Cessna 414 Chancellor

The pilot performed an instrument approach to the runway with an approaching winter storm. A review of on-board global positioning system (GPS) data indicated that the airplane flew through the approach course several times during the approach and was consistently below the glideslope path. The airplane continued below the published decision height altitude and drifted to the right of the runway’s extended centerline. The GPS recorded the pilot’s attempt to perform a missed approach, a rapid decrease in ground speed, and then the airplane descend to the ground, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Further, the airplane owner, who was also a passenger on the flight, stated that, after the pilot made the two “left turning circles” and had begun a third circle, he perceived that the airplane “just stalled.” An examination of the airframe and engine did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s anti-ice and propeller anti-ice switches were found in the “off” position. A review of weather information revealed that the airplane was operating in an area with the potential for moderate icing and snow. Based on the GPS data and weather information, it is likely that the airframe collected ice during the descent and approach, which affected the airplane’s performance and led to an aerodynamic stall during the climb.

The privately owned Cessna 414A departed Toronto/Buttonville Municipal Airport, Ontario, en route to Sydney, Nova Scotia. The flight was operating under an instrument flight rules flight plan with the pilot-in-command and the aircraft owner on board. Nearing Sydney, the aircraft was cleared to conduct an instrument approach. At the final approach waypoint the pilot was advised to discontinue the approach due to conflicting traffic. While manoeuvring for a second approach, the aircraft departed from controlled flight, entered a rapid descent and impacted the water at 2335 Atlantic Daylight Time. The aircraft wreckage was located using a side-scan sonar 11 days later, in 170 feet of water. The aircraft had been destroyed and both occupants were fatally injured. No signal was detected from the emergency locator transmitter.

The twin engine aircraft departed San Salvador-Ilopango Airport on a private flight to Barranquilla with an intermediate stop in San Andrés Island, carrying one passenger and one pilot. On final approach to San Andrés-Gustavo Rojas Pinilla Airport runway 06, the left engine failed. The pilot increased power on the right engine but the aircraft continued to lose height. The pilot ditched the aircraft near the coast. Both occupants evacuated safely and were quickly rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

According to witnesses, the airplane departed runway 35 and was observed flying in and out of the clouds. Several of the witnesses observed the airplane initiate a turn to the west. One witnesses commented that it was dark but he could still see the silhouette of the airplane. He observed the airplane descend below the trees. All of the witnesses reported flames and "fireballs." On scene evidence was consistent with the airplane impacting trees in a left turn. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of the airplane, flight controls, engines, and remaining systems revealed no anomalies. Weather observations and radar data depicted low clouds, and restricted visibility due to rain and mist, in the vicinity of the airport. Toxicological examination revealed cetirizine, an antihistamine, consistent with use within the previous 12 hours. Most studies have not found any significant impairment from the medication, though it is reported to cause substantial sedation in some individuals.

The 2,212-hour instrument rated commercial pilot collided with terrain while circling to land after completing an instrument approach to an uncontrolled non-towered airport. The airport had two instrument approaches to Runway 14; a VOR and a RNAV(GPS). The published minimums for a circling approach to Runway 32 are a 500 foot ceiling and one mile visibility (VOR14) and a 700 foot ceiling and one mile visibility for RNAV(GPS) to Runway 14. The weather at the airport at the time of the accident was reported as 300 overcast, visibility of 3/4 of a mile in mist, with winds from 020 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 14 knots. Two witnesses reported that the airplane circled over the airport and then descended straight to the ground. Radar data revealed that after the airplane made the instrument approach to Runway 14, at approximately 2,800 feet mean sea level (msl), the airplane initiated a circling turn to the left and a slight descent. The last radar hit showed the airplane at 2,600 feet at a groundspeed of 186 knots. A post impact fire consumed some of the airframe. The pilot's logbooks were not located during the course of the investigation and his instrument experience and currency could not be determined. The pilot was reported to be very familiar with the airport and the 2 instrument approaches. A detailed examination of the wreckage of the airplane failed to reveal any anomalies with the airframe, structure, or systems. Flight control continuity was established at the accident site. The engines were examined, and no mechanical anomalies were found. The propellers were shipped to the manufacturer's facility for examination and teardown. Both propellers were rotating at the time of ground impact. Neither of the two propellers was found in the feathered position. Blade damage was consistent with both propellers operating under power at the time of impact. No mechanical defects were noted with either propeller.

