Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

On 08.03.2015 M/s Spice Jet Ltd. Bombardier Q-400 aircraft VT-SUA, was operating a scheduled flight from Bangalore to Hubli under the command of ATPL license holder endorsed on type with duly qualified First Officer on type. There were 78 passengers and 4 crew members on board the aircraft. Previous to the accident flight, the aircraft VT-SUA had operated a flight Chennai – Bangalore with the same PIC. The flight was uneventful and there was no snag reported by the PIC on the completion of the flight. Subsequently the aircraft was scheduled for SG-1085, Bangalore - Hubli on 08.03.2015 at around 13:00 UTC. The aircraft took off from Bangalore at around 1300 UTC and the visibility reported for Hubli was 10 km. When the aircraft came in contact with Mangalore ATC, Mangalore ATC cleared aircraft direct to Hubli and informed heavy rains and thunder showers over Hubli with visibility 3000 m. Since the weather at Hubli had deteriorated, the PIC reduced aircraft speed for reassuring the flight parameters. As there is no refueling facility available at Hubli, the sector is a tankering sector hence the aircraft had enough fuel for holding. While approaching into Hubli the pilot requested latest weather from ATC Hubli. At around 60 nm from Hubli, the weather reported by ATC Hubli was heavy rain and visibility 4000 meters. The ATC cleared aircraft for NDB approach runway 26, however the PIC preferred to carry out VOR DME trial procedure for runway 26. The runway condition was neither asked by the cockpit crew nor intimated by the ATC. The descent was commenced and about 25 nm short of Hubli, ATC again advised visibility has reduced to 3000 m due heavy rain and thunderstorm. Thereafter the crew decided to hold over Hubli until the weather improves. 20 minutes into holding, the ATC again informed that visibility has improved to 4000m in moderate rain. Subsequently descent was requested by the pilot for runway 26. The PIC stated that he had established visual reference with runway at about 6 nm on the final approach course. The crew also selected vipers on short finals to have a better visibility. The aircraft landed normally. The PIC had stated that after touch down and reducing power to DISC, as he was concentrating on the far end of the runway as the runway was wet, he did not realize that the aircraft was drifting to the left of the center line. He further mentioned that he selected full reverse on both the engines to maintain the aircraft on the center line however the aircraft veered toward the left side of the runway and in the process overrun the runway edge light followed by LH landing gear collapsed. After the left landing gear collapsed the left propeller blades hit the runway surface and sheared off from the root attachment. The PIC maneuvered the aircraft however the nose wheel tyre failed under over load conditions and the nose landing gear collapsed and the aircraft belly came in contact with the runway surface. Subsequently, the aircraft exited the runway on the left side on Kutcha and came to the final stop at round 52 meters away from the runway center line. The cockpit crew switched off the engines and the electrical power supply and cockpit door and announced evacuation. The cabin crew opened and the cabin doors on the right for evacuation. The ATC had alerted the fire services and the fire vehicles reached the aircraft after it came to final halt position. The fire personnel also assisted in the safe evacuation of all the passengers from the RH side. There was no injury to any of the occupants on board the aircraft. There was no postaccident fire.

On 8 March 2015, the pilot of an Aero Commander 500 aircraft, registered VH-WZV, prepared to conduct a charter flight from Badu Island to Horn Island, Queensland, with five passengers. The aircraft had been refuelled earlier that day at Horn Island, where the pilot conducted fuel drains with no contaminants found. He had operated the aircraft for about 2 hours prior to landing at Badu Island with no abnormal performance or indications. At about 1330 Eastern Standard Time (EST), the pilot started the engines and conducted the standard checks with all indications normal, obtained the relevant clearances from air traffic control, and taxied for a departure from runway 30. As the pilot lined the aircraft up on the runway centreline at the threshold, he performed a pre-take-off safety self-brief and conducted the pre-takeoff checks. He then applied full power, released the brakes and commenced the take-off run. All engine indications were normal during the taxi and commencement of the take-off run. When the airspeed had increased to about 80 kt, the pilot commenced rotation and the nose and main landing gear lifted off the runway. Just as the main landing gear lifted off, the pilot detected a significant loss of power from the left engine. The aircraft yawed to the left, which the pilot counteracted with right rudder. He heard the left engine noise decrease noticeably and the aircraft dropped back onto the runway. The pilot immediately rejected the take-off; reduced the power to idle, and used rudder and brakes to maintain the runway centreline. The pilot initially assessed that there was sufficient runway remaining to stop on but, due to the wet runway surface, the aircraft did not decelerate as quickly as expected and he anticipated that the aircraft would overrun the runway. As there was a steep slope and trees beyond the end of the runway, he steered the aircraft to the right towards more open and level ground. The aircraft departed the runway to the right, collided with a fence and a bush resulting in substantial damage. The pilot and passengers were not injured.

The twin engine aircraft departed Sarajevo Airport on a cargo flight to Ancona, carrying three crew members and a load of various goods. On approach to Ancona-Falconara Airport, the crew encountered strong winds. Upon touchdown on runway 04, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft skidded for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe damages in the cockpit area due to fire.

The aircraft was landing on runway 13 at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York, when it departed the left side of the runway, contacted the airport perimeter fence, and came to rest with the airplane’s nose on an embankment next to Flushing Bay. The 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 98 of the 127 passengers were not injured; the other 29 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. Flight 1086 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The captain and the first officer were highly experienced MD-88 pilots. The captain had accumulated about 11,000 hours, and the first officer had accumulated about 3,000 hours, on the MD-88/-90. In addition, the captain was previously based at LGA and had made many landings there in winter weather conditions. The flight crew was concerned about the available landing distance on runway 13 and, while en route to LGA, spent considerable time analyzing the airplane’s stopping performance. The flight crew also requested braking action reports about 45 and 35 minutes before landing, but none were available at those times because of runway snow clearing operations. The unavailability of braking actions reports and the uncertainty about the runway’s condition created some situational stress for the captain, who was the pilot flying. After runway 13 became available for arriving airplanes, the flight crews of two preceding airplanes (which landed on the runway about 16 and 8 minutes before the accident landing) reported good braking action on the runway, so the flight crew expected to see at least some of the runway’s surface after the airplane broke out of the clouds. However, the flight crew saw that the runway was covered with snow, which was inconsistent with their expectations based on the braking action reports and the snow clearing operations that had concluded less than 30 minutes before the airplane landed. The snowier-than-expected runway, along with its relatively short length and the presence of Flushing Bay directly off the departure end of the runway, most likely increased the captain’s concerns about his ability to stop the airplane within the available runway distance, which exacerbated his situational stress. The captain made a relatively aggressive reverse thrust input almost immediately after touchdown. Reverse thrust is one of the methods that pilots use to decelerate the airplane during the landing roll. Reverse thrust settings are expressed as engine pressure ratio (EPR) values, which are measurements of engine power (the ratio of the pressure of the gases at the exhaust compared with the pressure of the air entering the inlet). Both pilots were aware that 1.3 EPR was the target setting for contaminated runways.As reverse thrust EPR was rapidly increasing, the captain’s attention was focused on other aspects of the landing, which included steering the airplane to counteract a slide to the left and ensuring that the spoilers had deployed (a necessary action for the autobrakes to engage). The maximum EPR values reached during the landing were 2.07 on the left engine and 1.91 on the right engine, which were much higher than the target setting of 1.3 EPR. These high EPR values likely resulted from a combination of the captain’s stress; his relatively aggressive reverse thrust input; and operational distractions, including the airplane’s continued slide to the left despite the captain’s efforts to steer it away from the snowbanks alongside the runway. All of these factors reduced the captain’s monitoring of EPR indications. The high EPR values caused rudder blanking (which occurs on MD-80 series airplanes when smooth airflow over the rudder is disrupted by high reverse thrust) and a subsequent loss of aerodynamic directional control. Although the captain stowed the thrust reversers and applied substantial right rudder, right nosewheel steering, and right manual braking, the airplane’s departure from the left side of the runway could not be avoided because directional control was regained too late to be effective.

On 4 March 2015 a BAe-ATP registration PK-DGB operated by PT. Deraya Air as scheduled cargo flight from Sentani to Wamena Airport. On board of this flight was two pilots while the Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as pilot flying and First Officer (FO) acted as pilot monitoring. The aircraft departed Sentani at 0524 UTC to Wamena airport. The pilot contacted Wamena Tower controller while position on Jiwika way point at altitude 10,000 feet. Wamena Tower controller instructed to use runway 33 and to proceed to left runway 33. At 0602 UTC the pilot requested to proceed to Pyramid waypoint and to descend to 8,000 feet and made holding due to weather. At 0613, a C-130 pilot that was on approach reported making go around runway 33 and ATC instructed to C-130 pilot to proceed to Pyramid waypoint and hold. At 0619 UTC, Wamena Tower controller informed that the weather reported continuous heavy rain, visibility was reported 2 up to 3 km and wind was from 060° with velocity of 6 knots. The PK-DGB aircraft left Pyramid waypoint for approach runway 33. The aircraft proceed to left downwind and descent to 6,500 feet. During turning base leg, the pilot observed runway insight and continued the approach. At 0620 UTC, the aircraft touched down, thereafter veered off to the right of the runway and skid. The aircraft re-entered the runway at approximately 400 meters from beginning runway 33 and stopped near taxiway Delta at approximately 800 meters from beginning runway 33.

The aircraft departed Istanbul at 1818LT on March 3 on a scheduled flight to Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA), Kathmandu with 11 crew members and 224 passengers .The aircraft started contacting Kathmandu Control from 00:02 hrs to 00:11hrs while the aircraft was under control of Varanasi and descending to FL 250 but there was no response because Kathmandu Control was not yet in operation. The airport opened at its scheduled time of 00:15hrs. The aircraft established its first contact with Kathmandu Approach at 00:17 hrs and reported holding over Parsa at FL 270. Kathmandu Approach reported visibility 100 meters and airport status as closed. At 00:22 hrs the aircraft requested to proceed to Simara due to moderate turbulence. The Kathmandu Approach instructed the aircraft to descend to FL 210 and proceed to Simara and hold. At 01:05 hrs when Kathmandu Approach provided an updated visibility of 1000 meters and asked the flight crew of their intentions, the flight crew reported ready for RNAV (RNP) APCH for runway 02. The aircraft was given clearance to make an RNP AR APCH. At 01:23 hrs when the aircraft reported Dovan, Kathmandu Approach instructed the flight crew to contact Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower issued a landing clearance at 01:24 hrs and provided wind information of 100° at 03 knots. At 01:27 hrs the aircraft carried out a missed approach due to lack of visual reference. The aircraft was given clearance to proceed to RATAN hold via MANRI climbing to 10500 feet as per the missed approach procedure. During the missed approach the aircraft was instructed to contact Kathmandu Approach. At 01:43 hrs the aircraft requested the latest visibility to which Kathmandu Approach provided visibility 3000 m and Kathmandu Tower observation of 1000 meters towards the south east and few clouds at 1000 ft, SCT 2000 ft and BKN 10,000 feet. When the flight crew reported their intention to continue approach at 01:44 hrs, Kathmandu Approach cleared the aircraft for RNAV RNP APCH runway 02 and instructed to report RATAN. The aircraft reported crossing 6700 ft at 01:55 hrs to Kathmandu Tower. Kathmandu Tower cleared the aircraft to land and provided wind information of 160° at 04 kts. At 01:57 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked the aircraft if the runway was insight. The aircraft responded that they were not able to see the runway but were continuing the approach. The aircraft was at 880 ft AGL at that time. At 783 ft AGL the aircraft asked Kathmandu Tower if the approach lights were on. Kathmandu Tower informed the aircraft that the approach lights were on at full intensity. The auto-pilots remained coupled to the aircraft until 14 ft AGL, when it was disconnected, a flare was attempted. The maximum vertical acceleration recorded on the flight data recorder was approximately 2.7 G. The aircraft pitch at touchdown was 1.8 degree nose up up which is lower than a normal flare attitude for other landings. From physical evidence recorded on the runway and the GPS latitude and longitude coordinate data the aircraft touched down to the left of the runway centerline with the left hand main gear off the paved runway surface. The aircraft crossed taxiways E and D and came to a stop on the grass area between taxiway D and C with the heading of the aircraft on rest position being 345 degrees (North North West) and the position of the aircraft on rest position was at N 27° 41' 46", E 85° 21'29" At 02:00 hrs Kathmandu Tower asked if the aircraft had landed. The aircraft requested medical and fire assistance reporting its position at the end of the runway. At 02:03 hrs the aircraft requested for bridge and stairs to open the door and vacate passengers instead of evacuation. The fire and rescue team opened the left cabin door and requested the cabin attendant as well as to pilot through Kathmandu Tower to deploy the evacuation slides. At 02:10 hrs evacuation signal was given to disembark the passengers. All passengers were evacuated safely and later, the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.

Earlier on the day of the accident, the pilot-in-command (PIC) and second-in-command (SIC) had landed the airplane on a 5,008-ft-long, asphalt-grooved runway. After touchdown with the flaps fully extended, the ground spoilers and thrust reversers were deployed, and normal braking occurred. The PIC, who was the flying pilot, and the SIC subsequently departed on an executive/corporate flight with a flight attendant, the airplane owner, and five passengers onboard. The PIC reported that he flew a visual approach to the dry, 5,000-ft-long runway while maintaining a normal glidepath at Vref plus 4 or 5 knots at the runway threshold with the flaps fully extended. He added that the touchdown was "firm" and between about 300 to 500 ft beyond the aiming point marking. After touchdown, the PIC tried unsuccessfully to deploy the ground spoilers. He applied "moderate" brake pressure when the nose landing gear (NLG) contacted the runway, but felt no deceleration. He also attempted to deploy the thrust reversers without success. The PIC then informed the SIC that there was no braking energy, released the brakes, and turned off the antiskid system. He then reapplied heavy braking but did not feel any deceleration, and he again tried to deploy the thrust reversers without success. He maintained directional control using the nosewheel steering and manually modulated the brakes. However, the airplane did not slow as expected. While approaching the runway end and realizing that he was not going to be able to stop the airplane on the runway, the PIC intentionally veered the airplane right to avoid water ahead. However, the airplane exited the runway end into sand, and the NLG collapsed. The airplane then came to rest about 250 ft past the departure end of the runway. The passengers exited the airplane, and shortly after, airport personnel arrived and rendered assistance. The airplane owner, who was a passenger in the cabin, stated that he left his seat and moved toward the cabin door when he realized that the airplane would not stop on the runway, and he sustained serious injuries. Examination of the airplane revealed that there was minimal pressure at the No. 2 (left inboard) brake due to failure of a spring in the upper brake control valve (BCV), and the coupling subassembly of the No. 1 wheel speed sensor (WSS) was fractured. A representative from the airplane manufacturer reported that, during certification of the brake system, the failure of the BCV spring was considered acceptably low and would be evident to flight crewmembers within five landings of the failure. Because the airplane did not pull while braking during the previous landing earlier that day to a similar length runway, the spring likely failed during the accident landing. Although the PIC was unable to manually deploy the ground spoilers and thrust reversers during the landing roll, they functioned normally during the landing earlier that day and during postaccident operational testing and examination, with no systems failures or malfunctions noted. Additionally, there were no malfunctions or failures with the weight-onwheels system found during postaccident examinations that would have precluded normal operation. Therefore, the PIC's unsuccessful attempts to deploy the ground spoilers and thrust reversers were likely due to errors made while multitasking when presented with an unexpected situation (inadequate deceleration) with little runway remaining. Airplane stopping distance calculations based on the airplane's reported weight, weather conditions, calculated and PIC-reported Vref speed, flap extension, and estimated touchdown point (300 to 500 ft beyond the aiming point marking as reported by the PIC and SIC and corroborated by security camera footage) and assuming the nonuse of the ground spoilers and thrust reversers, operational antiskid and steering systems, and the loss of one brake per side (symmetric half braking) showed that the airplane would have required 690 ft of additional runway; under the same conditions but with thrust reversers used, the airplane still would have required 27 ft of additional runway. Even though there were no antiskid failure annunciations, the PIC switched off the antiskid system, which led to the rupture of the Nos. 1, 3, and 4 tires and likely fractured the No. 1 WSS's coupling subassembly, both of which would have further contributed to the loss of braking action. Therefore, the combination of the failure of a spring in the No. 2 brake's upper BCV and the fracture of the coupling subassembly of the No. 1 WSS, the pilot's failure to attain the proper touchdown point, the slightly excess speed, and the subsequent failure of three of the tires resulted in there being insufficient runway remaining to avoid a runway overrun. Although the BCV manufacturer reported that there was 1 previous case involving a failed BCV spring and 43 instances of units with relaxed springs within the BCVs, none of these failed or relaxed springs would have been detected by maintenance personnel because a focused inspection of the BCV was not required.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight from Canada to California and had landed to clear customs into the United States and to refuel his airplane. The pilot then departed to continue the flight. During the initial climb after takeoff, the engine experienced a total loss of power, and the pilot attempted to make an off-airport forced landing. The right wing struck railroad tracks at the top of a hill, and the airplane continued down an embankment, where it came to rest adjacent to the bottom of a railroad bridge. Postaccident interviews revealed that, when requesting fuel from the fixed-base operator (FBO), the pilot did not specify a grade of fuel to be used to service the airplane. The refueler mistakenly identified the airplane as requiring Jet A fuel, even though the fuel filler ports were placarded "AVGAS (aviation gasoline) ONLY." The fueler subsequently fueled the airplane with Jet A instead of aviation gasoline. Additionally, the fueling nozzle installed on the fuel truck at the time of the refueling was not the proper type of nozzle. Jet A and AvGas fueling nozzles are different designs in order to prevent fueling an airplane with the wrong type of fuel. Following the fueling, the pilot returned to the FBO and signed a receipt, which indicated that the airplane had been serviced with Jet A. There were no witnesses to the pilot's preflight activities, and it is unknown if the pilot visually inspected or obtained a fuel sample before takeoff; however, had the pilot done this, it would have been apparent that the airplane had been improperly fueled.

En route from Saurimo to Luanda, the crew encountered technical problems and was cleared to divert to Malanje Airport for an emergency landing. Upon landing on an unlit runway, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 50 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire. The exact cause of the technical failure remains unknown.

The aircraft departed Quelimane on a cargo/military/supply mission to Mocuba, carrying six crew members and a load of equipment for the victims of the recent flood in northern Mozambique. Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a field and came to rest about 150 metres past the runway end. All six occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.