Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante

The crew departed Porto Alegre on a night cargo flight to Joinville. The JNV NDB beacon and the next PP NDB were selected by the crew to start the descent to Joinville Airport, with a minimum safe altitude fixed at 770 feet. After the aircraft passed over JNV beacon, the ADF system was unable to find the PP NDB as it was inoperative so the aircraft initiated a turn heading 051° towards the PP beacon located near São Paulo-Congonhas Airport. The crew did not notice the change of heading and continued the descent when few minutes later, the aircraft struck a hill and crashed. Both pilots were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Neiva-Benito Salas Airport at 0922LT on a regular schedule flight to Cali, carrying six passengers and two pilots. After departure, the crew was cleared to climb under VFR to the altitude of 14,500 feet. The last radio communication was recorded at 0940LT and three minutes later, while cruising in clouds at the altitude of 14,271 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Nevado del Huila (5,750 metres high). SAR operations were initiated but the wreckage was found 10 days later only, at an altitude of 4,350 metres. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

On the morning of 24 May 1995 the aircraft had returned to its base at Leeds/Bradford from Aberdeen, U.K. on a scheduled passenger flight landing at 09:44 local time. The crew, which was not the one later involved in the accident, stated that all of the aircraft's systems and equipment had been serviceable during the flight. Some routine maintenance was performed on the aircraft which was later prepared for a scheduled passenger flight, NE816, to Aberdeen. It was positioned at the passenger terminal where it was taken over by the crew which was to operate the service, comprising the commander, who occupied the left hand seat, the first officer and a flight attendant. Nine passengers were boarded. The weather at Leeds/Bradford Airport was poor with Runway Visual Range (RVR) reported as 1,100 metres; scattered cloud at 400 feet above the aerodrome elevation of 682 feet and a light south-easterly wind. It was raining and the airfield had recently been affected by a thunderstorm. The freezing level was at 8,000 feet and warnings of strong winds and thunderstorms were in force for the Leeds/Bradford area. The crew called ATC for permission to start the engines at 17:41 hrs. Having backtracked the runway to line up, the aircraft took-off from runway 14 at 17:47 hrs and the crew was instructed by ATC to maintain the runway heading (143°M). The aircraft began to turn to the left shortly after becoming airborne. One minute and fifty seconds after the start of the take-off roll and as the aircraft was turning through a heading of 050° and climbing through 1,740 feet amsl, the first officer transmitted to Leeds/Bradford aerodrome control: "Knightway 816 we've got a problem with the artificial horizon sir and we'd like to come back." The aerodrome controller passed instructions for a radar heading of 360° and cleared the aircraft to 3,000 feet QNH. These instructions were read back correctly but the aircraft continued its left turn onto 300° before rolling into a right hand turn with about 30° of bank. About 20 seconds before this turn reversal, the aircraft had been instructed to call the Leeds/Bradford approach controller. The aircraft was now climbing through an altitude of 2,800 feet in a steep turn to the right and the approach controller transmitted: "I see you carrying out an orbit just tell me what i can do to help". The first officer replied: "Are we going straight at the moment sir" The controller informed him that the aircraft was at that time in a right hand turn but after observing further radar returns he said that it was then going straight on a south-easterly heading. The first officer's response to this transmission was: "Radar vectors slowly back to one four then sir please". The controller then ordered a right turn onto a heading of 340°. This instruction was correctly acknowledged by the first officer but the aircraft began a left hand turn with an initial angle of bank between 30° and 40°. This turn continued onto a heading of 360° when the first officer again asked "Are we going straight at the moment sir" to which the controller replied that the aircraft looked to be going straight. Seconds later the first officer asked: "Any report of the tops sir". This was the last recorded transmission from the aircraft, although at 17:52 hrs a brief carrier wave signal was recorded but it was obliterated by the controller's request to another departing aircraft to see if its pilot could help with information on the cloud tops. At this point, the aircraft had reached an altitude of 3,600 feet, having maintained a fairly constant rate of climb and airspeed. The ATC clearance to 3000 feet had not been amended. After the controller had confirmed that the aircraft appeared to be on a steady northerly heading, the aircraft immediately resumed its turn to the left and began to descend. The angle of bank increased to about 45° while the altitude reduced to 2,900 feet in about 25 seconds. As the aircraft passed a heading of 230° it ceased to appear on the secondary radar. There were four further primary radar returns before the aircraft finally disappeared from radar. There had been a recent thunderstorm in the area and it was raining intermittently with a cloud base of about 400 feet and a visibility of about 1,100 metres. Residents in the vicinity of the accident site reported dark and stormy conditions. Several witnesses described the engine noise as pulsating or surging and then fading just prior to impact. Other witnesses saw a fireball descending rapidly out of the low cloud base and one witness saw the aircraft in flames before it stuck the ground. All of the occupants died at impact. From subsequent examination it was apparent that, at a late stage in the descent, the aircraft had broken up, losing a large part of the right wing outboard of the engine, and the right horizontal stabiliser. There was some disruption of the fuselage before it struck the ground. The airborne structural failure that had occurred was the result of flight characteristics which were beyond the design limits of the aircraft following the loss of control shortly before impact.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Feijó to Rio Branco with an intermediate stop in Tarauacá, carrying two pilots and a load of 635 kilos of various goods. As the flight to Tarauacá was 10 minutes only, the crew decided to leave the undercarriage down. Shortly after takeoff from Feijó Airport, the crew encountered technical problems with the right engine. The aircraft lost speed and height so the captain decided to raise the landing gear but this was too late. The aircraft struck a tree, causing 3,2 metres of the right wing to be torn off. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

The aircraft departed Colón-Enrique Adolfo Jiménez Airport in poor weather conditions (low pressure zone). During initial climb, the aircraft suffered an explosion and crashed 10 km from the airport. The crew did not send any distress call. The aircraft disintegrated and all 21 occupants were killed, among them 12 Jewish businessman.

The crew encountered poor weather conditions on approach to São Gabriel da Cachoeira Airport with low visibility due to fog. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed few hundred metres short of runway. All 16 occupants were injured, three seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.

The crew was engaged in a local post maintenance test flight at Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew encountered technical problems with the left main gear. After being cleared by ATC, the crew decided to return for an emergency landing and made a turn then completed a belly landing. The aircraft came to rest on the main runway and was damaged beyond repair. Both pilots escaped uninjured.

About 42 minutes after takeoff from Cuiabá Airport, while cruising at 10,000 feet, the captain obtained the permission to reduce his altitude to 8,000 feet to avoid a low pressure area with thunderstorm activity and heavy rain falls. Few seconds later, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, dove into the ground and crashed in an open field located in Tangará da Serra. All four passengers and both pilots were killed. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact.

The aircraft departed Southend at 06:59 UTC, about one hour before sunrise, on a Special VFR clearance. The aircraft flew to Wallasey via Daventry, White gate and the Liverpool Special Rules Zone at 2,400 feet. It could not be determined why the commander chose to fly this route however, some two weeks before the accident he had spent a short holiday at Haverigg which is close to the direct track from Wallasey to Glasgow. On leaving Wallasey, the aircraft tracked north towards Glasgow and, at 08:01 hrs, the crew called Warton aerodrome stating that they were descending to 1,000 feet and requesting a 'Radar Service'. At 08:10 hrs, an aircraft that had just taken off from Blackpool reported a cloud base of between 2,500 and 3,000 feet and a visibility greater than 20 km. At this time the radar transponder on the aircraft was operating but the height encoding facility had not been selected. Recordings of the Great Dunn Fell and the St Anne's ATC radar heads indicated that the aircraft had left Wallasey on a track of 007°M which was maintained until radar contact was lost at 08:13 hrs at a position one mile to the south west of Walney Island airfield near Barrow in Furness. Consideration of the obscuration due to terrain between the radar heads and the aircraft indicated that, at the time of loss of radar contact, the aircraft would have been no higher than 350 feet amsl and possibly lower. At 08:09 hrs, the time of local sunrise, the crew had called Walney Island stating that they were nine miles south of the airfield at 1,000 feet and requesting overflight of the airfield. At 08:12 hrs, the controller at Walney Island sighted the aircraft abeam the airfield at an estimated height of 800 feet and asked the crew to report at Millom which is about eight miles north of Walney Island. At about the same time, a witness on the beach near the airfield saw the aircraft heading north in and out of cloud at a height estimated to be not above 400 feet. The aircraft did not make the requested position report at Millom and, at 08:16 hrs, the controller advised the crew to call London Information for further service. There was no reply to this call. The last person to see the aircraft reported that it was flying steadily north towards Ponsonby Fell and that the cloud in the area of the Fell was covering the ground at 500 feet above sea level. At about 08:15 hrs a farmer, who was some 600 metres from the crash site, heard a bang from the direction of Ponsonby Fell. He stated that at the time that he heard the bang the weather was very bad with a strong wind, rain and mist covering the fell. The aircraft had flown into ground about 15 metres below the top of Ponsonby Fell. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and both occupants were killed.

While descending to Goroka Airport in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 16 km from the airport, near Daulo Pass. Four passengers were seriously injured while 11 other occupants were killed.