Alaska

The certificated airline transport pilot, with one non-revenue passenger, departed in the twin engine turboprop airplane from a rural airport on a CFR Part 135, VFR cargo flight over ocean waters. The flight did not reach its destination, and was reported overdue. Search personnel searched along the airplane's anticipated route of flight, over ocean waters. Shortly after initiation of the search, airborne search personnel reported sighting floating debris, consisting of what appeared to be aircraft seats, cardboard boxes, and small portions of aircraft wreckage, about 30.5 miles southwest of the flight's departure airport, and about 10 miles from shore. The airplane is presumed to have sunk in ocean waters estimated to be between 50 and 70 feet deep. Underwater search and recovery efforts were unsuccessful, and the airplane, pilot, and passenger remain missing. A review of archived radar data disclosed that as the accident airplane approached an area about 30.5 miles southwest of the departure airport, it descended to 500 feet msl, and then entered a right turn. As the turn progressed, the airplane continued to descend to 400 feet msl, with a radar-derived ground speed of 180 knots. The last radar return was recorded with the same radar-derived groundspeed, on an approximate heading of 200 degrees. A pilot who is familiar with geographical locations in the area reported that migrating whales are commonly sighted in the area where the radar depicted a descending right turn.

The private pilot departed on a cross-country personal flight with five passengers, en route to an Alaskan coastal community. The airplane had about 140 gallons of usable fuel aboard. The flight's intended destination was located about 757 nautical miles away. The pilot planned to make one stop in order to purchase fuel before continuing on to the destination airport. As the accident flight progressed towards the intended fuel stop airport, the pilot requested to continue on to another airport located about 100 miles away, and closer to the final destination airport. As the flight neared the second fuel stop airport, the pilot again made a request to the Air Traffic Control (ATC) specialist on duty, and said, in part: "I'm going to change my destination ah...one more time, this will be the final time..." The flight was then cleared to the pilot's intended destination airport. When the flight was about 22 miles southeast of the destination airport, the pilot informed the ATC specialist that he was concerned about his remaining fuel. He stated, in part: " ... I'm really low on fuel, and still 30 miles out." When asked by the ATC specialist how much fuel he had remaining, the pilot responded by saying: " Well... lets see, its very low... Below 5 gallons in both tanks." The ATC specialist then informed the pilot of an alternate airport that was located closer to the flight's present position, but the pilot was not familiar with the airport, and he elected to proceed on. Shortly thereafter, the pilot reported to the ATC specialist he was "...out of gas, both engines." The pilot selected a forced landing site located about 12 miles short of his intended destination airport, in open ocean waters. According to the two surviving passengers, after the collision with the water, all of the airplane's occupants lost consciousness momentarily. When the two survivors regained consciousness, there was about 2 feet of water in the airplane, and the airplane was sinking. The survivors said four of the six occupants successfully evacuated the airplane into the water. They added that the pilot was one of the four occupants who exited the sinking airplane. The two remaining occupants remained inside the airplane as it sank. The four survivors then began to swim to the closest shoreline, located about 1 mile from the accident site. During the swim to shore, the two surviving occupants became separated from the other two other occupants. To date, neither the two occupants who remained in the airplane, nor the pilot and the one occupant who were able to exit the airplane before it sank, have been located.

The pilot of the twin-engine accident airplane was on an IFR flight plan in instrument meteorological conditions when the right side nose baggage door opened. The pilot expressed concerns to air traffic control about baggage exiting the compartment and striking the right propeller. He requested a diversion to the nearest airport with an instrument approach. The flight was diverted as requested, and was cleared for a non precision instrument approach to a coastal airport adjacent to mountainous terrain. The flight was authorized to a lower altitude when established on the approach. A review of the radar track information disclosed that the pilot did not fly the published approach, but abbreviated the approach and turned the wrong direction, toward higher terrain, north of the approach course. The airplane was discovered in mountainous terrain, about 1,100 msl, and 1.5 miles north of the approach course. The crash path was initially at a shallow angle in the treetops, until the airplane struck larger trees. Post accident inspection of the airplane disclosed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical problems, other than the baggage door, which was still attached to the airplane.

The float-equipped airplane was in the traffic pattern to land at a seaplane base when the engine lost all power, and the pilot made an emergency landing in the backyard of a private residence. During the forced landing, the airplane struck trees and a railing on the deck of the residence, sustaining structural damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that he had the right wing fuel tank selected, and thought the tank was about 1/4 full. He indicated that when the engine lost power, he was too low and didn't have sufficient time or altitude to switch to the belly tank and restore power. Postaccident draining of the fuel tanks disclosed about 18 gallons of fuel in the belly tank, and about one quart in the right wing tank.

The airline transport certificated pilot departed from a paved runway for a short flight to a remote lake in an amphibious float-equipped airplane to deliver supplies to a client. The pilot reported that he was transporting several loads of equipment to the lake, and failed to visually check the gear position while looking for a new unloading area. He also indicated that he was distracted when he had to reset the flaps, and by a minor malfunction with the airplane's GPS receiver. He said he forgot to raise the landing gear wheels, and landed on the lake with the wheels extended. During the landing touchdown on the lake, the airplane nosed over and received damage to the left wing and fuselage. The airplane is equipped with floats that have landing gear position lights installed on the instrument panel. The airplane also has a mirror enabling the pilot to visually observe the landing gear position.

Prior to departing on an air taxi flight, the airline transport certificated pilot obtained a weather briefing and filed a VFR flight plan for a trip from his home base, to several remote villages, and return. The area forecast contained an AIRMET for IFR conditions and mountain obscuration due to clouds and light snow. The terminal forecast contained expected conditions that included visibilities ranging from 3 to 3/4 mile in blowing snow, a vertical visibility of 500 feet, and wind speeds from 14 to 22 knots. During the filling of the flight plan, an FAA flight service station specialist advised that VFR flight was not recommended. The pilot acknowledged the weather information and departed. When the pilot took off on the return flight from an airport 128 miles east of his home base, the pilot reported that the visibility at his base was greater than 6 miles. As he neared his home base, the visibility had decreased and other pilots in the area were requesting special VFR clearances into the Class E surface area. The pilot requested a special VFR clearance at 1441, but had to hold outside the surface area for other VFR and IFR traffic. At 1453, a METAR at the airport included a wind 080 of 26 knots, and a visibility of 1 mile in blowing snow. While holding about 7 miles north of the airport, the pilot provided a pilot report that included deteriorating weather conditions east of the airport. Once the pilot was cleared to enter the surface area at 1458, he was provided with an airport advisory that included wind conditions of 25 knots, gusting to 33 knots. While the pilot was maneuvering for the approach, a special aviation weather observation at 1501 included a wind condition of 26 knots, and a visibility of 3/4 mile in blowing snow. The pilot said he established a GPS waypoint 4 miles from the runway and descended to 1,000 feet. He continued inbound and descended to 300 feet. At 1 mile from the airport, the pilot said he looked up from the instrument panel but could not see the airport. He also stated that he was in a whiteout condition. The airplane collided with the snow-covered sea ice, about 1 mile from the approach end of the runway threshold at 1504.

The commercial certificated pilot reported that just after takeoff in a wheel/ski equipped airplane, he heard a very loud bang, followed by a loud rattling noise. As he turned towards the departure airstrip, he had difficulty using the airplane's rudder pedals. Using a combination of aileron input and the remaining amount of rudder control, he was able to maneuver the airplane for a landing on the airstrip. He said that as the airplane passed over the approach end of the airstrip, it drifted to the right, and he initiated a go-around. The airplane subsequently collided with a stand of trees bordering the airstrip, and sustained structural damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. In a written statement to the NTSB, the pilot stated that he suspected that the right elevator's outboard and center hinges or hinge pins failed, allowing the right elevator to swing rearward and jam the airplane's rudder. An FAA airworthiness inspector traveled to the accident scene to examine the airplane. He reported that the right elevator was discovered about 150 feet behind the airplane, within the wreckage debris path through a stand of trees. He said that the right elevator sustained a significant amount of damage along the leading edge, which would normally be protected by the horizontal stabilizer. The FAA inspector examined the airplane's horizontal stabilizer in the area where the right and left elevators connect, and noted signs of new paint on the rivets that held the torque tube support assembly, indicating recent reinstallation or replacement of the torque tube support assembly. He indicated that the torque tube support assembly was installed at a slight angle to the right, which allowed the right elevator to eventually slip off of the center and outboard hinge pins. The inspector said that witness marks on the center and outboard hinge pins showed signs of excessive wear towards the outboard portion of each pin. The inspector noted that a review of the airplane's maintenance records failed to disclose any entries of repair/replacement of the elevator torque tube support assembly.

The commercial pilot was positioning the airplane from the departure airport to another airport. The flight took place on a dark night with overcast skies, and no discernible horizon. The pilot departed and climbed to a cruise altitude between 1,200 and 1,400 feet msl. About 4 miles south of the departure airport, the airplane collided with an east-west ridge at 1,200 feet msl. The ridgeline is perpendicular to the direct route of flight between the departure and destination airports, and rises from west to east with a summit elevation of 1,714 feet msl. The departure airport was a newly commissioned airport 3 miles east-northeast of the old airport. The accident flight was the pilot's second trip to the new airport, and his first night departure from either the old or new airport. Direct flight from the new airport to the destination airport requires a higher altitude to clear the ridgeline than does a direct flight from the old airport. A direct flight from the old airport crosses the same ridgeline farther to the west, where the elevation of the ridge is less than 500 feet msl.

The amphibious float-equipped airplane was returning to a lodge located on a remote lake after picking up supplies. The airplane departed from a paved runway on an airport. En route to the destination lake, the pilot noted the airplane would not attain its normal cruise airspeed and attitude. Believing the airplane was tail heavy, the pilot asked the aft cabin passenger to move forward. Upon touchdown on the lake, the airplane nosed down into the water. As the airplane nosed down, the supplies, which were not secured in the aft cabin, came forward, and pinned the pilot and front seat passenger against the instrument panel. The passenger in the aft cabin lifted as many of the supplies off the pilot and front seat passenger as he could, before he had to exit the sinking airplane. Both the pilot and front seat passenger exited the submerged airplane under their own power, but the pilot did not reach the surface. An autopsy of the pilot disclosed that he had drowned. A postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed the wheels had not been retracted after takeoff on the runway, consequently the airplane landed on the lake with the wheels fully extended. The front seat passenger said that the pilot did not use a checklist prior to landing.