The airplane encountered in-flight icing, and the pilot diverted to an airport to attempt to knock the ice off at a lower altitude. During the instrument approach, the pilot advised the tower controller of the ice, and that it depended on whether or not the ice came off the airplane if she would land. As the airplane broke out of the clouds, it appeared to tower personnel to be executing a missed approach; however, it suddenly "dove" for the runway. The tower supervisor noticed that the landing gear were not down, and at 75 to 100 feet above the runway, advised the pilot to go around. The airplane continued to descend, and by the time it impacted the runway, the landing gear were only partially extended, and the propellers and airframe impacted the pavement. The pilot then attempted to abort the landing. The damaged airplane became airborne, climbed to the right, stalled, and nosed straight down into the ground.

According to Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) personnel, the pilot was given the current weather information before attempting his first instrument approach into Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe Field (LZU), Lawrenceville, Georgia, which included: winds calm, visibility 1/2-mile in fog, and ceiling 100 feet. The pilot acknowledged the current weather information and elected to continue for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway-25 approach. During the first landing attempt, the pilot reported that he was going to execute a missed approach, but that he saw the airport below and wanted to attempt another approach. The ARTCC controller provided the pilot with radar vectors back to the ILS runway-25 approach and again updated the pilot with current weather conditions. During the second approach the tower controller advised the pilot that he was left of the runway-25 centerline. Shortly after the pilot acknowledged that he was left of the centerline, the tower controller saw a bright "orange glow" off of the left side of the approach end of runway 25. Although the weather conditions were below approach minimums for the runway 25-approach, the pilot elected to attempt the landing. A flight inspection of the ILS was completed on December 26, 2006, and the results of the inspection revealed that the ILS runway-25 approach system was satisfactory. Examination of the airframe, flight control system components, engines and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.

The twin-engine medical transport airplane was on a positioning flight when the pilot reported a loss of power affecting one engine before impacting terrain 0.6 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The airplane was at 2,600 feet and in a shallow descent approximately 8 miles northwest of the airport when the pilot checked in with the tower and requested landing. Three and a half minutes later, the pilot reported that he had lost an engine and was in a righthand turn. Radar data indicated that the airplane was 2 miles southwest of the airport at 1,200 feet msl. The radar track continued to depict the airplane in a descent and in a right-hand turn, approximately 1.9 miles west of the approach end of the runway. The altitude fluctuated between 400 and 600 feet, the track turned right again, and stabilized on an approximate 100- degree magnetic heading, which put the airplane on a left base for the runway. The track entered a third right-hand turn at 500 feet. The pilot's last transmission indicated that one engine was not producing power. The last radar return was 6 seconds later at 200 feet, in the direct vicinity of where the wreckage was located. Using the radar track data, the average ground speed calculations showed a steady decrease from 134 knots at the time of the pilot's initial report of a problem, to 76 knots immediately before the airplane impacted terrain. The documented minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) for this airplane is 68 knots. The zero bank angle stall speed varied from 78 knots at a cruise configuration to 70 knots with the gear and flaps down. A sound spectrum study using recorded air traffic control communications concluded that one engine was operating at 2,630 rpm, and one engine was operating at 1,320 rpm. Propeller damage was consistent with the right engine operating at much higher power than the left engine at the time of impact, and both propellers were at or near the low pitch stops (not feathered). Examination and teardown of both engines did not reveal any evidence of mechanical malfunction. Investigators found that the landing gear was down and the flaps were fully deployed at impact. In this configuration, performance calculations showed that level flight was not possible with one engine inoperative, and that once the airspeed had decreased below minimum controllable airspeed (VMC), the airplane could stall, roll in the direction of the inoperative engine, and enter an uncontrolled descent. The pilot had been trained and had demonstrated a satisfactory ability to operate the airplane in slow flight and single engine landings. However, flight at minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative was not practiced during training. The operator's training manual stated that during single engine training an objective was to ensure the pilot reduced drag; however, there was no procedure to accomplish this objective, and the ground training syllabus did not specifically address engine out airplane configuration performance as a dedicated topic of instruction. The operator's emergency procedures checklist and manufacturer's information manual clearly addressed the performance penalties of configuring the airplane with an inoperative engine, propeller unfeathered, the landing gear down, and/or the flaps deployed. The engine failure during flight procedure checklist and the engine inoperative go-around checklist, if followed, configure the airplane for level single engine flight by feathering the propeller, raising the flaps, and retracting the landing gear.