Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-28 near Kedrovy

Date & Time: Jul 16, 2021 at 1611 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-28728
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kedrovy - Tomsk
MSN:
1AJ007-13
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
SL42
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7906
Captain / Total hours on type:
3970.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
181
Copilot / Total hours on type:
26
Aircraft flight hours:
8698
Aircraft flight cycles:
5921
Circumstances:
En route from Kedrovy to Tomsk, while cruising at an altitude of 12,000 feet in icing conditions, both engines failed simultaneously. The crew tried to restart both engines, without success. In such conditions, the crew reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in the taiga. Upon impact, the flipped over and came to rest upside down. The wreckage was found around 1430LT some 52 km southeast of Kedrovy. All 17 occupants were found alive, among them few were injured. The captain broke one of his leg. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The accident of the An-28 aircraft, registration RA-28728, occurred during a forced landing on an improvised landing site due to the simultaneous shutdown of both engines while in flight. The need for this landing was triggered by the engines' spontaneous shutdown. The shutdown occurred while the aircraft was flying in icing conditions with the Pitot-Static System (POSS) turned off due to ice ingestion into its air intake.
The aviation incident was most likely influenced by the following factors:
- The crew's failure to follow the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) procedures for manually activating the POSS when meteorological conditions favored icing;
- Violation of the crew's duty and rest time regulations, which could have led to the accumulation of operational fatigue and contributed to missing the operation to activate the POSS;
- The crew's failure to make the decision to cease further performance of their duties due to the accumulation of operational fatigue in the absence of the airline's established procedures for exercising this crew right, which does not comply with the provisions of the Russian Ministry of Transport Order No. 139 dated November 21, 2005, "On Approval of the Regulation on Features of the Work and Rest Time Regime for Crew Members of Civil Aviation Aircraft in the Russian Federation";
- Increased hypoxia stress when flying at altitudes exceeding 3000 meters without the additional use of oxygen, which is a violation of the regulations of FAP-128, AFM, and the airline's internal regulations, and could have exacerbated the negative effects of operational fatigue;
- A malfunction in the ice detection sensor DSL-40T, which prevented the issuance of ice detection alerts and the automatic activation of the POSS.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26B-100 in Palana: 28 killed

Date & Time: Jul 6, 2021 at 1450 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-26085
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky – Palana
MSN:
123 10
YOM:
1982
Flight number:
PTK251
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
22
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
28
Captain / Total flying hours:
3340
Captain / Total hours on type:
2885.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1253
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1091
Aircraft flight hours:
21492
Aircraft flight cycles:
10498
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Airport at 1257LT on a schedule service (flight PTK251) to Palana, carrying 22 passengers and a crew of six, among them Olga Mokhiriova, chief of the municipality of Palana. At 1439LT, the crew contacted Palana ATC and was cleared to start the descent. While completing an NDB approach to runway 29, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with fog and ceiling at 300 metres. Too low, the aircraft impacted terrain about 4 km northwest of the airport. The wreckage was found in the evening on the top of a rocky wall. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris fall down on the sea bank. All 28 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The cause of the An-26B-100 RA-26085 aircraft crash was the crew's violation of the established instrument approach procedure to Palana aerodrome, which was manifested in flying with significant deviation from the set route and descent well below the established minimum descent height (MDH) under weather conditions that excluded stable visual contact with ground landmarks, leading to the collision of the aircraft with a coastal cliff in controlled flight, its destruction, and the death of the crew and passengers.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew's failure to execute a missed approach with the acquisition of the established minimum safety altitude (MSA) when information about the bearing indicated a significant deviation of the aircraft from the established approach procedure;
- The absence in the Palana aerodrome dispatcher's work technology of actions in the presence of information about the bearing indicating a significant deviation of the aircraft from the established approach scheme, as well as the dispatcher's passivity when such information was available;
- The lack of warning signals from the early ground proximity warning system under conditions that should have triggered it. It is not possible to determine the reason for the absence of the warning signals;
- The overestimation of the barometric altimeter readings in the final phase of the flight due to the specific airflow around the steep coastline creating a low-pressure zone and the overestimation of the variometer readings, the cause of which cannot be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP-E in Pieri: 10 killed

