Queensland

The pilot hired the aircraft privately from his employer to conduct a holiday flight during his leave. The journey commenced at Moorabbin on 25 August and the aircraft arrived at Cairns about midday 30 August, after stopovers at Coolangatta and Proserpine. The pilot and his passengers then spent the next three days at leisure in the Cairns area. On the day of the accident, the pilot attended the Cairns Briefing Office where he collected the relevant weather forecasts and submitted a flight plan. The flight plan indicated that the flight would be conducted in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules. It contained a deficiency in that no details were given for the first route segment from Cairns to Biboohra. It is apparent that the pilot had not noticed that the tracks to the west of Cairns, on the relevant enroute chart, emanate from Biboohra and not Cairns. There was no track line which joined Cairns and Biboohra. Such a line might have alerted the pilot at the time he planned the flight. The error in the flight plan was not detected when the plan was submitted. When the pilot was issued with an airways clearance prior to DEPARTURE it was apparent that he did not understand the terms of the clearance, which gave the initial tracking point as Biboohra. The location of this point was explained to the pilot and he subsequently accepted the clearance. He elected to depart using visual procedures, after being offered a choice of these or the published Standard Instrument DEPARTURE profile. A visual DEPARTURE from the particular runway in use allows an aircraft proceeding towards Biboorha to intercept the required track sooner than is possible with an instrument DEPARTURE. The aircraft was issued with takeoff instructions which included clearance for the pilot to make a right turn after takeoff. Witnesses observed that the aircraft complied with this clearance and headed in a southwesterly direction before turning to the north-west and subsequently entering cloud. The cloud base was estimated to be between 2000 and 2500 feet above mean sea level. No further communications were received from the aircraft and a search was commenced that afternoon. The search effort was hampered by the weather and the wreckage was not located until the following afternoon.

This aircraft had only recently been acquired by the company. It had a fuel system different to other aircraft of the same type in the fleet. On the other aircraft there were three detents for each fuel selector, On, Off, Crossfeed. On this aircraft there were four detents, Off, Outboard, Inboard, Crossfeed. The pilot had not previously flown this aircraft. After a flight time of about 110 minutes the pilot reported that both engines had stopped and he was unable to access fuel from the outboard tanks. When the wreckage was located no evidence of fuel was found in the inboard tanks. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was engaged on a night freighter service from Cairns (CNS) to Brisbane (BNE) with intermediate stops at Townsville (TSV) and Proserpine (PPP). The flight departed Cairns at 18:47 hours. After arriving at Townsville the aircraft was refuelled and additional freight loaded before departing for Proserpine at 19:47 hours. The aircraft was cleared to track direct to Proserpine on climb to FL250. At 20:08 hours the pilot reported that the aircraft had left FL250 on descent into Proserpine and requested a clearance to track to intercept the 310 omni radial inbound for a DME Arrival. This request was approved and a short time later the aircraft reported established on the radial. At 20:16 hours, in answer to a question from Townsville Control, the aircraft reported at 2600 feet and was instructed to call Townsville Flight Service Unit. The aircraft complied with this instruction, and after the initial contact no further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The wreckage was located approximately 4 kilometres north-west of the threshold of runway 11 and in line with that runway. The aircraft had been destroyed by impact forces and the ensuing fire. A witness, who lived near the final approach path of the aircraft, reported that she observed the aircraft when it was on final approach. Analysis of her observations indicated that when she sighted the aircraft it was at a lower height than normal for the type of approach that the pilot reported would be flown. At the time of the sighting she did not notice anything unusual about the operation of the aircraft. Other persons at the Proserpine Aerodrome at the time of the accident reported rainstorms and strong winds in the vicinity.

The aircraft was established on final by the pilot under check. A 5 knot downwind component prevailed. The flare was commenced higher than is normal and the airspeed decreased below the optimum. The pilot did not react to prompting by the the check-pilot but, at about 20 feet, retarded the throttles. The aircraft struck the runway heavily in a left wing low attitude and the left main and nose landing gear was torn off. Command responsibility for the flight was not discussed and the check-pilot was under the misapprehension that his role was only that of safety pilot. Due to flight rescheduling, the pilot under check slept for only two and a half hours prior to commencing duty. The autopilot was unserviceable and the pilot under check flew the aircraft by hand for most of the four flight legs. During the last leg the check-pilot twice simulated an engine failure. The second failure was simulated on final approach at about 7 DME. Power was reinstated shortly afterwards and the approach continued normally until close to the threshold. At this time the pilot under check had been on duty for five and a half hours and the check-pilot for over twelve hours. Overseas research has shown that subtle errors in visual perception may be induced by an event which causes stress, and that this condition may persist for several minutes after the event. Fatigue may aggravate the problem. The errors in perception are the result of changes in focal length of the lens of the eye caused by the physiological effects of the stress resulting from the event. The experimental research and information from accident data has provided evidence that the effect of the changes in focal length may cause a pilot on final approach to perceive a runway to be on a higher plane than it actually is. In this case, with the particular combination of factors prevailing at the time, it is possible that the imposition of a simulated engine failure on approach within a few minutes prior to the final landing of a long and fatiguing night's operations caused a stress reaction in the pilot under check. The level of stress induced in this fatigued pilot may have been sufficient to cause the kind of perceptual error described above. The runway would thus appear to the pilot slightly higher than it actually was. His judgement of flare height, being based on this false perception, would therefore be incorrect.

