Moscow oblast

The aircraft was parked on the apron at Moscow-Sheremetyevo Airport since two months as it was offered for sale and not in service anymore. In the afternoon, a fire erupted in the cockpit for unknown reasons. It took more than an hour to the fire brigade to extinguish the fire that destroyed all the cabin and the roof of the aircraft.

The crew departed Moscow-Sheremetyevo Airport on a positioning flight to Moscow-Vnukovo Airport. On approach by night, the crew configured the aircraft for landed when he realized that the right main gear remained stuck in its wheel well. The crew following a holding pattern and after the runway was covered with foam, he completed an emergency landing. After touchdown, the right wing contacted ground and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to marginal weather conditions. Rather than initiating a go-around procedure, the crew continued the descent when the aircraft crash landed to the right of runway 14R, in an area between the runway and the boundary fence. All 28 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from Naples-Capodichino Airport, the crew started the descent to Moscow. On approach to Vnukovo Airport Runway 09, while completing the approach checklist and configuring the aircraft for landing, the crew noticed that both main landing gears remained stuck in their wheel well while the nose gear was lock down properly. The crew abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around. During a holding circuit, the crew attempted to troubleshoot the system and to deploy both main gears manually without success. The crew eventually decided to complete the landing in such configuration. The aircraft landed on runway 01 with both main gears retracted and the nose gear down, slid for few dozen metres and came to a halt. All 11 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Approach was carried out on the runway 19 at Vnukovo Airport with length of 3060m. Pilot was performed by pilot in command (PIC). Before entering the glide path the aircraft was in landing configuration: with flaps deployed at 37°, slats - at 23 °, and the landing gear down. Decision height was calculated to be 60 m. Landing weight of the aircraft was approximately 67.5 tons, alignment ~26.5%, which did not exceed the limits specified by the flight operation manual (FOM). During flight preparation PIC determined the landing glide path speed as 210 km/h, and specified that the speed at least 230 km/h has to be maintained. Glideslope descent was made in director mode with automatic throttle disabled with an average instrument speed about 255 km/h vertical speed -3…-5 m/s. Descent was performed without significant deviations from the glide path. Flyby of the of the neighboring (to the runway) homing radio beacon was performed at the altitude 65…70 m. Runway threshold was passed at the altitude about 15 m and airspeed of 260 km/h. 5 seconds after the throttle control lever had been switched to the idle mode the aircraft landed at the speed about 230 km/h, distance from the runway threshold of 900-1000 m and left bank of 1... 1.5°, provided that the signal of the signal of left gear strut compression was produced. During aircraft landing the right side wind gust reached up to ~11.5 m/s. The maximum value of the vertical acceleration during touch down was recorded as 1.12g according to flight recorders (hereinafter - magnetic tape recorder). About 10 seconds had passed from the moment of passing 4 m height above ground and touchdown. 3 seconds after landing nose gear strut was compressed. At this stage the right gear strut compression signal had not yet been formed. Almost simultaneously with nose landing gear touchdown the crew moved thrust reverser lever in one motion to the "maximum reverse" position and applied mechanical brakes. Actuation of the reverse valves didn't occur. Air brakes and spoilers were not also activated automatically and the crew didn't make attempt to activate them manually. After thrust levers were moved to the "maximum reverse" position an increase of forward thrust (up to ~90% Nvd) was recorded with both engines. The pressure in the hydraulic system of wheel brakes of the left (compressed) landing gear was up to 50 kgf/сm², whereas there were no pressure in the wheel brakes of the right (not compressed) landing gear. The minimum airspeed to to which the aircraft slowed 7-8 seconds after landing was 200-205 km/h at ~0° pitch and roll of 1° to the left, after that the speed began to increase. 2 seconds after thrust levers were moved to the "maximum reverse" position the flight engineer reported that reversers had not been deployed. Thrust lever had been maintained in the "maximum reverse" position for about 8 seconds and was switched off after that. During this time the airspeed increased to 240 km/h. The increase in airspeed led to further unloading of the main landing gear. With fluctuations in roll (from 4.5° to the left to 2.6° to the right) compression was produced alternately on the left and right landing gear struts. Almost simultaneously sith the reversers being switched off the brake pedal was pushed by left-hand-seat pilot to 60°. As before the breaking was inefficient - hydraulic pressure in the wheel brake in only applied after sufficient compression of the gear strut. 5 seconds after reversers were deactivated, after words of the flight engineer "Turn on reverse! Reverse!" the control was moved to the "maximum reverse" position again. As in the first attempt the deployment of reversers didn't occur, both engines started to produce direct thrust (at Nvd ~ 84%). Aircraft braking didn't occur, airspeed was 230…240 km/h. In 4 seconds the reverse was switched off. At the moment of reverser reactivation the aircraft was at the distance of about 900...1000 m from the exit threshold. 6 seconds after reversers switch off the crew attempted to supply automatic braking as evidenced by the crew conversation and transient appearance of commands: "Automatic braking on" for the primary and backup subsystems. When the aircraft passed the exit threshold thrust levers were in the "small-reverse" position. The aircraft overrun occurred 32 seconds after landing, being almost on the axis of the runway, with an airspeed of about 215 km/h. In the process of overrun flight engineer by PIC command turned off the engines by means of emergency brakes. The aircraft continued to roll outside the runway slowly due to road bumps and snow cover. The compression on both landing gear struts occurred which led to activation of air brakes and spoilers. The aircraft collided with the slope of a ravine at the ground speed of about 190 km/h. Four stewardess were seriously injured while four other crew members were killed. The following day, one of the survivor died from her injuries.