Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Sainte-Radegonde

Date & Time: Mar 29, 2013 at 1250 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90KH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bordeaux – Bergerac
MSN:
LJ-542
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2640
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Circumstances:
The pilot and two passengers departed Sarlat-Domme Airport for a training mission over the region of Bordeaux. A precision approach was completed at Bordeaux-Mérignac Airport followed by a go-around procedure. The IFR flight plan was closed and the pilot continued under VFR mode to Bordeaux-Léognan-Saucats Aerodrome where he landed. A passenger deplaned, the engine remained running and the aircraft took off few minutes later to Bergerac where a refueling was planned. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 2,000 feet, both engines failed. The pilot reduced his altitude, selected gear down and attempted and emergency landing in a vineyard. Upon landing, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of both engines in flight due to fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the pilot took off with 800 lbs of fuel on board, thinking having enough fuel for an hour and a half flight which corresponds to an autonomy with 800 liters. In such conditions, the fuel quantity was not sufficient to complete the flight and there were no required reserves. It is believed that the double engine failure was caused by the fact that the pilot mistook pounds for liters (livres - litres in French). The lack of a preflight visual check of the fuel gauges could did not allow the pilot to notice his mistake.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Knyazhyn

Date & Time: Feb 7, 2013 at 1210 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-54853
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Ozeryany – Gardychyvka
MSN:
1G184-60
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
7843
Aircraft flight cycles:
35664
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, departed Ozeryany on a private flight to Gardychyvka. En route, weather conditions deteriorated with low clouds and fog. The pilot decided to continue and reduced his altitude to maintain a visual contact with the ground when the aircraft struck the ground and crashed in a snow covered field. The pilot was seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The documentation was incomplete as there was no insurance certificat on board, no flying permit and no CofA,
- The flight was completed with one pilot only, without any copilot,
- The pilot failed to inform ATC and the Ukraine Army about the flight and did not receive any permission to perform the flight,
- When weather conditions worsened and the visibility dropped below minimums, the pilot failed to return or to divert to the alternate airport, continued and reduced his altitude until the aircraft impacted ground,
- Weather information obtain by the pilot prior to the flight did not correspond to the actual and forecaster weather at the time of departure,
- The operation of the aircraft with the ASh-62IR engine (s/n K1641652 was prohibited.

