North America

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight when, about 8 miles north of his intended destination, he reduced engine power, pitched for level flight, and waited for indicated airspeed to drop below 174 kts to add 20° of flaps. As soon as the drag was introduced, the airplane began to “buck back and forward,” and the two engines were “throttling up and down on their own.” He noted that the right engine seemed to be “sputtering and popping” more than the left engine, so he decided to raise the flaps and to shut down and feather the right engine. He declared an emergency to air traffic control. The pilot then noticed that the left engine was “slowly spooling down” and the airplane was not able to maintain airspeed and altitude. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat, muddy wheat field about 4 nautical miles from the airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and to both wings. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector traveled to the accident site to examine the airplane. Flight control and engine control continuity were confirmed. The master switch was turned on and the fuel gauges showed a zero indication. There was no evidence of fuel at the accident site or in the airplane. During the recovery of the airplane from the field, no fuel was found in the three intact fuel tanks, nor in any of the engine fuel lines. The pilot later stated that he ran the airplane out of fuel during the accident flight. The pilot reported that, during the preflight checks and twice during the accident flight, he activated the low fuel warning light, and no anomalies were noted. Postaccident testing of the low fuel warning light in an exemplar Piper Aerostar 602P revealed no anomalies.

The instrument-rated pilot of the business jet airplane, pilot-rated passenger, and five passengers departed on a cross-country flight and entered the clouds while performing a climbing right turn. The airplane then began to descend, and air traffic control (ATC) asked the pilot to confirm altitude and heading. The pilot did not respond. After a second query from ATC, the pilot acknowledged the instructions. The airplane entered a climbing right turn followed by a left turn. After ATC made several attempts to contact the pilot, the airplane entered a rapid descending left turn and impacted a shallow reservoir at a high rate of speed. Postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage and both engines revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Flight track data revealed that after takeoff, the airplane entered the clouds and made a series of heading changes, along with several climbs and descents, before it entered a steep, descending left turn. This type of maneuvering was consistent with the onset of a type of spatial disorientation known as somatogravic illusion. According to a National Transportation Safety Board performance study, accelerations associated with the airplane’s increasing airspeed were likely perceived by the pilot as the airplane pitching up although it was in a continuous descent. This occurred because the pilot was experiencing spatial disorientation and he likely did not effectively use his instrumentation during takeoff and climb. As a result of the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation, he likely experienced a high workload managing the flight profile, which would have had a further adverse effect on his performance. As such, the airplane entered a high acceleration, unusual attitude, descending left turn from which the pilot was not able to recover. The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger did not report any medication use or medical conditions to the Federal Aviation Administration on their recent and only medical certification examinations. Postaccident specimens were insufficient to evaluate the presence of any natural disease during autopsy. However, given the circumstances of this accident, it is unlikely that the pilot’s or pilot-rated passenger’s medical condition were factors in this accident. Low levels of ethanol were detected in the pilot’s muscle tissue and the pilot-rated passenger’s muscle and kidney tissue; n-butanol was also detected in the pilot’s muscle tissue. Given the length of time to recover the airplane occupants from the water and the circumstances of this accident, it is reasonable that some or all of the identified ethanol in the pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were from sources other than ingestion. Thus, the identified ethanol in the pilot and the pilot-rated passenger did not contribute to this accident.

The airplane departed Myrtle Beach International Airport (MYR), Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, at 1812, with the intended destination of Grand Strand Airport (CRE), North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast and air traffic control (ATC) communications information, the pilot established contact with ATC and reported that he was ready for departure from runway 18. He was instructed to fly runway heading, climb to 1,700 ft mean sea level (msl), and was cleared for takeoff. Once airborne, the controller instructed the pilot to turn left; however, the pilot stated that he needed to return to runway 18. The controller instructed the pilot to enter a right closed traffic pattern at 1,500 ft msl. As the airplane continued to turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, it reached an altitude of about 1,000 ft mean sea level (msl). While on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, the airplane descended to 450 ft msl, climbed to 700 ft msl, and then again descended to 475 ft msl before radar contact was lost. About 1 minute after the pilot requested to return to the runway, the controller asked if any assistance was required, to which the pilot replied, “yes, we’re in trouble.” There were no further radio communications from the pilot. The airplane crashed in a field and was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

