Aurora-Sugar Grove

The pilot was departing the private, fly-in community airport on a personal flight. He was familiar with the airport/fly-in community and was instrumental in its development. Fog was present at the time, and, according to witnesses, it was "rolling up the valley," which was a frequent event at the airport. The witnesses observed the airplane lift off the runway, drift to the left, and disappear into the fog with the landing gear extended. They heard the engine running normally, with no change in sound, until the crash. They heard two distinct "booms" about 4 to 6 seconds apart. They ran down to the departure end of the runway to look for a crash site and could not see the wreckage or any smoke or fire due to the fog. The wreckage was located on elevated terrain in a heavily wooded area, about 1,500 feet north of the departure end of the runway. The elevation at the crash site was about 250 feet higher than the elevation at the departure end of runway. A swath through the treetops leading to the main wreckage was indicative of a near-level flight path at impact. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure. A review of the weather by a NTSB meteorologist revealed that the departure airport was at the edge of an area of low-topped clouds. Airport remarks included "Mountainous terrain all quadrants."

The weekend before the accident, a fuel leak was identified. The fuel leak was subsequently repaired, and a final inspection the morning of the accident flight reportedly did not reveal any evidence of a continued fuel leak. Shortly after takeoff, the flight crew noticed a faint odor in the cockpit and a small amount of smoke near the radio room. The flight crew immediately initiated a turn with the intention of returning to the departure airport. About that time, they received a radio call from the pilot of the accompanying airplane advising that there was a fire visible on the left wing. The accident pilot subsequently executed an emergency landing to a corn field. Emergency crews were hampered by the muddy field conditions, and the fire ultimately consumed significant portions airframe. In-flight photographs showed the presence of fire on the aft lower portion of the left wing between the inboard and outboard engines. Located in the same area of the fire were fuel tanks feeding the left-side engines. After landing, heavy fire conditions were present on the left side of the airplane, and the fire spread to the fuselage. A postaccident examination noted that the C-channel installed as part of the No. 1 main fuel tank repair earlier in the week was partially separated. During the examination, the tank was filled with a small amount of water, which then leaked from the aft section of the repair area in the vicinity of the partially separated channel. Metallurgical examination of the repair area revealed a longitudinal fatigue crack along the weld seam. The fatigue nature of the crack was consistent with a progressive failure along the fuel tank seam that existed before the accident flight and was separate from the damage sustained in the emergency landing and postlanding fire. The repair earlier in the week attempted to seal the leak but did not address the existing crack itself. In fact, the length of the crack observed at the time of the repair was about one-half the length of the crack noted during the postaccident examination, suggesting that the crack progressed rapidly during the course of the accident flight. Because the repaired fuel tank was positioned within the open wing structure, a fuel leak of significant volume would have readily vaporized, producing a flammable fuel vapor/air mixture. Although the exact ignition source could not be determined due to the fire damage, it is likely that the fuel vapor and liquid fuel encountered hot surfaces from nearby engine components, which initiated the in-flight fire.

The visibility at the time of the accident was 1/2 mile with fog and the vertical visibility was 100 feet. A witness stated that the pilot checked the weather, but that he appeared to be in a hurry and took off without performing a preflight inspection of the aircraft. After takeoff, air traffic control instructed the pilot to turn left to a heading of 270 degrees. The pilot reported to the controller that he was at 1,300 feet climbing to 3,000 feet and the controller cleared the pilot to climb to 4,000 feet; the pilot acknowledged the clearance. Witnesses on the ground noted that the airplane was loud; one witness located about 1.5 miles from the departure airport reported that the airplane flew overhead at treetop height. The airplane impacted trees and a residence about 2.3 miles north-northeast of the departure airport. The airplane's turning ground track and the challenging visibility conditions were conducive to the onset of pilot spatial disorientation. Post accident inspection failed to reveal any mechanical failure that would have resulted in the accident. The pilot purchased the airplane about three months prior to the accident; at that time he reported having 72.6 hours of instrument flight experience and 25 hours of multi-engine experience, with none in the accident airplane make and model. After purchasing the airplane, the pilot received 52 hours of flight instruction in the accident airplane in 7 days. Logbook records were not located to establish subsequent flight experience.

Purpose of the flight was to provide training to the copilot for a new (part 135) operation. Witnesses observed the DC-3, N47CE, maneuvering at 3,000 feet msl (approximately 2,200 feet agl) with the gear and flaps extended. Shortly after completing a turn, the aircraft was observed in a nose high attitude, then it entered a spin. According to witnesses, the aircraft seemed to stop spinning, but it entered a secondary spin and crashed before recovery was accomplished. The pilot-in-command (pic) had 30 hours of flight time in the make/model of aircraft. No record was found to show that the pic had been trained in approaches to stalls. No preimpact part failure/malfunction of the aircraft was found, though it was destroyed by impact and fire. The copilot was a retired airline pilot, who had flown the DC-3 in the 1940's. An examination of the wreckage revealed the gear and flaps were (fully) extended and the elevator trim was set in a full nose up (trim) position. All three occupants were killed.

Following a missed approach to Aurora-Sugar Grove Airport, the twin engine airplane descended in a left turn, causing the left wing to struck the ground first. The aircraft broke up and caught fire. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. No malfunctions found.

The crew (one engineer and two pilots) departed Aurora-Sugar Grove for a local post maintenance test flight. While approaching the airport in poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to freezing fog, both engines lost power as the induction systems were iced. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the airplane crashed. All three occupants were seriously injured.