Country
code

Queensland

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AC Metro II in Mackay

Date & Time: Apr 14, 1993 at 0525 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-UZS
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Brisbane - Mackay
MSN:
TC-320
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2670
Captain / Total hours on type:
181.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was operating a freight charter flight, cruising normally at an altitude of 20,000 ft (FL200), when, about 150 km south-east of Mackay, the left engine lost power and could not be restarted. During the subsequent landing on runway 14 at Mackay, the pilot attempted a single engine go-around when he suddenly had the (mistaken) impression that the landing gear was not down. He temporarily lost control of the aircraft but recovered to touch down on the flight strip to the left of the runway, some 500 m before the runway end. During the landing roll, the landing gear collapsed and the aircraft sustained substantial damage.
Probable cause:
The report concludes that the engine power loss was caused by failure of the fuel pump high pressure relief valve. The pilot, believing that the landing gear was still retracted, initiated action to avoid a wheels-up landing. This action was initiated too late in the landing approach for a successful outcome.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft E90 King Air in Wondai: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jul 26, 1990 at 2248 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-LFH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cairns – Wondai – Camden
MSN:
LW-255
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
2654
Captain / Total hours on type:
285.00
Circumstances:
Beech E90 VH-LFH was being flown by the owner as pilot-in-command for the flight. The pilot had submitted a flight plan nominating a private category, single pilot, instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, from Cairns to Wondai and thence to Camden. VH-LFH, with six passengers on board, departed Cairns at 1830 hours EST and arrived at Wondai at 2142 hours after an uneventful flight. One passenger left the aircraft at Wondai. The aircraft was refuelled with 800 litres of aviation turbine fuel and the pilot reported taxying for Runway 36 at Wondai to Brisbane Flight Service at 2243 hours EST. The aircraft was issued an airways clearance at 2245 hours which the pilot acknowledged correctly. The last radio contact with the aircraft was at 2248 hours when the pilot reported airborne. Witnesses observed the aircraft take-off and a short time later heard the sound of impact. The aircraft struck a line of small trees slightly left of the runway extended centreline and 600 metres from the end of the runway in a wings level attitude and in a very shallow descent. Forty-eight metres beyond this point, the aircraft impacted the ground and began to break up. It then contacted a number of large trees and caught fire, finally coming to rest 90 metres further on. A passenger was seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The circumstances leading to the development of this accident could not be established conclusively. However, the evidence supports the following as probable factors:
- The pilot might not have been aware of the human factors aspects associated with dark night take-offs.
- The pilot could have been influenced by stress and/or fatigue.
- The aircraft was taking off towards dark textureless terrain and no visible horizon.
- By transmitting his airborne call very soon after lift-off, the pilot was not devoting his full attention to flying the aircraft.
- The pilot became disoriented and placed the aircraft in a shallow descent as it accelerated after take-off.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B1-H2 Turbo Porter in Goombungee

Date & Time: Jul 17, 1990
Operator:
Registration:
A14-704
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
730
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field located in Goombungee while engaged in a training flight. The pilot, sole on board, escaped with minor injuries.

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation near Mareeba: 11 killed