A Cirrus SR22 and a Swearingen AS226TC were approaching to land on parallel runways and being controlled by different controllers on different control tower frequencies. The pilot of the Swearingen was established on an extended final approach for the left runway, while the pilot of the Cirrus was flying a right traffic pattern for the right runway. Data from an on-board recording device showed that the Cirrus’ airspeed on the base leg of the approach was more than 50 kts above the manufacturer’s recommended speed of 90 to 95 kts. As the Cirrus made the right turn from the base leg to the final approach, its flight path carried it through the extended centerline for the assigned runway (right), and into the extended centerline for the left runway where the collision occurred. At the time of the collision, the Cirrus had completed about ½ of the 90° turn from base to final and its trajectory would have taken it even further left of the final approach course for the left runway. The pilot of the Swearingen landed uneventfully; the pilot of the Cirrus deployed the airframe parachute system, and the airplane came to rest upright about 3 nautical miles from the airport. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage to their fuselage. During the approach sequence the controller working the Swearingen did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot regarding the location of the Cirrus and the potential conflict. The issuance of traffic information during simultaneous parallel runway operations was required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65Y, which details air traffic control procedures and phraseology for use by persons providing air traffic control services. The controller working the Cirrus did issue a traffic advisory to the Cirrus pilot regarding the Swearingen on the parallel approach. Based on the available information, the pilot of the Cirrus utilized a much higher than recommended approach speed which increased the airplane’s radius of turn. The pilot then misjudged the airplane’s flight path, which resulted in the airplane flying through the assigned final approach course and into the path of the parallel runway. The controller did not issue a traffic advisory to the pilot of Swearingen regarding the location of the Cirrus. The two airplanes were on different tower frequencies and had the controller issued an advisory, the pilot of the Swearingen may have been able to identify the conflict and maneuver his airplane to avoid the collision.

The pilot, who was the owner of the airplane, and the pilot-rated passenger, whose maintenance facility had recently completed work on the airplane, departed on the second of two local flights on the day of the accident as requested by the pilot, since he had not flown the airplane recently. Flight track and engine monitor data indicated that, about 15 minutes after takeoff, fuel flow and engine exhaust gas temperature (EGT) values were consistent with a total loss of left engine power at an altitude about 2,500 ft. Engine power was fully restored about 4 minutes later. Between the time of the power loss and subsequent restoration, the airplane directly overflew an airport and was in the vicinity of a larger airport. It is likely that the left engine was intentionally shut down to practice one engine inoperative (OEI) procedures. Had the loss of power been unanticipated, the pilot would likely have initiated a landing at one of these airports in accordance with the airplane’s published emergency procedure, which was to land as soon as possible if engine power could not be restored; however, data indicated that engine power was restored, and the flight continued back to the departure airport. About 7.5 minutes later, about 6 nautical miles from the departure airport, engine data indicated a total loss of right engine power, followed almost immediately by a total loss of left engine power, at an altitude about 3,500 ft. A battery voltage perturbation consistent with starter engagement was recorded about 1 minute later, followed by a slight increase in left engine fuel flow; however, the data did not indicate that left engine power was fully restored during the remainder of the flight. The airplane continued in the direction of the departure airport as it descended and ultimately impacted a tree and terrain and came to rest upright. A witness saw the airplane flying toward her with the landing gear extended and stated that it appeared as though neither of the two propellers was turning. A doorbell security camera near the accident site captured the airplane as it passed overhead at low altitude. Sound spectrum analysis of the footage indicated that one engine was likely operating about 1,600 rpm while the other was operating at less than 1,000 rpm. The right propeller was found feathered at the accident site. An examination and test run of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left propeller blades exhibited bending, twisting, and chordwise polishing consistent with the engine producing some power at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine and engine-driven fuel pump did not reveal any anomalies. Based on the available information, it is likely that the pilots were conducting practice OEI procedures and intentionally shut down the right engine. The loss of left engine power immediately after was likely the result of the pilot’s failure to properly identify and verify the “failed” engine before securing it, which resulted in an inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. Although partial left engine power was restored before the accident (as indicated by fuel flow values, damage to the left propeller, and sound spectrum analysis of security camera video), the left engine power available was inadequate to maintain altitude for reasons that could not be determined, and it is likely that the pilot was performing a forced landing when the accident occurred. It is also likely that the pilot’s decision to conduct intentional OEI flight at low altitude resulted in reduced time and altitude available for troubleshooting and restoration of engine power following the inadvertent shutdown of the left engine. The 67-year-old pilot was a Canadian national and had never applied for a Federal Aviation Administration medical certificate. According to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the pilot was issued a category 1 license with knowledge of a previous condition and knowledge of currently taking Xarelto (rivaroxabam). No acute or historical cardiovascular event was found on autopsy. Toxicology testing detected the sedating antihistamine cetirizine just below therapeutic levels in the pilot’s blood. A very low concentration of the narcotic pain medication codeine was detected in the pilot’s blood and urine; codeine’s metabolite morphine was also detected in his urine. The mood stabilizing medication lamotrigine was detected but not quantified in the pilot’s blood and urine. Thus, the pilot was taking some impairing medications and likely had a psychiatric condition that could impact decision-making and performance; however, given the circumstances of the accident, including the presence of the pilot-rated passenger to operate the airplane, the effects from the pilot’s use of cetirizine, codeine, and lamotrigine were not likely factors in this accident.

The pilot in command (PIC) and second-in-command (SIC) completed an uneventful positioning flight to pick up passengers and then continued to the destination airport. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information revealed that, while en route, the PIC expressed a desire to complete the flight as quickly as possible and arrive at the destination before another airplane that was also enroute to the destination airport, presumably to please the passengers. The PIC compared the flight with an automobile race, and the airplane’s overspeed warning annunciated multiple times during the descent. The flight crew elected to conduct a straight-in visual approach to land. Throughout the final approach, the airplane was high and fast, as evidenced by the SIC’s airspeed callouts. When the SIC asked whether s-turns should be made, and the PIC responded that such turns were not necessary. An electronic voice recorded by the CVR repeatedly provided “sink rate” and “pull up” warnings while the airplane was on final approach, providing indications to the crewmembers that the approach was unstable, but they continued the landing. The airplane touched down about 1,000 ft down the 4,200-ft-long runway. The PIC described that the airplane’s wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and ground air brakes did not function after touchdown, but witness and video evidence showed that the thrust reversers deployed shortly after touchdown. In addition, tire skid marks indicated that wheel braking occurred throughout the ground roll and increased heavily during the final 1,500 ft of the runway when the antiskid system activated. The ground air brakes did not deploy. The airplane overran the runway and came to rest about 400 ft past the departure end of the runway in marshy terrain. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage. The switch that controlled the automatic deployment of the ground air brake system was found in a position that should have allowed for their automatic deployment upon landing. There was no evidence to indicate a preaccident mechanical malfunction or failure with the hydraulic system, wheel brakes, thrust reversers, and weight-on-wheel switches, or electrical issues with either air brake switches. The airplane’s ground air brake deployment system logic required that both throttle levers be below 18° (throttle lever angle) in order to activate. The accident airplane’s throttle lever position microswitches were tested after the accident. The left throttle microswitch tested normal, but the right throttle microswitch produced an abnormal electrical current/resistance during initial testing. When the throttle was touched and then further manipulated by hand, the electrical resistance tested normal. The investigation was unable to determine whether the intermittent right throttle microswitch resistance prevented the ground air brakes from deploying because the testing was inconclusive. Landing performance calculations showed that, without ground air brakes, the landing ground roll exceeded the runway that was available from the airplane’s touchdown point about 1,000 ft down the runway. Mobile phone video evidence revealed that a quartering tailwind of about 10 to 15 knots persisted during the landing, which exceeded the manufacturer’s tailwind landing limitation of 10 knots for the airplane, and thus would have further increased the actual ground roll distance beyond that calculated. Throughout the final approach, the flight crew received several indications that the approach was unstable. The flight crew was aware that the airplane was approaching the runway high, fast, and at an abnormal sink rate. Both pilots had an opportunity to call for a go-around, which would have been the appropriate action. However, it is likely that the external pressures that the PIC and SIC accepted to complete the flight as quickly as possible influenced their decision-making in continuing the approach.

The pilot was flying a non precision approach in instrument meteorological conditions at night. While flying the procedure turn for the approach, the airplane’s speed decayed toward the stall speed before the airplane accelerated back to the standard approach speed. During the descent from the final approach fix, the airplane’s descent stopped for about 30 seconds and then the airplane descended at a rate of about 1,300 ft per minute. The airplane decelerated and continued to descend until the airspeed was about 85 knots (about 7 knots above the calculated stall speed for flaps 20°) and the altitude was 500 ft mean sea level. The last recorded data point showed the airplane about 460 ft mean sea level and 750 ft from the accident site. The airplane impacted a private residence, and a postcrash fire ensued and destroyed the airplane. Impact signatures were consistent with a low-energy impact. Examination of the airframe and engines did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. Signatures on the engines and propellers were consistent with both engines providing power at impact. A review of the pilot’s toxicological information found that the level of eszopiclone in his specimens was subtherapeutic and thus not likely a factor in the accident. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with an inadvertent aerodynamic stall from which the pilot was unable to recover.

The pilot was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight and climbing to a planned altitude of 23,000 ft mean sea level (msl). According to air traffic control data, as the airplane climbed through 18,600 ft msl, its groundspeed was 171 knots, and a gradual reduction in groundspeed began. After reaching an altitude of about 20,200 ft msl, the airplane began a descent on a southeast heading. Just before the descent began, the airplane’s groundspeed had decreased to 145 knots. About 2 minutes after the descent began, the airplane turned right to a northeast heading on which it continued for about 30 seconds. The flightpath then became erratic before the data ended. The pilot made no distress calls and did not respond to repeated calls from the controller. The main wreckage of the airplane was located in densely forested terrain at an elevation of about 930 ft about 1,000 ft south of the last radar return. The outboard portion of the right wing, right aileron, right horizontal stabilizer, and right elevator were not located with the main wreckage and, despite ground and aerial searches with a small unmanned aircraft system, were not found. Examination of the wreckage indicated that the missing wing and tail sections separated in flight due to overload. Examination of the recovered airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any pre-existing mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Weather forecasts indicated that the accident site was in an area where moderate icing conditions up to 25,000 ft msl, embedded thunderstorms, and 2-inch hail were forecasted. Review of preflight weather information received by the pilot indicated that he was aware of the conditions forecast on the route of flight before initiating the flight. Meteorological data revealed that the airplane likely entered icing conditions that ranged from light to heavy as it climbed through 14,000 ft msl about 23 minutes after takeoff and remained in icing conditions for the remaining 16-minute duration of the flight. Freezing drizzle conditions were likely present along the flightpath. Although the airplane was equipped for flight in icing conditions, the pilot’s operating handbook contained a warning about flight into severe icing conditions, which stated that flight in freezing drizzle could result in ice build-up on protected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection system. The airplane’s gradual loss of groundspeed as it climbed was consistent with ice accumulating on the airplane. It is likely that during the 16 minutes the airplane was operating in icing conditions, the capability of the ice protection system was exceeded, which resulted in a degradation of aircraft performance and subsequent aerodynamic stall. During the ensuing uncontrolled descent, the structural capability of the airplane was exceeded, which resulted in an inflight break up. A review of the pilot’s records revealed multiple certificate application failures for reasons that included inadequate knowledge of cross-country flight planning, aircraft performance, and stalls. Review of the pilot’s airman knowledge written tests found areas answered incorrectly over multiple exams included meteorology, aircraft performance, aeronautical decision-making, and stalls. The ethanol identified in the pilot’s cavity blood was most likely the result of postmortem production. Therefore, effects from ethanol did not play any role in this accident. The cargo was documented as it was removed from the airplane and remained secure until after it was weighed. Based upon the weight of the cargo, passengers, airplane, and fuel from the filed flight plan, at the time of departure, the airplane would have been about 361 lbs over maximum gross weight. According to the FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, an overloaded airplane “may exhibit unexpected and unusually poor flight characteristics,” which include reduced maneuverability and an increased stall speed.

The pilot was conducting a personal flight and was descending the airplane to the destination airport. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that the airplane accomplished several turning maneuvers near the airport. These turns occurred from an elevation of 6,000 to 4,950 ft mean sea level, at which time the data ended. The airplane was 80 ft above ground level at the time. Witnesses reported seeing a low-flying airplane perform a turn and then veer toward the ground. The airplane came to rest about 4 miles east of the destination airport and 70 ft from the last data target. A postcrash fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines found no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the left engine revealed that the engine was likely producing power. The right engine examination revealed damage consistent with low or no rotation at the time of the accident, including distinct, localized contact marks on the rotating propeller shaft. In addition, no metal spray was found in the turbine section, and no dirt was found within the combustor section. The examination of the right propeller blades showed chordwise scoring with the blades bent aft and twisted toward a low-pitch setting. Examination of the fuel system noted no anomalies. The airplane was equipped with a single redline (SRL) autostart computer. Examination of the right (R) SRL-OFF annunciator panel light bulb showed signatures of hot filament stretch, which was consistent with illumination of the light at the time of the accident. The SRL light normally extinguishes above an engine speed of 80% rpm. Given the low rotational signatures on the right engine and the illuminated “R SRL-OFF” warning light, it is likely that the right engine lost engine power during the flight for reasons that could not be determined.

The pilot was planning to perform a functional test of the airplane’s newly upgraded autopilot system. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data showed that, after takeoff, the airplane turned east and climbed to 2,750 ft. Air traffic control information indicated that the controller cleared the pilot to operate under visual flight rules to the east of the airport. Communications between ground control, tower control, and the pilot were normal during the ground taxi, takeoff, and climb. Radio and radar communications were lost 6 minutes after takeoff, and no radio distress calls were received from the pilot. The airplane impacted wooded terrain about 3/4 mile to the east of the last recorded radar data point. Groundspeeds and headings were consistent throughout the flight with no abrupt deviations. The airplane impacted the wooded terrain in a nose-down, near-vertical flight attitude. Most of the airplane, including the fuselage, wings, and empennage, were consumed by a postimpact fire. Both engines and propellers separated from the airplane at impact with the ground. Examination of the engines revealed no preaccident failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operations. Both propellers showed signs of normal operation. Flight control continuity was confirmed. The elevator trim cables stop blocks were secured to the cables and undamaged. They were found against the forward stop meaning the trim tab was at full down travel (elevator leading edge full down) which indicated that the airplane was trimmed full nose up at impact. The airplane’s cabin sustained fragmentation from impact and was consumed by fire; as a result, the autopilot system could not be examined. The investigation was unable to determine why the pilot lost control of the airplane.