Crash of a Beechcraft King Air C90A in Cândido Mota: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 3, 2013 at 2030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PP-AJV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Maringá – São Paulo
MSN:
LJ-1647
YOM:
2001
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total hours on type:
441.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3137
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Maringá Airport at 1837LT on a flight to São Paulo, carrying four passengers and one pilot. 35 minutes into the flight, about five minutes after he reached its assigned altitude of 21,000 feet, the aircraft stalled and entered an uncontrolled descent. The pilot was unable to regain control, the aircraft partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a flat attitude in a field. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The lack of a prompt identification of the aircraft stall by the captain may have deprived him of handling the controls in accordance with the prescriptions of the aircraft emergency procedures, contributing to the aircraft entry in an abnormal attitude.
- The captain’s attention was focused on the passengers sitting in the rear seats, in detriment of the flight conditions under which the aircraft was flying. This had a direct influence on the maintenance of a poor situational awareness, which may have made it difficult for the captain to immediately identify that the aircraft was stalling.
- There was complacency when the copilot functions were assumed by a person lacking due professional formation and qualification for such. Even under an adverse condition, the prescribed procedure was not performed, namely, the use of the aircraft checklist.
- The fact that the aircraft was flying under icing conditions was confirmed by a statement of the female passenger in the cockpit (CVR). The FL210 (selected and maintained by the captain) gave rise to conditions favorable to severe icing on the aircraft structure. If the prevailing weather conditions are correlated with reduction of speed (attested by the radar rerun), the connection between loss of control in flight and degraded aircraft performance is duly established.
- The rotation of the aircraft after stalling may have contributed to the loss of references of the captain’s balance organs (vestibular system), making it impossible for him to associate the side of the turn made by the aircraft with the necessary corrective actions.
- The non-adherence to the aircraft checklists on the part of the captain, in addition to the deliberate adoption of non-prescribed procedures (disarmament of the starter and “seven killers”) raised doubts on the quality of the instruction delivered by the captain.
- The captain made an inappropriate flight level selection for his flight destined for São Paulo. Even after a higher flight level was offered to him, he decided to maintain FL 210. Also, after being informed about icing on the aircraft, he did not activate the Ice Protection System, as is expressly determined by the flight manual.
- The captain had the habit of making use of a checklist not prescribed for the aircraft, and this may have influenced his actions in response to the situation he was experiencing in flight.
- His recently earned technical qualification in the aircraft type; his inattention and distraction in flight; his attitude of non-compliance with operations and procedures prescribed in manuals; all of this contributed to the captain’s poor situational awareness.
- The flight plan was submitted via telephone. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the captain’s level of awareness of the real conditions along the route, since he did not report to the AIS office in SBMG. In any event, the selection of a freezing level for the flight, considering that the front was moving along the same proposed route, was indication of inappropriate planning.
- The investigation could neither determine the whole experience of the aircraft captain, nor whether his IFR flight experience was sufficient for conducting the proposed flight, since he made decisions which went against the best practices, such as, for example, selecting a flight level with known icing.
- With a compromised situational awareness, the pilot failed to correctly interpret the information available in the aircraft, as well as the information provided by the female passenger sitting in the cockpit, and he chose to maintain the flight level under inadequate weather conditions.
- The lack of monitoring/supervision of the activities performed by the captain allowed that behaviors and attitudes contrary to flight safety could be adopted in flight, as can be observed in this occurrence.
- Apparently, there was lack of an effective managerial supervision on the part of the aircraft operator, with regard to both the actions performed by the captain and the correction of the aircraft problems.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-46-500TP Malibu Meridian in Glory: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 12, 2013 at 0854 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N5339V
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Paris – Austin
MSN:
46-97110
YOM:
2001
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
2365
Captain / Total hours on type:
127.00
Aircraft flight hours:
1614
Circumstances:
The instrument-rated pilot obtained a weather briefing prior to departure that contained surface observations along the route of flight, as well as significant meteorological (SIGMET) and airman's meteorological (AIRMET) information. The briefing also included convective weather advisories, a convective outlook, the area forecast, pilot reports, radar summary, and winds aloft information. The area forecast included overcast ceilings at 1,500 feet mean sea level (msl) with cloud tops at 6,000 feet msl, visibility between 3 and 5 miles, light rain and mist, and isolated thunderstorms with cumulonimbus tops to 35,000 feet msl. After the pilot departed, he established contact with air traffic control; the airplane was initially observed on radar heading toward the destination airport. An analysis of radar from the day of the accident indicated that isolated thunderstorms existed and that, almost 4 minutes after departing, the airplane encountered an area of developing rain showers and vertical updrafts. The airplane began a descending right turn followed by a brief climb, then another descent; its ground speed slowed from 202 knots to 110 knots before the data ended. At that time, the airplane was at 4,500 feet msl. A witness said he heard the airplane but was unable to see it due to the low cloud layer. A few moments later, he saw the airplane exit the cloud layer in a spin before it impacted the ground. A postaccident examination revealed no mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane and engine.
Probable cause:
The pilot's encounter with convective weather, which resulted in a loss of airplane control.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft E90 King Air near Amarillo: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 14, 2012 at 1805 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N67PS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Amarillo - Fort Worth
MSN:
LW-112
YOM:
1974
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1650
Aircraft flight hours:
8607
Circumstances:
During the cross-country instrument flight rules flight, the pilot was in contact with air traffic control personnel. The controller cleared the airplane to flight level 210 and gave the pilot permission to deviate east of the airplane's route to avoid weather and traffic. A review of radar data showed the airplane heading southward away from the departure airport and climbing to an altitude of about 14,800 feet mean sea level (msl). Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned north, and the controller queried the pilot about the turn; however, he did not respond. The airplane wreckage was located on ranch land with sections of the airplane's outer wing, engines, elevators, and vertical and horizontal stabilizers separated from the fuselage and scattered in several directions, which is consistent with an in-flight breakup before impact with terrain. A review of the weather information for the airplane's route of flight showed widely scattered thunderstorms and a southerly surface wind of 30 knots with gusts to 40 knots. An AIRMET active at the time advised of moderate turbulence below flight level 180. Three pilot reports made within 50 miles of the accident site indicated moderate turbulence and mountain wave activity. An assessment of the humidity and freezing level noted the potential for clear, light-mixed, or rime icing between 10,700 and 17,300 feet msl. Postaccident airplane examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airframe and engines that would have precluded normal operation. It's likely the airplane encountered heavy to extreme turbulence and icing conditions during the flight, which led to the pilot’s loss of control of the airplane and its subsequent in-flight breakup.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s loss of control of the airplane after encountering icing conditions and heavy to extreme turbulence and the subsequent exceedance of the airplane’s design limit, which led to an in-flight breakup.
Final Report:

Crash of a PAC Cresco 08-600 in Waitaanga

Date & Time: Dec 11, 2012 at 1738 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-LTR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Taumatunui - Mount Messenger
MSN:
003
YOM:
1980
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in Waitaanga while completing a spraying mission between Taumatunui and Mount Messenger. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured.