Date & Time: Mar 2, 2021 at 1705 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-4274
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Juba - Pieri - Yuai - Juba
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
10
Circumstances:
Coming from Juba, the twin engine airplane departed Pieri Airstrip on a short flight to Yuai (about 22 km southwest from Pieri) before returning to Juba, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces but there was no fire. All 10 occupants were killed.

Crash of a Boeing 737-524 off Jakarta: 62 killed

Date & Time: Jan 9, 2021 at 1440 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-CLC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Jakarta - Pontianak
MSN:
27323/2616
YOM:
1994
Flight number:
SJY182
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
56
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
62
Captain / Total flying hours:
17904
Captain / Total hours on type:
9023.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5107
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4957
Aircraft flight hours:
62983
Aircraft flight cycles:
40383
Circumstances:
On 9 January 2021, a Boeing 737-500 aircraft, registration PK-CLC, was being operated by PT. Sriwijaya Air on a scheduled passenger flight from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta to Supadio International Airport (WIOO), Pontianak . The flight number was SJY182. According to the flight plan filed, the fuel endurance was 3 hours 50 minutes. At 0736 UTC (1436 LT) in daylight conditions, Flight SJY182 departed from Runway 25R of Jakarta. There were two pilots, four flight attendants, and 56 passengers onboard the aircraft. At 14:36:46 LT, the SJY182 pilot contacted the Terminal East (TE) controller and was instructed “SJY182 identified on departure, via SID (Standard Instrument Departure) unrestricted climb level 290”. The instruction was read back by the pilot. At 14:36:51 LT, the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data recorded that the Autopilot (AP) system engaged at altitude of 1,980 feet. At 14:38:42 LT, the FDR data recorded that as the aircraft climbed past 8,150 feet, the thrust lever of the left engine started reducing, while the thrust lever position of the right engine remained. The FDR data also recorded the left engine N1 was decreasing whereas the right engine N1 remained. At 14:38:51 LT, the SJY182 pilot requested to the TE controller for a heading change to 075° to avoid weather conditions and the TE controller approved the request. At 14:39:01 LT, the TE controller instructed SJY182 pilot to stop their climb at 11,000 feet to avoid conflict with another aircraft with the same destination that was departing from Runway 25L. The instruction was read back by the SJY182 pilot. At 14:39:47 LT, the FDR data recorded the aircraft’s altitude was about 10,600 feet with a heading of 046° and continuously decreasing (i.e., the aircraft was turning to the left). The thrust lever of the left engine continued decreasing. The thrust lever of the right engine remained. At 14:39:54 LT, the TE controller instructed SJY182 to climb to an altitude of 13,000 feet, and the instruction was read back by an SJY182 pilot at 14:39:59 LT. This was the last known recorded radio transmission by the flight. At 14:40:05 LT, the FDR data recorded the aircraft altitude was about 10,900 feet, which was the highest altitude recorded in the FDR before the aircraft started its descent. The AP system then disengaged at that point with a heading of 016°, the pitch angle was about 4.5° nose up, and the aircraft rolled to the left to more than 45°. The thrust lever position of the left engine continued decreasing while the right engine thrust lever remained. At 14:40:10 LT, the FDR data recorded the autothrottle (A/T) system disengaged and the pitch angle was more than 10° nose down. About 20 seconds later the FDR stopped recording. The last aircraft coordinate recorded was 5°57'56.21" S 106°34'24.86" E. At 14:40:37 LT, the TE controller called SJY182 to request for the aircraft heading but did not receive any response from the pilot. At 14:40:48 LT, the radar target of the aircraft disappeared from the TE controller radar screen. At 14:40:46 LT, the TE controller again called SJY182 but did not receive any response from the pilot. The TE controller then put a measurement vector on the last known position of SJY182 and advised the supervisor of the disappearance of SJY182. The supervisor then reported the occurrence to the operation manager. The TE controller repeatedly called SJY182 several times and also asked other aircraft that flew near the last known location of SJY182 to call the SJY182. The TE controller then activated the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz and called SJY182 on that frequency. All efforts were unsuccessful to get any responses from the SJY182 pilot. About 1455 LT, the operation manager reported the occurrence to the Indonesian Search and Rescue Agency (Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan/BNPP). At 1542 LT, the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provider declared the uncertainty phase (INCERFA) of the SJY182. The distress phase of SJY182 (DETRESFA) was subsequently declared at 1643 LT.
Probable cause:
The following contributing factors were identified:
• The corrective maintenance processes of the A/T problem were unable to identify the friction or binding within the mechanical system of the thrust lever and resulted in the prolonged and unresolved of the A/T problem.
• The right thrust lever did not reduce when required by the A/P to obtain selected rate of climb and aircraft speed due to the friction or binding within the mechanical system, as a result, the left thrust lever compensated by moving further backward which resulted in thrust asymmetry.
• The delayed CTSM activation to disengage the A/T system during the thrust asymmetry event due to the undervalued spoiler angle position input resulted in greater power asymmetry.
• The automation complacency and confirmation bias might have led to a decrease in active monitoring which resulted in the thrust lever asymmetry and deviation of the flight path were not being monitored.
• The aircraft rolled to the left instead of to the right as intended while the control wheel deflected to the right and inadequate monitoring of the EADI might have created assumption that the aircraft was rolling excessively to the right which resulted in an action that was contrary in restoring the aircraft to safe flight parameters.
• The absence of the guidance of the national standard for the UPRT, may have contributed to the training program not being adequately implemented to ensure that pilots have enough knowledge to prevent and recover of an upset condition effectively and timely.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-529 in Garowe

