Minnesota

On June 8, 2012, about 1307 central daylight time, a Piper PA-31-325, N174BH, departed from the South St Paul Municipal Airport-Richard E Fleming Field (SGS), South St Paul, Minnesota for a maintenance test flight. The airplane reportedly had one of its two engines replaced and the pilot was to fly for about 4 hours to break-in the engine. The airplane did not return from the flight and was reported overdue. The airplane is missing and is presumed to have crashed. The airline transport pilot has not been located. The airplane was registered to Family Celebrations LLC, and was operated as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed SGS with the intention of returning to SGS at the conclusion of the flight. The airplane was reported missing and an alert notification issued about 2225. The last reported contact with the airplane and pilot was about 1300 when the fixed base operator at SGS towed the airplane to the fuel pumps. When he returned about 15 minutes later, the airplane was no longer there. Aircraft radar track data from various ground based sources indicated that the airplane departed SGS about 1307. The airplane maneuvered east of SGS before turning toward the north. The airplane's track continued north toward Duluth, Minnesota. Once the airplane reached Duluth, it followed the west shoreline of Lake Superior. Radar track data indicated that the airplane was at a pressure altitude of 2,800 feet when it reached the shoreline. The airplane continued along the west shoreline toward Two Harbors, Minnesota, flying over the water while maintaining a distance of about 0.5 miles from the shore. As the airplane approached Two Harbors, it descended. The airplane's last recorded position at 1427 was about 30 miles northeast of Duluth, Minnesota, at an uncorrected pressure altitude of 1,600 feet. The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center coordinated a search for the missing airplane. The Civil Air Patrol, United States Coast Guard, and other entities participated in the search efforts. Search efforts were suspended on July 4, 2012.

After a night landing on runway 13 at Warroad Airport, the aircraft collided with a White-tailed deer. The crew was able to stop the aircraft that suffered structural damages to the left wing. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot reported that he performed a stabilized visual approach with a right crosswind. The airplane touched down on the centerline and subsequently drifted to the right. The pilot overcorrected for the drift and the airplane veered hard to the left. The airplane continued off the left side of the runway and skidded to a complete stop. The right main landing gear collapsed and the right wingtip hit the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and wing. A postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed no preimpact anomalies. The pilot additionally reported that there was no mechanical malfunction or failure.

About 20 minutes after departing on a cross-country flight, the pilot acknowledged the air traffic controller’s clearance to climb to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Radar data indicated that the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 16,800 feet msl. The airplane then entered a right descending turn followed by a left descending turn. While in the left turn, the pilot informed the controller, “I lost my autopilot; I’m in an unusual attitude.” The pilot stated this same information two more times in response to transmissions by the controller. The pilot’s last transmission was that he was busy trying to recover the airplane. Witnesses heard the airplane flying overhead for several minutes, but they could not see it due to the low ceiling. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any pre accident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the autopilot system revealed a loose screw inside the pitch servo housing. The screw was one of two that secured the high wattage resistor to the solenoid housing. Observed corrosion within the screw threads was consistent with the threads not being engaged in a nut or other internally threaded feature. No mechanical damage or arcing was visible on the screw. The operational impact of the loose screw is unknown. The pilot’s instrument flying proficiency could not be determined. According to log records, the pilot last flew 4.5 months before the accident. The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions when the pilot stated that he was trying to recover from the unusual attitude. The pilot did not follow prescribed procedures for an autopilot malfunction. Weather data indicates that the airplane most likely encountered turbulence and icing conditions during the flight; however, the airplane was equipped with an ice protection system. Although ethanol was found during the toxicology tests, the levels varied greatly among the tissue/fluid samples. The investigation was unable to determine if the presence of ethanol was from ingestion or from postmortem production or contamination. The detected level of diphenhydramine, an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine used to treat allergies, was above therapeutic levels and likely contributed to the pilot’s inability to recover from the unusual attitude.

The pilot purchased the airplane approximately one year prior to the accident with the intention of restoring it for flight. The airplane had not been flown for approximately five years and had been used for spare parts. The pilot was flying the airplane to another airport to pick up passengers prior to returning. The pilot was cleared for takeoff and to circle the airport at 2,500 feet prior to departing the area. Witnesses reported that after taking off the airplane seemed to “wobble” at a slow airspeed in a nose-high attitude and that it never got higher than 500 feet. Some witnesses reported the engine(s) sputtering, and another stated that the airplane was loud and "didn't sound good," although other witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal. One witness reported seeing white smoke coming from the left engine and hearing the engine "popping" as the airplane took off. The airplane made three left turns and it appeared as if the pilot was attempting to return to land. Witnesses described the left wing rising prior to the airplane banking hard to the left and the nose dropping straight down. The airplane impacted the ground just northeast of the airport property and a postimpact fire ensued. Flight control continuity was established. The right side of the elevator/tailcone structure exhibited black rub marks and scrapes. Grass and nesting material was found inside the left wing. The left fuel valve was found in the OFF position and the right fuel valve was positioned to the rear auxiliary tank. Neither the fuel crossfeed valve nor the fuel boost pump switch was located. The left engine sustained substantial fire and impact damage. The right engine sustained heavy impact damage. The airplane was last fueled one month prior to the accident with 120 gallons of fuel. About 20 engine test runs in addition to high-speed taxi tests had been conducted since then. A Special Flight Permit had been obtained but had not been signed by the mechanic, who did not know that the pilot was going to fly the airplane on the day of the accident. The pilot reportedly did not have any Beech 18 flight experience.