While cruising at an altitude of 27,000 feet in good weather conditions and just passing over the city of Adavale, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and entered a dive. It descended for about 7,000 feet when excessive g loads caused both wings and the fuselage to breakup. The wreckage was found about 3,5 km south of Adavale and all 12 occupants were killed.

The aircraft was engaged in operating a night freight flight from Brisbane to Gladstone and Rockhampton. The pilot departed Rockhampton as a passenger in another company aircraft at about 2100 hours the night before the accident and was flown to Caloundra. He then flew VH-DIL to Brisbane and after arriving submitted a flight plan for the return flight to Rockhampton giving an estimated time of DEPARTURE Brisbane of 0230 hours. Before DEPARTURE, however, the pilot was required to await the arrival of another aircraft so that freight could be transhipped to his aircraft. DEPARTURE from Brisbane was made at 0301 hours and at 0400 hours the pilot reported the aircraft's position over Gayndah, the pilot was instructed to call on another radio frequency at 0410 hours. No further transmissions were heard from the aircraft. The wreckage was located two days later in mountainous terrain. The aircraft had impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. Subsequent investigation did not reveal any fault with the aircraft or its systems that could have contributed to the accident. The day before the accident the pilot rose at about 0730 hours after spending the previous night and day at a friends property near Rockhampton. He spent the day at leisure at the property before returning to Rockhampton in the afternoon. After dining at his parents home he proceeded to the airport for the flight to Caloundra. Before departing Brisbane to return to Rockhampton the only sleep the pilot would have had was about an hour on the flight to Caloundra and possibly another short period at Brisbane Airport while waiting for his aircraft to be loaded.

The crew as completing a local training flight at Amberley Airport. On final approach, the instructor simulated a left engine failure. The airplane lost height on short final, went into a nose-down attitude and landed hard. The nose gear collapsed and the left engine partially detached. The airplane veered off runway and came to rest. While all three crew members escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was being operated on a regular freight carrying run between Dysart and Rockhampton. On the evening preceding the accident, the aircraft departed Dysart at 2045 hours, arriving at Rockhampton at 2139 hours. At 0222 hours on the following morning the pilot telephoned Brisbane Flight Service Centre to obtain an update on the weather for the return flight to Dysart. The forecast indicated that at the time of arrival at Dysart, light rain with 5 oktas of cloud at 700 feet above ground level, could be expected. The pilot nominated Rockhampton as the alternate for Dysart in the event that weather conditions at the latter aerodrome precluded a safe approach and landing. The aircraft was refuelled to give a total fuel endurance of 290 minutes, and after loading departed Rockhampton at 0354 hours. At 0435 hours, the pilot reported that descent had been commenced into Dysart and because of poor reception on High Frequency radio channels further communications with VH-CLU were relayed by another aircraft in the area, VH-EEF on Very High Frequency channels. After communications with VH-CLU, the pilot of VH-EEF advised Brisbane Flight Service Unit (FSU) at 0453 hours, that the runway lighting was not yet displayed. The runway lighting at Dysart was provided by a number of hand-lit flares. The lighting of these flares was carried out by an employee of the company operating VH-CLU, and normally took about ten minutes. On this occasion the employee had overslept and arrived at the aerodrome at about the same time that the aircraft flew overhead. At 0501 hours further attempts by the pilot of VH-EEF and Brisbane FSU to contact VH-CLU were unsuccessful. The wreckage of the aircraft was later located about 800 metres to the west of the aerodrome. The aircraft had struck trees while heading in a direction aligned with runway 14 but displaced to the west of the runway. It had been destroyed as a result of the impact forces. Witnesses reported that when VH-CLU arrived at Dysart it was not raining, however, low cloud was present. The aircraft was observed to complete three orbits of the aerodrome and at times during these orbits it was obscured by cloud. Both occupants were killed.

At 1201 EST, shortly after taking off from Runway 10L at Archerfield Airport, the airplane crashed into an annex attached to a Thiess Contractors workshop located in Kerry Road, Archerfield. The accident site was 455 metres east-north-east from the departure end of the runway. The pilot and four workmen taking their lunch break in the annex were killed. The aircraft and the annex were destroyed by impact forces and the following explosion and fire. The accident occurred during a test flight following corrective maintenance. The aircraft had completed a periodic inspection on 23 December 1981 but, during the next 10 days, a problem was experienced with the control of the left hand propeller. Following maintenance on 4 January to rectify the problem, the pilot elected to test fly the aircraft prior to its intended use for endorsement training at 1500 hours on the day of the accident.

During a night takeoff from Weipa Airport, the single engine airplane went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest. There were no casualties.