Cessna 414 Chancellor

The purpose of the flight was to "check out" the airplane before delivering it to its new owner, and to provide the copilot with an indoctrination ride in the Cessna 414. During the approach, the pilot provided guidance and corrections to the copilot. The copilot flew the airplane to within 200 feet of the ground when the nose of the airplane yawed abruptly to the right. The pilot took control of the airplane, and pushed the engine and propeller controls to the full forward position. He placed the fuel pump switches to the "high" position, retracted the flaps, and attempted to retract the landing gear. With full left rudder and full left aileron applied, he could neither maintain directional control nor stop a roll to the right. The airplane struck the ground and continued into the parking area where it struck an airplane and a waste-oil tank. Examination of the airplane following the accident revealed that the landing gear was down and locked, and the propeller on the right engine was not feathered. The emergency procedure for an engine inoperative go-around required landing gear retraction and a feathered propeller on the inoperative engine. The pilot's handbook further stated, "Climb or continued level flight is improbable with the landing gear extended and the propeller windmilling." After the accident, both pilots stated that they didn't notice a power loss on the right engine until the copilot surrendered the flight controls. The right engine was removed and placed in a test cell. The engine started immediately on the first attempt and ran continuously without interruption.

The twin engine aircraft departed Linz-Hörsching Airport on a taxi flight to Stuttgart with five passengers and two pilots on board. During the takeoff roll on runway 27, at a speed of 105 knots, the crew started the rotation. Immediately after liftoff, the aircraft adopted a high nose attitude with an excessive angle of attack. It rolled to the left, causing the left gear door and the left propeller to struck the runway surface, followed shortly later by the right propeller. After the speed dropped, the aircraft stalled and crash landed on the runway. It slid for few dozen metres and came to rest 2,752 metres past the runway threshold. All seven occupants were evacuated, one passenger suffered serious injuries. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane collided with trees and mountainous terrain at the 3,600-foot-level of Mauna Kea Volcano during an en route cruise descent toward the destination airport that was 21 miles east of the accident site. The flight departed Honolulu VFR at 0032 to pickup a patient in Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii. The inter island cruising altitude was 9,500 feet and the flight was obtaining VFR flight advisories. At 0113, just before the flight crossed the northwestern coast of Hawaii, the controller provided the pilot with the current Hilo weather, which was reporting a visibility of 1 3/4 miles in heavy rain and mist with ceiling 1,700 feet broken, 2,300 overcast. Recorded radar data showed that the flight crossed the coast of Hawaii at 0122, descending through 7,400 feet tracking southeast bound toward the northern slopes of Mauna Kea and Hilo beyond. The last recorded position of the aircraft was about 26 miles northwest of the accident site at a mode C reported altitude of 6,400 feet. At 0130, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact was lost and also said that at the airplane's altitude, radar coverage would not be available inbound to Hilo. The controller terminated radar services. A witness who lived in the immediate area of the accident site reported that around 0130 he heard a low flying airplane coming from the north. He alked outside his residence and observed an airplane fly over about 500 feet above ground level (agl) traveling in the direction of the accident site about 3 miles east. The witness said that light rain was falling and he could see a half moon, which he thought provided fair illumination. The area forecast in effect at the time of the flight's departure called for broken to overcast layers from 1,000 to 2,000 feet, with merging layers to 30,000 feet and isolated cumulonimbus clouds with tops to 40,000 feet. It also indicated that the visibility could temporarily go below 3 statute miles. The debris path extended about 500 feet along a magnetic bearing of 100 degrees with debris scattered both on the ground and in tree branches. Investigators found no anomalies with the airplane or engines that would have precluded normal operation. Pilots for the operator typically departed under VFR, even in night conditions or with expectations of encountering adverse weather, to preclude ground holding delays. The pilots would then pick up their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance en route. The forecast and actual weather conditions at Hilo were below the minimums specified in the company Operations Manual for VFR operations.

The pilot was on a circling approach for landing in instrument icing conditions. The landing gear were extended and the flaps were lowered to 15°. The alternate air induction system was not activated. The surviving passenger stated when the airplane came out of the clouds and the airplane started to buffet and shake. The pilot was heard to state on the UNICOM frequency by the fixed base operator and a lineman, "Emergency engine ice." The airplane was observed to make a 60-degree angle of bank and collided with trees and terrain. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the airplane will stall at 129 miles per hour with the landing gear and flaps down at 15-degrees. The maximum landing weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,430 pounds. The total aircraft weight at the crash site was 6,568.52 pounds. Witnesses who knew the pilot stated the pilot had flown one other known flight in icing conditions before the accident flight.

The Alta Flights Cessna 414A (registration C-GVZE, serial number 414A0219) departed Cranbrook, British Columbia, at approximately 1910 mountain daylight time (MDT) on a visual flight rules cargo flight to Calgary, Alberta. The aircraft disappeared from the Calgary area radar at 1936 MDT, at an indicated altitude of 9000 feet above sea level (asl) in the Highwood Range mountains, approximately 49 nautical miles southwest of Calgary. The aircraft wreckage was found on a mountain ridge at 8900 feet asl some 40 hours later. The flight was in controlled descent to Calgary when the impact occurred. There was a total break-up of the aircraft, and the pilot, the lone occupant, was fatally injured. There was a brief fireball at the time of impact.

The pilot reported visually checking the main fuel tanks during his preflight inspection of the airplane and later reported there was enough fuel for the intended flight which would be less than 1 hour, plus a 45-minute reserve amount of fuel. He estimated the fuel level in the main fuel tanks was 2-3 inches from the top. He also reported that before the accident flight he had never flown the accident make and model airplane, and that he had not had any flight training in the airplane. The passengers were boarded, the flight departed and climbed to between 4,500 and 6,500 feet msl. He leaned the mixture during cruise, and the flight continued. He began descending when the flight was 12 miles from the destination airport, and he performed the pre landing checks when the flight was 3 miles from the destination airport. The flight entered left downwind where he lowered the landing gear and turned on the fuel pumps. When abeam the landing point he reduced power, lowered the flaps 10 degrees, and turned onto base leg. During the base leg while rolling out of the turn and flying at 600 feet, "the right engine suddenly came to a stop...." He banked to the left to maintain zero sideslip, pushed the mixture, propeller, and throttle controls full forward, and identified the right engine had failed. He reportedly pulled the right propeller control to the feather position but during the postaccident investigation, the right propeller blades were not in the feather position and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the propeller. The pilot further reported that while pulling the right propeller control to the feather position, the airplane, "began to yaw right and simultaneously bank right...." He moved the left throttle control to idle, and they were on the ground in a span of 6 seconds from the time the right engine quit. No fuel leakage was noted at the scene, and no fuel contamination was noted in a nearby pond. Additionally, only residual fuel was noted in the fuel lines in each engine compartment. A total of 4.0 and 1.5 gallons of fuel were drained from the left and right auxiliary fuel tanks, respectively. No evidence of preimpact flight control failure or malfunction was noted. Neither propeller was at or near the feather range at the time of impact. Both engines were removed from the airplane, placed on a test stand with a "club" propeller, and both engines were noted to operate normally during the engine run. Examination of the right seat in the third row of the airplane revealed the seat frame was bent down on the left side, and all seat feet were in position but distorted; no fracture of the seat feet were noted. Examination of the seat of the passenger who sustained minor injuries (left seat in the third row) revealed the seatpan was compressed down, and the lapbelt was unbuckled. The inboard arm rest was bent inward, and the outboard arm rest was bent outward. The seat frame indicated displacement to the left. The seat back was twisted counter clockwise, and the left forward seat foot was in place. The seat and attach structure was certificated for a maximum forward g loading of 9 g's, and a maximum sideward g loading of 1.5 g's. This does not include a 1.33 margin of safety factor. The seat and attach structure was tested to ultimate loads in a combined forward, sideward, and upward directions in accordance with CAR 3.390-2. The same loads were also applied in a downward direction by itself. The empennage was separated just aft of the aft pressure bulkhead but remained secured by flight control cables. According to personnel from the airplane manufacturer, the tested load (150 percent limit) for the empennage in negative shear translates to 14.0 g loading. Based on Cessna Engineering rough calculations, they believe the empennage is capable of sustaining an additional 30 percent beyond what it was tested to, or an estimated 18.2 g's in negative shear loading.

The commercial pilot/owner was on a cross-country flight from Orlando, Florida, to Salisbury, Maryland, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot stated that all five fuel tanks were topped off and verified as full before departure. The fueler, in a written statement, reported that he added 100 gallons of fuel and that the fuel tank levels were topped off. In addition to the main tanks, the airplane was equipped with two large-capacity auxiliary tanks (31.5 gallons of useable fuel each) and a locker tank, and the airplane's total useable fuel capacity was 183 gallons. As the airplane approached Maryland, the pilot requested weather for White Plains, New York (HPN) and then changed his destination to HPN. As he approached the New York area at 21,000 feet, air traffic control (ATC) instructed the pilot to fly a published arrival procedure and to maintain an altitude of 16,000 feet. The pilot stated that, due to poor weather and air traffic congestion, he became concerned about possible delays and informed ATC that he had "minimal fuel." He did not declare an emergency. ATC then issued the pilot a descent clearance, and he reduced both throttles to idle. In preparation to level off at the new altitude, the pilot increased power on both throttles, and the right engine stopped producing power. The pilot was unable to maintain the assigned altitude and told the controller that he had "lost an engine, and needed vectors to the nearest runway." The left engine stopped producing power about 2 minutes later. The pilot ditched the airplane and exited the airplane before it sank. The airplane was not recovered. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical problems with the airplane before the flight.

The VFR repositioning flight departed Rome, Georgia en route to Canton, Georgia but never arrived. Late on the evening of April 10, 2003, the pilot's spouse contacted the local authorities when her husband did not arrive at home or call. The spouse stated that her husband flew out of Rome early Thursday morning headed to Augusta, Georgia to pick up an unknown number of passengers and fly them back to Rome, Georgia. The authorities confirmed that the passengers had arrived at their destination. The Civil Air patrol began a search and located the airplane on the side of "Bear Mountain" in Canton, Georgia, on April 11, 2003. The wreckage site was located 11.3 nautical miles west of Cherokee County Airport, Canton, Georgia, and 26 nautical miles east of Rome, Georgia on the west side of Bear Mountain. The mountains ridgeline runs northeast and southwest, near the town of Waleska, Georgia. The field elevation at the crash site was 1,750 feet above mean sea level (msl) and the peak of Bear Mountain was 2,268 feet msl. The upslope of the terrain at the site was estimated at 30-40 degrees. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assembly and accessories revealed no anomalies.

While descending to Hahn Airport, the pilot encountered marginal weather conditions with limited visibility due to clouds down to 500 feet. On approach, the twin engine aircraft collided with trees and crashed about 11 km from the runway 03 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

The airplane was destroyed after an attempted landing following a reported partial power loss of the left engine while en route. The flight did not divert to the closest airport located about 27 nautical miles to the southwest while at an altitude of about 15,900 feet. This airport was a controlled field equipped with airport rescue and fire fighting (ARFF), and its longest runway was 9,005 feet. The flight diverted to the departure airport located about 93 nautical miles to the north. This airport was an uncontrolled field not equipped with ARFF, and its longest runway was 5,000 feet. No emergency was declared. The airplane was reported by a witness to be too high and too fast to land on runway 34 at the airport. The winds were from 140 degrees at 6 knots. The wreckage distribution was consistent with an impact resulting from a Vmc (minimum control speed with the critical engine inoperative) roll to the left. The pilot received a checkout from the right seat in the accident airplane by the airplane owner. The checkout was about 20 minutes in duration and did not include any single-engine flight maneuvers or emergency procedures. The owner did not hold a certified flight instructor certificate. The pilot had stopped flying for 12 years and just began giving flight instruction and flying in single-engine airplanes about a year prior to the accident. The pilot's recent multiengine flight experience was limited to a couple of non-revenue flights within the past year while seated in the right seat of a King Air. The King Air was used for commercial charter work which would involve one or two landings per flight. One landing was made on the day prior to the accident. The accident pilot asked the King Air pilot to accompany him along on the accident flight; the King Air pilot declined. A multiengine commercial rated pilot-rated passenger, who the accident pilot knew, was seated in the right front seat. Examination of the airplane's supplemental type certificate (STC) revealed that the airplane had undergone numerous inspections by different maintenance personnel. The left engine's variable absolute pressure controller had safety wire around its control arm, which precluded its normal operation and a pressure relief valve that was not called for in the STC drawings. At the time of issuance, Federal Regulation's did not require STC instructions for continued airworthiness. Reliance on the airplane and engine maintenance manuals would not have provided enough information for continued airworthiness in accordance with the STC and could have yielded a setting exceeding those for which the STC parts were originally certificated to and thus increasing Vmc speed. Examination of the left engine revealed a cylinder head separation on the number six cylinder assembly, which had accumulated an estimated time since installation of 240 hours. Visual inspection of the assembly revealed the presence of some undecipherable characters in its parts numbering. A cylinder head separation from another airplane was also examined. This cylinder assembly accumulated about 270 hours since installation. Both cylinder assembly examinations revealed the presence of additional material on the cylinder barrel threads and fatigue fracture on the cylinder head.