Date & Time: May 11, 1990 at 1740 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-ANQ
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Proserpine – Mareeba – Cairns
MSN:
500-0283
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
14150
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Circumstances:
Cessna 500 VH-ANQ was operating the Proserpine to Mareeba leg of a charter flight The aircraft departed Proserpine at 16:35 hours. The charter flight had been organised to transport members of five local government authorities from the Cairns/Atherton Tablelands area to a Local Government Association Conference at Airlie Beach, Queensland. The flight plan indicated that the flight would follow Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) with a planned cruising altitude of FL330. The aircraft was planned to track via overhead Townsville then direct to Mareeba with a flight time interval of 68 minutes. The flight apparently continued normally and at 17:26 the aircraft was cleared to descend to FL170 and instructed to call Cairns Approach. On first contact with Cairns Approach, the pilot advised that the aircraft was tracking for Mareeba via the 163 radial at 41 miles (76 kilometres) DME from Biboohra. (There are no radio navigational aids at Mareeba, the nearest aids for tracking and instrument approach purposes are at Biboohra, about 16 kilometres north of Mareeba). The aircraft was advised to maintain FL170 but a short time later was cleared to descend to FL120. The pilot stated that he would not be closing down the engines at Mareeba and that his estimated departure time was 17:50. At 17:35 hours VH-ANQ was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet and one minute later the pilot advised that the aircraft was "approaching over Mareeba and visual". Cairns Approach advised VH-ANQ that there would be a short delay at 10,000 feet and following a request from the pilot gave approval for the aircraft to circle over Mareeba. At 17:40 hours, Cairns Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to 7,000 feet. This transmission, and other subsequent transmissions to the aircraft, went unanswered. The wreckage of VH-ANQ was ultimately located on the eastern slopes of Mt Emerald, 15 kilometres south of Mareeba Airport, by searching helicopters at 0240 hours on 12 May 1990. The aircraft initially impacted the mountainside with the left wingtip, while travelling on a track of about 340 degrees Magnetic. At the time it was in a wings level attitude at an angle of descent of eight degrees. It then struck the ground just below the apex of a ridge and the wreckage spread in a fan shape, at an angle of 30 degrees, along a centreline track of 350 degrees Magnetic.
Probable cause:
This accident was unusual in that the last report by the pilot indicated that the aircraft was at 10,000 feet and on a track that was 55 kilometres to the east of the accident site. There was no substantiated, and very little circumstantial evidence to suggest what caused the aircraft to descend 6,400 feet and to be displaced a considerable distance to the west of track. As a result the causal factors associated with this accident remain undetermined.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver off Cape Richards

