Tennessee

A witness stated he observed the airplane on climbout from runway 32. The airplane started a right turn estimated at about 30 to 45° angle of bank. The airplane stopped climbing and began descending. Subsequently, it collided with a tree line, while in a right bank, and then it impacted the ground. Weather conditions at the time of accident were described by the witness as very dark, with no ambient light or visible horizon. Examination of the airframe, flight control system, engine assembly, and propeller assembly revealed no evidence of a precrash failure or malfunction. The autopilot was found in the off position, and the autopilot circuit breakers were not tripped. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured and had no memory of the flight. A radio transcript revealed that after taking off, the flight had made one radio transmission to request an ifr clearance.

The pilot departed Knoxville on a local pleasure flight to the Gatlinburg area. A few minutes into the flight, the pilot requested the ILS approach to Knoxville. About two minutes after the initial request, he requested immediate radar vectors. The controller requested the flight's altitude, but there was no reply from the pilot. The aircraft collided with trees at the 3,500 foot level of rising terrain seven miles southwest of gatlinburg. A hiker reported hearing, the sound of the engines running until the airplane collided with trees. The hiker also stated that clouds obscured the tops of the mountains. Examination of the accident site disclosed that wreckage debris was scattered over an area 650 feet long and 75 feet wide. The wreckage examination failed to disclose a mechanical problem. Sole on board, the pilot was killed.

The ATP and his passenger were en route to pick up a patient for transport to a VA hospital. The destination airport was uncontrolled, and VFR only. The pilot cancelled with ATC and reported the field in sight. The airport was reporting VFR conditions, but rising, mountainous terrain existed to the northeast, and local authorities reported that the top third of the mountain was obscured in clouds during the morning of the accident. After cancelling IFR, no subsequent radio calls were received from the flight, and the flight did not arrive at its destination. The wreckage was found several hours later near the crest of holston mountain, 1/2 mile east of the Holston mountain VOR. An examination of the wreckage indicated the aircraft impacted upsloping, wooded terrain, while at a climb angle of 8°. Disintegration of the wreckage was indicative of a high speed impact. No evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure was found during the examination of the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.

N500AK encountered icing in flight before start of ILS approach. Radar data showed that before reaching outer marker, it slowed in a manner that was consistent with a power reduction (or partial loss of power), then it entered a steep descent and crashed. Examination revealed engines were not operating at impact and that propellers had been feathered. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of engines, propellers or anti-ice system was found. There was evidence that engine inlet anti-ice annunciator lights and stability augmentation system (SAS) fault warning light were illuminated during impact. The engine manufacturer reported that flameouts had occurred in other aircraft, during or following operation in icing conditions, sometimes after descent into warmer air. Flight manual noted that if icing was encountered with anti-ice system off, select continuous ignition and then select engine and propeller heat (1 engine at a time, ensuring first engine was operating satisfactorily before selecting second engine) and engage sas heat. All four occupants were killed.

A witness reported that the airplane used the entire runway to get airborne, reached about 300 feet agl after liftoff, and drifted right. It then impacted trees about 1/3 mile from the departure end of the runway. Damage to the trees indicated that the airplane was in a right bank at impact. Both propellers showed evidence of rotation at impact. Estimated weight calculations showed that the airplane was at least 165 lbs in excess of max gross weight; this does not include an unknown amount of fuel on board prior to the last refueling. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

After a series of instrument procedures, the flight returned to Knoxville and landed. On the next takeoff, the first officer dropped the airplane's checklist and the check airman elected to continue the flight without using the checklist. On the next visual approach, the check airman and first officer attempted a landing without lowering the landing gear. The airplane touched down and both propeller assemblies struck the concrete runway surface. The pilot reported the gearup touchdown to the control tower and elected to go around. During the climbout the check airman lowered the landing gear, established a teardrop pattern for the opposite runway and feathered the right propeller. Crash fire rescue (cfr) equipment was alerted and was in position for the second landing attempt. While on short final, the check airman called for max power, a reduction in the flap setting, and initiated a single engine go-around below 200 feet. There is no operational procedure for a single engine go-around below 200 feet. The airplane climbed briefly and crashed inverted about 7,500 feet from the approach end of the runway. Both pilots were killed.

The pilot had cancelled his ifr flight plan, and was proceeding to the airport visually. During his approach, the left engine quit, followed by the right engine. He then realized that he had failed to switch from the auxiliary fuel tanks to the main fuel tanks prior to the approach, and exhausted the auxiliary fuel supply. With insufficient altitude to attempt a restart, he force landed the airplane in a bean field short of the airport. After the airplane came to a stop, the occupants egressed, and the fuselage was consumed in a post-crash fire.

The pilot had computed landing performance information for a landing on a wet runway with anti-skid; sufficient runway surface was available. Touchdown was normal, however during the braking process, the airplane started to fishtail and the pilot believed that the anti-skid system had failed. Therefore, the pilot turned the antiskid system off and continued the rollout with normal braking. The airplane went off the departure end of runway 05 and sustained substantial damage. Performance data indicated more runway surface was required for a safe landing on a wet runway without anti-skid assistance. The braking sequence of events described by the pilot resembled dynamic hydroplaning where there was a complete loss of braking effectiveness rather than an anti-skid malfunction. An examination of the airplane failed to disclose any mechanical problems.

On a previous flight, low power was noted in the right engine, the right engine fuel flow was 5 to 8 gal/hr less than the left engine and the right engine temperature (itt) was about 500° less than the left. A decision was made to ferry the aircraft to a maint facility to have the right engine examined. The pilot took off on a 5,186 feet runway (unrway 02C) with a light tail wind in 95° temperature, though the airport had longer runways (7,702 feet, 8,000 feet and 8,500 feet). A witness noted the aircraft lifted off at the end of the runway (charts showed the takeoff roll with normal power should have been about 3,100 feet). Witnesses reported the aircraft remained low (nearly hitting a 55 feet light standard) until it rolled right and 'dropped like a rock.' Impact occurred in a right wing low attitude about 2 miles from the departure end of runway 02C. The aircraft was extensively damaged by impact and fire; no preimpact part failure was found. Both engines had evidence of engine rotation at the time of impact. The operator's lead mechanic had reported for duty about 3 hours before the accident flight, but he had not been informed of the engine problem before the aircraft took off. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

After conducting ground training all day, the instructor/director of operations and his trainee flew an EMB-110P1 to Memphis to exchange airplanes. Ground fog had started to form prior to departure. After exchanging airplanes, they made the return flight to Columbia. They obtained radar vectors to the final approach course for the SDF at Columbia. The thick fog resulted in a missed approach. During the missed approach, the runway was visible from above and the crew indicated that they would try for a VFR approach and landing. The airplane collided with trees 2,350 feet from the runway in a wings level attitude. The tops of the trees were broken 41 feet above the runway threshold altitude. The trainee had been without rest for at least 30 hours prior to the accident. One pilot was killed while the second was seriously injured.