personal level. For example, 1) the pilot did not appear to recognize the significance of widespread low ceilings and visibility along his route of flight and at his destination (nor did he file an alternate airport even though conditions warranted); 2) the accident airplane was being operated beyond mandatory inspection intervals; and 3) toxicological testing showed the pilot had taken a combination of multiple medications and drugs that would have likely been impairing and contraindicated for the safe operation of an airplane. The pilot's decision-making was likely affected by the medications and drugs.

During the takeoff roll on runway 31 at Abu Dhabi Airport, just before V1, the aircraft started to vibrate and longitudinal control was lost. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiate an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and came to a halt few dozen metres further. On impact, the cockpit and both engines were almost destroyed and the left wing broke in two.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in Cairo West. Crew fate unknown.

On approach to Cairo-Intl Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions due to sandstorm. On final, the aircraft descended below the glide when it struck the roof of a building and crashed in an industrial estate located short of runway. Three passengers were seriously injured while 23 other occupants were killed.

During the takeoff roll at Cairo Airport, one of the engine caught fire. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran and came to rest in flames few dozen metres further. All occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was to perform a non-scheduled international cargo flight from Cairo to Beirut. Before departure the operator's chief of the ground operations shift informed the pilot-in-command of the aircraft that bad weather was prevailing both on the route Cairo to Beirut and at Beirut Airport, and that the weather conditions had been confirmed by the crew of another aircraft who had arrived from Beirut at 0200 hours local time. The pilot-in-command then went to the weather office and was again informed that the weather en route was very bad with low and medium altitude clouds, including some cumulonimbus extending from 550 m to 8 500 m, and that moderate to severe icing and turbulence within these clouds were highly probable. He was also informed that a SIGMET had been issued at 0115 hours (see 1.7 below). Back at the operator's ground operations office he obtained once more all necessary weather information, including copies of two SIGMETS issued by Cairo and Beirut respectively and decided to delay his departure until 0700 hours expecting some weather improvement. Although the aircraft had no de-icing equipment, it departed Cairo at 0721 hours and at 0735 hours the crew reported at EL 70 to Cairo Approach. Eight minutes later they reported over Zif ta Beacon at the same flight level and were then instructed by Cairo Approach to contact Area Control. At 0745 hours they contacted and informed Cairo Control that they would return to Cairo due to icing. Shortly thereafter they repeated that message adding that there was some ice accretion on the aircraft. This was the last message from the aircraft. At 1020 hours Cairo ACC received a message that the aircraft had crashed 5 km SE of A1 Mahalla-Al Kobra. All four occupants were killed.

The aircraft was on a non-scheduled flight from Bangkok to Base1 with scheduled stops at Colombo, Bombay and Cairo. The aircraft departed Bombay for Cairo on 19 April at 1312 hours GMT, with 11 hours and 10 minutes of fuel endurance and an estimated flight time for Cairo of 9 hours. According to the flight plan time, it was due to arrive in Cairo at 2212 hours. The alternate airport for the above sector was given as Beirut. At 2215 hours the aircraft was heard calling Nicosia but, due to distance and height, two-way communication with Nicosia on VHF could not be established until 2234 hours. In the meantime a message was received from Beirut advising Nicosia that the aircraft had entered the Nicosia FIR and had reported over position Red 18A at 2229 hours. From the Area Control radiotelephony tape recording, it is evident that the actual weather conditions at Nicosia at 2145 hours and 2245 h~.:rs were passed to the aircraft at 2238 hours and 2254 hours respectively. Details of the latter actual weather were passed again to the aircraft at 2300 hours by Approach Control. The aircraft came over the field at 2306 hours and was cleared for a right- hand circuit. At 2310 hours, when over the threshold of runway 32, the aircraft was slightly high and the captain decided to overshoot. He informed the tower and was cleared for a left-hand circuit. He further informed the tower that he would carry out a low circuit. The aircraft was momentarily seen by the controller during its final approach and the glare of its landing lights was visible through the low cloud when it made a pass over the runway in use and disappeared from view over the upwind end of the runway in the low cloud to the north-west. On his second attempt to land and while executing a low circuit, the aircraft collided with the ground at 0113LT, 3,5 km short of runway threshold. A crew member and three passengers were seriously injured while 126 other occupants were killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

After touchdown at Al Hudaydah Airport, the crew started the braking procedure when control was lost. The airplane veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. There were no casualties but the airplane was written off.

Following an uneventful flight from Cairo, the crew started the approach to Beirut Airport in heavy rain falls and strong cross winds. On short final, during the last segment, the airplane was suddenly caught by a downdraft, lost height and struck the runway surface. It bounced and climbed to a height of 30 feet before descending and striking the runway again. Upon impact, the right main gear was sheared off, causing the propellers of both engines number three and four to struck the ground as well. Out of control, the airplane veered off runway and came to rest. While all 53 occupants were evacuated safely, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Aswan Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility caused by a sandstorm. On final, the captain decided to reduce his altitude in an attempt to establish a visual contact with the ground when the airplane struck a sand dune and crashed in flames some three km short of runway threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 31 occupants were killed, among them 25 Egyptian soldiers and six Russian crew members.