Date & Time: Dec 2, 2020 at 0930 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EY-560
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Djibouti – Hargeisa – Garowe – Mogadishu
MSN:
26538/2298
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
IV206
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
31
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6050
Captain / Total hours on type:
5170.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
900
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Djibouti on a regular schedule service to Mogadishu with intermediate stops in Hargeisa and Garowe. There were 31 passengers and 8 crew members on board. On short final approach to Garowe Airport Runway 06, the aircraft was too low, causing the right main gear to struck the ground just short of runway threshold (concrete). The right main gear collapsed and the airplane slid on the runway until it turned to the right and came to rest on the runway with the right engine cowling contacting the runway surface. All 39 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Airbus A320-214 in Karachi: 98 killed

Date & Time: May 22, 2020 at 1439 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
AP-BLD
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Lahore - Karachi
MSN:
2274
YOM:
2004
Flight number:
PK8303
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
91
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
98
Aircraft flight hours:
47124
Aircraft flight cycles:
25866
Circumstances:
On 22 May 2020 at 13:05 hrs PST, the Pakistan International Airlines aircraft Airbus A320-214, registration number AP-BLD, took off from Lahore (Allama Iqbal International Airport – AIIAP) Pakistan to perform a regular commercial passenger flight (PK8303) to Karachi (Jinnah International Airport – JIAP) Pakistan, with 8 crew members (01 Captain, 01 First Officer, and 06 flight attendants) and 91 passengers on board. At 14:35 hrs the aircraft performed an ILS approach for runway 25L and touched down without landing gears, resting on the engines. Both engines scrubbed the runway at high speed. Flight crew initiated a go-around and informed “Karachi Approach” that they intend to make a second approach. About four minutes later, during downwind leg, at an altitude of around 2000 ft, flight crew declared an emergency and stated that both engines had failed. The aircraft started losing altitude. It crashed in a populated area, short of runway 25L by about 1340 meters. An immediate subsequent post impact fire initiated. Out of 99 souls on-board, 97 were fatally injured and 02 passengers survived. On ground 04 persons were injured however 01 out of these reportedly expired later at a hospital.

