Flight

On November 6, 2020, about 1600 Pacific standard time, a Pilatus PC-12, N400PW, was substantially damaged when it was ditched in the Pacific Ocean about 1000 miles east of Hilo, Hawaii. The two pilots sustained no injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 ferry flight. According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), who was also the ferry company owner, he and another pilot were ferrying a new airplane from California to Australia. The first transoceanic leg was planned for 10 hours from Santa Maria Airport (KSMX), Santa Maria, California to Hilo Airport (PHTO), Hilo, Hawaii. The manufacturer had an auxiliary ferry fuel line and check valve installed in the left wing before delivery. About 1 month before the trip, the pilot hired a ferry company to install an internal temporary ferry fuel system for the trip. The crew attempted the first transoceanic flight on November 2, but the ferry fuel system did not transfer properly, so the crew diverted to Merced Airport (KMCE), Merced, California. The system was modified with the addition of two 30 psi fuel transfer pumps that could overcome the ferry system check valve. The final system consisted of 2 aluminum tanks, 2 transfer pumps, transfer and tank valves, and associated fuel lines and fittings. The ferry fuel supply line was connected to the factory installed ferry fuel line fitting at the left wing bulkhead, which then fed directly to the main fuel line through a check valve and directly to the turbine engine. The installed system was ground and flight checked before the trip. According to Federal Aviation Administration automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) data, the airplane departed KSMX about 1000. The pilots each stated that the ferry fuel system worked as designed during the flight and they utilized the operating procedures that were supplied by the installer. About 5 hours after takeoff, approaching ETNIC intersection, the PIC climbed the airplane to flight level 280. At that time, the rear ferry fuel tank was almost empty, and the forward tank was about 1/2 full. The crew was concerned about introducing air into the engine as they emptied the rear ferry tank, so the PIC placed the ignition switch to ON. According to the copilot (CP), she went to the cabin to monitor the transparent fuel line from the transfer pumps to ensure positive fuel flow while she transferred the last of the available rear tank fuel to the main fuel line. When she determined that all of the usable fuel was transferred, and fuel still remained in the pressurized fuel line, she turned the transfer pumps to off and before she could access the transfer and tank valves, the engine surged and flamed out. The PIC stated that the crew alerting system (CAS) fuel low pressure light illuminated about 5 to 15 seconds after the transfer pumps were turned off, and then the engine lost power and the propeller auto feathered. The PIC immediately placed the fuel boost pumps from AUTO to ON. The CP went back to her crew seat and they commenced the pilot operating handbook’s emergency checklist procedures for emergency descent and then loss of engine power in flight. According to both crew members, they attempted an engine air start. The propeller unfeathered and the engine started; however, it did not reach flight idle and movement of the power control lever did not affect the engine. The crew secured the engine and attempted another air start. The engine did not restart and grinding sounds and a loud bang were heard. The propeller never unfeathered and multiple CAS warning lights illuminated, including the EPECS FAIL light (Engine and Propeller Electronic Control System). The crew performed the procedures for a restart with EPECS FAIL light and multiple other starts that were unsuccessful. There were no flames nor smoke from either exhaust pipe during the air start attempts. About 8,000 ft mean sea level, the crew committed to ditching in the ocean. About 1600, after preparing the survival gear, donning life vests, and making mayday calls on VHF 121.5, the PIC performed a full flaps gear up landing at an angle to the sea swells and into the wind. He estimated that the swells were 5 to 10 ft high with crests 20 feet apart. During the landing, the pilot held back elevator pressure for as long as possible and the airplane landed upright. The crew evacuated through the right over wing exit and boarded the 6 man covered life raft. A photograph of the airplane revealed that the bottom of the rudder was substantially damaged. The airplane remained afloat after landing. The crew utilized a satellite phone to communicate with Oakland Center. The USCG coordinated a rescue mission. About 4 hours later, a C-130 arrived on scene and coordinated with a nearby oil tanker, the M/V Ariel, for rescue of the crew. According to the pilots, during the night, many rescue attempts were made by the M/V Ariel; however, the ship was too fast for them to grab lines and the seas were too rough. After a night of high seas, the M/V Ariel attempted rescue again; however, they were unsuccessful. That afternoon, a container ship in the area, the M/V Horizon Reliance, successfully maneuvered slowly to the raft, then the ship’s crew shot rope cannons that propelled lines to the raft, and they were able to assist the survivors onboard. The pilots had been in the raft for about 22 hours. The airplane was a new 2020 production PC-12 47E with a newly designed Pratt and Whitney PT6E-67XP engine which featured an Engine and Propeller Electronic Control System. The airplane is presumed to be lost at sea.

The single engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances near Balad Airport while completing a local mission. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both pilots were killed.

Probably engaged in an illegal flight, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in an isolated and swampy area located in the Laguna del Tigre National Park. The wreckage was found on November 2 about 7 km south from the Mexican border. Two dead bodies were found and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft, assigned to Airborne Command & Control Squadron (VAW) 120 Fleet Replacement Squadron, departed Norfolk-Chambers Field NAS on a training flight. In the afternoon, the crew encountered an unexpected situation, abandoned the aircraft and bailed out. Out of control, the aircraft entered a dive and crashed in a field located near Wallops Island. All four occupants parachuted to safety while the aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

The pilot-in-command seated in the right seat was providing familiarization in the multiengine airplane to the left seat pilot during a flight to a nearby airport for fuel. Shortly after takeoff, one of the pilots reported an engine problem and advised that they were diverting to a nearby airport. A witness along the route of flight reported hearing the engines accelerating and decelerating and then popping sounds; several witnesses near the accident site reported hearing no engine sounds. The airplane impacted a building and terrain about 10 minutes after takeoff. Very minimal fuel leakage on the ground was noted and only 23 ounces of aviation fuel were collected from the airplane’s five fuel tanks. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted for either engine or propeller; the damage to both propellers was consistent with low-to-no power at impact. Since the pilot could not have visually verified the fuel level in the center fuel tank because of the low quantity of fuel prior to the flight, he would have had to rely on fuel consumption calculations since fueling based on flight time and the airplane’s fuel quantity indicating system. Although the fuel quantity indications at engine start and impact could not be determined postaccident from the available evidence, if the fuel quantity reading at the start of the flight was accurate based on the amount of fuel required for engine start, taxi, run-up, takeoff, and then only to fly the accident flight duration of 10 minutes, it would have been reading between 8 and 10 gallons. It is unlikely that the pilot, who was a chief pilot of a cargo operation and tasked with familiarizing company pilots in the airplane, would have knowingly initiated the flight with an insufficient fuel load for the intended flight or with the fuel gauge accurately registering the actual fuel load that was on-board. Examination of the tank unit, or fuel quantity transmitter, revealed that the resistance between pins A and B, which were the ends of the resistor element inside the housing, fell within specification. When monitoring the potentiometer pin C, there was no resistance, indicating an open circuit between the wiper and the resistor element. X-ray imaging revealed that the conductor of electrical wire was fractured between the end of the lugs at the wiper and for pin C. Bypassing the fractured conductor, the resistive readings followed the position of the float arm consistent with normal operation. Visual examination of the wire insulation revealed no evidence of shorting, burning or damage. Examination of the fractured electrical conductor by the NTSB Materials Laboratory revealed that many of the individual wires exhibited intergranular fracture surface features with fatigue striations in various directions on some individual grains. It is likely that the many fatigue fractured conductor strands of the electrical wire inside the accident tank unit or fuel transmitter resulted in the fuel gauge indicating that the tanks contained more fuel than the amount that was actually on board, which resulted in inadequate fuel for the intended flight and a subsequent total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. The inaccurate fuel indication would also be consistent with the pilot’s decision to decline additional fuel before departing on the accident flight. While the estimated fuel remaining since fueling (between 15 and 51 gallons) was substantially more than the actual amount on board at the start of the accident flight (between 8 and 10 gallons), the difference could have been caused by either not allowing the fuel to settle during fueling, and/or the operational use of the airplane. Ultimately, the fuel supply was likely completely exhausted during the flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of power to both engines. Given the circumstances of the accident, the effects from the right seat pilot’s use of cetirizine and the identified ethanol in the left seat pilot, which was likely from sources other than ingestion, did not contribute to this accident.

The aircraft entered the Venezuelan airspace without flight plan and authorisation. While flying over the Paraguaña Peninsula at low altitude, the crew was forced to land when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in shallow water few meters offshore, lost its tail and both wings. Both pilots were killed.

Operated by Babcock Spain, the aircraft was stationed at Castelo Branco Airport in Portugal on behalf of the Civil Security of Portugal (Autoridade Nacional de Emergência e Proteção Civil).. The airplane departed Castelo Branco Airfield at 0815LT with a second CL-215 and was dispatched over the region of Lindoso, at the border with Spain, to fight a fire. While approaching the area to treat, the airplane was too low and impacted ground, causing the tail to detach. The aircraft crashed on a rocky area located near Lobios, on Spanish territory. The cockpit was destroyed upon impact and the Portuguese copilot aged 66 was killed while the Spanish captain aged 39 was seriously injured and transferred to an hospital in Alto Minho.

According to the pilot, he and the copilot were flying low-level mapping flights in the twin-engine airplane. Although the copilot was not multi-engine rated, he and the pilot regularly switched control of the airplane during the mapping flights. On the accident flight, the pilot was seated in the right seat; the copilot was seated in the left seat; and they were flying the airplane at an altitude of about 300 ft above ground level. According to the pilot, they flew for about 2 hours before he, who was the pilot flying at the time, switched fuel tanks from the inboard tanks to the outboard tanks. The pilot did not tell the copilot he had switched fuel tanks. About 1.5 hours later, while the copilot was the pilot flying, the left engine started to surge and lose power. The pilot began the steps of the emergency procedure for an engine failure in cruise flight starting with moving the fuel selectors to the inboard tanks. Power was not restored; the airplane immediately began losing altitude; and the pilot took over control of the airplane. The copilot stated that at the time the pilot took over control, he looked at the fuel tank quantity gauges, and they both displayed zero. The pilot reported that the airplane stalled just above the ground during the emergency landing in a field. The right wing struck first, and within a couple of seconds, the right outboard fuel tank exploded. The pilot and copilot egressed out the rear door. Examination of the wreckage revealed that neither engine exhibited evidence of power at impact. The left outboard fuel tank was found completely full of fuel, and the left inboard fuel tank was empty. Both right wing tanks were fire damaged, and the fuel quantity in the tanks at impact could not be determined. Further examination revealed that the fuel crossfeed valve was in the “crossfeed/open” position. No fuel was observed in the valve or attached fuel lines during disassembly. The left fuel selector valve was found in the “OFF” position, and no fuel was observed within the fuel line between the valve and gascolator. The right fuel selector valve was damaged by fire, and its position at impact could not be determined. No other anomalies were noted in the engines or airframe. According to the pilot, all fuel tanks were full before the flight. According to the pilot’s operating manual, the airplane likely consumed about 33.1 gallons of fuel per hour or a total of about 115 gallons of fuel during the 3.5-hour flight. Given that the inboard fuel cells held 56 gallons each (112 gallons total), that the left inboard tank was found empty, and that the copilot noticed that the fuel gauges were reading zero just before impact, it is likely that each engine was drawing fuel from its respective inboard tank throughout the flight until those tanks were empty. The left engine lost power first, and the right engine likely lost power just before impact. The postaccident positions of the crossfeed valve (on) and the left fuel selector (off) did not correspond to the pilot’s statements regarding his positioning of the fuel selector valves during the flight. The fuel panel was located between and behind the pilots’ seats and required the pilots to look down and back in order to see the panel when making changes to the panel; therefore, it is likely the pilot misconfigured the valves when he switched tanks 2 hours into the flight, when he switched tanks after the left engine lost power, or on both occasions. It is unlikely the copilot would have been able to see an incorrect switch selection on the fuel panel due to the location of the panel, and he would have been unlikely to look at the 2-hour point as the pilot did not verbalize that a change to the panel had been made.

The twin engine aircraft departed Puerto Plata-Gregorio Luperón Airport at 1718LT on a flight to Santa Cruz de Barahona. En route, the pilot was informed that this airport is closed to all traffic after 1700LT and decided to return to Puerto Plata. A last radio communication was recorded with ATC when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens eight minutes later. Dominican authorities thought the aircraft may have crashed in the septentrional mountain range and SAR operations were initiated. Few hours later, the wreckage was found in a marshy area of the Lake Maracaibo, more than 1,000 km south of Puerto Plata. All three occupants were found alive and arrested while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Venezuelan authorities reported the aircraft and its occupants were engaged in an illegal narcotic flight.

On July 31, 2020, about 0827 Alaska daylight time, a de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N4982U, and a Piper PA-12 airplane, N2587M, sustained substantial damage when they were involved in an accident near Soldotna, Alaska. The pilot of the PA-12 and the pilot and the five passengers on the DHC-2 were fatally injured. The DHC-2 was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand charter flight. The PA-12 was operated as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The float-equipped DHC-2, operated by High Adventure Charter, departed Longmere Lake, near Soldotna, about 0824 bound for a remote lake on the west side of Cook Inlet. The purpose of the flight was to transport the passengers to a remote fishing location. The PA-12, operated by a private individual, departed Soldotna Airport, Soldotna, Alaska, (PASX) about 0824 bound for Fairbanks, Alaska. Flight track data revealed that the DHC-2 was traveling northwest about 78 knots (kts) groundspeed and gradually climbing through about 1,175 ft mean sea level (msl) when it crossed the Sterling Highway. The PA-12 was traveling northeast about 1,175 ft msl and about 71 kts north of, and parallel to, the Sterling Highway. The airplanes collided about 2.5 miles northeast of the Soldotna airport at an altitude of about 1,175 ft msl. A witness located near the accident site observed the DHC-2 traveling in a westerly direction and the PA-12 traveling in a northerly direction. He stated that the PA-12 impacted the DHC-2 on the left side of the fuselage toward the back of the airplane. After the collision, he observed what he believed to be the DHC-2's left wing separate, and the airplane entered an uncontrolled, descending counterclockwise spiral before it disappeared from view. He did not observe the PA-12 following the collision.