Alabama

The pilot was taking the airplane on a flight to another airport for maintenance. During the preflight inspection, the pilot turned on the electrical power and noticed that the fuel gauge was indicating 80 gallons of fuel. The pilot reported the airplane holds a maximum of 156 gallons of fuel and he calculated that he needed 113 gallons of fuel to legally complete the flight. He informed the fixed base operator (FBO) that he wanted the fuel tanks topped off, but was informed by the ramp technician that the fuel tanks were full and he did not need fuel. The pilot went back to the airplane and removed the fuel cap. He noticed fuel in the filler neck and assumed the fuel tanks were full. He did not push open the anti-siphon fuel valve to see if the tanks were full or if residual fuel was pooled on top of the anti-siphon fuel valve. When the pilot started the engines, he noticed the fuel gauge was flickering and thought it was malfunctioning. He proceeded to depart for the maintenance base. After about 2 hours of flight time both engines lost power. Unable to reach the closest airport, the pilot executed an off field landing in a cotton field. After landing, the airplane rolled into the trees and the left wing separated from the fuselage. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. According to the fueler at the FBO, she drove out to the airplane to fuel it on the morning of the accident and, after removing the single fuel cap, saw fuel on top of the anti-siphon valve. She used her finger to push down the valve and felt fuel, so she believed the airplane was full of fuel and it did not need additional fuel. Both wing fuel bladders were breached during the accident and a minor amount of fuel was leaked onto the ground. Personnel from the company who recovered the wreckage stated that there was no fuel in the fuel tanks when the airplane was recovered. The fuel quantity transmitter was sent to the manufacturer for examination. Testing of the transmitter revealed no anomalies with the unit. Based on this information, it is likely that the pilot erred in his assessment of the airplane’s fuel quantity prior to departing on the accident flight and that the available quantity of fuel was exhausted, which resulted in the total loss of engine power and the subsequent forced landing.

The private pilot and five passengers departed on a day instrument flight rules cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane. Before departure, the airplane was serviced to capacity with fuel, which corresponded to an endurance of about 5 hours. About 1 hour 45 minutes after reaching the flight's cruise altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported a failure of the right engine fuel pump and requested to divert to the nearest airport. About 7 minutes later, the pilot reported that he "lost both fuel pumps" and stated that the airplane had no engine power. The pilot continued toward the diversion airport and the airplane descended until it impacted trees about 1,650 ft short of the approach end of the runway; a postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The propellers of both engines were found in the unfeathered position. All six of the fuel pumps on the airplane were functionally tested or disassembled, and none exhibited any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. Corrosion was noted in the right fuel boost pump, which was likely the result of water contamination during firefighting efforts by first responders. The airplane was equipped with 4 fuel tanks, comprising an outboard and an inboard fuel tank in each wing. The left and right engine fuel selector valves and corresponding fuel selector handles were found in the outboard tank positions. Given the airplane's fuel state upon departure and review of fuel consumption notes in the flight log from the day of the accident, the airplane's outboard tanks contained sufficient fuel for about 1 hour 45 minutes of flight, which corresponds to when the pilot first reported a fuel pump anomaly to air traffic control. The data downloaded from the engine data monitor was consistent with both engines losing fuel pressure due to fuel starvation. According to the pilot's operating handbook, after reaching cruise flight, fuel should be consumed from the outboard tanks before switching to the inboard tanks. Two fuel quantity gauges were located in the cockpit overhead switch panel to help identify when the pilot should return the fuel selectors from the outboard fuel tanks to the inboard fuel tanks. A flight instructor who previously flew with the pilot stated that this was their normal practice. He also stated that the pilot had not received any training in the accident airplane to include single engine operations and emergency procedures. It is likely that the pilot failed to return the fuel selectors from the outboard to the inboard tank positions once the outboard tanks were exhausted of fuel; however, the pilot misdiagnosed the situation as a fuel pump anomaly.

