Ground fire of a Tupolev TU-204-100C in Hangzhou

Date & Time: Jan 8, 2022 at 0440 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-64032
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hangzhou - Novosibirsk
MSN:
145074 2 2 64032
YOM:
2002
Flight number:
4B6534
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Parked on the apron at Hangzhou-Xiaoshan Airport, the airplane was prepared for a cargo service to Novosibirsk with 8 crew members and a load of 20 tons of various goods on board. A fire erupted in the cargo compartment. The crew evacuated the aircraft and was uninjured while the aircraft was partially destroyed by fire and broke in two.

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BK in Irkutsk: 9 killed

Date & Time: Nov 3, 2021 at 1945 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EW-518TI
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Yakutsk - Irkutsk
MSN:
8 34 61 07
YOM:
1968
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Captain / Total flying hours:
14625
Captain / Total hours on type:
11182.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5168
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight, carrying two passengers, seven crew members and a load consisting of foods. While on a night approach to Irkutsk-Intl Airport Runway 30, the crew encountered poor visibility due to snow falls. On final, at a height of about 240 metres, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure when the aircraft impacted trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 3,1 km short of runway 30. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all nine occupants were killed.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Dagi Baru

Date & Time: Oct 29, 2021 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PK-RVH
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dekai - Dagi Baru
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Dekai-Nop Goliat Airport for a short cargo flight to the Dagi Baru Airstrip with two pilots on board. Weather conditions were considered as good upon arrival. After landing, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest down a ravine. Both occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in Ilaga: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 25, 2021 at 0810 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-SNN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Timika - Ilaga
MSN:
208-0556
YOM:
2014
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
On final approach to Ilaga Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to foggy conditions. The single engine airplane impacted ground near the runway 25 threshold, lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. One of the pilot was killed.

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E3 in Menzelinsk: 16 killed

Date & Time: Oct 10, 2021 at 0911 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RF-94591
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Menzelinsk - Menzelinsk
MSN:
87 18 26
YOM:
1987
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Menzelinsk for a local skydiving mission, carrying 20 skydivers and two pilots. During initial climb, the crew reported technical problems with the left engine and elected to return for an emergency landing. The aircraft lost height and eventually struck a concrete wall before coming to rest on a wood piles. Six passengers were rescued while 14 other occupants were killed.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26KPA near Khabarovsk: 6 killed

Date & Time: Sep 22, 2021 at 1811 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-26673
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Khabarovsk - Khabarovsk
MSN:
84 08
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
11990
Captain / Total hours on type:
3276.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
530
Copilot / Total hours on type:
390
Aircraft flight hours:
36881
Circumstances:
The airplane was engaged in a calibration mission at Khabarovsk-Novy Airport, carrying six crew members. The goal of the flight was to caliber the ILS system of runway 05R. In the afternoon, the airplane departed Khabarovsk-Novy Airport and completed several circuits over the aerodrome and the area. The crew was instructed to climb away from the airport to an altitude of 600 metres and to turn to follow the reverse approach course. However, the minimum published altitude for that sector up to a distance of 46 km was fixed to 1,200 metres. The crew continued at an altitude of 600 metres with a heading of 220° for few minutes. While initiating a slight climb and while flying at an altitude of 742 metres in poor visibility due to marginal weather conditions, the airplane impacted trees and crashed on the wooded slope of Mt Khrebtovaya (793 metres high) located in the Bolchoï Khekhtsir Mountain Range, some 40 km southwest of Khabarovsk Airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all six occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the airplane was flying over the radio beacons of runway 05R of Khabarovsk-Novy) Airport in instrumental meteorological conditions (IMC) at an altitude of 600 metres QFE, which was significantly lower than the established minimum safe altitude of 1,200 metres QFE in the sector where the accident occurred, which led to a collision with the mountain slope and resulted in a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).

