Douglas DC-9

The aircraft departed Manila-Ninoy Aquino Airport at 0916LT on a regular schedule flight to Cagayán de Oro. The crew made an unscheduled stop at Tacloban Airport to deliver spare tires for another Cebu aircraft. It took off from Tacloban Airport at 1002LT and continued to Cagayán de Oro at FL115. While descending in marginal weather conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Sumagaya (2,234 metres high) located about 54 km northeast of Cagayán de Oro Airport. First rescuers arrived on site about 24 hours later and the wreckage was found in an isolated area about 150 metres below the summit. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 104 occupants were killed, among them five foreigners including one Swiss citizen. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with clouds and strong winds.

The base of the empennage struck the runway surface upon landing at Mexico City-Benito Juárez Airport. The aircraft was stopped on the runway and all 72 occupants evacuated safely. The aircraft was written off.

The aircraft departed Posadas-Libertador General José de San Martín Airport at 2118LT on a regular scheduled flight to Buenos Aires, carrying 69 passengers and five crew members. While cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet, weather conditions deteriorated with cumulonimbus reported till 49,000 feet, stormy weather, icing conditions and severe turbulences with winds up to 80 km/h and an OAT of -59° C. The crew modified his route and entered the Montevideo FIR without contacting Montevideo ATC. At 2204LT, the aircraft entered an area with severe icing conditions and three minutes later, the copilot (pilot-in-command) initiated a descent without prior permission. Meanwhile, the captain contacted Ezeiza Control, requesting permission to descend. Ezeiza Control radioed that the flight was over Uruguay territory and that they needed to contact Montevideo Control for permission. At 2209:17, Montevideo ATC cleared the crew to descend to FL257, an altitude reached at 2210:25. During the descent the first officer complained that his airspeed indicator did not seem to be working correctly. Descending through FL300, the first officer extended the slats. The pilots were trained to extend slats when recovering from approach to stall situations at 10,000 - 12,000 feet. However, the actual airspeed at the time of extension was higher than permitted. This exceeded the design limit, causing an asymmetry. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a near vertical attitude in an open field located about 21 km east of Nuevo Berlin. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 74 occupants were killed. At the point of impact, a cratere of 10 metres deep by 30 metres wide was found. The accident was not survivable. It was reported that that the airspeed suddenly increased from 200 knots to 450 knots in four seconds, probably after the Pitot tubes got iced.

Following an uneventful flight from Accra-Kotoka Airport, the crew started the descent to Abidjan-Félix Houphouët-Boigny Airport in poor weather conditions. Due to heavy rain falls, the horizontal visibility did not exceed 2 km and on final, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, the crew started a second approach to runway 21, established on the ILS but continued the approach above the glide. This caused the aircraft to land 900 metres past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft skidded and veered off runway to the left. While contacting soft ground, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and came to rest 1,800 metres past the runway threshold. All 104 occupants were evacuated, among them three passengers were slightly injured. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with heavy rain falls and wind from 110 gusting at 25 knots.

En route from Orlando to Cancún, the crew got lost and was unable to follow the prescribed route, causing the aircraft to deviate from the flight plan to the west. Eventually, the crew was vectored to the Tampico-General Francisco Javier Mina Airport located about 1,144 km northwest of the destination airport. On final approach, both engines failed simultaneously due to fuel exhaustion. The aircraft lost speed, stalled and collided with ILS equipment located about 300 metres short of runway 31. Upon impact, the undercarriage were sheared off and the aircraft crash landed on the runway and came to rest 220 metres further. All 47 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

