De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver

The pilot-in-command (PIC) departed Lake Union seaplane base with four British Broadcasting Company passengers aboard the De Havilland DHC-2 'Beaver.' The passengers were engaged in aerial videography of an east/west geological fault line crossing from south Seattle through Blakely Harbor near the south end of Bainbridge Island. An onboard video recorder captured a voice instructing 'Keep as low as you can and slow as you can while we're doing this please... .' The PIC's first pass over the south end of Bainbridge Island was uneventful and the aircraft was maneuvered for a second pass. The PIC reported that approaching the upsloping, tree covered terrain he applied climb flaps and power but shortly thereafter realized the climb rate was less than he expected. He attempted a shallow left turn towards down sloping terrain and then leveled the wings as the aircraft descended into the treetops. The scenario was corroborated by two onboard video recordings. The pilot reported no powerplant or control system malfunction during the accident flight. He also reported encountering a downdraft condition over the tree covered terrain. Winds remained below 12 knots throughout the day at reporting stations near the accident site, and the video recordings showed no wind streaking and only sporadic whitecaps on the surface of Puget Sound during the transit from Seattle to the south end of Bainbridge Island.

The float equipped airplane was attempting to cross a mountain pass, following two other company airplanes. The first two pilots, and passengers, described five to seven miles visibility, 700 feet ceilings, clouds hanging on the mountainsides, and misty rain. The route of flight required several turns in the pass. The pilot had not flown through the pass in marginal Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather before this flight. After the first two airplanes went through the pass, they lost radio contact with the accident pilot, and did not see or hear from him again. The wreckage was later located at the head of an intersecting canyon, two miles before the correct pass. The airplane had been modified with a Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) kit. Canadian certification flight tests had determined that this modification eliminated aerodynamic warning of impending stalls, and therefore required an audible stall warning. Company pilots indicated it was common for the stall warning system to activate at an airspeed 10-15 miles per hour above the actual stall. At the time of the accident, the airplane did not have the ventral fin installed, and a takeoff flaps setting was selected. The audible stall warning circuit breaker was found in the pulled (disabled) position.

The float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver, serial number 0039, departed Prince Rupert, British Columbia, at 1719 Pacific daylight time on a visual flight rules flight to Kincolith, British Columbia, with the pilot and four passengers on board. When the aircraft arrived at Kincolith at about 1750, witnesses watched it carry out three low approaches to the water landing area, each time descending to a few feet above the water before climbing away. On the fourth approach, at about 1758, the aircraft touched down, apparently in a controlled manner, and skipped on the water surface. The floats then dug into the water followed by the right wing, which was severed from the fuselage on water impact. The aircraft quickly overturned and came to rest inverted with only the bottom of the floats visible. Several members of the village community, who had been waiting for the aircraft on the Government Dock, rushed to the sunken aircraft in small boats but were unable to rescue the pilot or passengers inside the submerged cabin. The five occupants drowned in the accident, and the aircraft was substantially damaged.

The float equipped airplane was observed taking off in light winds and calm water, and obtaining a steep climb and nose high attitude. Witnesses described hearing no reduction of engine noise from takeoff power to climb power. The airplane entered a steep left bank about 200 feet above the water, then rolled rapidly to the right and impacted at a steep angle into the water. The airplane had been modified with a Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) kit. Certification flight tests had determined that this modification eliminated aerodynamic warning of impending stalls, and therefore required an audible stall warning. Test results also required the addition of both a ventral fin, and horizontal stabilizer finlets, to meet directional stability certification. These tests determined that the least stable condition was in the takeoff flap configuration, during climb. The Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for the modification required the ventral fin, and an audible stall warning system be installed. The manufacturer provided a marketing video, produced prior to the STC approval, which stated the stall warning system was not required in the U.S. The company indicated this tape was used for training, and was a basis for pilots routinely disabling the stall warning horn by pulling the circuit breaker. At the time of the accident, the airplane did not have the ventral fin installed, a takeoff flaps setting was selected, and the audible stall warning circuit breaker was in the pulled (disabled) position. The local FAA Flight Standards Office had inspected the accident airplane 14 times in the previous 29 months, and made no mention of the ventral fin not being installed.

The pilot boarded the 4 passengers and cargo (unsecured) for a chartered flight to a fishing lodge. The floatplane departed uneventfully. About 45 min. later, while cruising about 1,700 feet above rugged terrain and a river, the engine began to lose power and the floatplane descended. The pilot attempted a forced landing in a small lake that was 1,200 ft. in length and located about 1 mile west of the river. During the approach to landing, the airplane stalled and impacted swampy terrain at the lake's edge in a steep nose down attitude. An examination of the wreckage revealed that the no.1 engine exhaust pushrod had failed in fatigue just below the top (valve) ball end. Examination of the pushrod revealed that material had been pushed away from the rod during installation of the ball end. The fatigue crack may have initiated from a score mark produced by the installation. Pushrod life is reduced due to surface scratches. The life of the failed pushrod could not be determined. Insufficient information exists in the overhaul manual regarding pushrod life/inspection.

Shortly after takeoff from Saskatoon, while in initial climb, the single engine aircraft nosed down and crashed, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured and the aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

According to the passenger, he and the pilot had just taken off, and as they were climbing out over an open water portion of a bay, the pilot said, 'here comes a gust.' Reportedly, the pilot added engine power, and the airplane began descending. The right wing started to dip, and the nose started to drop. The pilot had the control yoke turned all the way to the left, then yelled that they were going in. The airplane crashed in the water, and the passenger exited the airplane through the windshield. He did not see the pilot. The deceased pilot was found still strapped in his seat several days later, when a portion of the wreckage was recovered.

On the morning of the accident, the pilot and the loader-driver left Armidale in the aircraft between 0715 and 0730 and flew to the property "KOTUPNA". The task required the aircraft to operate from an agricultural strip 4,400 ft above mean sea level. Superphosphate spreading operations commenced between 0745 and 0800 and continued for approximately 1.5 hours after which the pilot and driver refuelled the aircraft and had a break. The pilot remarked to the driver that the aircraft was going very well and requested him to load a tonne of superphosphate. Operations resumed for about 1.5 hours and then ceased again whilst the aircraft was refuelled. After refuelling, the driver and the pilot had lunch and a break for about half an hour. The pilot again advised the loader driver that he would take a tonne, as the aircraft was performing well. After warming up the engine, the pilot made a normal take-off in a northeasterly direction and banked to the left to head southwest to the treatment area. The driver observed that the aircraft was lower and closer into the strip than had been the normal route to the treatment area. The aircraft did not seem to be climbing sufficiently to pass over the hill in front of it. The aircraft was then seen to be in a climbing left turn, toward the driver with superphosphate dumping from it. The aircraft's left wingtip contacted the ground after which the aircraft cartwheeled and came to rest 200-300 meters from the superphosphate dump. The driver ran down to the aircraft and found the pilot still strapped in the seat with no apparent sign of life. He moved the pilot clear of the aircraft in case of fire and then summoned help.