Alaska

The commercial pilot of the float-equipped airplane was transporting passengers to a lodge at a remote lake. When the airplane did not arrive at the lake, a search was initiated, and two days later the wreckage of the airplane was located on the side of a box canyon about the 2,400 foot elevation level. The canyon is oriented approximately east-west, and the wreckage was distributed along a 100 foot debris field on the north flank of the canyon. Ground scars and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane impacting terrain in a steep left bank while executing a turn to reverse direction. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies was discovered.

The certificated airline transport pilot was departing on a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The purpose of the flight was to deliver a load of wooden roofing shakes to a friend's remote lodge. Witnesses reported that just after takeoff, as the airplane climbed to about 200 to 300 feet above the ground, the airplane abruptly pitched up about 70 degrees, and drifted to the right. The airplane continued to turn to the right as the nose of the airplane lowered momentarily. As the airplane flew very slowly the landing gear was extended. The nose of the airplane pitched up again, the right wing dropped, and the airplane descended. One witness described the descent as: "The wings rocked back and forth as it descended, like a card in the wind, with the nose of the airplane slightly higher." The airplane impacted shallow water in an area of tidal mud flats. A postaccident investigation revealed that the estimated gross weight of the airplane at takeoff was 11,500.8 pounds, 1,400.8 pounds in excess of the airplane's maximum takeoff gross weight. The airplane's center of gravity could not be calculated due to the fact that the exact location/station of the cargo could not be determined. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies.

The captain and first officer were conducting a localizer DME back course approach to runway 36 in a twin-engine turboprop airplane during a night cargo flight under IFR conditions. The minimum visibility for the approach was one mile, and the minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 460 feet msl (338 feet agl). Prior to leaving their cruise altitude, the first officer listened to the ATIS information which included an altimeter setting of 29.30 inHg. No other altimeter information was received until the crew reported they were inbound on the approach. At that time, tower personnel told the crew that the visibility was one mile in light snow, the wind was from 040 degrees at 22 knots, and the altimeter setting was 29.22 inHg. The crew did not reset the airplane altimeters from 29.30 to 29.22. At the final approach fix (5 miles from the runway), the captain began a descent to the MDA. Thirty-six seconds before impact, the first officer cautioned the captain about the airplane's high airspeed. Due to strong crosswinds, the captain disconnected the autopilot 22 seconds before impact. He said he pushed the altitude hold feature on the flight director at the MDA. Eighteen seconds before impact, the airplane leveled off about 471 feet indicated altitude, but then descended again 9 seconds later. The descent continued until the airplane collided with the ground, 3.5 miles from the runway. The crew said that neither the airport, or the snow-covered terrain, was observed before impact. The crew reported that the landing lights were off. The airplane was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system.

The airplane was parked outside on the ramp the night before the accident and was subjected to rain, snow, and temperatures that dropped below 32 degrees F. Other pilots whose airplanes were also parked outside overnight stated that about 1/4 to 1/2 inch of snow/frost covered a layer of ice on their airplanes the morning of the accident. Because of these conditions, ramp personnel deiced the accident airplane with a heated mixture of glycol and water. The PenAir ramp supervisor who conducted the deicing stated that he believed the upper surface of the wing was clear of ice but that he did not physically touch the wing to check for the presence of ice. Investigators were unable to determine whether the accident pilot visually or physically checked the wing and tail surfaces for contamination after the accident airplane was deiced. However, the airplane's high-wing configuration would have hindered the pilot's ability to see residual clear ice on the surface of the wing after the deicing procedures. Company records indicate that the certificated commercial pilot completed his initial CE-208 flight training 2 months before the accident and had accumulated a total of 74 hours in this make and model of airplane. The airplane, with the pilot and nine passengers onboard, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 01. A witness observed that the airplane's flight appeared to be normal until the airplane suddenly pitched up, rolled 90 degrees to the left, and yawed to the left. The airplane then descended nose-down until it disappeared from view. Data from the engine monitoring system revealed that the maximum altitude obtained during the accident flight was about 651 feet mean sea level. The airplane crashed in a level attitude. Investigators found no evidence of pre-impact failures in the structure, flight control systems, or instruments. Further, examination of the engine and propeller revealed no pre-impact failures and that the engine was running when the airplane hit the ground.

The crew was conducting a GPS instrument approach in a Douglas DC-6B airplane under IFR conditions. Both pilots were certificated and type-rated in the Douglas DC-6B airplane. The first pilot, seated in the right seat, was one of the company's senior check airman, and possessed a right seat dependency endorsement. The second pilot, seated in the left seat, had less experience in the DC-6B airplane. It had been previously agreed that the second pilot would fly the leg of the flight on which the accident occurred. The first pilot reported that light snow showers were present, with visibility reported at 4 miles. During final approach as the airplane passed over the airstrip threshold, a higher than normal sink rate was encountered. He said that the initial touchdown was "firm," but was thought to be within acceptable tolerances. Just after touchdown, the left wing broke free from the airplane at the wing to fuselage attach point. The airplane veered to the left, continued off the left side of the 5,000 feet long by 75 feet runway, down an embankment, and came to rest in an area of wet, tundra covered terrain. A postcrash fire heavily damaging the center section of the fuselage. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed that as the airplane progressed along the approach, the first pilot says: "You're only one mile from it....Take it on down ah three." As the airplane passes over the runway threshold, the first pilot says: "Keep that, keep that (expletive) power off.... Just push forward on the nose." The sound of impact is heard 4 seconds later. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach is 400 feet msl (383 feet agl). A contract weather observer reported lower ceilings, with about 1 mile visibility, over the approach end of the runway at the same time as the accident.

The captain and the first officer were landing a short takeoff and landing (STOL) cargo airplane on a private, dirt and gravel surface runway. The airplane was configured for landing with 40 degrees of flaps. During the landing approach, variations in indicated airspeed and ground speed indicated windshear conditions. About 100 to 200 feet above the ground, the airplane encountered a downdraft and began to drift to the right of the runway centerline. The captain said she increased engine power and applied full left aileron and rudder, but could not gain directional or pitch control of the airplane. The right wing struck trees, short of the runway threshold, increasing the airplane's right yaw. The captain said that as the airplane neared the ground, she pulled the engine throttles off. The airplane struck the ground with the right main landing gear and right front portion of the fuselage. The airplane then pivoted to the right, 180 degrees from the approach heading. The owner of the airport reported that wind conditions from the east may produce downdrafts in the area of runway 05. He indicated that at the time of the accident, the wind was blowing from the east about 15 knots. The first officer reported the captain appeared to be attempting to maintain a stabilized approach angle by varying the pitch attitude of the airplane. A review of company training literature revealed that the airplane is especially sensitive to slight wind shear, and wind gusts as low as 5 knots when operating at low airspeeds. Pilots are cautioned that when flying the aircraft at low speeds, a large application of the aileron control may be required to maintain wings level. During gusty wind conditions, the threshold airspeed should be increased by one-half the gust factor, and any lateral displacement should be corrected rapidly. If a wing is allowed to drop beyond corrective action of full aileron, power should be increased immediately to regain level flight.