Atlanta-William Berry Hartsfield

As ValuJet Flight 597 began its takeoff roll, a 'loud Bang' was heard by the occupants, the right engine fire warning light illuminated, the crew of a following airplane reported to the ValuJet crew that the right engine was on fire, and the takeoff was rejected. Shrapnel from the right engine penetrated the fuselage and the right engine main fuel line, and a cabin fire erupted. The airplane was stopped on the runway, and the captain ordered evacuation of the airplane. A flight attendant (F/A) received serious puncture wounds from shrapnel and thermal injuries; another F/A and 5 passengers received minor injuries. Investigation revealed that an uncontained failure of the right engine had occurred due to fatigue failure of its 7th stage high compressor disc. The fatigue originated at a stress redistribution hole in the disc. Analysis of fatigue striation measurements indicated that the fatigue crack had originated before the disc was last overhauled at a repair station (Turk Hava Yollari) in 1991, but was not detected. Also, investigation of the repair station revealed evidence concerning a lack of adequate recordkeeping and a failure to use 'process sheets' to document the step-by-step overhaul/inspection procedures.

This was the first day on duty in the southern region operation for both pilots. In addition, they had never flown together. During the flight, the flight crew lost awareness of their airplane's position, erroneously believed that the flight was receiving radar services from ATC, and commenced the approach from an excessive altitude and at a cruise airspeed without accomplishing the published procedure specified on the approach chart. The crew believed that the airplane was south of the airport, and turned toward the north to execute the ILS runway 05 approach. In actuality, the airplane had intercepted the back course localizer signal, and the airplane continued a controlled descent until it impacted terrain. The captain and two passengers were killed while the copilot and two other passengers were seriously injured.

Witnesses reported that the airplane suddenly turned or rolled left until the wings were perpendicular to the ground. The airplane then fell in a nose-down attitude. Examination of the left propeller components indicated a blade angle of about 3°, while the left propeller control unit (pcu) ballscrew position was consistent with a commanded blade angle of 79.2°. Extreme wear on the pcu quill spline teeth, which normally engaged the titanium-nitrided splines of the propeller transfer tube, was found. The titanium-nitrided surface was much harder and rougher than the nitrided surface of the quill. Therefore, the transfer tube splines acted like a file and caused abnormal wear of the gear teeth on the quill. Wear of the quill was not considered during the certification of the propeller system. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all 23 occupants were killed, among them John Goodwin Tower, Senator of Texas and the astronaut Manley Sonny Carter.

During arrival at night, Beechcraft A100 (King Air, N44UE) was cleared for an ILS runway 26R approach behind Continental flight 9687, then Eastern Airline (EA) flight 111 (Boeing 727, N8867E) was cleared for the same approach behind the King Air. After landing, flight 9687 had a radio problem and the tower controller had difficulty communicating with flight 9687. Meanwhile, the King Air landed and its crew had moved the aircraft to the right side of the runway near taxiway Delta (the primary taxiway for general aviation aircraft). The turnoff for taxiway Delta was about 3,800 feet from the approach end of runway 26R. Before the King Air was clear of the runway, EA111 landed and converged on the King Air. The crew of EA111 did not see the King Air until moments before the accident. The captain tried to avoid a collision, but the Boeing's right wing struck the King Air, shearing the top of its fuselage and cockpit. Some of the King Air's strobe/beacon lights were inoperative, though they most likely would have been extinguished for the IMC approach. The local controller did not issue a traffic advisory to EA111 with the landing clearance. One of the pilot on board the King Air was killed while the second was seriously injured.