Date & Time: Jul 5, 1989 at 1645 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-OCW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cap Richards-Townsville
MSN:
436
YOM:
1953
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was scheduled to conduct three round trips between Townsville and Cape Richards, with a stop at Orpheus Island on some legs, during the day. The pilot involved in the accident flew the first and third trips and another pilot flew the second. After the first trip the pilot reported that he pumped the floats out and considered that the quantity of water removed was normal. On the third trip he picked up a "standby" passenger at Orpheus Island. On arrival at Cape Richards the scheduled six passengers were loaded. A witness employed by the resort to handle the aircraft and passengers on the island reported that the floats appeared to be sitting in the water such that the water was above the normal water line on the floats. Examination of the aircraft loading indicated that the aircraft was overweight and the centre of gravity was just inside the rear limit. The pilot reported taxiing at 1613 hours with eight persons on board. At 1624 hours he reported that he was returning to unload one passenger. In that time two takeoff attempts into the north-east were made. The wind in the bay where the attempts were made was a light northerly. The pilot again reported taxiing at 1634 hours with seven persons on board. A further two takeoff attempts were made. On the final attempt the pilot did not taxi as far into the bay as on previous occasions. The takeoff was continued well out beyond the shelter of the island into an area where the wind was easterly at about 10 knots, and the swell was 1 to 1.5 metres. The pilot reported that the aircraft had attained an indicated airspeed of 55 knots, and he intended to fly it off the water at 57 knots. The right float had lifted from the water and it hit a wave which pushed the right wing up. The pilot was unable to lift the left wing which hit the water, causing the aircraft to cart-wheel.
Probable cause:
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The pilot selected the incorrect takeoff direction for the wind conditions prevailing.
2. The pilot continued the takeoff into an area of unsuitable swell. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Lake Monduran: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 5, 1988 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-BSL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bundaberg - Bundaberg
MSN:
1618
YOM:
1966
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft reported departing Bundaberg for Monduran Dam on a no SAR flight at 1135 hrs EST with three persons on board and an endurance of 270 minutes. The purpose of the flight was to complete the endorsement of the pilot under check and to assess the suitability of an area of water on the coast to where the passenger, who was the regular pilot of the aircraft, was to fly the aircraft the following day. The pilot in command had flown 27 hours in the previous three months, of which 9 were on type. The pilot under check had flown only one hour in the last three months. This flight had been in VH-BSL. At approximately 1200 hrs, the aircraft was observed in the Lake Monduran area. It flew two left hand circuits, landing into wind towards the dam wall each time. After the second takeoff, it turned left and was seen heading north from the lake. Nothing further was heard or seen of the aircraft. Following an extensive search, the wreckage was located six days later lying inverted in 15 metres of water approximately 2 km WNW of the dam wall in the area of the junction of the main east-west channel and a northsouth channel of the lake. Both floats had separated from the aircraft and the right float was severely torn for about half its length. There was substantial water impact damage to the windshield frame/cockpit roof area and to the upper leading edge surfaces of both wings.
Probable cause:
No fault was found with the aircraft or its systems which might have contributed to the accident. It could not be determined who was manipulating the controls of the aircraft at the time of the accident. Evidence was obtained that it was the habit of the check pilot to have pilots undergoing endorsement or check to fly two circuits landing into wind and then to carry out crosswind landings. The check pilot and the pilot under check had previously operated at the dam and alighted on to both the east/west and the north/south channels. Having been observed to fly two into wind circuits and then head north and not be sighted again, it is possible that the aircraft then commenced crosswind operations onto the north/south arm of the lake, landing in a southerly direction with a crosswind from the left. Information from the Bureau of Meteorology indicated that the surface wind in the area at the time of the accident was 090` magnetic at 15 knots. This information was confirmed by witnesses at the dam wall who observed white caps on the surface of the dam. The north/south channel of the lake was bounded on its east side by steep hills rising to 70 metres above water level. The effect of this high ground was to partially blanket the north/south channel from the easterly wind. The position of the wreckage was in the area where the wind shadow effect would have ended and where the wind would have blown at full strength along the main east/west channel of the lake. The crosswind limitation for the aircraft as stated in the flight manual was 8.7 knots. Commenting in early 1988 on an enquiry regarding the raising of this limit, the aircraft manufacturer emphasised the 8.7 knot limit and advised that any test work to raise the limit should proceed cautiously starting at or below the current (8.7 knot) limit. If the aircraft was conducting crosswind operations in the north/south channel, and suddenly encountered a 15 knot crosswind on exiting the wind shadow area, the control difficulties confronting the pilot could have been significant. The aircraft wreckage was intact except for the floats which had been torn off by water impact forces. The right float was severely damaged while the left was intact. The forward tip of the right float had been severed by the propeller. The remaining forward section had then been forced upwards and outboard and had broken off. This weakened the float support structure, causing it to fail, and allowing the remaining section of the right float to strike the right side of the fuselage just aft of the cabin. Damage of this type an magnitude was most probably caused by the nose of the right float digging into the surface of the lake at relatively high speed. For this to occur, the aircraft was banked to the right at float impact - a possible consequence of encountering a strong crosswind from the left. There was no evidence that the aircraft had hit a submerged object. The factors associated with the development of this accident could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B Victor in Kolane

Date & Time: Oct 14, 1988 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-PFQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kolane - Taroom - Kolane
MSN:
95
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The Taroom aerodrome had recently been equipped with a pilot activated lighting (PAL) system which was due to be commissioned on the evening of 15 October 1988. The pilot, who is a local Council member had flown from his property "Kolane" to Taroom late in the afternoon, to check that the PAL system was functional. He had intended to fly to Taroom the following evening to activate the lights for the official opening celebration, which was planned to be held at the aerodrome. After checking that the system was working the pilot decided to take the opportunity to practice some night circuits and landings before returning to his property. Before departing Taroom he arranged to have two vehicles positioned at his property landing area to illuminate the strip which is 850 metres long, aligned 235/055 degrees magnetic, and 1000 feet above sea level. He apparently intended to check the suitability of the strip for a night landing on his return. The aircraft was observed to fly over the strip in a north-easterly direction and then make a left turn. The aircraft was then seen to descend and the sound of impact was heard by the occupant of a vehicle near the strip. The aircraft had impacted the ground whilst in a descending left turn at a ground speed of approximately 125 knots. Initial impact was in a clearing near trees. The aircraft slid 91 metres before the left wing struck a large tree and was torn off. The aircraft slid another 45 metres before coming to rest and catching fire. The pilot was thrown from the aircraft while still strapped to his seat and was able to move himself away from the immediate vicinity of the fire before help arrived.
Probable cause:
The pilot has no recollection of events immediately prior to the accident. There is no indication that the aircraft was not functioning normally at the time of the accident. The weather was fine, there was a light northerly breeze, and there was no moonlight. Indications are that the pilot may have become disorientated whilst attempting to carry out a visual circuit when there was no visual horizon. The landing area did not meet the requirements for night operations published in the Visual Flight Guide.
The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:
The pilot was attempting to carry out a night visual circuit when there was no visual horizon.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S in Mount Garnet