The following contributing factors were identified:
- Lack of current regulatory documents governing the conduct of flight inspections of ground-based flight support equipment, avionics, and civil aviation lighting equipment systems, including for airfields whose topographical features do not allow inspections to be conducted according to standard procedure;
- Unreasonable establishment of a continuous exclusion zone from 0 m to 6000 m by altitude within a radius of 99900 m from KTA for the function of signaling aircraft descent below the minimum safe altitude (MSAW), which excluded issuing a corresponding warning to a DPC dispatcher;
- Absence of the ATC Dispatcher's Work Procedure at the ATC and other documents of the ATC of EU ATS (Khabarovsk):
- procedure for ATC specialists when flying over the aerodrome's RMS;
- procedure for practical training of ATC specialist performing direct ATC under the control of ATC instructor, including their interaction and responsibility for ensuring flight safety.
- Making a decision to combine two sections of trainee navigator training without the necessary risk analysis and risk mitigation measures;
- Insufficient preliminary preparation of the crew for the overflight, including failure to take into account the terrain features (presence of zones with considerable elevation) and geographical features (proximity to the state border) of the airfield, as well as the presence in the crew of a trainee navigator not admitted to independent flights and to this particular type of work;
- Insufficient cooperation between the crew and ATC specialists when preparing and performing the overflight, including coordination by the crew and ATC specialists during the flight of the maneuver with violation of the established minimum safe altitude when performing a flight under instrumental weather conditions;
- Interference of the instructor navigator in the flight procedure (route change) without assessing the relevant risks in the absence of the pilot's control;
- Failure of the trainee navigator to comply with the operating procedures in terms of comprehensive use of aircraft equipment for precise piloting, maintenance of safe altitudes and timely informing the crew about turns, as well as lack of proper control over his actions on the part of the instructor navigator;
- Lack of control over the aircraft flight by the trainee controller and instructor controller at their minimum workload (controlling only the aircraft which had suffered a crash).
- The Operator's Flight Operations Manual lacked standard operating procedures for crew operation regarding the EGPWS Mark VIII system installed on board the aircraft. There were no warnings of this system during the flight. Probably, the system was not activated by the crew prior to the flight, maybe to avoid frequent activation during the flight. Due to the complete destruction of the system as a result of the crash, it was impossible to determine the cause of its failure. A proper use of this system may have prevent the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Bilogai: 3 killed

Date & Time: Sep 15, 2021 at 0730 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PK-OTW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Nabire – Bilogai
MSN:
493
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
13158
Captain / Total hours on type:
8051.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
974
Copilot / Total hours on type:
807
Aircraft flight hours:
10333
Aircraft flight cycles:
1569
Circumstances:
On 15 September 2021, a DHC-6-300 (Twin Otter) aircraft registered PK-OTW was being operated for an unscheduled cargo flight from Douw Aturure Airport (WABI), Nabire, Papua to Bilorai Airport (WAYB), Intan Jaya, Papua. The aircraft was operated by two pilots accompanied by one engineer on board. The filed flight plan for the flight indicated that the aircraft would be operated under Visual Flight Rule (VFR) with fuel endurance of 2 hours 30 minutes. The estimate time departure for the flight was at 0640 LT. At 0610 LT, the pilot received weather observation report from the Bilorai aeronautical communication officer (ACO) that the visibility was 5 up to 7 kilometers, several clouds over the airport and all final areas were clear. About 7 minutes later, the ACO updated the observation report which indicated that the visibility changed to 7 up to 8 kilometers (km). After the cargo loading process and the flight preparation had completed, the aircraft taxied to Runway 16. At 0644 LT, the aircraft departed and climbed to the cruising altitude of 9,500 feet. Prior to the departure, there was no record or report of aircraft system malfunction. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM) while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF). At 0658 LT, the PK-OTW pilot reported to the Nabire air traffic control that the aircraft was at 25 Nm with altitude of 9,500 feet. At 0702 LT, the SIC asked the PIC to have the aircraft control as PF. During flight, the PK-OTW pilots monitored weather information provided by the pilots of two other aircraft that flew ahead of the PK-OTW to Bilorai. Both pilots monitored that the first aircraft (Cessna 208B EX) landed using Runway 27 while the second aircraft (Cessna 208B) would use Runway 09. At 0715 LT, the PIC advised the SIC to use the Runway 27 for landing. At 0719 LT, the SIC made initial contact with the ACO and advised that the aircraft was approaching Bilai at altitude of 9,500 feet and the estimate time arrival at Bilorai was 0726 LT. The ACO acknowledged the pilot report and provided current weather observation as follows “…wind westerly 3 until 5 knots, final 09 open with broken fog and final 27 open, visibility 5 until 7 km, blue sky overhead”. The SIC acknowledged the weather information and advised the ACO would report when the aircraft position was on left downwind Runway 27. At 0721 LT, the SIC read the descent checklist included the item of Landing Data/Approach Briefing and was replied by completed. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) did not record any pilot’s discussion regarding to the airport minimum safe altitude since the beginning of the recording. At 0723 LT, a pilot of DHC-6-400 aircraft registered PK-OTJ, asked the PK-OTW pilot of the weather condition in Bilorai. The PK-OTJ flew behind the PK-OTW with from Nabire to Bilorai. The SIC then responded that the PK-OTW was on descend and would fly through clouds about 5 Nm to Bilorai. Thereafter, the ACO provided traffic information to PK-OTW pilot that there was an aircraft (Cessna 208B aircraft) on final Runway 09. The PIC who acted as PF acknowledged the traffic information and advised to the ACO that the PK-OTW would join left downwind Runway 27 for the landing approach. At 0725 LT, the SIC advised to the ACO that the aircraft was on left downwind Runway 27. The ACO then advised the PK-OTW pilot to report when on final Runway 27. At 07:26:12 LT, a stall warning recorded in the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) then the PIC asked to the SIC to check the aircraft speed. The SIC responded the aircraft speed was 65 knots. At 07:26:16 LT, the PIC asked to the SIC to advise the ACO that they were making a go around. The SIC then advised the ACO that the PK-OTW was making a go around and was responded to report when on final. The CVR did not record pilot’s discussion about the plan maneuver of the go around. At 07:26:45 LT, the PIC informed that they were making a go around to the PK-OTJ pilot. The PK-OTJ pilot responded that the aircraft was approaching Homeyo and would reduce the speed to make enough separation with the PK-OTW. The PIC then advised the PK-OTJ that the PK-OTW would attempt to land using Runway 09. Based on the data transmitted from the flight following system, at 07:27:57 LT, the aircraft was about 3 Nm outbound from Bilorai on direction of 238°. At 07:28:22 LT, the PK-OTJ pilot advised to the ACO that the aircraft was about 6 nm to Bilai and the pilot intended to make holding maneuver over Bilai to make enough separation with the PK-OTW. At 07:28:33 LT, the SIC advised the PIC that the aircraft was at 8,200 feet and was responded that the PIC initiated turning the aircraft. A few second later, the SIC advised to the PIC that the aircraft was turning, and the aircraft was at 3.2 Nm outbound from Bilorai. At 07:28:38 LT, the last data of the flight following system recorded that the aircraft was on direction of 110°. At 07:29:25 LT, the SIC advised the PIC to fly left. Thereafter, the SIC advised the PIC that the aircraft was passing 8,000 feet. At 07:29:35 LTC, the PIC asked to the SIC about the distance to Bilorai and was responded 2.5 Nm. The SIC, reminded the PIC to fly left as the aircraft flew too close to the terrain. At 07:29:49 LT, the CVR recorded the first impact sound and the CVR recording stopped at 07:29:55 LT. At 0730 LT, the ACO asked the PK-OTW pilot intention as the aircraft was not visible from the ACO working position, and the pilot did not respond the ACO. At about the same time, the ACO heard impact sound that was predicted coming from terrain area on west of Bilorai. The ACO then called the PK-OTW pilot several times without response. Several pilots also attempted to contact the PK-OTW with the same result. The PK-OTW was found on a ridge at elevation of 8,100 feet, about 2 Nm on bearing 260° from Bilorai.

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E20 in Kazashinskoye: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 12, 2021 at 2251 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-67042
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Irkutsk – Kazashinskoye
MSN:
14 29 16
YOM:
2014
Flight number:
SL51
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
5623
Captain / Total hours on type:
4625.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1385
Copilot / Total hours on type:
693
Aircraft flight hours:
5481
Aircraft flight cycles:
3632
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane was supposed to depart Irkust at 1435LT but the flight had been delayed for several hours. On approach to Kazashinskoye Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to the night and fog. On final approach to runway 04, at an altitude of 130 metres, the crew initiated a go-around procedure as he was unable to establish a visual contact with the ground. Few minutes later, during a second attempt to land, the crew descended to the height of 10 metres when he initiated a second go-around procedure, again for the same reason. The airplane climbed to an altitude of 400 metres then the crew made a 180 turn in an attempt to land on runway 22. In below minima weather conditions, the airplane deviated 1,100 metres to the right of the runway 22 extended path, descended into trees and crashed in a wooded area located about 3 km from the airport. Three passengers and a pilot were killed while 12 others occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of the crew's non-compliance with the rules for visual flights at night, which was expressed in making an approach to land with visibility below the established minimum values, leading to a collision with natural obstacles and resulting in a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The discrepancy between the coordinates of the runway thresholds at Kazachinskoe in the GPS receivers of the aircraft commander and the co-pilot and their actual values, which led to an incorrect calculation for landing ;
- The failure of the aircraft commander to make a timely decision to divert to an alternate airport despite having information about the meteorological conditions not meeting the established minimum values. The individual psychological characteristics of the aircraft commander allowed him to make leadership decisions, but in the case of their erroneousness, he did not possess the ability to correct them and was inclined to unjustifiably risky, dangerous decisions ;
- The crew's use of the autopilot in the final stage of flight, which did not comply with the Flight Operations Manual. The autopilot modes selected significantly reduced the crew's situational awareness. In fact, the descent was carried out significantly to the right of the extended runway centerline over an area that lacked light landmarks ;
- The lack of proper interaction within the crew and insufficient monitoring of flight parameters.
Final Report:

Crash of an Ilyushin II-112V in Kubinka: 3 killed

Date & Time: Aug 17, 2021 at 1118 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RF-41400
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kubinka - Kubinka
MSN:
01-01
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
On August 13, the aircraft (first prototype of this new model) departed the aviation plant at Voronezh Airport on a flight to Moscow-Zhukovsky, preparing for a demonstration flight at the 7th Military Technical Forum. On August 17, the crew departed Zhukovsky for a test flight to Kubinka Airport where the aircraft landed at 1109LT. Four minutes after takeoff at 1114LT, while flying at low altitude in a flat attitude, the right engine caught fire. 35 seconds later, while the crew elected to reach the airport, the aircraft rolled to the right, got inverted and crashed in a wooded area located 2,5 km short of runway 22. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed. This first exemple was dedicated to the Russian Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily) and was also registered 01 yellow.
Crew:
Nikolay Dmitrievich Kuimov, test pilot,
Dmitry Komarov, test pilot,
Nikolai Khludeyev, flight engineer.

Crash of a Beriev Be-200Chs near Kahramanmaraş: 8 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2021
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RF-88450
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
64620090311
YOM:
2020
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
Owned and operated by the Russian Navy, the aircraft was dispatched in Turkey in July to help the Turkish government (General Directorate of Forestry) to fight raging forest fires in the southeast part of the country. On board were eight crew members, five Russian and three Turkish. After the aircraft drop water on fire, the crew elected to gain height when the aircraft impacted terrain and crashed on the slope of a mountain, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 8 occupants were killed.