Landing (descent or approach)

The airplane touched down about 1/3 beyond the approach end of Runway 28, a 5,000 footlong, asphalt runway. The PIC stated, 'as usual,' he applied 'light' braking and attempted to actuated the airplane's thrust reverser (TR) system; however, the TR handles could not be moved beyond the 'Deploy-Reverse-Idle' position. After the PIC cycled the levers two or three times, he began to apply maximum braking. A passenger in the airplane stated he looked out of the cockpit window, saw the end of the runway, and the airplane seemed like it was still moving 'pretty fast.' As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he could see smoke, which he believed was coming from the airplane's tires. He then sensed the airplane was falling. The co-pilot stated he had no memory at all of the accident flight. Review of the CVR revealed the co-pilot said that the airplane was 'Vref plus about twenty,' when the airplane was 100 feet over the runway threshold. The PIC could not recall the airplane's touchdown speed, however, he stated that it seemed like the airplane was still traveling 50 to 60 knots when it departed the end of the runway. A pair of parallel tire marks were observed 3,200 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. The tire marks extended past the end of the runway and onto a 106 foot-long grass area. The airplane came to rest on a plateau about 90 feet below the runway elevation. Examination of the airplane, including the optional TR system did not reveal any pre-impact malfunctions. The airplane's estimated landing distance was calculated to be about 3,100 feet. The PIC reported about 4,700 hours of total flight experience, of which, 107 hours were in make and model. The PIC stated he had never performed a landing in the accident airplane without using the TR system. Winds reported at the time of the accident were from 290 degrees at 15 knots, with 21 knot gusts.

The aircraft departed São Paulo-Congonhas on a training flight to Ribeirão Preto-Leite Lopes Airport, carrying five crew members, instructor and pilots. On final approach to runway 18, during the last segment, just prior to touchdown, the aircraft rolled to the right, causing the right wing tip to struck the runway surface. The pilot-in-command overcorrected, the aircraft went out of control and crashed 420 metres past the first impact, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed.

The pilot reported that prior to takeoff, he completed a preflight inspection of the airplane that included checking the engine oil quantity. The line personnel topped off the oil reservoirs, and reportedly secured the engine oil reservoir filler caps. Approximately two minutes into the flight, the right engine oil pressure warning light illuminated. The pilot informed Palm Beach Approach Control of the engine oil pressure problem, shut down the right engine, and returned to Lantana. As the flight approached runway 03, the pilot heard a radio transmission from another airplane taxiing for takeoff. As the pilot continued the approach, with full flaps extended, he elected to go-around 1500 feet from the approach end of the 3000-foot runway. The airplane collided with the ground during the go-around maneuver to runway 15. The wreckage examination also disclosed that the right cowling showed oil streaming back from behind the engine and onto the wing strut. Inspection of the oil filler cap revealed that it had not been properly installed.

The pilot was receiving a competency flight in the seaplane from an FAA inspector. The pilot was returning to their initial departure airport, descended to 1,000 feet, contacted the control tower for landing instructions, and was instructed to enter on a right base. Before he could acknowledge the landing instructions the engines started to make loud, rough, and unusual noises. The pilot informed the control tower that he was 2 miles south , declared an emergency, and stated he had a bad engine on the left side. The FAA inspector stated the pilot started the emergency procedure, the manifold pressure and rpm was fluctuating. The inspector could not determine the dead engine by the dead foot, dead engine method, because her rudder pedals were stowed. She pointed out a pasture and the pilot stated they were going to the water. She did not recall the pilot shutting down the engine or feathering the propeller. She could not recall the final seconds of the flight. The airplane collided with a tree, canal bank, and came to rest inverted in the canal. Examination of the airframe and flight control systems revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the left propeller revealed it was not feathered. The No. 6 front forward spark plug ignition lead was disconnected from the spark plug. The ignition lead shroud threaded coupling on the No. 4 front forward spark plug was unscrewed and the carbon wire was exposed. The left and right engines were removed from the airplane and transported to an authorized FAA approved repair station. The left engine was placed in an engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. The spark plug lead was removed from the No.6 forward cylinder. The left magneto had a 125 rpm drop during the magneto check. The right magneto had a 75 rpm drop. The magneto drop exceeded the allowable drop indicated by the engine overhaul manual. The right engine was placed in a engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. Review of the FAA inspectors FAA Form 4040.6 revealed she was not Event Based Current (EBC) for the 4th quarter of the Flight Standards EBC program, and she did not meet the EBC quarterly events required by the end of the 14-day grace period. FAA Order 4040.9 states for an FAA inspector to be eligible / assigned to perform flight certification job function they must be EBC current., and inspectors should not accept assignments without being in compliance with the FAA Order. Managers and supervisors should not assign inspectors who are not current. The FAA inspector's supervisor was aware that the inspector was not current. He contacted the FAA Safety Regulation Branch, FAA Southern Region Headquarters, and stated that FAA Southern Region indicated that the inspector could administer the checkride. FAA Southern Region stated at no time did they approve or agree to an operation outside the parameters of the FAR's, Inspector Handbook or FAA Order.

Following an uneventful flight from Dubai, the crew completed the approach to Rhodes-Diagoras Airport in rain falls and strong winds. The aircraft landed at a speed of 166 knots, about 22 knots above Vref. After touchdown, the ground spoilers did not deploy automatically because they had not been armed. Consequently the auto brake system, which operates by the deployment of spoilers, did not activate. The crew attempted manual braking but this operation was too late and the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All 271 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight was a pilot self-dispatched, non-scheduled cargo flight from Goose Bay to Davis Inlet, Newfoundland, and was operating as Speed Air 960 under a defence visual flight rules flight plan. Before the flight, the captain received weather information from the St. John's, Newfoundland, flight service station (FSS) via telephone and fax. The aircraft departed for Davis Inlet at 0815 Atlantic standard time (AST). The captain was the pilot flying (PF). During the first approach, the first officer (FO) had occasional visual glimpses of the snow on the surface. The captain descended the aircraft to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1340 feet above sea level (asl). When the crew did not acquire the required visual references at the missed approach point, they executed a missed approach. On the second approach, the captain flew outbound from the beacon at 3000 feet asl until turning on the inbound track. It was decided that if visual contact of the surface was made at any time during the approach procedure, they would continue below the MDA in anticipation of the required visual references. The captain initiated a constant descent at approximately 1500 feet per minute with 10 degrees flap selected. The FO occasionally caught glimpses of the surface. At MDA, in whiteout conditions, the captain continued the descent. In the final stages of the descent, the FO acquired visual ground contact; 16 seconds before impact, the captain also acquired visual ground contact. At 8 seconds before impact, the crew selected maximum propeller revolutions per minute. The aircraft struck the ice in controlled flight two nautical miles (nm) from the airport (see Appendix B). During both approaches, the aircraft encountered airframe icing. The crew selected wing de-ice, which functioned normally by removing the ice.

On approach to Mucuri-Itabatã Airport runway 05, the right engine caught fire. The crew followed the checklist, continued the approach and completed a safe landing. After touchdown, the aircraft slightly deviated to the right and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 14 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After takeoff, the airplane returned to the departure airport for an emergency landing. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the runway threshold, about 500 feet above the ground, with it's left propeller feathered, when it entered a left bank which increased to about 90 degrees. The airplane then entered a spin, descended, and impacted the ground. Examination of wreckage revealed the camshaft of the left engine had failed as a result of a fatigue crack. No other abnormalities were observed of airframe or engine. The left engine had accumulated about 1,200 hours since overhaul. The pilot purchased the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident. At that time, he reported 700 hours of flight experience in multi-engine airplanes, of which, 10 hours were in the make and model of the accident airplane.

On approach to Pohang Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and strong winds. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure and started a second approach few minutes later. On approach to runway 10, the wind component changed and the crew continued the descent with a 20 knots tailwind. At an excessive speed of 158 knots, the aircraft landed 1,500 feet past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 10 is 7,000 feet long), overran, struck a 3 metres high embankment and came to rest in a ravine, broken in two. All 156 occupants were rescued, among them 60 passengers were injured, two seriously.

While descending to New Delhi-Indira Gandhi Airport runway 10, the crew encountered poor visibility due to thick fog and requested ATC assistance. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck successively a concrete water tank and power cables then crashed in the Pappankalan district, about 2,4 km short of runway. The aircraft and a building were destroyed. All 18 occupants were killed as well as three people on the ground.