The private pilot of the twin-engine airplane departed on the personal flight. During the takeoff roll, all indications were normal. When the airplane accelerated to between 75 and 80 knots, the pilot pulled back on the yoke slowly, and the airplane began to climb. After he raised the landing gear, the pilot noticed that the airplane was not continuing to climb and that the airspeed was 80 knots; he then heard the stall warning horn. The airplane impacted trees about 1/4 mile from the runway, caught fire, and was destroyed; the pilot egressed with minor injuries. The airplane's published minimum control speed was 86 knots and the break ground and climb speed was 106 knots. Given that information, it is likely that the pilot's attempt to rotate and climb the airplane below 80 knots resulted in the airplane being unable to gain altitude and climb above trees at the end of the runway.

A pilot proficiency examiner (PPE) was using the airplane to conduct a pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency check for two company pilots. Before the accident flight, one of the two company pilots on board received a PIC proficiency check, which terminated with a full-stop landing and reverse thrust application; no discrepancies with either thrust reverser were discussed by either flight crewmember. The pilot being examined then left the cockpit, and the accident pilot positioned himself in the left front seat while the PPE remained in the right front seat. The flight crew then taxied to the approach end of the runway to begin another flight. Data from the enhanced ground proximity system (EGPWS) revealed that, the flight began the takeoff roll with the flaps retracted, the thrust reversers armed, and both engines stabilized at 96 percent N2. About 2 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the "V1" call while on the airplane was on the runway; acoustic analysis indicated that the N2 speed of one engine, likely the right, decreased; the N2 speed of the other engine remained constant. This decrease in N2 speed was consistent with the PPE retarding right engine thrust to flight idle with the intent of simulating an engine failure. The takeoff continued, and, while the airplane was in a wings-level climb at an airspeed of 148 knots about 18 ft radar altitude, the CVR recorded the pilot command that the landing gear be retracted. The landing gear remained extended, and, about 1 second after the command to retract the landing gear, or about 3 seconds after becoming airborne, while about 33 ft above the runway and at the highest recorded airspeed of 149 knots, the CVR recorded the beginning of a rattling sound, which was consistent with the deployment of the right thrust reverser, and it continued to the end of the recording. About 1.5 seconds after the rattling sound began, the CVR recorded the PPE asking, "…what happened," which indicates that the deployment was likely not annunciated in the cockpit. The right engine N2 speed continued to gradually decrease, and the airplane rolled slightly left, back to a wings-level position. The airplane continued climbing with the landing gear extended as pitch changes continued to occur. During this time, the flight crew exchanged comments about their lack of understanding about what was occurring. While flying 10 knots above V2 speed with the left engine N2 speed remaining steady and the right engine N2 speed decreasing at a slightly greater rate than previously, the airplane began a right roll with a corresponding steady decrease in airspeed from about 144 knots. About 9 seconds after the original call to retract the landing gear, the CVR recorded the PPE requesting that the landing gear be retracted, which occurred 1 second later. The airplane then continued in the right turn with the airspeed steadily decreasing, and about 11 seconds after the PPE asked "…what happened", the EGPWS sounded a bank angle alert. At that time, the airplane was in a right roll of about 30 degrees, and the airspeed was about 132 knots. The right roll continued to a maximum value of about 39 degrees, which was the last valid bank angle value recorded. The airplane impacted the ground off the right side of the runway in a nose- and right-winglow attitude. The landing gear and flaps were retracted, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw; nor was there any evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of either engine. A definitive reason for the deployment of the right thrust reverser could not be determined. No previous instances of inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment were documented by the operator of the accident airplane or by the airframe manufacturer for the accident airplane make and model. Certification flight testing of an airplane with the same thrust reverser system determined that the airplane remained controllable with the right thrust reverser deployed and throttle retarder system functioning. The flight testing also included application of a momentary, peak burst of right engine thrust, again with no controllability issues noted. It was also noted that with the installed throttle retarder system, in the event of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, that the engine's thrust should have been reduced to idle within 4 to 8 seconds. Acoustic analysis of the accident flight indicated that the lowest recorded N2 rpm value was about 84 percent and that the reduction in rpm occurred over a period of about 8.5 seconds, after the right thrust reverser deployed. No determination could be made as to why the throttle retarder system did not reduce the right engine thrust to flight idle as designed. Additionally, no determination could be made as to why the flight crew was not able to maintain directional control of the airplane following deployment of the right thrust reverser. Although the PPE had severe coronary artery disease, which placed him at risk for an acute coronary event that would cause symptoms like chest pain, shortness of breath, or sudden unconsciousness, the CVR recorded no evidence of impairment. Neither the heart disease nor the medications he was taking to treat it would have impaired his judgement or physical functioning. Therefore, it is unlikely any medical condition or substance contributed to the PPE's actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that any medical condition would have impaired judgement or physical functioning of the pilot being examined.