On July 31, 2008, about 0945 central daylight time, East Coast Jets flight 81, a BAe 125-800A airplane, registered N818MV, crashed while attempting to go around after landing on runway 30 at Owatonna Degner Regional Airport, Owatonna, Minnesota. The two pilots and six passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The nonscheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed and activated; however, it was canceled before the landing. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The airplane was destroyed on impact with terrain during a forced landing following an observed in-flight loss of engine power after takeoff. A witness observed the takeoff and stated that the airplane took off from the end of runway 34. About halfway down the runway the airplane emitted a sound like a rapid misfire, a pop, and then no more audible engine sounds. The airplane was about 300 to 400 feet above ground level at that point. He said that the airplane turned right then turned left to a bank where the wing was straight down. The airplane's wings then leveled, the airplane descended, and it impacted terrain. He stated that the time from the sounds to the impact was about two to three seconds. An on-scene examination revealed no airframe pre-impact anomalies. An engine examination revealed a cracked crankshaft propeller flange. The engine without the turbochargers and with the original crankshaft was test run up to 2,100 RPM. A propeller and governor inspection revealed no anomalies. Examination of the turbocharger system's exhaust bypass valve assembly revealed its butterfly valve was stuck (bound) in the extended closed position. The engine's cracked crankshaft was removed and a serviceable crankshaft was installed. The engine was test run again with a serviceable exhaust bypass valve assembly. The engine produced rated power. The original exhaust bypass valve assembly was reinstalled. The exhaust bypass valve assembly's wastegate bound again during an engine run and a loss of engine power was observed. Sectioning of the bypass valve assembly revealed a bent wastegate shaft. The valve assembly lever arm was bent and exhibited pre-impact tool marks consistent with pliers loosening a bound wastegate shaft. The airplane's pilot operating handbook and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved airplane flight manual (POH), in part, stated, "ENGINE POWER LOSS DURING TAKEOFF If sufficient runway remains for a normal landing, leave gear down and land straight ahead." The engine manufacturer's maintenance and operator's manual stated that the wastegate is required to be checked for operation and condition during 100 hour inspections. The manual did not specify a procedure for maintenance personnel on how to check the wastegate's operation and its acceptable condition. National Transportation Safety Board Recommendation A-94-081, issued to the FAA in 1994, stated, "Require the amendment of pilot operating handbooks and airplane flight manuals applicable to aircraft equipped with engine turbochargers by including in the 'Emergency Procedures' section information regarding turbocharger failure. The information should include procedures to minimize potential hazards relating to fire in flight and/or loss of engine power." The airplane's POH latest revision was dated October 14, 2002 and review of the emergency procedures section showed that the POH did not contain information, procedures, or amplified procedures on turbocharger failures. The airplane accumulated 8.7 hours of operation since the last annual inspection.

The DC-9 was taxiing to the gate area when it collided with a company A319 that was being pushed back from the gate. Prior to arriving at the destination airport, the DC-9 experienced a loss of hydraulic fluid from a fractured rudder shutoff valve located in the DC-9's right side hydraulic system. The left side hydraulic system had normal hydraulic pressure and quantity throughout the flight. The flightcrew elected to continue to the scheduled destination and declared an emergency while on approach to the destination airport. After landing, the emergency was negated by the flight crew and the airplane taxied to the gate. Flight data recorder information indicates the left engine, which provides power for the left hydraulic system, was shut down during taxi. The captain stated he did not remember shutting the left engine down, and that if he had, it would have been after clearing all runways. The first officer stated that he was unaware that the left engine was shut down. Upon arrival at the gate with the left engine shut down and no hydraulic pressure from the left system and a failure of the right hydraulic system, the airplane experienced a loss of steering and a loss of brakes. The flightcrew requested company maintenance to chock the airplane since they were unable to use brakes to stop the airplane. The crew said they were going to keep the "...engines running in case we have to use reversers..." The airplane began to roll forward and the captain applied reverse thrust but the reversers did not deploy. The airplane impacted the A319 with a speed of approximately 15.65 miles per hour to 16.34 miles per hour. Evacuation of the DC-9 was completed approximately 5:22 minutes after the collision and evacuation of the A319 occurred approximately 13:08 minutes after the collision. Examination of the left hydraulic system revealed no anomalies and examination of the right hydraulic system revealed a fractured rudder shutoff valve that displayed features consistent with fatigue. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer issued a service letter pertaining to the replacement of the rudder shutoff valve based upon reliability information that was reported to them. The number of reports was greater than that of the Federal Aviation Administration's Service Difficulty Reports database, and less than the operators records.