Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

The aircraft departed Andersen AFB on a flight around the Guam Island under call sign 'Raider 21' with 6 crew members on board, taking part to the Guam Liberation Day celebrations. About 15 minutes into the flight, while descending from 14,000 to 1,000 feet, the aircraft became uncontrollable and crashed in the sea about 50 km north of Guam Island. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and only few debris were found. All six crew members were killed.
Crew:
Maj Chris Cooper, pilot,
Cpt Michael Dodson, copilot,
1st Lt Robert Gerren, electronic warfare officer,
1st Lt Joshua Shepherd, navigator,
Maj Brent Williams, radar navigator,
Col George Martin, flight surgeon.

14th July 2008 was a Monday; the busiest day of the week where there is an average of 150-200 movements. 8Q-MAS completed six sectors prior to the accident, with the same flight crew. Sixteen pieces of baggage were loaded, in the aft cabin, with total weight of 458 lbs. The flight manifest signed by Pilot in Command indicated that the aircraft was loaded up to 11874 lbs. The aircraft was boarded with 14 passengers (7 females, 6 males and 1 child) and the flight manifest used approved weights of 77 lbs Child, 181 lbs for male and 141 lbs for female to calculate the aircraft weight. The aircraft had 930 lbs of fuel. This particular aircraft was a short nose twin otter aircraft, with main loading in aft cabin. The MAT seaplane operation was based on a day VFR, non-schedule and a self dispatch system. All pre-flight duties were completed by the crew. The weather was windy and sea was rough. The aircraft departed at 12.11 hrs from MAT dock at Male International Airport, Water Aerodrome to Adaaran Club Bathala with 14 passengers total: 10 passengers to Adaaran Club Bathala, 2 passengers to Nika Maldives and 2 Passengers to W Retreat and Spa (Fesdu). The estimated flight time to destination was 20 minutes. The W Retreat and Spa Maldives Resort’s Speed Boat (Angelina) (a 34 ft Triana Express) was moored at a buoy (located at 04 04’ 43.6” N, 072 56’ 37.1” E) used by MAT to moor the aircrafts for night stops. The floating platform was located (04 04’ 43.5”N, 072 56’ 38.8”E) east of the buoy. The distance between the floating platform and buoy is around 165 feet. Around 12:30 the aircraft approached for landing near the floating platform. The wind was on a westerly direction 20 to 25 knots and the aircraft approached for a westbound landing. The aircraft made an orbit over the lagoon to inspect the water. The aircraft did a touchdown and was cutting the wave tops to find an appropriate location to stop, when it hit a big wave and was airborne. The aircraft veered to the left. The PIC declared to do a go around. The crew action was 10 degree flap, full throttle and Max Prop RPM. On climb the aircraft collided with the Speed Boat and the aircraft veered to the right and PIC was able to land on LH float.

The flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was hired as a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins for the operator Helitrans. He was one of two candidates that were employed by the company in early 2008. They underwent ground school and flight training in cooperation with the Swedish Type Rating Training Organisation (TRTO) Trafikkhögskolan. Later it became clear that the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) did not accept skill-tests limited to first officer duties on a single pilot certified airplane, as the Norwegian CAA did. The candidates did not possess the skills to act as commanders on the Merlin, and there was a period of uncertainty while the operator and the Norwegian CAA discussed how to conduct the skill-tests, in particular whether to use a simulator or an actual airplane. After several months the issues were resolved and an examiner was appointed. There was a limited slot on a Thursday and a Friday where the examiner, the instructor/commander and the aircraft was available at Bergen Airport Flesland. The first candidate performed the skill-test on Thursday. The weather was not suited for flying skill tests. It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. Turbulence caused the stick pusher to activate during the demonstration of slow flight. The commander decided to pull the circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SAS) presumably to avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher. After the slow flight demonstration, the examiner asked the candidate to demonstrate a stall. The candidate found this exercise frightening as she experienced great difficulties, having to use all her available physical strength to regain normal flight with the engines on full power and in IMC conditions. The weather was similar on Friday with even stronger winds. The SAS circuit breaker was not reset. This was confirmed during the start-up check. The examiner requested a similar program during this skill-test as he did the day before. However, when it came to demonstrating stalls, the examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate’s request. It was IMC. During this exercise the crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased, even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 – 400 ft during the period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000 ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured. The accident aircraft was used for coastguards duties and was modified with external sensors and antennas. The AIBN made a Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis in order to determine whether these installations influenced on stability and flight characteristics in the slow flight and pre-stall regime. It was found that the modifications reduced the overall performance, but did not result in any significant degradation of stability and control in this regime. There was no investigation as to any influence on the characteristics of a fully developed stall. The AIBN is of the opinion that this accident highlights the need for a change in the current training on initial stall recovery techniques, especially the focus on minimum loss of altitude at the expense of breaking the stall by lowering the nose and thus reducing the angle of attack. The AIBN has issued two safety recommendations to the Norwegian CAA; one regarding the conduct of skill-tests for pilots in a multi crew concept on single pilot airplanes, and one suggesting increased focus on flight examiners tasks.

On June 9, 2008, about 1401 eastern daylight time, an Aero Commander 500S, N501AP, registered to and operated by Gramar 500, Inc., experienced a loss of engine power in both engines and was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean about 1/2 mile south of North Bimini, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from Nassau International Airport (MYNN), Nassau, Bahamas, to Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The airplane was destroyed due to salt water immersion, and the airline transport rated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. The pilot stated that when the flight was past Bimini, the right engine started running rough and losing power. He turned southeast to enter a left base for runway 09 at South Bimini Airport, and the left engine also began to run rough and lost power. The pilot ditched the aircraft, evacuated into a life raft, and was rescued by a pleasure boater. The pilot also stated that 25 gallons of fuel were added while at MYNN, for a total fuel supply of 90 gallons. Both engines were test run 8 days after the accident using a test propeller. Both engines ran to near maximum RPM. One magneto from each engine was replaced prior to the test run.

The amphibious-float-equipped airplane departed from a paved runway for the 40-nautical mile flight to its destination, where a water landing on a lake was to be made. The pilot did not raise the landing gear after takeoff. During the flight, the air was bumpy and turbulent, and this resulted in the gear advisory system activating numerous times. The purpose of the system is to alert the pilot of the landing gear position--up for a water landing or down for a runway landing--when the airspeed decreased below a set threshold value. The pilot disabled the system by pulling its circuit breaker because the alerts were becoming a nuisance; he intended to reset the breaker during descent, but did not do so. Upon reaching the destination, the pilot set up a 150- to 200-feet-per-minute rate of descent for a glassy water landing on the lake. With the landing gear in the down position, the airplane contacted the water and abruptly nosed over. The airplane came to rest floating inverted, suspended by the floats. The pilot reported that the day of the accident was his nineteenth consecutive duty day, including office duty and flight duty. He stated that he feels the lack of days off during the previous 19 days was a contributing factor to this accident. When asked what would have prevented the accident, the pilot suggested consistency in using the checklist. On two flights earlier in the day he had used a written checklist; on the accident flight he did not.

The aircraft departed Bata on a special flight to Annobón Island carrying six politicians completing an election tour and a crew of five. While approaching Annobón Island, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with strong winds and heavy rain falls. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed in the sea. Four dead bodies were found.

On 9 April 2008, at 2325 Eastern Standard Time, a Fairchild Industries Inc. SA227-AC (Metro III) aircraft, registered VH-OZA, departed Sydney Airport, New South Wales on a freight charter flight to Brisbane, Queensland with one pilot on board. The aircraft was subsequently observed on radar to be turning right, contrary to air traffic control instructions to turn left to an easterly heading. The pilot reported that he had a ‘slight technical fault’ and no other transmissions were heard from the pilot. Recorded radar data showed the aircraft turning right and then left, followed by a descent and climb, a second right turn and a second descent before radar returns were lost when the aircraft was at an altitude of 3,740 ft above mean sea level and descending at over 10,000 ft/min. Air traffic control initiated search actions and search vessels later recovered a small amount of aircraft wreckage floating in the ocean, south of the last recorded radar position. The pilot was presumed to be fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed. Both of the aircraft’s on-board flight recorders were subsequently recovered from the ocean floor. They contained data from a number of previous flights, but not for the accident flight. There was no evidence of a midair breakup of the aircraft.

On January 29, 2008, about 1723 eastern standard time, a Grumman G-21A, amphibian airplane N21A, impacted the ocean during landing near Marathon, Florida. The certificated airline transport pilot and passenger received serious injuries and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The flight was operated as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and no flight plan was filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed from the Florida Keys Marathon Airport (MTH) in Marathon, Florida, on January 29, 2008, about 1615. According to the pilot he departed MTH and after take off and the checklist accomplished he proceeded in a westerly direction to inspect a water-work area. The pilot stated that other then that, he had no further recollection of the flight. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the passenger stated that the pilot was practicing takeoffs and landings. During a water landing, the left wing contacted the water and the airplane water looped. A Good Samaritan rescued them from the water in his boat and brought them ashore where rescue personal were waiting. Examination of the airplane by the FAA revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane or engine, and none were reported by the pilot or passenger.

At 0858LT, while cruising at an altitude of 7,500 feet some 83 km from the destination, the crew reported his position to ATC. About 10 minutes later, while cruising at an altitude of 3,000 feet, the captain declared an emergency following a double engine failure. The aircraft lost height and crashed in the sea some 29 km off Los Roques Airport. Few debris were found floating on water and all 14 occupants were killed, among them 8 Italians, one Swiss and five Venezuelans. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor. On 19 June 2013, an Italian-Venezuelan search team found the wreckage at a depth of 974 metres.

The twin engine aircraft departed Sabang-Maimum Saleh airport at 1110LT on a maritime survey flight to Medan. About 15 minutes into the flight, the crew informed ATC about engine problems and elected to return to Sabang. On final approach in poor weather conditions, the aircraft crashed in the sea and sank about 200 metres offshore. Two people were rescued while five others were killed.