On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), UPS flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer non precision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time. A notice to airmen in effect at the time of the accident indicated that runway 06/24, the longest runway available at the airport and the one with a precision approach, would be closed from 0400 to 0500 CDT. Because the flight's scheduled arrival time was 0451, only the shorter runway 18 with a non precision approach was available to the crew. Forecasted weather at BHM indicated that the low ceilings upon arrival required an alternate airport, but the dispatcher did not discuss the low ceilings, the single-approach option to the airport, or the reopening of runway 06/24 about 0500 with the flight crew. Further, during the flight, information about variable ceilings at the airport was not provided to the flight crew.

The multi-engine airplane was in cruise flight at flight level 210 when the pilot declared an emergency due to a rough-running right engine and diverted to a non-towered airport about 10 miles from the airplane’s position. About 4 minutes later, the pilot reported that he had shut down the right engine. The pilot orbited around the diversion airport during the descent and reported to an air traffic controller that he did not believe he would require any assistance after landing. The airplane initially approached the airport while descending through about 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and circled above the airport before entering a left traffic pattern approach for runway 22. About 7,000 feet msl, the airplane was about 2.5 miles northeast of the airport. The airplane descended through 2,300 feet msl when it was abeam the runway threshold on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. According to the airplane information manual, procedures for landing with an inoperative engine call for “excessive altitude;” however, the airplane's last radar return showed the airplane at an altitude of 700 feet msl (about 600 feet above ground level) and about 3 miles from the approach end of the runway. The airplane was configured for a single-engine landing and was likely on or turning to the final approach course when it rolled and impacted trees. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 0.8 miles north of the runway threshold, inverted, in a flat attitude with no longitudinal deformation. A majority of the airplane, including the cockpit, main cabin, and left wing, were consumed by a postcrash fire. Search operations located the airplane about 6 hours after its expected arrival time. Due to the severity of the postcrash fire, occupant survivability after the impact could not be determined. Examination of the airframe, the left engine, and both propellers did not reveal any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation revealed that the right engine failed when the camshaft stopped rotating after the camshaft gear experienced a fatigue fracture on one of its gear teeth. The remaining gear teeth were fractured in overstress and/or were crushed due to interference contact with the crankshaft gear. Spalling observed on an intact gear tooth suggested abnormal loading of the camshaft gear; however, the origin of the abnormal loading could not be determined.

According to the pilot, during cruise flight the engine began to run rough and lose power. He heard a loud metallic sound; the engine vibrated violently and then lost power. He performed a forced landing to a farm field, and the airplane nosed over in the soft terrain, resulting in substantial damage to the wings. A postaccident inspection revealed that the crankshaft would not rotate. An internal inspection of the cylinders and spark plugs did not reveal a reason for the power loss. The oil system was examined and there were large amounts of metal particles in the oil. Due to a lack of suitable equipment and facilities, further disassembly of the engine was not attempted.

