Crash of a GAF Nomad N.24A in Weston-on-the-Green

Date & Time: Apr 13, 2002 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
OY-JRW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Weston-on-the-Green - Weston-on-the-Green
MSN:
117
YOM:
1981
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
13
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
581
Captain / Total hours on type:
51.00
Circumstances:
A series of parachute flights had been planned from Weston-on-the-Green. The forecast conditions were good, predicting a surface wind of 360°/10 kt, visibility 30 km, with no significant weather and some strato-cumulus cloud with a base of 3,000 feet. The first flight, which consumed 144 lb of fuel, was completed successfully with 12 parachutists jumping from 12,000 feet. Thirteen parachutists boarded for the second flight and the aircraft was cleared to take off from the dry surface of grass Runway 01 (take off run available 3,194 feet). The surface wind at the time was 360°/15 kt with no significant weather and the temperature was 15°C. The pilot subsequently reported that he checked the condition levers were set to 100% N2, the flaps were set to 10° and that the trim was set in the take off range. He also reported that the company recommended power of 738°C turbine outlet temperature (TOT), and 89 pounds per square inch (psi) manifold pressure were set and achieved during the take off run. This power setting was equivalent to the 'Max Cruise Rating' as specified in the 'Operating Limits' section of the aircraft manual and no take off performance charts or data concerning 'take off distance required' (TODR) and 'accelerate stop distance required' (ASDR) information was available. The maximum take off power available (5 minute limit) was 810°C TOT and 102 psi. At approximately 80 to 83 kt (scheduled rotation speed 71 kt) the pilot pulled back on the control column. He reported that, 'the aircraft felt more nose heavy', 'the aircraft nose did not rise and he perceived that the aircraft was no longer accelerating'. He decided to abort the take off, commenced braking and set the condition levers to the full reverse position. As the aircraft decelerated he turned it to the right in order to avoid trees and bushes ahead. The aircraft struck a small earth mound, whilst still travelling at about 15-20 kt, and came to an abrupt halt. The pilot shut down both engines and selected the fuel and the battery to OFF. The crew and passengers evacuated the aircraft unaided.
Probable cause:
The pilot had successfully completed a similar flight in the same aircraft, in benign meteorological conditions and the available evidence suggests that the aircraft was serviceable. He reported that during the second take off run 'the company recommended take off power of 738°C TOT and 89 psi was set and achieved'. The take off was therefore attempted with only 89 -90% of the maximum power available. This would have had the effect of not only increasing the take off distance but also the 'ASDR' to achieve a successful rejected take off from a speed at or beyond normal rotate speed. With the flap position and trim set correctly for take off the pilot attempted to rotate the aircraft between 80 to 83 kt, at least 9 kt above the scheduled rotation speed of 71 kt. If the aircraft loading had been within the limits of mass and CG prompt rotation of the aircraft should have occurred. This however did not happen and instead the pilot felt the aircraft to be 'more nose heavy than normal'. The exact mass and CG for this flight are uncertain. If the CG position was at the forward limit for the calculated mass, control column forces would have been high but not sufficiently high to prevent a successful takeoff. Extreme forces would only have been encountered if the aircraft CG position was significantly in error. It is therefore considered that for the second takeoff of the day the aircraft CG was significantly forward of the forward CG limit.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus UV-20A Turbo Porter in Marana: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 15, 2002 at 1000 LT
Operator:
Registration:
79-23253
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Marana - Marana
MSN:
802
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6187
Captain / Total hours on type:
31.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6267
Circumstances:
A US Army Pilatus UV-20A collided in midair with a Cessna 182C during parachute jumping operations. The collision occurred about 4,800 feet mean sea level (msl) (2,800 feet above ground level (agl)) on the northeast side of runway 12 abeam the approach end. Both aircraft had made multiple flights taking jumpers aloft prior to the accident. The Pilatus departed runway 12 about 5 minutes prior to the Cessna's departure on the same runway. The drop zone was on the airport west of the intersections of runways 12 and 03. The Pilatus departed to the south and began a climb to the jump altitude of 5,500 feet msl, which was 3,500 feet agl. The pilot began the jump run on the southwest side of the runway paralleling it on a heading of about 300 degrees and when he was 1 to 2 minutes from the drop zone broadcast the intent to drop jumpers. The first jumper stated that it normally took him between 1 minute and 1 minute 15 seconds to reach the ground. As he neared the ground he observed everyone running toward the crash site. The Cessna pilot had four jumpers on board and said that his usual practice is to plan his climb so that the jump altitude (5,000 to 5,500 feet msl) is reached about the same time that the aircraft arrives over the jump zone. He departed runway 12 and made a wide sweeping right turn around the airport to set up for the jump. As the Pilatus neared the jump zone the Cessna was greater than 1,000 feet lower and west of the Pilatus climbing on a northerly heading. The Cessna pilot planned to make a right turn to parallel the left side of runway 12, and then turn right toward the drop zone. The jumpers in the Cessna looked out of the right side, and watched the Golden Knights exit their airplane. The jumpers said that their altimeters read 2,500 feet agl. The Cessna pilot turned to a heading of 120 degrees along the left side of the approach end of runway 12. He heard the Pilatus pilot say on Common Traffic Advisory Frequency that the Pilatus was downwind for runway 12. Based on witness observations, at this point the Pilatus was in a descending turn heading generally opposite to the downwind heading on the northeast side of the runway. Everyone in the Cessna heard a loud bang, the Cessna pilot felt something hit him in the head, and the airplane pitched down and lost several hundred feet of altitude. He noticed a blur of yellow and white out of his left window. The lead jumper decided that they should exit, and they all jumped. The Cessna pilot decided that the airplane was controllable, and landed safely. Both civilian and military witnesses on the ground heard the Pilatus pilot call downwind for runway 12. About 10 seconds later they heard intense transmissions over the loud speaker, and looked up and observed the Pilatus in a nearly vertical, nose down slow spiral. There was an open gash in the top of the Cessna's cabin on the left side near the wing root. The green lens and its gold attachment fitting from the Pilatus were on the floor behind the pilot's seat.
Probable cause:
The failure of both pilots to maintain an adequate visual lookout. The failure of the Pilatus pilot to report his proper position was a factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Technoavia SM-92G Turbo Finist in Thiene

Date & Time: Feb 3, 2002 at 1630 LT
Registration:
HA-YDG
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Thiene - Thiene
MSN:
00-004
YOM:
1995
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
500
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Thiene Airstrip at 1540LT for a local flight, carrying nine skydivers, one observer and one pilot. At the altitude of 13,500 feet, seven skydivers jumped while three others decided to stay in the cabin because the visibility was poor due to foggy conditions. While returning to his departure point, the pilot encountered poor visibility and completed two unsuccessful approach. He eventually decided to divert to Asiago Airport located 24 km from his position but this decision was taken too late. While circling around the airport, the engine failed and the aircraft stalled, struck the roof of a house and crashed in Rozzampia, less than one km east of the airfield. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Weather conditions were marginal with thick fog reducing the visibility to 100 metres,
- Poor flight planning as the pilot failed to refuel the airplane prior to departure and ignored the instability of the weather conditions,
- The pilot's decision to divert to Asiago Airfield was taken too late,
- Poor coordination with the people in place at the Thiene Aerodrome,
- The pilot's inexperience.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B2-H2 Turbo Porter in Annemasse

Date & Time: Jun 26, 2001 at 1705 LT
Operator:
Registration:
F-GUAS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Annemasse - Annemasse
MSN:
557
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
919
Captain / Total hours on type:
520.00
Aircraft flight hours:
13000
Circumstances:
The pilot took off from Annemasse Airfield with nine skydivers on board. After dropping them at FL125, five to six seconds after initiating the descent, he felt strong vibrations. He reduced speed and saw the right out aileron separating from the wing. The pilot managed to maintain control of the aircraft by keeping the stick fully to the right and used the rudders to return to his departure aerodrome. He landed the airplane on the grass near the paved runway 30. During a hard landing, the right main landing gear broke off and damaged the fuselage. The pilot escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The accident was due to the loss of the right outboard aileron in flight. This loss was probably following the crack noticed by the pilot at the base of the right aileron balancing weight, which would have propagated in flight and would have then leads to tearing off the balancing weight. The accident resulted from the club pilots' decision to continue flying despite they have noticed the crack and that the manufacturer had advised them to stop flights.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-2 off Volzhsky: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 2, 2001
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft was engaged in a local skydiving mission in the region of Volgograd. After some of the skydivers jumped out, the pilot decided to return to his departure point and two passengers remained in the cabin. For unknown reasons, the pilot started a quick descent when, at an altitude of 1,000 metres, he lost control of the airplane that entered a dive and crashed at a speed of 310 km/h in the Akthuba River located near Volzhsky. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
For unknown reasons, the pilot initiated a rapid descent when, apparently, the passenger who was seating on the copilot seat (and was not wearing his seatbelt), fell on the control column, causing the aircraft to become uncontrollable.

