Lawrenceville-Gwinett County-Briscoe

During the preflight inspection, some water was present in the fuel sample; it was drained until a clear sample was observed. Subsequently, the fuel tanks were topped off, and the remaining preflight inspection revealed no other anomalies. The pilot initiated a takeoff and upon reaching rotation speed, the airplane became airborne and the landing gear was retracted. The right engine immediately lost power, and the pilot feathered the engine and attempted to return to the airport. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power. The pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane had lost all power. The airplane subsequently collided with trees and terrain and a post crash fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of fuel retrieved from the right main fuel tank, as well as fuel from the fixed base operator, revealed no anomalies. The left fuel selector valve was observed in the plugged port (no fluid flow) position, but it was most likely moved to that position during the accident sequence. The right fuel selector valve was partially aligned with the main fuel passageway and was unobstructed. The reason for the loss of engine power to both engines was not determined.

According to Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) personnel, the pilot was given the current weather information before attempting his first instrument approach into Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe Field (LZU), Lawrenceville, Georgia, which included: winds calm, visibility 1/2-mile in fog, and ceiling 100 feet. The pilot acknowledged the current weather information and elected to continue for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway-25 approach. During the first landing attempt, the pilot reported that he was going to execute a missed approach, but that he saw the airport below and wanted to attempt another approach. The ARTCC controller provided the pilot with radar vectors back to the ILS runway-25 approach and again updated the pilot with current weather conditions. During the second approach the tower controller advised the pilot that he was left of the runway-25 centerline. Shortly after the pilot acknowledged that he was left of the centerline, the tower controller saw a bright "orange glow" off of the left side of the approach end of runway 25. Although the weather conditions were below approach minimums for the runway 25-approach, the pilot elected to attempt the landing. A flight inspection of the ILS was completed on December 26, 2006, and the results of the inspection revealed that the ILS runway-25 approach system was satisfactory. Examination of the airframe, flight control system components, engines and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.

While executing an instrument approach to land on runway 25, the airplane collided with the runway, and collapsed the right main landing gear. The airplane subsequently burst into flames after the pilot and passenger exited the airplane. Post-accident examination of the engines found both the left and right engine fuel controls in a low power setting. Examination of the propeller control found both propellers at 30-degrees. The pilot did not report any flight control or mechanical problems during flight.

A review of communications between Mobile Downtown Control Tower, and the pilot revealed that while on approach the pilot reported having a problem. The Ground Controller reported that he had the airplane in sight and cleared the flight to land on runway 18. The pilot stated that he had a "run away engine", and elected to shut down the engine and continued the approach. The Controller then cleared the pilot again to runway 18. The pilot then stated that he did not think that he was going to "make it." The airplane collided with a utility pole and the ground and burst into flames short of the runway. The post-accident examination of the engine found that the fuel control unit arm to the fuel control unit interconnect rod end connection was separated from the rod end swivel ball assembly. The swivel ball assembly was found improperly attached to the inboard side of the arm, with the bolt head facing inboard, instead of outboard, and the washer and nut attached to the arm's outboard side instead of the inboard side. The rod separation would resulted in a loss of power lever control. The published emergency procedures for "Power Lever Control Lose," states; If minimum power obtained is excessive: 1) reduce airspeed by setting airplane in nose-up attitude at IAS < 178 KIAS. 2) "inert Sep" switch--On. 3) if ITT >800 C "Inert Sep"--Off. 4) Landing Gear Control--Down. 5) Flaps--Takeoff. 6) Establish a long final or an ILS approach respecting IAS < 178 KIAS. 7) When runway is assured: Condition Lever to --Cut Off. 8) Propeller Governor Lever to-- Feather. 9) Flaps --Landing as required (at IAS <122 KIAS). 10) Land Normally without reverse. 11) Braking as required. The pilot stated to Mobile Downtown Control Tower, Ground Control that he had a "run away engine" and that he "had to shut down the engine". As a result of the pilot not following the published emergency procedures, the airplane was unable to reach the runway during the emergency.

The pilot had received a weather briefing and was aware of the weather conditions west and north of the airport. The pilot was issued the flight clearance as filed, and was assigned an initial altitude of 2000 feet. Approximately five minutes into the flight, the air traffic controller questioned the pilot concerning the assigned heading. The controller stated that the pilot 'sounded extremely strained' and replied, 'N269M is in trouble.' Radar altitude data showed a rapid loss of altitude for N269M; the last radar altitude data showed the flight at 2800 feet. The airplane collided with the ground in a nose low attitude. Weather radar data from the Miami Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) showed a large, intense convective cell just west of Boca Raton between 1530:15 and 1535:57. Moderate to very heavy rain showers were associated with the convective activity. A review of the radar data showed that N269M was 3.5 to 4.0 miles north of the core of the large convective cell.