Below, the preliminary report published by the Pakistan AAIB.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-524 in Usinsk

Date & Time: Feb 9, 2020 at 1227 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VQ-BPS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Usinsk
MSN:
28909/2960
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
UT595
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
94
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17852
Captain / Total hours on type:
7672.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6595
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4989
Aircraft flight hours:
57410
Aircraft flight cycles:
29162
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Moscow-Vnukovo Airport, the crew initiated the descent to Usinsk Airport Runway 13. On short final, the aircraft hit a snow bank (1,1 metre high) located 32 metres short of runway threshold, still on the concrete zone. Upon impact, both main gears were torn off and the airplane belly landed and slid for few hundred metres before coming to rest. All 100 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The accident with the Boeing 737-500 VQ-BPS aircraft occurred during the landing as a result of a collision of the aircraft with a snow parapet 1.1 m high at a distance of 32 m to the runway threshold (within the paved section of the runway), which resulted in damage to the main landing gear and their subsequent "folding" in the process of moving along the runway.
The accident was caused by a combination of the following factors:
- the presence of contradictions in the Federal Aviation Rules for flights in the airspace of the Russian Federation, the airline's radio control system and the aircraft operational documentation regarding the need and procedure for introducing temperature corrections to the readings of barometric altimeters at low ambient temperatures;
- Failure by the operator of the Usinsk aerodrome to comply with the FAP-262 requirements for the maintenance of the aerodrome, which resulted in the presence of snow parapets on the paved section of the landing strip;
- the operator of the Usinsk aerodrome did not eliminate the shortcomings in the winter maintenance of the aerodrome, noted based on the results of the inspection by the Rosaviatsia commission on January 22, 2020;
- lack of risk assessment in the airline associated with the execution of approaches in the baro-VNAV mode in the presence of factors that impede such approaches (low ambient temperatures, snow-covered underlying surface, drifting snow (snowstorm), significant changes in the relief in front of the runway end, lack of PAPI-type lights), as well as appropriate recommendations to the crews on the specifics of such approaches, including after the transition to visual flight, and crew training;
- insufficient assessment by the crew during the preparation of the existing threats (hazard factors) and making an insufficiently substantiated decision to perform an RNAV (GNSS) approach (under the control of the autopilot in LNAV/VNAV mode) without introducing a correction for low outside air temperature in altitude overflying waypoints, which led to a flight below the established glide path;
- performing a flight along the "extended glide path" after turning off the autopilot and switching to manual piloting without attempting to enter the set glide path;
- the PIC may have had a visual illusion of a "high glide path" due to a snow-covered underlying surface, a snowstorm and the presence of a ravine directly in front of the runway end in the absence of PAPI type lights, which led to an incorrect assessment of the aircraft's flight altitude after switching to manual piloting, lack of reaction to timely and correct warnings of the co-pilot and exit to the runway end at a height significantly less than the established one.
Final Report:

Crash of a Being 737-86J in Istanbul: 3 killed

Date & Time: Feb 5, 2020 at 1820 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TC-IZK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Izmir - Istanbul
MSN:
37742
YOM:
2009
Flight number:
PC2193
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
177
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Izmir-Adnan Menderes Airport, the crew initiated the approach to Istanbul-Sabiha Gökçen Airport runway 06. Weather conditions were poor with thunderstorm activity, rain, CB's and a wind from 290 gusting to 37 knots. After touchdown on a wet runway, the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, turned slightly to the left then went down an embankment (25 meters high) and came to rest, broken in three. Three passengers were killed while all 180 other occupants were evacuated to local hospitals. It is understood that the airplane apparently landed 1,500 meters past the runway threshold (runway 06 is 3,000 meters long) with a non negligible tailwind component that must be confirmed.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 in Bandar-e Mahshahr

Date & Time: Jan 27, 2020 at 0736 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-CPZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tehran - Bandar-e Mahshahr
MSN:
53464
YOM:
1994
Flight number:
RV6936
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
136
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
18430
Captain / Total hours on type:
7840.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
124
Circumstances:
On Jan. 27, 2020, at 03:12 UTC Caspian Airlines (CPN) Flight 6936, an MD83, EP-CPZ took off from Mehrabad International Airport and climbed to FL320 as final cruising level. At about 03:45:37 UTC, the aircraft was flying according to the flight plan route on Airway B417 at an assigned FL320. Due to another traffic departing flight, an A320, IRA356 from Abadan Airport (OIAA) to destination Mashhad International Airport (OIMM), the ACC controller issued direct routing to the flight CPN 6936 position GODMO. At 03:49:34 UTC, CPN6936 requested descent clearance, so the flight was cleared to FL100. At 03:52:30 UTC, the pilot called Mahshahr AFISO and reported position 50 nm inbound GODMO and estimated time over GODMO at 03:59 UTC. At 03:52:51 UTC, Mahshahr AFISO reported necessary information as below: "RWY active is 31; wind is now 280/08kts, CAVOK, temperature +06, DP 04 and QNH 1023, expected VOR approach RWY 31 via GODMO 1E ARRIVAL" At 03:53: 33 UTC, the pilot requested RWY 13 and Mahshahr AFISO performed VOR/DME approach RWY 13, via GODMO 1F arrival. At 03:59:39 UTC, the pilot reported, “we are approaching position GODMO in contact with destination Mahshahr.” At 04:00:41UTC, the pilot reported his position “GODMO” to Mahshahr AFISO. At 04:02:46 UTC, the pilot reported leaving of IAF and received landing clearance for RWY13. Finally, at 04:06:11 UTC, the aircraft landed on RWY 13, passed two-thirds of RWY length and ran off the end of runway13 after landing at Mahshahr Airport at 04:06 UTC, Khuzestan province. The accident flight was being operated on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan in a Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC). The main door of the accident aircraft was opened in emergency condition, but the slide skid did not operate automatically. The cabin floor was just too close to the ground (grass surface) due to the impact of the nose and main landing gears strut which were broken after the runway overrun. The evacuation was performed from the main door, and all 136 passengers and 8 crew members disembarked.
Probable cause:
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the pilots’ failures below, resulting in a runway overrun:
- Poor decision-making for acceptance of the risk of high-speed landing;
- Un-stabilized approach against the normal flight profile;
- Poor CRM in the cockpit; and
- Poor judgment and not accomplishing go-around while performing an unstabilized approach.

Contributing Factors:
- Loading of 5 tons of extra fuel, which increased the landing distance required.
- Decision to make a landing on RWY 13 with tailwind.
- Inability of the copilot (PM) to take control of the aircraft and proper action to execute goaround.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-8KV in Sabashahr: 176 killed

Date & Time: Jan 8, 2020 at 0618 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-PSR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tehran - Kiev
MSN:
38124
YOM:
2016
Flight number:
PS752
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
167
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
176
Captain / Total flying hours:
11590
Captain / Total hours on type:
8428.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7633
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3642
Circumstances:
On Wednesday, January 08, 2020, at 00:53, the inbound flight No. 751 of Ukraine International, Boeing 737-800, UR-PSR, en route to Tehran Imam Khomeini INTL. Airport from Kyiv Boryspyl INTL. Airport was cleared for landing, and after four minutes landed on the IKA runway. After disembarking 58 passengers and refueling, the flight crew went on to check into the hotel located at IKA. From 01:16 to 01:38, the aircraft was refueled with 9510 kg (11800 liters) of fuel. Once the total weight of the cargo received from passengers (310 packages weighing 6794 kg) was determined, in order to comply with the maximum takeoff weight allowed for aircraft, 82 packages in 2094 kg in weight, were separated by Airport Service Company, that is, they were not loaded. Initially, 78 packages of the passenger's luggage were not loaded first, then due to the large volume of passengers' hand luggage, the flight attendants passed some of them on to the Airport Service Company personnel to be placed in the aircraft cargo. After that, 4 packages belonging to the passengers were removed from the aft cargo door, where the hand luggage was placed. At 04:35, the flight crew embarked on the aircraft. After checking the aircraft and cabin, boarding was announced at 04:45, and passengers started to board the plane. Based on the available documents, 167 passengers proceeded to the Airport Services Co. counter at the airport terminal, all of whom went on board. Only one of the passengers who received the boarding pass online the night before the flight, due to the delay in arriving in Tehran from another city did not go to the airport in person, and therefore had been removed from the list of passengers provided by the UIA. At 05:13, the pilot made his first radio contact with the IKA's control tower ground unit and requested the initial clearance for flying, which was issued by the controller subsequently. At 05:48, all the aircraft documents required to start the flight operations were filled out, and all the doors were then closed at 05:49. The flight was initially scheduled for 05:15, and based on the flight coordinator's report form, the reason given for its delay was the aircraft being overweight and the decision not to load the passengers' lugga for reducing the aircraft weight. At 05:51 the pilot notified his position at the airport parking, declared his readiness to exit the parking and start up the aircraft. The IKA tower asked him to wait for receiving the clearance since they wanted to make the coordination required with other relevant units. At 05:52, the IKA tower made the necessary coordination with the Mehrabad approach unit, who contacted Tehran ACC asking for clearance. Accordingly, the controller in ACC made coordination on Ukrainian flight clearance with the CMOCC. The clearance was issued by the CMOCC. At 05:54, the Mehrabad approach unit, received the FL260 clearance for the flight AUI752 from ACC, and forwarded it to IKA via the telecommunication system. Flight no. 752 was detached from the A1 Jet Bridge and at about 05:55 started to leave its parking position, NO 116 on the right, by a pushback truck. Following that, at 05:55 the ground controller cleared the AUI752 flight for startup and exiting the parking, which was read back by the pilot. At 06:12, the aircraft took off from the Runway 29 Right of IKA and was delivered to the Mehrabad approach unit. The pilot contacted the approach unit, and announced the IKA 1A radar procedure as SID procedure. Next, the Mehrabad approach identified and cleared the flight to climb to FL260. The controller instructed the pilot to turn to the right after 6,000 feet, and continue straight to PAROT. After it was read back by the pilot, the controller again instructed the pilot to continue to PAROT point once passing the 6000-foot altitude, which was read back by the pilot. From 06:17 onwards, upon the disappearance of the PS752 information from the radarscope, the controller called the captain repeatedly, but received no response. According to the data extracted from the surveillance systems and FDR, the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 8,100 feet; thereafter, the label including the call sign and altitude of aircraft disappeared from the radarscope, yet no radio contact indicating unusual conditions was received from the pilot. FDR recording terminated at 06:14:56. This time corresponds to the termination of Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) and ADS-B information. After the mentioned time, the aircraft was still being detected by the Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), according to which the aircraft veered right and after approximately three minutes of flying, it disappeared from the PSR at 06:18 too. The aircraft was conducting the flight under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and the accident occurred around half an hour before the sunset.
Probable cause:
Cause of the Accident:
- The air defense's launching two surface-to-air missiles at the flight PS752, UR-PSR aircraft the detonation of the first missile warhead in proximity of the aircraft caused damage to the aircraft systems and the intensification of damage led the aircraft to crash into the ground and explode instantly.

Other Contributing Factors:
- The mitigating measures and defense layers in risk management proved to be ineffective due to the occurrence of an unanticipated error in threat identifications, and ultimately failed to protect the flight safety against the threats caused by the alertness of defense forces.
Final Report: