Landing (descent or approach)

On December 27, 2021, about 1914 Pacific standard time, a Gates Learjet Corporation 35A, N880Z, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near El Cajon, California. The 2 pilots, and 2 flight nurses were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 repositioning flight. Earlier in the day, the flight crew had flown from Lake Havasu City Airport (HII), Lake Havasu, Arizona, to John Wayne / Orange County Airport (SNA), Santa Ana, California, for a patient transfer. They departed SNA about 1856 to reposition to their home base at Gillespie Field (SEE), El Cajon, California. Review of preliminary communication recordings revealed that at 1908:23, the pilot contacted the SEE Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and reported to the controller they were on the GPS approach to runway 17. The controller issued the current wind and cleared the pilot to land on runway 17. At 1912:03, the pilot reported the airport in sight and requested to squawk VFR. The controller did not acknowledge the request to squawk VFR, however, he reissued the landing clearance for runway 17. At 1912:13, the pilot requested to land on runway 27. The controller asked the pilot if they wanted to cancel their IFR flight plan, to which the pilot replied, “yes sir.” The controller acknowledged that the IFR cancelation was received and instructed the pilot to overfly the field and enter left traffic for runway 27R and cleared them to land runway 27R. At 1912:30, the pilot requested that the runway lights for runway 27R be increased, however, the controller informed them that the lights were already at 100 percent. Preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that after departure from SNA, the flight made a left turn out over the waters of the Pacific Ocean and flew generally south – southeast along the coast and ascended to a cruise barometric altitude of about 11,000 ft sea level (MSL). After the flight passed Carlsbad, California, the airplane turned left and began to descend toward SEE. As shown in figure 1, ADS-B data showed that the airplane overflew SEE at a barometric altitude of about 775 ft MSL (407 ft above ground level) and entered a left downwind for runway 27R. While on the downwind leg, the airplane descended to a barometric altitude of 700 ft MSL, then ascended to a barometric altitude of 950 ft MSL while on the base leg. The last recorded ADS-B target was at 1914:09, at a barometric altitude of 875 ft MSL. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck a set of power lines and subsequently impacted the yard of a residential home about 1.43 nautical miles east of the approach end of runway 27R. The airplane came to rest upright on a heading of about 118°, at an elevation of about 595 ft msl. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a heading of about 310° and was about 186 ft long and 90 ft wide. All major structural components of the airplane were located throughout the wreckage debris path. The wreckage was recovered to a secure location for further examination. At 1855, recorded weather data at SEE showed weather conditions were variable wind at 5 knots, visibility of 3 statute miles, mist, broken cloud layer at 2,000 ft, overcast cloud layer at 2,600 ft, temperature of 10° C, dew point temperature of 8° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury. No precipitation was indicated. At 1955, SEE reported a variable wind of 5 knots, visibility 3 statute miles, mist, broken cloud layer at 1,100 ft, overcast cloud layer at 2,600 ft, temperature of 10°C, dew point temperature of 8°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.96 inches of mercury. No precipitation was indicated.

The aircraft departed Goma on a cargo flight to Shabunda, carrying two conveyors and three crew members. On approach to Shabunda Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions when the arcraft crashed 15 km from the airport. All five occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed La Isabela-Dr. Joaquín Balaguer Airport on a charter flight to Orlando, carrying six passengers and three crew members. Shortly after takeoff, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to divert to Santo Domingo-Las Américas Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the aircraft went out of control and crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed, among them the Portorican music artist José Angel Hernández aka Flow La Movie. According to a preliminary report, the crew encountered technical problems with the spoilers and maintenance was performed to change the ground spoiler actuators. After maintenance, the crew completed a ground check and while all spoilers properly deployed on both wings, only the spoilers on the left wing retracted as the spoilers on the right wing remained deployed. The crew failed to notice this asymetry. Immediately after takeoff, the crew reported controllability problems and elected to return but finally decided to divert to Las Américas Airport. The aircraft eventually went out of control and crashed 16 minutes after takeoff.

During an instrument approach at night in a twin-engine turboprop airplane, the pilot reported an engine failure, but did not specify which engine. About 9 seconds later, the airplane impacted terrain about ¼-mile short of the runway and a postcrash fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. During that last 9-second period of the flight, the airplane’s groundspeed slowed from 99 kts to 88 kts, as it descended about 400 ft in a slight left turn to impact (the airplane’s minimum controllable airspeed was 92 kts). The slowing left turn, in conjunction with left wing low impact signatures observed at the accident site were consistent with a loss of control just prior to impact. Postaccident teardown examination of the left engine revealed that the 1st stage turbine rotor had one blade separated at the midspan. The blade fracture surface had varying levels of oxidation and the investigation could not determine if the 1st stage turbine blade separation occurred during the accident flight or a prior flight. The 2nd stage turbine was operating at temperatures higher than the 1st stage turbine, which was consistent with engine degradation over a period of time. Additionally, the 2nd stage turbine stator assembly was missing vane material from the 6 to 12 o’clock positions, consistent with thermal damage. All of these findings would have resulted in reduced performance of the left engine, but not a total loss of left engine power. The teardown examination of the right engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of both propellers revealed that all blade angles were mid-range and exhibited evidence of little to no powered rotation. Neither propeller was in a feathered position, as instructed by the pilot operating handbook for an engine failure. If the pilot had perceived that the left engine had failed, and had he secured the engine and feathered its propeller (both being accomplished by pulling the red Engine Stop and Feather Control handle) and increased power on the right engine, the airplane’s performance should have been sufficient for the pilot to complete the landing on the runway.

The pilot was conducting a solo night cross-country flight in low visibility through mountainous terrain. The pilot was then cleared by an air traffic controller to conduct a RNAV (GPS)-E instrument approach into the destination airport. After passing the final approach fix and before the missed approach point, the pilot, for an unknown reason, executed a left turn, consistent with the missed approach procedure. During the turn toward the holding waypoint, the airplane did not climb. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted steep rising terrain The local weather at the time of the accident indicated a cloud ceiling of 1,200 ft above ground level and 1 statute mile visibility, which was below the weather minimums for the approach. Data retrieved from the onboard avionics revealed that although the pilot flew the published route in accordance with the instrument approach procedure, the minimum required altitudes were not adhered to. A review of the ForeFlight weather briefing data indicated that a route weather briefing had been generated by the pilot with the filing of the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. While no weather imagery was reviewed during the period, the pilot had checked METARs for the destination and another nearby airport before departure and viewed the RNAV (GPS)-E approach procedure at the destination airport. A review of the data that was presented to the pilot indicated that visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the destination with light snow in the vicinity at the time it was generated. Based on the preflight weather briefing the pilot obtained, he was likely unaware of the IFR conditions and below minimum weather conditions at the destination until he descended into the area and obtained the current local weather during the flight. It is probable that, based upon the weather and flight track information, as the pilot was on the instrument approach, he became aware of the below minimum weather conditions and elected to initiate the missed approach, as evident by the turn away from the airport similar to the missed approach procedure and the flaps and landing gear being in transition. This investigation was unable to determine why the missed approach procedure was prematurely initiated and why the airplane failed to climb. Additionally, there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies found during a postaccident examination that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot was conducting a scheduled air taxi flight with five passengers onboard. Shortly after departure, the pilot began to smell an electrical burn odor, and he elected to return to the airport. About 1 minute later, the electrical burn smell intensified, which was followed by visible smoke in the cockpit, and the pilot declared an emergency to the tower. After landing and all the passengers had safely departed the airplane, heavy smoke filled the cockpit and passenger compartment, and the pilot saw a candle-like flame just behind the pilot and co-pilot seats, just beneath the floorboards of the airplane. Moments later, the airplane was engulfed in flames. Postaccident examination of the airframe revealed the origin of the fire to be centered behind the pilot’s row of seats, where a wire harness was found improperly installed on top of the aft fuel line from the left tank. Examination of the wire harness found a range of thermal and electrical damage consistent with chafing from the fuel line. It is likely that the installation of the wire harness permitted contact with the fuel line, which resulted in chafing, arcing, and the subsequent fire.

While on final approach, the airplane gradually slowed to near its stall speed. About 600 ft beyond the last recorded data, the airplane impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude that was consistent with a stall. Postaccident examination revealed no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have contributed to the accident. Witnesses near the accident site reported very heavy sleet with low visibility conditions, whereas a witness located near the final approach flightpath, about 2 miles before the accident site observed the airplane fly by below an overcast cloud layer with no precipitation present. Based on the witness accounts and weather data, the airplane likely entered a lake effect band of heavy sleet during the final portion of the flight. The airplane was modified with 5-bladed propellers, and other pilots reported it would decelerate rapidly, especially when the speed/propeller levers were moved to the high rpm (forward) position. The pilot usually flew a larger corporate jet and had not flown the accident airplane for 8 months. The passenger was a student pilot with an interest in becoming a professional pilot. The pilot’s poor airspeed control on final approach was likely influenced by a lack of recency in the turboprop airplane. The workload of inflight deicing tasks may have also contributed to the poor airspeed control. The aerodynamic effects of the heavy sleet that was encountered near the accident site likely contributed to the stall to some degree.

A pilot-rated witness observed the airplane during the final approach to the destination airport and stated that the airplane was flying slowly, with a high pitch attitude, and was “wallowing” as if nobody was flying. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground about 300 ft from the runway. GPS and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data captured the accident flight, but the ADS-B data ended about 0.24 miles before the accident. GPS data showed that the airplane’s speed was at or near the published stall speed for the airplane’s given loading condition. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. Examination of the airplane verified flight and engine control continuity. No preimpact anomalies were found with respect to the airplane, engines, or systems. The pilot allowed the airspeed to decrease during the approach, increased pitch attitude, and exceeded critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin into terrain.

The twin engine airplane departed Goiânia-Santa Genoveva Airport on a taxi flight to Caratinga, carrying three passengers and two pilots. On final approach to Caratinga-Ubaporanga Airport in VFR conditions, the airplane collided with a lightning rod located on the top of a high-voltage pylon. Upon impact, the left engine was torn off and the airplane stalled before crashing in a river bed located about 4,1 km short of runway 02. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and all five occupants were killed, among them the Brazilian singer Marília Mendonça aged 26.

The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight, carrying two passengers, seven crew members and a load consisting of foods. While on a night approach to Irkutsk-Intl Airport Runway 30, the crew encountered poor visibility due to snow falls. On final, at a height of about 240 metres, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure when the aircraft impacted trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 3,1 km short of runway 30. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all nine occupants were killed.