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24A-954 near Rotorua: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 8, 2012 at 1315 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-EMX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
278
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
430
Captain / Total hours on type:
95.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11300
Circumstances:
The pilot, who was undertaking training toward a Grade 2 Agricultural Pilot Rating, began work at approximately 0625 hours on the day of the accident. The pilot and his instructor, who was in another topdressing aircraft, flew to a block of land to the south east of Rotorua where the pilot completed 15 sowing runs, while his instructor worked in the local vicinity in the second aircraft. The pilot and instructor completed the work on this block, had a break and then transited to the Waikite Valley, arriving at approximately 0945 hours. At 1045 hours, after refuelling his aircraft, the pilot commenced sowing a ‘special mix’ fertiliser, in an alternating pattern between the instructor and pilot, with two aircraft operating from the airstrip. The alternating pattern allowed the instructor to observe and supervise the pilot during the take off and landing phases, while allowing the operation to proceed efficiently. The pilot and instructor stopped for lunch after an hour of flying, refuelled once more and then continued with their work. The amount of fertiliser that was loaded into the pilot’s aircraft was progressively increased as the work proceeded. The initial load of product was 900 kg, gradually increasing by 50 kg increments, when the instructor was satisfied that the pilot’s performance allowed this increase. The last five loads carried prior to the accident were each 1100 kg. Nothing untoward was noticed during the sowing runs, apart from the pilot aborting one landing attempt, due to the wake turbulence from the instructor’s aircraft during take off. At the time of the accident the pilot was performing ‘clearing runs’, sowing on remaining areas of land not already covered by previous sowing runs. Immediately prior to the accident, the pilot called the instructor on the radio to enquire of his location. The instructor responded with “directly behind you on the other side of the woolshed”. A few seconds later, as the instructor approached to land at the airstrip, he observed the pilot’s aircraft flying in a westerly direction at approximately 400 ft AGL. He then saw the pilot’s aircraft make a slight turn to the left. Describing what he had seen as: “he started to climb and turn slightly to the left, then the plane was in a left hand spin”. The instructor thought at the time that the aircraft spun for one and a half rotations to the left, prior to being obscured by the ridge adjacent to the airstrip. The accident occurred in daylight, at approximately 1315 hours, at Waikite Valley, Rotorua, at an elevation of 1460 ft. Latitude S 38° 18.5', longitude E 176° 17.42'.
Probable cause:
Conclusions
- The pilot was appropriately licensed and held a valid medical certificate.
- The aircraft had been appropriately maintained and no technical discrepancy was discovered that could have contributed to the accident.
- It is likely that, during a climbing turn, the pilot inadvertently allowed an aerodynamic stall to occur at which point the aircraft suddenly departed controlled flight.
- No emergency jettison of the hopper contents was attempted.
- The height above the ground, was insufficient for the pilot to perform a successful recovery once the departure from controlled flight had fully developed.
- The pilot’s lack of experience with agricultural operations and relative unfamiliarity with the aircraft type could not be eliminated as having a bearing on the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III in Wells: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 26, 2012 at 2124 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N67SR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
West Houston - Tulsa
MSN:
421C-0257
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2500
Aircraft flight hours:
6736
Circumstances:
The airplane was substantially damaged during an in-flight encounter with weather, in-flight separation of airframe components, and subsequent impact with the ground near Wells, Texas. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The airplane sustained impact and fire damage to all major airframe components. The aircraft was registered to H-S Air LP and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from the West Houston Airport (IWS), Houston, Texas, about 2040 and was bound for the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma. Witnesses near the accident site reported hearing an explosion and then seeing a fireball descending through the clouds to the ground. Radar track data for the last portion of the flight depicted the airplane on a 7720 transponder code. The track showed the airplane initially on a heading of about 20 degrees at 23,000 feet. The track continued in this direction until 2120:03.73 when the airplane began a right turn. The right turn continued for about 30 seconds during which time the altitude remained constant and the heading changed to about 90 degrees. After 2120:45.86, the track showed an erratic steep descent that continued to the end of the data. The final data location was received at 2122:15.53 at an altitude of 2,800 feet. The accident location was 0.86 miles and 94 degrees from the last recorded radar position.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s decision to continue the flight into an area of extreme weather, which led to the in-flight encounter with a thunderstorm and structural failure of the wings and tail.
Final Report:

Crash of a Casa C-295M in Saint-Germain-du-Teil: 6 killed

Date & Time: Nov 9, 2012 at 1545 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
7T-WGF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Paris - Boufarik AFB
MSN:
S-026
YOM:
2005
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Paris-Le Bourget Airport around 1500LT bound to Boufarik Air Base near Algiers, carrying a crew of five, one employee of the National Bank of Algeria and a cargo consisting of fiduciary papers intended to the manufacture of bank notes. While cruising at FL150, the crew encountered icing conditions and elected to gain height. While climbing, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent, partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a field located in Saint-Germain-du-Teil, some 20 km east of Mende. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all six occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
In a report published in January 2013, the French BEA confirmed that the accident was the consequence of an excessive frost accretion on all surfaces and airframe of the airplane. Investigations were able to determine that the aircraft was flying at the limit of its performances in adverse weather conditions with dangerous phenomena such as the accretion of clear ice. This situation caused the frost alarm to activate, and the pilots to increase their altitude. At this moment, the airplane entered a spin and the tail detached due to aerodynamic forces that exceeded its certification/design. Out of control, the aircraft completed several barrels before breaking up and descending to the ground.

Crash of a Grumman C-1A Trader near Skwentna: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 15, 2012 at 1557 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N27PH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wasilla – Nixon Fork Mine
MSN:
44
YOM:
1957
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
25000
Circumstances:
The airplane was destroyed when it collided with tree-covered terrain and incurred a postcrash fire and explosion about 19 miles west of Willow, Alaska. The airline transport rated
pilot, who was the only occupant, was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Fuel Services, LLC, Anchorage, Alaska, and was being operated as a 14 CFR Part 91 visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country fuel transport flight when the accident occurred. Marginal visual meteorological conditions were reported at the airplane's point of departure. The accident flight originated from the Wasilla Airport, Wasilla, Alaska, about 1520, en route to the Nixon Fork Mine, about 28 miles northeast of McGrath, Alaska. According to the co-owner of the airplane, the purpose of the flight was to transport approximately 900 gallons of diesel fuel to a company owned tank that supplies fuel for a mining operation. When the airplane did not arrive at its destination, the co-owner of the airplane reported it overdue to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) at 1757. After being notified of the overdue airplane, personnel from the 11th Air Force's Rescue Coordination Center initiated a search for the missing airplane along its supposed route of flight. On the morning of October 16, an Air National Guard C-130 Hercules was able to locate the wreckage. Rescue personnel aboard a HH-60G helicopter were able to reach the site later that morning, and confirmed the pilot was deceased. Two witnesses reported seeing the airplane fly over their locations. The first witness saw the airplane as it was flying northwest at an altitude that he estimated at 3,000 to 4,000 feet under an overcast layer. He stated that the airplane did not sound "normal," but he did not notice anything unusual, like smoke, trailing the airplane. The second witness stated that he saw the airplane fly over his cabin headed southeast at an estimated altitude of 300 to 400 feet. He stated that the airplane sounded like it was "struggling," but he could not see anything abnormal about the airplanes appearance. Primary radar data taken from the Anchorage Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON), shows an unidentified aircraft, believed to be the accident airplane, depart the Wasilla airport about 1522. After departure, the track proceeded to the Northwest with cruising ground speeds of between 180 and 193 knots. No altitude or transponder code data was transmitted by the airplane. Around 1343 the radar track changed direction and proceeded to the southeast. Ground speeds after the track changed direction started at 143 knots, and gradually decreased to a low of 117 knots about 5 minutes before the accident. The last radar plot for the airplane was at 1556:47, approximately 5.5 nautical miles from the accident site, and showed a heading of 088 degrees, and a ground speed of 175 knots.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s loss of control of the airplane for reasons that could not be determined because the wreckage was not recovered from the accident site.
Final Report: