Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The aircraft was being flown as a route check for for a captain. Another captain was acting as Pilot Monitoring on the flight. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The aircraft was conducting an ILS approach to runway 05 and the controller reported that they would be behind Philippine Airlines flight 809, an Airbus A319. As the Boeing 737 broke out of clouds, the A319 was observed on runway 05. The Pilot Flying informed ATC of his intention to perform a 360° maneuver, but the Pilot Monitoring advised ATC of the opposite, stating that the aircraft would turn right instead of following the missed approach procedure, which called for a left hand turn to a 020° heading. The aircraft re-entered clouds and attempted to fly visually at a lower altitude in instrument conditions when in fact it should have climbed to 4,000 feet. The flight continued over Samal Island and the flight requested a VOR/DME approach and landing in the opposite direction (runway 23), which was approved by the controller. After having aligned with the runway heading, the aircraft descended below the normal glide path for this approach. It continued down to 570 feet at a point where the aircraft should have been at 1,500 feet. The aircraft crashed into a coconut plantation on a hillside in Barangay San Isidro, disintegrated and caught fire. All 131 occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Pepa Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft collided with a flock of birds that struck both engines. The aircraft lost height and crashed past the runway end, bursting into flames. All 24 occupants were killed, among them several officers from the Rwanda Army, one major, two captains, two lieutenants and some soldiers who were returning to Kigali after taking part to a presidential ceremony.

During the takeoff climb, the airplane turned sharply right, went into a steep bank and collided with terrain. The airplane began a right turn immediately after departure and appeared to be going slow. A witness was able to distinguish the individual propeller blades on the right engine, while the left engine propeller blades were indistinguishable. The airplane stopped turning and flew for an estimated 1/4-mile at an altitude of 100 feet. The airplane then continued the right turn at a steep bank angle before disappearing from sight. Then the witness observed a plume of smoke. White and gray matter, along with two ferrous slivers, contaminated the chip detector on the right engine. The airplane had a rudder assist system installed. The rudder assist provided additional directional control in the event of a loss of power on either engine. The NATOPS manual specified that the rudder assist switch should be in the ON position for takeoff, landing, and in the event of single-engine operation. The rudder boost switch was in the off position, and the rudder boost actuator in the empennage was in the retracted (off) position. The owner had experienced a problem with the flight controls the previous year and did not fly with the rudder assist ON. The accident flight had the lowest acceleration rate, and attained the lowest maximum speed, compared to GPS data from the seven previous flights. It was traveling nearly 20 knots slower, about 100 knots, than the bulk of the other flights when it attempted to lift off. The airplane was between the 2,000- and 3,000-foot runway markers (less than halfway down the runway) when it lifted off and began the right turn. Due to the extensive disintegration of the airplane in the impact sequence, the seating positions for the three occupants could not be determined. One of the occupants was the aircraft owner, who held a private certificate with a single-engine land rating, was known to have previously flown the airplane on contract flights from both the left and right seats. A second pilot was the normal copilot for all previous contract flights; his certificates had been revoked by the FAA. The third occupant held an airline transport pilot certificate and had never flown in the airplane before. Prior to the accident flight, the owner had told an associate that the third occupant was going to fly the airplane on the accident flight.

The pilot was departing from Lansing, Michigan, when he reported engine problems. The aircraft subsequently lost power to both engines. Fuel receipts were found that indicate that the aircraft was serviced with 25 gallons of jet fuel in each wing tank. No preexisting anomalies were found with regard to the aircraft or its systems. An FAA inspector interviewed the person that had fueled the aircraft and that person stated he had used a JET-A fuel truck to fuel the accident aircraft. The inspector also interviewed the safety director of the company that provided the fueling service. The safety director told the inspector that the fuel truck used to fuel the accident aircraft was found to have a small nozzle installed on one of the hoses and not the wide nozzle used on jet fueling trucks. He also said that, '...the small nozzle was used for the purpose of fueling tugs at the airport and that the small nozzles were immediately removed from all jet refueling trucks so that this could not happen again.'

The single engine airplane departed Breitscheid Airfield on a local skydiving flight. Once the appropriate altitude was reached, 11 skydivers jumped out and the pilot returned to the airfield with another passenger on board. On final approach, at an altitude of about 280 metres, the parachute of the passenger mistakenly opened in the cockpit. The passenger was caught outside the cabin and collided with the elevators. The aircraft went out of control and crashed in an open field located 1,500 metres short of runway 07 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot and the passenger were killed.

The single engine aircraft departed Saransk on a positioning flight to Malye Alabukhi, carrying two technicians and two pilots who were dispatched in Malye Alabukhi to proceed to crop spraying missions. After touchdown at Malye Alabukhi Airfield, the aircraft was caught by strong crosswinds. It went out of control, veered off runway to the left and eventually collided with a tree. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed Aschaffenburg Airport on a training flight to Hahn with two pilots on board, one instructor and one pilot under supervision who was completing his type rating qualification. On approach to Hahn Airport runway 03 in marginal weather conditions, at an altitude of 4,350 feet and at a speed of 150 knots, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent. The rate of descent was up to 2,800 feet during the last four seconds before the aircraft crashed in an almost vertical position in a wooded area located about 9 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were as follow: overcast with few clouds at 200 feet, light rain possible on approach, moderate icing conditions possible in clouds, visibility one km and RVR runway 03 1,300 metres.

The pilot canceled the IFR flight plan as the aircraft crossed the VOR and reported the airport in site. The last radio contact with Air Traffic Control was at 0935:16. The crew did not report any problems before or during the accident flight. The distance from the VOR to the airport was 4 nautical miles. Witnesses saw the airplane enter right traffic at a low altitude, for a landing on runway 36, then turn right from base leg to final, less than a 1/2-mile from the approach end of the runway. Witnesses saw the airplane pitch up nose high, and the right wing dropped. The airplane than struck trees west of the runway, struck wires, caught fire, and impacted on a hard surface road. This was a training flight for the left seat pilot to retake a Learjet type rating check ride he had failed on March 24, 2000. He failed the check ride, because while performing an ILS approach in which he was given a simulated engine failure, and he was transitioning from instruments to VFR, he allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point below Vref [landing approach speed]. According to the company's training manual, "...if a crewmember fails to meet any of the qualification requirements because of a lack in flight proficiency, the crewmember must be returned to training status. After additional or retraining, an instructor recommendation is required for reaccomplishing the unsatisfactory qualification requirements." The accident flight was dispatched by the company as a training flight. On the accident flight a company check airman was in the right seat, and the check ride was set up for 0800, April 5,2000. The flight arrived an hour and a half late. The left seat pilot's, and the company's flight records did not indicate any training flights, or any other type of flights, for the pilot from March 24, 2000, the date of the failed check flight, and the accident flight on April 5, 2000. The accident flight was the first flight that the left seat pilot was to receive retraining, and was the only opportunity for him to demonstrate the phase of flight that he was unsuccessful at during the check flight on March 24th. Examination of the
airframe and engine did not reveal any discrepancies.

Following a night takeoff from Manzini-Matsapha Airport, the twin engine aircraft struck power cables and crashed. The captain survived while the copilot and the passenger, a company mechanic, were killed. It was reported that a turbocharger fitted to one of the engines was not compliant. Also, the pilot's licence was forged. Poor engine maintenance was identified.

The twin engine aircraft departed La Paz-El Alto Airport on a flight to Santa Cruz, carrying two pilots and two technicians. After takeoff, the crew declared an emergency after the right engine failed during initial climb and was cleared to return. On final, the aircraft crashed 500 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. All four occupants were killed.