Landing (descent or approach)

The airline transport rated pilot was attempting to land under visual flight rules for a scheduled passenger pick-up and subsequent charter flight. The pilot was communicating with a pilot at the airport, who was utilizing a hand held radio. The accident pilot reported he was not able to see the runway lights due to ground fog and continued to circle the airport for about 20 minutes. The pilot on the ground stated the airplane appeared to be about 1,500 feet above the ground when it circled, and then entered a downwind for runway 26. He was not able to hear or see the airplane as it flew away from the airport. He then began to hear the airplane during its final approach. The airplane's engines sounded normal. He then heard a "terrible sound of impact," followed by silence. When he arrived at the accident site, the airplane was fully engulfed in flames. The airplane impacted trees about 80-feet tall, located about 2,000 feet from, and on a 240 degree course to the approach end of runway 26. Several freshly broken tree limbs and trunks, up to 15-inches in diameter, were observed strewn along a debris path, which measured 370 feet. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any pre-impact malfunctions. The weather reported at an airport about 19 miles south-southeast of the accident site, included a visibility of 1 3/4 miles, in mist, with clear skies and a temperature and dew point of 17 degrees Celsius. Witnesses in the area of the accident site generally described conditions of "thick fog" and a resident who lived across from the accident site stated visibility was "near zero" and he could barely see across the road.

Following an uneventful flight from Iqaluit, the twin engine aircraft bounced twice upon landing. The crew completed the braking procedure 'normally' then vacated the runway and parked the airplane on the apron. After all 10 occupants disembarked, technicians realized that the fuselage was severely damaged and the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.

The airplane had just taken off and was climbing through 9,000 feet when the pilot heard "a very loud explosive sound" that came from the right side of the aircraft. He returned to the airport and landed. When the airplane touched down, it began veered to the right and the pilot attempted to correct. The airplane departed the right side of the runway and the right main landing gear collapsed, driving it through the top of the wing. Half of the right main tire (30 hours total time in service) and most of its inner tube (with a round section blown out) were found at the point of touch down. Missing was the valve stem. Continuous S-shaped marks indicated the tire came off the rim.

The flight made two instrument approaches to minimums and executed two missed approaches before the crew elected to land about 25 miles south and wait for the low ceiling condition to improve. An hour later, having topped off fuel tanks, confirmed by telephone that destination weather was improving, the flight re-launched to their original destination. They executed a GPS-A, (circling) instrument approach, broke out of instrument conditions about 100 ft. above minimums, (600 feet, agl) and about one mile from the runway, and started a right downwind turn to enter a left base leg for landing runway 30. During the turn to final approach, the crew extended the landing gear and flaps for landing, and according to the copilot, the pilot flew through the extended runway centerline requiring a, " teardrop turn back toward the runway. In the turn the bank angle was about 45 degrees, the descent rate increased rapidly and a faint warning [stall warning] sounded, the nose then pitches down and [the PIC] screams as he shoves both throttles full forward and using both hands pulls the yoke back and as soon as the nose came above the horizon the plane impacted the ground wings were fairly level mains hit first and we paralleled the runway about fifty feet or so to the right of the runway". The impact sheared the landing gear, shed the propellers, broke the engines from their mounts, started a fire in the left engine, and broke open the fuselage 3 feet aft of the cabin pressure bulkhead. The two pilots and three of four passengers received minor injuries, and one passenger received serious injuries. The cockpit voice recorder was shipped to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC. Readout of data recorded from the cockpit area microphone revealed that 6.4 seconds before impact the stall warning sounded, and 4.4 seconds before impact the altitude alerter sounded.

The flight, during which the accident occurred, was part of a non-scheduled international cargo flight from Gdansk (EPGD) to Louisville (KSDF). The flight crew had previously on August 4, 2001, on another charter flight, flown the aircraft from Hanover (EDDV) to Palma de Mallorca (LEPA) and then to EPGD in order to bring the aircraft in position for the cargo flight. The flight was chartered by a cargo courier to depart EPGD at 2000 hrs on August 4, 2001, and arrive at KSDF at 0900 hrs on August 5, 2001. Technical landings (fuel uplift) were planned at EKCH in Denmark, at Keflavik (BIKF) in Iceland, at BGBW in Greenland and at Sept-Iles (CYZV) in Canada. The aircraft had a two hour delay at LEPA due to a slot time. For that reason, the aircraft did not arrive at EPGD until 2106 hrs. The aircraft was refuelled and the flight crew loaded the cargo themselves. The aircraft departed EPGD at 2218 hrs and arrived at EKCH at 2238 hrs. Then the aircraft departed EKCH at 2313 hrs and arrived at BIKF at 0202 hrs. At BIKF, the aircraft was refuelled with 1034 USG of JET A1. The commander filed an ATC flight plan for BGBW with Kangerlussuaq (BGSF) in Greenland as destination alternate. At BIKF no weather reports for BGBW were valid for the flight crew’s flight planning. The handling agent directed the Commander’s attention to the lack of updated weather reports for BGBW, but the Commander seemed not to be concerned. It was the general opinion of the handling agent that the Commander seemed stressed. At 0246 hrs, the flight crew requested start up and shortly after they got an ATC clearance to BGBW via EMBLA, 63N 30W, 62N 40W and NA at FL 240 with cruise Mach at 0.76. The aircraft departed BIKF at 0300 hrs and the flight crew got an ATC clearance with FL 260 as the final cruising level inbound BGBW. The First Officer was the pilot flying and the Commander was the pilot non-flying. At 0423:24 hrs, the Commander contacted Narsarsuaq Flight Information Service (FIS) on frequency 121.300 MHz. The Commander reported that they expected to be overhead NA (358 KHz) at 0438 hrs. At this time, the aircraft was cruising at FL 260 and was inbound NA on a magnetic track of 280° approximately 50 nm east of the aerodrome. Through link to Gander ATC, Narsarsuaq FIS cleared the aircraft to descend out of controlled airspace on QNH 1004 and to report FL 195 descending. The Commander was now the pilot flying and the First Officer was the pilot non-flying. The Commander had experience of flying to BGBW. The aircraft left FL 260, and at 0434:27 hrs, the First Officer reported that the aircraft was passing FL 195. Narsarsuaq FIS requested the flight crew to report 10 nm from the aerodrome. While descending, the flight crew made a briefing on the NDB/DME approach procedure to runway 07. At 0437:00 hrs, the First Officer reported that the aircraft was 10 NM from NA. Narsarsuaq FIS requested the flight crew to contact Narsarsuaq AFIS on frequency 119.100 MHz. At 0437:17 hrs, the flight crew was in contact with Narsarsuaq AFIS and the First Officer reported passing FL 130. The AFIS Operator reported that there was no reported traffic in the TIZ and that the flight crew could make an approach by their own discretion. The weather was reported to be a wind direction and speed of 080° at 24 knots, visibility 10 kilometres with broken clouds at 6000 feet and overcast at 9000 feet, light rain, temperature +14°C, dew point +3°C and the QNH 1004 hPa. At 0440:26 hrs and at 0440:52 hrs, one of the flight crewmembers made cockpit call outs of passing 6 nm and 8 nm respectively outbound from NA. At 0441:45 hrs, one of the flight crewmembers made a cockpit call out of the aircraft being on base. The Commander ordered the extension of the landing gear. With reference to the CVR read out, there were no audible flight crew call outs concerning the use of checklists, altitude checks and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) during the descent, the initial and the final approach phase. At 0442:29 hrs, the First Officer reported that the aircraft was on final to runway 07. The AFIS operator reported the threshold wind for runway 07 to be 070° at 22 knots gusting to 29 knots and the runway to be free. The AFIS operator made a visual scan of the approach sector, but he did not see the aircraft, as he normally would have, when an aircraft was established on final in dark night and under similar weather conditions. At approximately 0443:07 hrs, the aircraft impacted in landing configuration mountainous terrain at approximately 700 feet msl. The accident occurred 4.5 nm southwest of the aerodrome. On the CVR read out, there were no audible flight crew call outs immediately before the impact. Several times from 0452 hrs until 0459 hrs, Narsarsuaq AFIS tried to get in radio contact with the aircraft, but there was no reply.

The airplane was on final approach to land at Hilton Head Airport, when according to witnesses, it suddenly rolled to the right, and descended, initially impacting trees at about the 70-foot level, and then impacting the ground. A fire then ensued upon ground impact, and the debris field spanned about 370 feet along an azimuth of about 082 degrees. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that left wing flap actuator and jack nut measurements were consistent with the wing flaps being extended to 40 degrees, and on the right wing the flap jack nut and actuator measurements were consistent with the right flap being extended to about a 20-degrees. In addition, the right flap torque tube assembly between the flap motor and the flap stop assembly had disconnected, and the flap torque tube assembly's female coupler which attaches to the male spline end of the flap motor and flap stop assembly was found with a cotter pin installed through the female coupler of the flap stop assembly. The cotter pin, had not been placed through the spline and the coupler consistent with normal installation as per Mitsubishi's maintenance manual, or as specified in Airworthiness Directive 88-23-01. Instead, the cotter pin had missed the male spline on the flap motor. In addition, the flap coupler on the opposite side of the flap motor was found to also found to not have a cotter pin installed. Company maintenance records showed that on April 3, 2001, about 87 flight hours before the accident, the airplane was inspected per Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88-23-01, which required the disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of the flap torque tube joints. In addition, on July 9, 2001, the airplane was given a phase 1 inspection, and Bankair records showed that a company authorized maintenance person performed the applicable maintenance items, and certified the airplane for return to service.

Following an uneventful flight from Sana'a, the three engine aircraft landed on runway 25 at Asmara-Johannes IV Airport. After touchdown on a wet runway surface, the crew started the braking procedure and the thrust reverser systems were activated. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 25 is 3 km long), the aircraft overran and collided with a concrete block, causing the left main gear to be torn off. All 140 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, wind was from 200 at 6 knots and the runway surface was wet due to recent rain falls. The exact touchdown point could not be determined and all braking systems were available and properly used after landing. The aircraft collided with a concrete block located beside a runway light just past the runway end.

he float-equipped aircraft had landed at Minstrel Island and was taxiing to the dock when the pilot of a company aircraft that was following C-GNWS to the dock radioed that he saw smoke coming from the lower right area of C-GNWS's engine cowling. The pilot of C-GNWS docked the aircraft, unloaded the three passengers and emptied a fire extinguisher onto the burning aircraft. The fire was not extinguished and the aircraft was pushed away from the dock where it burnt to the water.

After a normal cross country flight, the airplane was on final approach for landing to runway 20, when the air traffic controller instructed the pilot to "go-around" because a preceding airplane had not cleared the runway. The airplane was observed to pitch up and enter a steep, almost 90 degree left bank. The passenger in the rear seat described the flights from and to BAF as "smooth." She stated she thought that the airplane would be landing; however, then realized the airplane was in a left turn. The airplane impacted on the roof of a commercial building, and came to rest upright on a heading of 020 degrees, in a parking lot, about 1/4 mile east of the approach end the runway. Examination of the airplane, which included a teardown of the engine, did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact malfunctions. Weather reported at the airport about the time of the accident included winds from 240 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 10 status miles and few clouds at 6,500 feet. The pilot owned the airplane and had accumulated about 1,660 hours of total flight experience.

On Friday 20 July 2001, at around 0450, Partenavia P68B ZK-DMA was abeam North Shore Aerodrome at 5000 feet in darkness and enroute to Whangarei, when it suffered a double engine power loss. The pilot made an emergency landing on runway 21 at North Shore Aerodrome, but the aircraft overran the end of the runway, went through a fence, crossed a road and stopped in another fence. The pilot was the only person on board the aircraft and received face and ankle injuries. The aircraft encountered meteorological conditions conducive to engine intake icing, and ice, hail or sleet probably blocked the engine air intakes. The pilot had probably developed a mindset that dismissed icing as a cause, and consequently omitted to use alternate engine intake air, which should have restored engine power.