ValuJet Flight 592 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Atlanta (ATL). The inbound flight had been delayed and arrived at Miami at 13:10. Flight 592 had been scheduled to depart at 13:00. The cruising altitude was to be flight level 350 with an estimated time en route of 1 hour 32 minutes. The DC-9 was loaded with 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail, and company-owned material (COMAT)). The COMAT consisted of two main tires and wheels, a nose tire and wheel, and five boxes that were described as "Oxy Cannisters -‘Empty.’" This cargo was loaded in the forward cargo compartment. Flight 592 was pushed back from the gate shortly before 13:40. The DC-9 then taxied to runway 09L. At 14:03:24, ATC cleared the flight for takeoff and the flightcrew acknowledged the clearance. At 14:04:24, the flightcrew was instructed by ATC to contact the north departure controller. At 1404:32, the first officer made initial radio contact with the departure controller, advising that the airplane was climbing to 5,000 feet. Four seconds later, the departure controller advised flight 592 to climb and maintain 7,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:07:22, the departure controller instructed flight 592 to "turn left heading three zero zero join the WINCO transition climb and maintain one six thousand," which was acknowledged. At 14:10:03, the flight crew heard a sound, after which the captain remarked, "What was that?" At that moment, the airplane was at 10,634 feet msl, 260 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and both engine pressure ratios (EPRs) were 1.84. At 14:10:15, the captain stated, "We got some electrical problem," followed 5 seconds later with, "We’re losing everything." At 14:10:21, the departure controller advised flight 592 to contact Miami on frequency 132.45 mHz. At 14:10:22, the captain stated, "We need, we need to go back to Miami," followed 3 seconds later by shouts in the background of "fire, fire, fire, fire." At 14:10:27, the CVR recorded a male voice saying, "We’re on fire, we’re on fire." At 14:10:28, the controller again instructed flight 592 to contact Miami Center. At 14:10:31, the first officer radioed that the flight needed an immediate return to Miami. The controller replied, "Critter five ninety two uh roger turn left heading two seven zero descend and maintain seven thousand." The first officer acknowledged the heading and altitude. The peak altitude reached was 10,879 feet msl at 14:10:31, and about 10 seconds a wings-level descent started. Shouting in the cabin subsided. The controller then queried flight 592 about the nature of the problem. The captain stated "fire" and the first officer replied, "uh smoke in the cockp... smoke in the cabin." The controller responded, "roger" and instructed flight 592, when able, to turn left to a heading of two five zero and to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. At 14:11:12, a flight attendant was heard shouting, "completely on fire." The DC-9 began to change heading to a southerly direction and at 14:11:26, the north departure controller advised the controller at Miami Center that flight 592 was returning to Miami with an emergency. At 14:11:37, the first officer transmitted that they needed the closest available airport. At 1411:41, the controller replied, "Critter five ninety two they’re gonna be standing (unintelligible) standing by for you, you can plan runway one two when able direct to Dolphin [a navaid] now." At 14:11:46, the first officer responded that the flight needed radar vectors. At 14:11:49, the controller instructed flight 592 to turn left heading one four zero. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:12:45, the controller transmitted, "Critter five ninety two keep the turn around heading uh one two zero." There was no response from the flightcrew. The last recorded FDR data showed the airplane at 7,200 feet msl, at a speed of 260 KIAS, and on a heading of 218 degrees. At 14:12:48, the FDR stopped recording data. The airplane’s radar transponder continued to function; thus, airplane position and altitude data were recorded by ATC after the FDR stopped. At 14:13:18, the departure controller instructed, "Critter five ninety two you can uh turn left heading one zero zero and join the runway one two localizer at Miami." Again there was no response. At 14:13:27, the controller instructed flight 592 to descend and maintain 3,000 feet. At 1413:37, an unintelligible transmission was intermingled with a transmission from another airplane. No further radio transmissions were received from flight 592. At 14:13:43, the departure controller advised flight 592, "Opa Locka airport’s about 12 o’clock at 15 miles." The accident occurred at 14:13:42. Ground scars and wreckage scatter indicated that the airplane crashed into the Everglades in a right wing down, nose down attitude.

The airplane landed wheels up and slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the airplane was evacuated. Investigation showed that because the captain had omitted the 'Hydraulics' item on the in-range checklist and the first officer failed to detect the the error, hydraulic pressure was not available to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps. Both the captain and the first officer recognized that the flaps had not extended after the flaps were selected to 15°. The pilots then failed to perform the landing checklist and to detect the numerous cues alerting them to the status of the landing gear because of their focus on coping with the flap extension problem and the high level of workload as a result of the rapid sequence of events in the final minute of flight. The first officer attempted to communicate his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain. There were deficiencies in Continental Airlines' (COA) oversight of its pilots and the principal operations inspector's oversight of COA. COA was aware of inconsistencies in flightcrew adherence to standard operating procedures within the airline; however, corrective actions taken before the accident had not resolved this problem.