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in Nagambie: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 29, 2001 at 1312 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-MMV
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nagambie - Nagambie
MSN:
208-0003
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4000
Captain / Total hours on type:
700.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8576
Circumstances:
Four parachutists were practising as a team for a skydiving competition. They had completed seven parachute descents prior to the accident flight. Each descent had been video recorded by a cameraman using a helmet-mounted camera. The parachutists used a Cessna Aircraft Company Caravan aircraft. That aircraft was climbed to 14,000 ft with the team of four parachutists, their cameraman, six other parachutists and the pilot. At the drop altitude, the team members carried out their ‘pin check’ in which each parachutist’s equipment was checked to ensure that the release pins for the main and reserve parachutes were correctly positioned. Approaching overhead the drop zone, a roller blind, which covered the exit doorway on the left side of the aircraft, and minimised windblast during the climb, was raised. The cameraman positioned himself on the step outside and to the rear of the exit doorway. The first three members of the team positioned themselves in the exit doorway. The team member nearest to the front of the aircraft faced out and the next two members faced into the aircraft. The team member in the middle grasped the jumpsuits of the adjacent parachutists. The fourth member was inside the aircraft facing the exit. As the team exited the aircraft, the middle parachutist’s reserve parachute’s pilot chute deployed. Due to the bent over position of that parachutist, the action of the ejector spring in the pilot chute pushed the chute upwards and over the horizontal stabiliser of the aircraft, pulling the reserve canopy with it. The parachutist passed below the horizontal stabiliser resulting in the reserve parachute risers and lines tangling around the left elevator and horizontal stabiliser. Eleven seconds later, the empennage separated from the aircraft and the left elevator and the parachutist separated from the empennage. The parachutist descended to the ground with the reserve and main parachutes entangled and landed 800 metres west of the drop zone landing strip. A short section of the elevator was tangled in the parachute lines. The parachutist’s rate of descent was estimated to be 3.6 times greater than that for an average parachutist under canopy. Immediately after the empennage separated, the aircraft entered a steep, nose-down spiral descent. The pilot instructed the remaining parachutists to abandon the aircraft. The last one left the aircraft before it descended through 9,000 ft. The pilot transmitted a mayday call, shutdown the engine and left his seat. On reaching the rear of the cabin, he found that the roller blind had closed, preventing him from leaving the aircraft. After several attempts, the pilot raised the blind sufficiently to allow him to exit the aircraft, and at an altitude of approximately 1,000 ft above ground level, he deployed his parachute and landed safely. The aircraft, minus the empennage, descended almost vertically and crashed on the drop zone landing strip. It was destroyed by impact forces and the post-impact fire. The empennage, in several pieces, landed 600 metres west of the landing strip. A Country Fire Authority fire vehicle arrived at the accident site within two minutes of the accident and extinguished the fire. The parachutist that had been entangled was fatally injured. The injuries sustained when entangled on the horizontal stabiliser made the parachutist incapable of operating the main parachute. The other parachutists and the pilot were uninjured.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
- The parachutist’s reserve parachute deployed prematurely, probably as a result of the parachute container coming into contact with the aircraft doorframe/handrail.
- The reserve parachute risers and lines tangled around the horizontal stabiliser and elevator.
- The reserve canopy partially filled, applying to the aircraft empennage a load that exceeded its design limits.
- The empennage separated from the aircraft and the elevator separated from the empennage, releasing the parachutist and sending the aircraft out of control.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3 Otter in Decatur

Date & Time: Mar 31, 2001 at 1215 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N120BA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Decatur - Decatur
MSN:
115
YOM:
1956
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
33000
Captain / Total hours on type:
169.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6633
Circumstances:
The pilot and 21 jumpers were aboard the airplane for the local skydiving flight. The airplane took off to the north on the wet grass runway. Jumpers reported that during the initial takeoff climb, the aircraft assumed a "very steep angle of attack," and described the pilot "winding the wheel on the lower right side of the chair clockwise, frantically," and "busy with a wheel between the seats." The airplane impacted trees and terrain approximately 250 yards east of the runway. The pilot reported that the "airplane flew through a dust devil" and did not have enough altitude for a complete recovery. The pilot stated the winds were northerly at 6 to 8 knots with "extreme" turbulence. The nearest weather observation facility reported clear skies with calm wind. Takeoff weight and center of gravity (CG) were calculated at 9,118.05 lbs and 161.92 inches. The AFM listed the maximum gross weight at 8,000 pounds and the aft CG limit at 152.2 inches. Further, an AFM WARNING stated: C. G. POSITION OF THE LOADED AIRCRAFT MUST BE CHECKED AND VERIFIED PRIOR TO TAKE-OFF, AND APPROPRIATE TRIM SETTINGS SHOULD BE USED; OTHERWISE ABNORMAL STICK FORCES AND POSITIONS MAY RESULT. The elevator trim wheel is located on the righthand side of the pilot's seat. Post-accident examination of the airplane revealed that there were 16 seatbelts in the cabin section and 2 seatbelts in the cockpit. Additionally, a placard installed in the cockpit stated, in part, THIS AIRPLANE IS LIMITED TO THE OPERATION OF NINE PASSENGERS OR LESS. Regarding the discrepancy between the placarded 9 passenger limit and the 21 jumpers aboard, the pilot stated that parachute jumpers are not considered to be passengers and therefore, he did not have to comply with the placarded limit.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control during the takeoff/initial climb. Contributing factors were the pilot's exceeding aircraft weight and balance limits and the dust devil.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B2-H4 Turbo Porter in Breitscheid: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 8, 2000 at 1852 LT
Operator:
Registration:
HB-FMC
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Breitscheid - Breitscheid
MSN:
938
YOM:
2000
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Aircraft flight hours:
10
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Breitscheid Airfield on a local skydiving flight. Once the appropriate altitude was reached, 11 skydivers jumped out and the pilot returned to the airfield with another passenger on board. On final approach, at an altitude of about 280 metres, the parachute of the passenger mistakenly opened in the cockpit. The passenger was caught outside the cabin and collided with the elevators. The aircraft went out of control and crashed in an open field located 1,500 metres short of runway 07 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot and the passenger were killed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control on final approach after the parachute of a passenger mistakenly opened in the cockpit and the passenger was caught outside the cabin and collided with the elevators.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus PC-6/B2-H4 Turbo Porter in Cumiana: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 26, 1999
Registration:
HB-FKJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cumiana - Cumiana
MSN:
895
YOM:
1993
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft was completing a local skydiving flight on behalf of the Skydiving Club of Cumiana. In flight, the aircraft encountered atmospheric turbulences when a wing detached. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field. Two occupants were killed and two others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
A wing separated in flight and the aircraft broke in two following severe turbulences.

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Marine City: 10 killed

Date & Time: Jul 31, 1999 at 0825 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N518DM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Marine City - Marine City
MSN:
LJ-251
YOM:
1967
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Captain / Total flying hours:
9700
Aircraft flight hours:
8986
Circumstances:
The airplane impacted the terrain approximately 2,065 feet south of the departure end of runway 22. Damage to the cockpit section of the wreckage indicated a nose down crush angle of approximately 80 degrees. The wreckage path was on a 208 degree heading, and the distance from the initial impact to the location of the empennage was about 142 feet. The cockpit and cabin were destroyed by post impact fire. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no preexisting failures or conditions that would have prevented normal operation. The engines exhibited indications of rotation, and the witness marks on both sets of propellers were consistent with the propellers operating in the governing range at impact. Control continuity was established from the right aileron, elevator, and rudder. Witnesses reported the airplane seem to be operating normally during taxi and takeoff, but that it entered a steep left bank after clearing a 100 foot powerline located about 1,800 feet from the departure end of runway 22. After entering the steep left turn, the nose of the airplane dropped and the airplane impacted the ground. There was no evidence in the airplane's maintenance records of any annual maintenance inspection since August, 1997, although an airframe and powerplant mechanic reported that he had completed an inspection on June 30, 1999. There was no record in the airplane's maintenance records of compliance with five airworthiness directives applicable to the airplane.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which resulted in a stall, inflight loss of control, and collision with the ground.
Final Report: