Piedmont Airlines

During arrival, Piedmont flight 467 was vectored for an ILS runway 36R approach. At 2001 cdt (approximately 7 minutes before landing), all arriving flights were advised the weather was (in part): 400 feet overcast, visibility 2 miles with light rain and fog, wind from 090° at 8 knots. Runway 05/32 was out of-svc at that time. Flight 467 was vectored for right turns (from north and west) onto final approach. At 2002:42, the ATC final controller told another flight (same frequency) that there was a 20 to 25 knots right crosswind on final approach. When flight 467 was cleared for landing at 2005:36, the surface wind was reported from 100° at 4 knots. The aircraft was not configured for landing until just before touchdown and the copilot did not alert the captain of the deviation. The aircraft landed approximately 3,200 feet from the threshold and the captain was unable to stop on the wet runway. After departing the runway, the aircraft hit an ILS antenna and a culvert, then went thru a fence and stopped beside railroad tracks. Reportedly, the captain added 20 knots to approach speed for possible wind shear and delayed spoiler option after touchdown. There was evidence of hydroplaning and poor frictional quality on last 1,500 feet of runway. Three passengers received back injuries; both pilots and one flight attendant had minor injuries.

Flight 230 was a scheduled domestic flight from Louisville, Kentucky, to Roanoke, Virginia, with en-route stops at Cincinnati, Ohio and Charleston, Kanawha County Airport, West Virginia. The flight to Cincinnati was routine. At 0805 hours eastern daylight time the flight departed Cincinnati on an IFR clearance to Charleston via Victor Airways 128 south to York, thence Victor 128 to Charleston, to maintain 9 000 ft. At 0835 hours the flight contacted the Charleston Tower to request the latest weather information, which was provided as: sky partially obscured, visibility 4 mile fog and smoke, runway 23 visibility less than 1/8 of a mile. Shortly thereafter it was cleared by the Indianapolis ARTCC to the Milton Intersection (10 miles west-northwest of the Charleston VORTAC on Victor 128) and to descend to and maintain 5 000 ft. At approximately 0841 hours the flight contacted Charleston Approach Control and reported leaving 6 000 for 5 000 ft. The controller advised the flight that radar contact had been established and instructed the flight to take a 070' heading for a vector to the holding pattern at the ILS outer marker. The latest weather was also given at this time as: sky partially obscured, visibility 4 mile, fog and smoke, runway visibility runway 23 zero, altimeter setting 29.94 in. The flight was then provided with holding instructions to be followed upon arrival over the outer marker compass locator (LOM) and was given an expected approach time of 0915 hours subject to weather conditions. At 0850 hours prior to reaching the LOM, the flight was instructed to turn right to a heading of 140°, cleared to descend to 2 400 ft and advised that the runway visibility for runway 23 had improved to seven-eighths of a mile. At 0851 hours the flight was advised that it was seven miles northeast of the outer locator, instructed to turn right to a 200' heading and cleared for an ILS approach. The flight acknowledged the clearance and it shortly thereafter was advised by the approach controller that the glide path was out of service. At 0852 hours the flight was advised that it was 5 miles from the LOM and instructed to contact Charleston Tower on 120.3 MHz. At 0853 hours radio contact with the flight was established by the tower local 'controller who cleared the flight to land. By that time the landing check had been completed by the crew and descent was established at a fairly constant rate of descent of approximately 620 ft/min. At 0854:40 hours the flight reported passing the outer marker inbound and requested the wind which was given as being 230°/4 kt. At 0855:55 hours the flight asked the tower if the approach lights and high intensity runway lights were turned all the way up and the controller replied in the affirmative, adding "a little fog right off the end there and its wide open after you get by that, it's more than a mile and a half on the runway". This was the last known radio communication from the flight. At 0856:09 hours the pilot-in-command mentioned to the co-pilot that he was going to hold the present altitude which was approximately 1 250 ft AMSL (350 ft above the elevation of runway 23 threshold). At 0856:24 hours the co-pilot informed the pilot-in-command that he had the lights in sight "down low" and asked him if he could see them. The pilot-in-command replied he had them in sight and requested landing flaps. The co-pilot then commented "I got to get to the chart right here we're likely to lose it". At 0856:42 hours the co-pilot asked the pilot-in-command if he saw the lights "there", the pilot-in-command replied in the affirmative and shortly thereafter reduced the power and 2 sec later increased it - 1 sec later the co-pilot commented "watch it". About 1 sec later the aircraft crashed. The controller observed a column of smoke rising near the approach end of the runway and immediately activated the crash siren and called for the dispatch of airport emergency equipment. The aircraft struck the steep hillside about 250 ft short of the runway threshold at an elevation of 865 ft AMSL (approximately 33 ft below the elevation of the threshold). The aircraft then careened up and over the side of the hill and on to the airport, coming to rest off the right side of runway 23. The accident occurred at 0856:53 hours during daylight. Two passengers were seriously injured while 35 other occupants were killed.

The three engine aircraft departed Asheville Regional Airport at 1158LT and climbed to its assigned altitude. About three minutes later, while climbing to an altitude of 6,132 feet in a limited visibility due to clouds, the aircraft collided with a Cessna 310 registered N3121S. Operated by Lanseair, it was carrying two passengers and a pilot. Following the collision, both aircraft dove into the ground and crashed in a dense wooded area located about nine miles southeast of Asheville Airport. The wreckage of the 727 was found in a forest along a highway located in Hendersonville. All 82 occupants in both aircraft were killed.

The crew departed Wilmington Airport, North Carolina, at 0540LT on a positioning flight to New Bern under call sign PI101. The approach to New Bern-Simmons Nott Airport was started in limited visibility due to the night when the airplane, too low, struck tree tops and crashed in the Croatan National Forest, about 3 miles short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.
Crew:
Joe Helsabeck, pilot,
E. O. Adams, copilot,
Pamela Rumble, stewardess.

While parked at Roanoke-Woodrum Airport, all passengers embarked when the undercarriage failed. The airplane sank on its belly. All 42 occupants were evacuated safely and the airplane was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Wilmington-New Hanover County Airport. After touchdown, the airplane went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest. While all three crew members were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

About 2040, October 30, 1959, Piedmont Airlines Flight 349 crashed on Bucks Elbow Mountain located about 13 miles west of the Charlottesville-Albemarle County, Virginia, Airport. The crew of 3 and 23 of 24 passengers were killed; the sole survivor was seriously injured. The aircraft, a DC-3, N55V, was demolished by impact. From the available evidence it is the determination of the Board that this accident occurred during an intended instrument approach. More specifically, it occurred during the inbound portion of the procedure turn which was being flown 6 to 11 miles west of the maneuvering area prescribed by the instrument approach procedure. The Board concludes that the lateral error resulted from a navigational omission which took place when the pilot did not turn left about 20 degrees in conformity to V-140 airway at the Casanova omni range station. Consequently, when the pilots believed the flight was over the Rochelle intersection it was in fact 13 files northwest of tract position. As a result of this position, when the pilot turned left and flew the heading normally flown from Rochelle intersection, the path of the aircraft over the ground was displaced 8 to 11 miles west of the prescribed track. The Board further concludes that the error was undetected because tracking and other instrument approach requirements were not followed precisely. From information regarding the personal background of Captain and expert medical analysis of this information, it is the Board's opinion that preoccupation resulting from mental stress may have been a contributing factor in the accident cause.