Date & Time: May 20, 1988 at 1750 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-SDI
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kidston – Cairns
MSN:
500-3188
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The pilot was temporarily replacing the pilot who normally flew the aircraft. After arriving at Kidston he checked the fuel quantity gauge and decided that there was sufficient fuel on board for the return flight. As the aircraft approached top of climb, the pilot found that the fuel gauge indicated a lower fuel quantity than he had expected. He re-checked the indicated quantity after the aircraft was established in cruise and decided that sufficient fuel still remained to complete the planned flight. Shortly after passing Mt Garnet both engine fuel flow gauges began to fluctuate and the engines began to surge. The pilot immediately turned the aircraft towards the Mt Garnet strip, but shortly afterwards both engines failed. The pilot attempted to glide the aircraft to the strip, but it collided with trees and came to rest about one kilometre from the runway 27 threshold. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Both engines had failed due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot normally flew a different type of aircraft, this aircraft only being used by the company to supplement its services. For company aircraft normal route fuel requirements are specified. As a result, there was little need for him to make significant fuel calculations. On this occasion, the pilot found he had little time between his arrival at Cairns and the scheduled DEPARTURE of his next flight. He ordered that only 80 litres of fuel be added to the aircraft tanks. The calculated fuel burn for the proposed return flight to Kidston was approximately 240 litres. However, on DEPARTURE from Cairns it was estimated that only about 220 litres of fuel was in the aircraft tanks. Refuelling facilities were available at Kidston but no fuel was added to the aircraft tanks.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The aircraft design is such that the fuel quantity can only be determined by the gauge, unless the tanks are full.
2. The preflight preparation, in relation to fuel requirements, carried out by the pilot was inadequate.
3. The pilot lacked recent experience at more complex fuel calculations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402C in Bundaberg: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 21, 1987 at 0318 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-WBQ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bundaberg - Brisbane
MSN:
402C-0627
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The flight had been arranged to transport a critically injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot evidently experienced some difficulty in starting one of the engines. However, witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal as the aircraft commenced moving from the parking area. At 0310 hours the pilot contacted Brisbane Flight Service Unit and reported that the aircraft was taxying. He advised that he was in a hurry, and indicated that he would provide details of the flight after takeoff. Two minutes later he advised that takeoff was being commenced from Runway 14. No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was seen to become airborne and shortly afterwards enter a fog bank. Other witnesses subsequently reported hearing the sounds of an impact. The flight had been arranged to transport a critically injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot evidently experienced some difficulty in starting one of the engines. However, witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal as the aircraft commenced moving from the parking area. At 0310 hours the pilot contacted Brisbane Flight Service Unit and reported that the aircraft was taxying. He advised that he was in a hurry, and indicated that he would provide details of the flight after takeoff. Two minutes later he advised that takeoff was being commenced from Runway 14. No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was seen to become airborne and shortly afterwards enter a fog bank. Other witnesses subsequently reported hearing the sounds of an impact. The flight had been arranged to transport a critically injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot evidently experienced some difficulty in starting one of the engines. However, witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal as the aircraft commenced moving from the parking area. At 0310 hours the pilot contacted Brisbane Flight Service Unit and reported that the aircraft was taxying. He advised that he was in a hurry, and indicated that he would provide details of the flight after takeoff. Two minutes later he advised that takeoff was being commenced from Runway 14. No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was seen to become airborne and shortly afterwards enter a fog bank. Other witnesses subsequently reported hearing the sounds of an impact. The investigation revealed that the aircraft had collided with a tree 800 metres beyond the aerodrome boundary, while tracking about 10 degrees to the right of the extended centreline of the runway. It had then continued on the same heading until striking the ground 177 metres beyond the initial impact point. The wreckage was almost totally consumed by fire.
Probable cause:
The extensive fire damage hampered the investigation of the accident. The surviving passenger believed that the aircraft was on fire before the collision with the tree. No other evidence of an in-flight fire could be obtained, and it was considered possible that the survivor's recall of the accident sequence had been affected by the impact and the fire. Such discrepancies in recall are not uncommon among accident survivors. The elevator trim control jack was found to be in the full nose-down position, but it was not possible to establish whether the trim was in this position prior to impact. Such a pre-impact position could indicate either a runaway electric trim situation or that, in his hurry to depart, the pilot had not correctly set the trim for takeoff. The aircraft was known to have had an intermittent fault in the engine fire warning system. The fault apparently caused the fire warning light to illuminate, and the fire bell to sound, usually just after the aircraft became airborne. The pilot was aware of this fault. It was considered possible that, if the fault occurred on this occasion as the aircraft entered the fog shortly after liftoff, the pilot's attention may have been focussed temporarily on the task of cancelling the warnings. During this time he would not have been monitoring the primary flight attitude indicator, and would have had no external visual references. It was also possible that, if for some reason the pilot was not monitoring his flight instruments as the aircraft entered the fog, he suffered a form of spatial disorientation known as the somatogravic illusion. This illusion has been identified as a major factor in many similar accidents following night takeoffs. As an aircraft accelerates, the combination of the forces of acceleration and gravity induce a sensation that the aircraft is pitching nose-up. The typical reaction of the pilot is to counter this apparent pitch by gently applying forward elevator control, which can result in the aircraft descending into the ground. In this particular case, the pilot would probably have been more susceptible to disorientating effects, because he was suffering from a bronchial or influenzal infection. Although all of the above were possible explanations for the accident, there was insufficient evidence available to form a firm conclusion. The precise cause of the accident remains undetermined.
It is considered that some of the following factors may have been relevant to the development of the accident
1. The pilot was making a hurried DEPARTURE. It is possible that he did not correctly set the elevator trim and/or the engines may not have reached normal operating temperatures before the takeoff was commenced.
2. Shortly after liftoff the aircraft entered a fog bank, which would have deprived the pilot of external visual references.
3. The aircraft had a defective engine fire warning system. Had the system activated it may have distracted the pilot at a critical stage of flight.
4. The aircraft might have suffered an electric elevator trim malfunction, or an internal fire, leading to loss of control of the aircraft.
5. The pilot may have experienced the somatogravic illusion and inadvertently flown the aircraft into the ground. The chances of such an illusion occurring would have been increased because the pilot was evidently suffering from an infection.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Mount Dianne: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 2, 1987 at 0639 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-TLQ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cairns – Mount Dianne
MSN:
402B-1236
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft was the first of a group of four aircraft being used to return staff to an alluvial gold mine after a weekend break. The weather in the area of the destination was not suitable for a visual arrival and the aircraft was initially held for several minutes in an area five kilometres to the south of the strip, awaiting an improvement in the weather. The aircraft was then flown towards the strip and the pilot reported to a following aircraft that there had been a lot of rain and that the strip looked wet. He also advised that he intended to carry out a precautionary circuit and check if it was safe to land. No further transmissions were received from VH-TLQ. The wreckage of the aircraft was subsequently found burning in a river valley, 300 metres west of the threshold of runway 34. Surviving passengers stated that the aircraft struck trees shortly before impact. There were no ground witnesses. The aircraft had impacted the ground in a steep nose down left wing low attitude, at a low forward speed, then cartwheeled up rising ground before coming to rest inverted, 42 metres from the point of impact. The cabin area was destroyed by an ensuing fire.
Probable cause:
An inspection of wreckage did not reveal any mechanical defect or failure that could have contributed to the accident. The reasons for the apparent loss of control of the aircraft could not be determined.
Final Report: