Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S in Fort Huachuca: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 17, 2014 at 1020 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N40TC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Huachuca - Fort Huachuca
MSN:
500-3091
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
13175
Captain / Total hours on type:
600.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
16560
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4100
Aircraft flight hours:
21660
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to perform a check/orientation flight with the airline transport pilot (ATP), who was new to the area; the ATP was the pilot flying. The airplane was started, and an engine run-up completed. The commercial pilot reported that, during the takeoff roll, all of the gauges were in the “green.” After reaching an airspeed of 80 knots, the airplane lifted off the ground. About 350 ft above ground level (agl), the pilots felt the airplane “jolt.” The commercial pilot stated that it felt like a loss of power had occurred and that the airplane was not responding. He immediately shut off the boost pumps, and the ATP initiated a slow left turn in an attempt to return to the airport to land. The airplane descended rapidly in a nose-low, right-wing-low attitude and impacted the ground. A witness reported that he watched the airplane take off and that it sounded normal until it reached the departure end of the runway, at which point he heard a distinct “pop pop,” followed by silence. The airplane then entered an approximate 45-degree left turn with no engine sound and descended at a high rate with the wings rolling level before the airplane went out of sight. Another witness made a similar statement. Based on the witnesses’ statements and photographs of the twisted airplane at the accident site, it is likely that a total loss of engine power occurred and that, during the subsequent turn back to the airport, the ATP did not maintain sufficient airspeed and exceeded the airplane’s critical angle-of-attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Although a postaccident examination of the airframe and engines did reveal an inconsistency between the cockpit control positions and the positions of the fuel shutoff valves on the sump tank, this would not have precluded normal operation. No other anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation.
Probable cause:
The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed and his exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle-of-attack after a total loss of engine power during the takeoff initial climb, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. The reason for the total loss of engine power could not be determined because an examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-74TK-300D in Xiang Khouang: 16 killed

Date & Time: May 17, 2014 at 0615 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
RDPL-34020
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Vientiane – Xieng Khouang
MSN:
470 98 982
YOM:
2007
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Circumstances:
On final approach to Xieng Khouang Airport, the aircraft descended too low, impacted trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located some 1,500 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. 14 occupants were killed while 3 others were injured, among them a nurse. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. A day later, two survivors died from their injuries and the nurse was the only survivor. Among the passengers were members of the Laotian Government flying to Xieng Khouang to attend a celebration of the creation of the 2nd Division of the Laotian Army. Among the passengers were the Laotian Ministry of Defense and Vice-Prime Minister Mr. Douangchay Phichit, the Secretary of the National Party Mr. Cheuang Sombounkhanh, the Mayor of Vientiane Mr. Soukanh Mahalath and the Laotian Ministry of Public Safety Mr. Thongbanh Sengaphone. For unknown reason, the crew was approaching the airport at a too low altitude.

Crash of a Harbin Yunsunji Y-12-II in El Wak: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 12, 2014
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
KAF124
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mandera – El Wak – Garissa – Nairobi
MSN:
0095
YOM:
1997
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from El Wak Airfield, bound for Garissa, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed. The copilot was killed while 11 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Cessna T207A Turbo Stationair 7 in Page: 1 killed

Date & Time: May 10, 2014 at 1545 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N7311U
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Page - Page
MSN:
207A-0395
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6850
Captain / Total hours on type:
48.00
Aircraft flight hours:
14883
Circumstances:
During a local sightseeing flight, the pilot noticed that the engine had lost partial power, and he initiated a turn back toward the airport while troubleshooting the loss of power. Despite the pilot's attempts, the engine would not regain full power and was surging and sputtering randomly. The pilot entered the airport's traffic pattern on the downwind leg, and, while on final approach to the runway, the airplane encountered multiple downdrafts and wind gusts. It is likely that, due to the downdrafts and the partial loss of engine power, the pilot was not able to maintain airplane control. The airplane subsequently landed hard short of the runway surface and nosed over, coming to rest inverted. The reported wind conditions around the time of the accident varied between 20 and 70 degrees right of the runway heading and were 14 knots gusting to greater than 20 knots. In addition, a company pilot who landed about 8 minutes before the accident reported that he encountered strong downdrafts and windshear while on final approach to the runway and that he would not have been able to reach the runway if he had a partial or total loss of engine power. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The engine was subsequently installed on a test stand and was successfully run through various power settings for several minutes. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inability to maintain aircraft control due to a partial loss of engine power and an encounter with downdrafts and gusting crosswinds while on final approach to the runway. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined because postaccident examination revealed no mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker 100 in Zahedan

Date & Time: May 10, 2014 at 1300 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-ASZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mashhad - Zahedan
MSN:
11421
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
EP853
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
98
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On approach to Zahedan Airport, the crew followed the checklist and configured the aircraft for landing when he realized that the left main gear remained stuck in its wheel well. The crew abandoned the landing manoeuvre and initiated a go-around procedure. During an hour, the crew followed a holding circuit to burn fuel and also to try to lower the left main landing gear but without success. Eventually, the crew was cleared to land on runway 35. After touchdown, the aircraft rolled for about 1,500 metres then veered off runway to the left before coming to rest in a sandy area. All 103 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2T in Gryazi

Date & Time: May 9, 2014 at 1630 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RF-00446
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Terbuny – Gryazi
MSN:
1G236-07
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was returning to its base in Gryazi after taking part to a demonstration in Terbuny. After takeoff, while in initial climb, the engine lost power. The aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height, impacted power cables and crashed in an open field. All nine occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Loss of engine power for unknown reasons.

Crash of a Boeing 737-4Y0 in Kabul

Date & Time: May 8, 2014 at 1704 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YA-PIB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New Delhi – Kaboul
MSN:
26077/2425
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
FG312
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
122
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport, the crew was cleared for an ILS approach to Kabul Airport Runway 29. On short final, the aircraft entered an area of heavy rain falls. The crew continued the approach and the aircraft landed after the touchdown zone. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage, collided with the ILS antenna and slid for 285 metres before coming to rest. All 132 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew completed the landing too far down the runway, reducing the landing distance available. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew failed to follow SOP's,
- Poor crew recurrent training,
- The thrust reverse systems were activated too late after landing.

Crash of a Boeing 737-476SF in East Midlands

Date & Time: Apr 29, 2014 at 0228 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-STD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Paris-Roissy-Charles de Gaulle – East Midlands
MSN:
24433/1881
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
ABR1748
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4279
Captain / Total hours on type:
377.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3900
Circumstances:
The aircraft was scheduled to operate three commercial air transport (cargo) sectors: from Athens to Bergamo, then to Paris Charles de Gaulle, and finally East Midlands. The aircraft’s flap load relief system was inoperative, which meant that the maximum flap position to be used in flight was 30, rather than 40º. This defect had been deferred in the aircraft’s technical log and it had no effect on the landing of the aircraft. Otherwise, the aircraft was fully serviceable. The co-pilot completed the pre-flight external inspection of the aircraft in good light, and found nothing amiss. The departure from Athens was uneventful, but a combination of factors affecting Bergamo (including poor weather, absence of precision approach aids, and work in progress affecting the available landing distance) led the crew to decide to route directly to Paris, where a normal landing was carried out. The aircraft departed Paris for East Midlands at 0040 hrs, loaded with 10 tonnes of freight, 8 tonnes of fuel (the minimum required was 5.6 tonnes), and with the co-pilot as Pilot Flying. Once established in the cruise, the flight crew obtained the latest ATIS information from East Midlands, which stated that Runway 27 was in use, although there was a slight tailwind, and Low Visibility Procedures (LVPs) were in force. They planned to exchange control at about FL100 in the descent, for the commander to carry out a Category III autoland. However, as they neared their destination, the weather improved, LVPs were cancelled, and the flight crew re-briefed for an autopilot approach, followed by a manual landing, to be carried out by the co-pilot. The landing was to be with Flap 30, Autobrake 2, and idle reverse thrust. The final ATIS transmission which the flight crew noted before landing stated that the wind was 130/05 kt, visibility was 3,000 metres in mist, and the cloud was broken at 600 ft aal. The commander of EI-STD established radio contact with the tower controller, and the aircraft was cleared to land; the surface wind was transmitted as 090/05 kt. The touchdown was unremarkable, and the autobrake functioned normally, while the co-pilot applied idle reverse thrust on the engines. As the aircraft’s speed reduced through approximately 60 kt, the co-pilot handed control to the commander, who then made a brake pedal application to disengage the autobrake system. However, the system remained engaged, so he made a second, more positive, brake application. The aircraft “shuddered” and rolled slightly left-wing-low as the lower part of the left main landing gear detached. The commander used the steering tiller to try to keep the aircraft tracking straight along the runway centreline, but it came to a halt slightly off the centreline, resting on its right main landing gear, the remains of the left main landing gear leg, and the left engine lower cowl. The co-pilot saw some smoke drift past the aircraft as it came to a halt. The co-pilot made a transmission to the tower controller, reporting that the aircraft was in difficulties, after which the co-pilot of another aircraft (which was taxiing from its parking position along the parallel taxiway) made a transmission referring to smoke from the 737’s landing gear. The commander of EI-STD had reached the conclusion that one of the main landing gear legs had failed, but as a result of the other pilot’s transmission, he was also concerned that the aircraft might be on fire. The commander immediately moved both engine start levers to the cut-off positions, shutting down the engines. Three RFFS vehicles had by now arrived at the adjacent taxiway intersection, and their presence there prompted the commander to consider that the aircraft was not on fire (he believed that if it were, the vehicles would have adopted positions closer by and begun to apply fire-fighting media). The RFFS vehicles then moved closer to the aircraft and fire-fighters placed a ladder against door L1, which the co-pilot had opened. Having spoken to fire-fighters while standing in the entrance vestibule, the commander returned to the flight deck and switched off the battery. The flight crew were assisted from the aircraft and fire-fighters applied foam around the landing gear and engine to make the area safe. The commander had taken the Notoc2 with him from the aircraft, and informed fire-fighters of the dangerous goods on board the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The damage to the flap system, fuselage, and MLG equipment was attributable to the detachment of the left MLG axle, wheel and brake assembly. The damage to the MLG outer cylinder, engine and nacelle was as result of the aircraft settling and sliding along the runway. The left MLG axle assembly detached from the inner cylinder due to the momentary increase in bending load during the transition from auto to manual braking. The failure was as a result of stress corrosion cracking and fatigue weakening the high strength steel substrate at a point approximately 75 mm above the axle. It is likely that some degree of heat damage was sustained by the inner cylinder during the overhaul process, as indicated by the presence of chicken wire cracking within the chrome plating over the majority of its surface. However, this was not severe enough to have damaged the steel substrate and therefore may have been coincidental. Although the risk of heat damage occurring during complex landing gear plating and refinishing processes is well understood and therefore mitigated by the manufacturers and overhaul agencies, damage during the most recent refinishing process cannot be discounted. The origin of the failure was an area of intense, but very localized heating, which damaged the chrome protection and changed the metallurgy; ie the formation of martensite within the steel substrate. This resulted in a surface corrosion pit, which, along with the metallurgical change, led to stress corrosion cracking, fatigue propagation and the eventual failure of the inner cylinder under normal loading.
Final Report:

Crash of a Comp Air CA-8 in Jämijärvi: 8 killed

Date & Time: Apr 20, 2014 at 1540 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OH-XDZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jämijärvi - Jämijärvi
MSN:
01
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Captain / Total flying hours:
1029
Captain / Total hours on type:
43.00
Aircraft flight hours:
809
Aircraft flight cycles:
3015
Circumstances:
The Tampere Skydiving Club (TamLK) organized the skydiving event “Easter Boogie” at Jämijärvi aerodrome, in the Satakunta region, on Sunday 20 Apr 2014. The event started on Maundy Thursday, 17 Apr 2014 and was planned to end on Easter Monday, 21 Apr 2014. The aircraft reserved for the event were Finland’s Sport Aviators’ Comp Air 8 airplane (CA8, OH-XDZ), which was intended to be used to take skydivers up to 4 000 m, and the Tampere Skydiving Club’s own Cessna U206F (OH-CMT), to be used for jumps from lower altitudes. On Sunday morning the cloud base hampered skydiving operations, which is why the activity started with student jumps from the Cessna. The pilot of the accident flight flew two flights on the Cessna. Once the weather improved he began to fly on the OH-XDZ. He flew two flights on it before he took a lunch break. Another pilot flew four flights on the airplane, following which it was topped up with 240 l of fuel. After refuelling the pilots changed duties again and the pilot of the accident flight flew yet another skydiving flight, landing at 15:25. Ten skydivers boarded the airplane for the accident flight. Takeoff occurred at 15:28 from northern runway 27 of Jämijärvi aerodrome. The airplane climbed to 4 230 m AGL by making a wide, left turn. The pilot steered the aircraft to the jump run, which was over the southern runway. Some of the skydivers sitting at the rear rose to their knees, and two of them cracked the jump door open so as to check the jump run. The skydivers then gave instructions to the pilot as regards correcting the jump run. The pilot adjusted the heading following which he reduced engine power to idle, reducing airspeed to approximately 70-75 kt. Nonetheless, the skydivers noted that they had overshot the jump line and requested that the pilot take them to a new run. The skydivers closed the door. The pilot increased engine power and, according to his account, simultaneously began to turn to the left at a 20-30 degree bank angle. He did not order the skydivers to return to their seats as he was homing in on the new jump run. At the end of the turn the occupants of the aircraft felt a downward acceleration which the skydivers experienced as a force pushing them towards the cabin ceiling. Approximately three seconds later the situation returned to normal. According to the pilot the airspeed was approximately 100 kt when they encountered the vertical acceleration. A moment later the pilot noticed that the airplane was in a descent and that the airspeed had suddenly risen to over 180 kt IAS. According to the pilot the airspeed peaked at 185 kt. He attempted to end the descent by pulling on the control stick. The aircraft levelled out or went into a shallow climb. He reduced engine power to idle to decrease the airspeed. The pilot said that the pitch control stick forces were relatively high. The aircraft returned to level flight, or to a gentle climb. The longitudinal control force suddenly decreased and the airplane suddenly flipped forward past the vertical axis. One of the surviving skydivers said that he heard a crushing sound roughly at the same time; how-ever, he was unsure of the precise point in time of the sound. The aircraft became uncontrollable and began to rotate around its vertical axis, akin to an inverted spin. According to eyewitness videos the aircraft was turning to the left. The videos show that the right wing was buckled against the fuselage and that a vapour trail of fuel was streaming from the damaged wing. While the aircraft was spinning its left wing, which was intact, was pointing upwards and the airplane was falling with its right side forward. Shouts of “open the jump door, bail out immediately” were heard inside the airplane. The pilot concluded that the aircraft was so badly damaged that it was no longer possible to recover from the dive. He unbuckled his seat belts and opened the pilot’s door on his left at approximately 2 000 m. The pilot jumped out at approximately 1 800 m and opened his emergency parachute. Even though twists had developed in the parachute’s lines, the pilot managed to untangle them. The skydiver sitting at the rear of the seat positioned next to the pilot (skydiver 3) noted that it would be impossible for him to make it to the jump door. Therefore, he chose the pilot’s door as a point of exit. It was extremely difficult to get to the door because the airplane was spinning. The skydiver sitting at the front of the seat positioned next to the pilot (skydiver 2) followed skydiver 3 on his way to the cockpit door and pushed skydiver 3 out of the door. Following egress, skydiver 3 immediately hit his head on airplane structures. The blow momentarily blurred his field of vision but he remained conscious. The Automatic Activation Device (AAD) opened the reserve parachute almost immediately after egress, at approximately 250 m. While skydiver 2 was still behind skydiver 3 he grabbed the control stick, intending to reduce the g-forces caused by the spinning and make it easier to bail out of the airplane. He soon realized that the airplane did not respond to stick movements and exited through the pilot’s door immediately behind skydiver 3. The skydiver who had occupied the furthest forward position (skydiver 1) assisted skydiver 2 in exiting through the door. The AAD of skydiver 2 opened his reserve parachute at approximately 200 m. After skydiver 2 had bailed out neither skydiver 1, situated closest to the pilot’s door, nor the remaining seven skydivers in the rear of the cabin managed to bail out. The airplane collided with the ground at 15:40 and caught fire immediately. The pilot landed approximately 300 m downwind from the wreckage. Skydiver 3 landed on a dirt road, some 60 m from the wreckage and skydiver 2 in the woods, approximately 40 m from the wreckage.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the stress resistance of the right wing’s wing strut was exceeded as a result of the force which was generated by a negative g-force. The force which resulted in the buckling of the wing strut was the direct result of a negative (nose-down) change in pitching moment, in conjunction with an engine power reduction intended to decrease the high airspeed. The buckling was followed by the right wing folding against the fuselage and the jump door. The aircraft entered into a flight condition resembling an inverted spin, which was unrecoverable. It was impossible to exit through the jump door.
The contributing factors were the following:
1. There was a fatigue crack on the wing strut. Because of the damage to the aircraft it was not possible to investigate the mechanism of the fatigue crack formation. It is possible that, in addition to the stress caused to the aircraft by short flights and high takeoff weights, the temperature changes caused by the exhaust gas stream as well as vibration contributed to the fatigue cracking.
2. The nature of skydiving operations generated many takeoffs and landings in relation to flight hours. A significant part of the operations was flown close to the maximum takeoff weight. These factors increased the structural stress.
3. The pilot’s limited flight experience on a powerful turboprop aircraft, his inadequate training as regards aircraft loading and its effects on the centre of gravity and airplane behavior, the high weight of the aircraft and the aft position of the CG in the beginning of a new jump line and, possibly, the pilot’s incorrect observation of the actual visual horizon contributed to the onset of the occurrence. During the turn to a new jump run the aircraft began to descend and very rapidly accelerated close to its maximum permissible airspeed. The pilot did not immediately realize this.
4. The structural modifications on the wing increased the loads on the aircraft and the wing struts. Their effects had not been established beforehand. The kit manufacturer was aware of the modifications. No changes to the Permit to build were applied for in writing regarding the modifications. Neither the build supervisor nor the aircraft inspectors were aware of the origin or the effects of the modifications.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Guriceel

Date & Time: Apr 20, 2014
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-VVJ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nairobi – Guriceel
MSN:
20133
YOM:
1988
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Nairobi-Wilson Airport on a cargo flight to Guriceel, carrying two pilots and a load of six tons of khat. After landing, the crew encountered difficulties to stop the airplane within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran and came to rest with its left wing partially torn off. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.