During arrival, the pilot was cleared for an ILS runway 07 approach. Also, he was advised of a DC-9 that was 4 miles ahead and was told to use caution for wake turbulence. As the aircraft was on final approach, it descended below the ILS glide slope and subsequently hit trees and crashed about 1.8 mile short of the runway. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft or engines was found that would have resulted in an accident. Also, there were no reported problems with the ILS system and it tested normal after the accident. The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate which was good for single engine land aircraft; his multi-engine privileges were authorized as a private pilot, only. An NTSB performance study showed the aircraft was 2 minutes and 57 seconds behind the DC-9. Radar data indicated the aircraft did not exceed a bank angle of 32° and no excessive g-values were evident during the approach. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The airplane used about 1/2 of the 8,602 feet runway for the t/o roll. After t/o it pitched nose-down briefly over the runway during initial climb. The pilot radioed that he was having a problem with the elevator which required 'full back pressure' to keep the nose up, and that he was returning to land. After maneuvering around the airport, the aircraft pitched 70-80° nose down and dove into terrain off the approach end of the runway. The wreckage examination revealed that the bolt securing the elevator trim tab pushrod to the actuator was missing. The rod had become wedged inside the elevator which resulted in an extreme tab up (nose down) condition. The aircraft underwent an annual inspection two days/5 flight hours earlier. The ia mechanic reported that no maintenance was performed on the tab system, and that he was certain the bolt was properly safetied. Another pilot who flew the aircraft the day of the accident reported that he found the pushrod to be secure during his preflight inspection. The 402B poh indicated that the aircraft should have request about 1,200 feet for the t/o ground roll. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Eastern flight 573 contacted approach control at 2323 cst, was advised to expect an ILS runway 16 approach and was vectored around weather. At 2330, the controller advised the ILS glide slope (g/s) had gone into 'alarm' but the loc appeared normal. At 2333, the wind shifted to 310° at 7 knots. Since the bc approach to runway 34 was notamed as inop, the crew continued to runway 16, using 50° of flaps. At 2334, they told the controller, 'if you don't get the g/s up, we'll do a... loc approach.' They reported receiving the g/s, but were advised the g/s was still in alarm. The aircraft broke out of clouds in rain at 900 feet; light turbulence was encountered on final approach. At about 1 mile out, the f/o noted the aircraft was high and advised the captain. The captain pushed the nose over and reduced power, increasing speed and rate of descent. Requested altitude callouts were not made. F/O advised captain to flare, but flare was inadequate. The aircraft touched down hard and the fuselage failed between stations 813 and 756. Aircraft was stopped with the tail resting on the runway. Four passengers received minor injuries during evacuation. Weather study showed a moderate to strong (vip level 2 to 3) weather echo over the approach end of runway 16.

The commercial pilot was on a repositioning flight from Kenosha, Wisconsin to Atlanta, Georgia, after having been without sleep for about 20 hours. Witnesses observed the aircraft circling a subdivision near Rockford, Illinois at a low altitude, just above the treetops. The aircraft was in a steep left bank, described as 70-90°, when it reversed direction into a steep right bank and descended into the trees. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Radar data indicated the aircraft climbed normally to 9,200 feet at which time some maneuver was performed with the aircraft. The aircraft then entered a near vertical dive and the last radar hit was at 6,900 feet. Examination of the aircraft revealed it experienced an inflight structural breakup and there was no evidence to indicate prebreakup failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engines, engine mounts, autopilot, or systems. The operator reported one employee overheard the pilot and passenger talk about rolling the aircraft prior to departure, and two company employees reported being onboard when the pilot had rolled it on prior occasions. One of these was at night. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot was alerted at 0100 for 0200 flight from Kenosha to Milwaukee, WI to pick up cargo for a flight to Atlanta, GA. At 0310, the aircraft departed Milwaukee in VFR. En route, the pilot obtained weather and an IFR clearance. Some of his radio transmissions were not standard. At 0433, he complied with ATC request for frequency change, but his radio transmissions were not clear. Approximately 5 minutes later, ATC asked the pilot to change frequency again, but 5 calls were made before he replied. His last transmission was at 0445:48; he didn't respond to further ATC calls. The aircraft continued cruising at 11,000 feet until 0621, then it descended without clearance. Radar contact was lost at 0627 cst (0727 est). Shortly thereafter, it impacted trees on a mountain, then crashed to the ground and burned. A witness believed the engines were throttled back before impact. Also, the witness reported low clouds and fog, but said the mountain was visible and was not obscured. The pilot had a 1,58‰ alcohol level in blood, no sleep for 21.5 hours, history of alcohol abuse, 7 prior dwi convictions (and ndr rec). Also, he falsified FAA medical applications. FAA was advised in 1984, but took no action.