The multiengine airplane was at an altitude of 6,000 feet when it experienced a catastrophic right engine failure, approximately 15 minutes after takeoff. The pilot elected to return to his departure airport, which was 30 miles away, instead of diverting to a suitable airport that was located about 10 miles away. The pilot reported that he was not able to maintain altitude and the airplane descended until it struck trees and impacted the ground, approximately 3 miles from the departure airport. The majority of the wreckage was consumed by fire. A 5 1/2 by 6-inch hole was observed in the top right portion of the crankcase. Examination of the right engine revealed that the No. 2 cylinder separated from the crankcase in flight. Two No. 2 cylinder studs were found to have fatigue fractures consistent with insufficient preload on their respective bolts. In addition, a fatigue fracture was observed on a portion of the right side of the crankcase, mostly perpendicular to the threaded bore of the cylinder stud. The rear top 3/8-inch and the front top 1/2-inch cylinder hold-down studs for the No. 2 cylinder exceeded the manufacturer's specified length from the case deck by .085 and .111 inches, respectively. The airplane had been operated for about 50 hours since its most recent annual inspection, which was performed about 8 months prior the accident. The right engine had been operated for about 1,425 hours since it was overhauled, and about 455 hours since the No. 2 cylinder was removed for the replacement of six cylinder studs. It was not clear why the pilot was unable to maintain altitude after the right engine failure; however, the airplane was easily capable of reaching an alternate airport had the pilot elected not to return to his departure airport.

The pilot obtained a weather briefing from an Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) and filed an IFR flight plan before departing on an IFR flight from Cornelia, Georgia, to Pensacola, Florida, on May 10, 2006.The flight service specialist provided information on a line of embedded thunderstorm activity along the route from Atlanta to Mobile including SIGMETs and advised that tops were forecasted to be at 41,000 to 50,000 feet. The specialist suggested that the pilot not depart immediately because of the weather, but said that it might be possible to land at an intermediate stop ahead of the weather, possibly in Pensacola or further north in the Crestview area. The pilot filed an IFR flight plan from Cornelia to Pensacola at 16,000 feet. The pilot called the AFSS again and requested an IFR clearance. The specialist responded that the clearance was on request, and that he would work on the void time and placed the pilot on hold. The specialist obtained the clearance from Atlanta Center and returned back to provide the clearance to the pilot. The pilot was not on the telephone line. The pilot departed Cornelia without an IFR clearance and contacted Atlanta Center. The controller informed the pilot on initial contact that he was not on his assigned heading, altitude, correct transponder code, and subsequently handed the pilot off to another controller. The flight was subsequently cleared direct to Panama City, Florida, and the pilot was instructed to climb to 16,000 feet. Atlanta Center broadcasted weather alerts over the radio frequency the pilot was on for Center Weather Advisory 101, SIGMETS 73C, 74C,and AIRMET Sierra between 0903 to 0913 CDT. The National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center, issued Severe Thunderstorm Watch 329 valid from 0635 CDT until 1300 CDT. The National Weather Service Aviation Weather Center issued Convective SIGMET 73C valid from 0855 CDT until 1055 CDT. The SIGMET was for a line of thunderstorms 40 nautical miles wide, and moving from 280 degrees at 35 knots. The tops of the thunderstorms were at 44,000 feet, with 2-inch hail, and possible wind gusts up to 60 knots. These weather alerts included the route of flight for the accident airplane. The controllers did not issue the pilot with severe radar-depicted weather information that was displayed on the controller's radar display. The airplane was observed on radar level at 16,000 feet at 09:19:48 CDT heading southwest. The airplane was observed to began a continuous left turn northwest bound at 15,700 feet at 09:20:38. The pilot called Atlanta center at 09:20:48 CDT and stated, "Aero Star six eight triple nine we're going to make a reverse." and there was no further radio contact with the pilot. The last radar return was at 09:20:59. The airplane was at 15, 600 feet. The wreckage was located on May 11, 2006. Examination of the wreckage revealed the right wing separated 9 feet 2 inches outboard of the wing root. The separated outboard section of the right wing was not recovered. The components were forwarded to the NTSB Laboratory for further examination. Examination of the components revealed the deformation patterns found on the fracture surfaces were consistent with upward bending overstress of the right wing.

Shortly after liftoff, about 20 feet above the ground, the pilot noticed a drop in the right engine manifold pressure. As the airplane began a right roll, efforts by the pilot to arrest the roll failed. When the pilot decided to put the airplane back on the ground, the right wing collided with the ground, the airplane cart wheeled and came to rest on its belly and burst into flames. Examination of the wreckage site revealed the aircraft located approximately 200 feet on the northwest side of the runway 22 centerline. The left fuel tank was ruptured and the left side of the airplane was fire damaged. Both occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.