Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan near Togiak: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 2, 2016 at 1157 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N208SD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Quinhagak – Togiak
MSN:
208B-0491
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
HAG3153
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
6481
Captain / Total hours on type:
781.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
273
Copilot / Total hours on type:
84
Aircraft flight hours:
20562
Circumstances:
On October 2, 2016, about 1157 Alaska daylight time, Ravn Connect flight 3153, a turbine powered Cessna 208B Grand Caravan airplane, N208SD, collided with steep, mountainous terrain about 10 nautical miles northwest of Togiak Airport (PATG), Togiak, Alaska. The two commercial pilots and the passenger were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The scheduled commuter flight was operated under visual flight rules by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at PATG (which had the closest weather observing station to the accident site), but a second company flight crew (whose flight departed about 2 minutes after the accident airplane and initially followed a similar route) reported that they observed unexpected fog, changing clouds, and the potential for rain along the accident route. Company flight-following procedures were in effect. The flight departed Quinhagak Airport, Quinhagak, Alaska, about 1133 and was en route to PATG.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's decision to continue the visual flight rules flight into deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver after entry into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Contributing to the accident were:
- Hageland's allowance of routine use of the terrain inhibit switch for inhibiting the terrain awareness and warning system alerts and inadequate guidance for uninhibiting the alerts, which reduced the margin of safety, particularly in deteriorating visibility;
- Hageland's inadequate crew resource management (CRM) training;
- The Federal Aviation Administration's failure to ensure that Hageland's approved CRM training contained all the required elements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 135.330;
- Hageland's CFIT avoidance ground training, which was not tailored to the company's operations and did not address current CFIT-avoidance technologies.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in San Antonio de Prado: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 30, 2016 at 1204 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
HK-3804
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Medellín – Juradó
MSN:
208B-0315
YOM:
1992
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3534
Captain / Total hours on type:
335.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6378
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1245
Aircraft flight hours:
2867
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Medellín-Enrique Olaya Herrera Airport on a charter flight to Juradó, carrying nine passengers and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the crew encountered difficulties to gain sufficient altitude and apparently attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted a hill and eventually crashed into trees. The copilot and three passengers were killed and seven others occupants were injured, some seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- Execution of a take-off with a weight approximately 17% higher than the maximum gross operating weight (MTOW) established for the C208B aircraft.
- Limited climb rate with signs of lift loss due to the low performance given by the overweight during the initial climb phase.
- Forced landing in mountainous terrain due to loss of lift caused by overweight during the initial climb.
- Absence in the identification of the risks associated to an overweight operation of the aircraft.
- Lack of supervision by the Aircraft Operator in relation to the dispatch of aircraft operating from the outside at the main base of operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Russian Mission: 3 killed

Date & Time: Aug 31, 2016 at 1001 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N752RV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Russian Mission – Marshall
MSN:
208B-5088
YOM:
2014
Flight number:
HAG3190
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
18810
Captain / Total hours on type:
12808.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3559
Circumstances:
The Cessna had departed about 3 minutes prior on a scheduled passenger flight and the Piper was en route to a remote hunting camp when the two airplanes collided at an altitude about 1,760 ft mean sea level over a remote area in day, visual meteorological conditions. The airline transport pilot and two passengers onboard the Cessna and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Piper were fatally injured; both airplanes were destroyed. Post accident examination revealed signatures consistent with the Cessna's outboard left wing initially impacting the Piper's right wing forward strut while in level cruise flight. Examination revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of either airplane. Neither pilot was in communication with an air traffic control facility and they were not required to be. A performance and visibility study indicated that each airplane would have remained a relatively small, slow-moving object in the other pilot's window (their fuselages spanning less than 0.5° of the field of view, equivalent to the diameter of a penny viewed from about 7 ft away) until about 10 seconds before the collision, at which time it would have appeared to grow in size suddenly (the "blossom" effect). From about 2 minutes before the collision, neither airplane would have been obscured from the other airplane pilot's (nominal) field of view by cockpit structure, although the Cessna would have appeared close to the bottom of the Piper's right wing and near the forward edge of its forward wing strut. The Cessna was Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipped; the Piper was not ADS-B equipped, and neither airplane was equipped with any cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). CDTI data would have presented visual information regarding the potential conflict to both pilots beginning about 2 minutes 39 seconds and auditory information beginning about 39 seconds before the collision, providing adequate time for the pilots to react. The see-and-avoid concept requires a pilot to look through the cockpit windows, identify other aircraft, decide if any aircraft are collision threats, and, if necessary, take the appropriate action to avert a collision. There are inherent limitations of this concept, including limitations of the human visual and information processing systems, pilot tasks that compete with the requirement to scan for traffic, the limited field of view from the cockpit, and environmental factors that could diminish the visibility of other aircraft. Given the remote area in which the airplanes were operating, it is likely that the pilots had relaxed their vigilance in looking for traffic. The circumstances of this accident underscore the difficultly in seeing airborne traffic by pilots; the foundation of the "see and avoid" concept in VMC, even when the cockpit visibility offers opportunities to do so, and particularly when the pilots have no warning of traffic in the vicinity. Due to the level of trauma sustained to the Cessna pilot, the autopsy was inconclusive for the presence of natural disease. It was undetermined if natural disease could have presented a significant hazard to flight safety.
Probable cause:
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid each other while in level cruise flight, which resulted in a midair collision.
Final Report: