Bristol-Tri-Cities

The pilots reported they experienced an engine fire during a missed approach in night, IMC conditions, and feathered the propeller and shut down the engine. On an approach to another airport, the airplane touched down short of the runway, traveled onto the runway, and then departed the left side of the runway. The pilot reported he could not maintain altitude due to ice accumulations, and the lack of power with one engine shut down. Examination of the wreckage revealed rotational damage to both engines and propellers consistent with operating engines. Neither propeller was in the feathered position. The pilot had been briefed about known moderate icing conditions, and isolated severe icing. The AFM recommended a minimum speed in icing conditions of 140 knots, and at less than 140 knots, ice could accumulate on the wings in unprotected areas. The pilot reported he flew the approach at 114 knots.

N500AK encountered icing in flight before start of ILS approach. Radar data showed that before reaching outer marker, it slowed in a manner that was consistent with a power reduction (or partial loss of power), then it entered a steep descent and crashed. Examination revealed engines were not operating at impact and that propellers had been feathered. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of engines, propellers or anti-ice system was found. There was evidence that engine inlet anti-ice annunciator lights and stability augmentation system (SAS) fault warning light were illuminated during impact. The engine manufacturer reported that flameouts had occurred in other aircraft, during or following operation in icing conditions, sometimes after descent into warmer air. Flight manual noted that if icing was encountered with anti-ice system off, select continuous ignition and then select engine and propeller heat (1 engine at a time, ensuring first engine was operating satisfactorily before selecting second engine) and engage sas heat. All four occupants were killed.

The copilot stated that when he began the approach to the destination airport, the weather condition was hazy and he delayed his descent slightly until he located the airport. When he saw the runway, he believed that they were a little too close, so he indicated to the captain that he would like to make a 360° turn. At that point, the captain assumed control of the aircraft and continued the approach to runway 04. According to witnesses, the aircraft touched down long. According to the captain, he tried several applications of the normal braking system, but got no response. He then tried the emergency brakes and asked the copilot to get on the brakes, but reported there was no braking. Subsequently the aircraft went off the end of the runway, went over an embankment and hit a fence. It came to rest on a second embankment where it exploded and burned. Tire marks with evidence of braking action were found starting 2,377 feet beyond the runway threshold. A required field length of approximately 2,600 feet was calculated for landing. No pre-impact part failure/malfunction was found. VASI lights were inoperative. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries.

On final approach to runway 23 at Bristol-Tri-Cities Airport, both engines stopped simultaneously. The pilot attempted an emergency landing and the airplane belly landed in a field located 2,600 feet short of runway. The pilot, sole on board, was uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During a night approach to Bristol-Tr-Cities Airport, the airplane was too low and struck the slope of Mt Holston located 15 miles from runway 27 threshold. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all ten occupants were killed. The evidence indicates Flight 308 departed Nashville, Tennessee, with an inoperative radio compass. Although the flight was cleared by way of low frequency airway Green 5, it does not appear that the facilities defining this airway were used. Upon arriving in the Tri-Cities area the aircraft was east of its intended track and erroneously identified the reporting point from which an ILS approach procedure was to be initiated. During the instrument approach, which was conducted in snow showers, the flight missed the outer marker. The approach was continued under instrument conditions without utilizing the VOR facility which would have been of assistance in confirming the flight's position. Without having clearly established his position, the pilot flew 15 miles beyond the outer marker and descended to an altitude too low to clear high terrain in this area.