Private

After exiting the clouds during the landing approach at the uncontrolled airport, the private pilot of the small jet canceled his instrument flight plan with air traffic control. He stated that, although there was no precipitation when he exited the clouds, he suspected the runway may be icy due to the weather conditions. The pilot saw an airplane holding short on the taxiway at the end of the runway and assumed it was preparing to takeoff, which he stated led him to believe that the runway condition was good. Although the pilot announced his location and intentions on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), he did not inquire about the runway condition via CTAF/UNICOM. Witnesses reported that the approach looked normal. After touchdown, the pilot applied brakes and realized he had no braking action. He subsequently retracted the speed brakes, spoilers, and flaps, and added takeoff power. The airplane yawed to the left and the pilot reduced engine power to idle while applying rudder to correct the airplane's track. The airplane continued off the runway, where it traveled through a fence and across a road before coming to rest inverted. The pilot and mechanic seated in the airplane that was holding short of the runway during the landing reported that they were only taxiing to a maintenance facility and did not intend to take off. They reported that the taxiways were icy. A witness who assisted the pilot following the accident reported that the roads at the time were covered in ice and "very slick." Recorded data from the airplane showed that the pilot flew a stabilized approach and that the airplane touched down near the approach end of the runway; however, given the icy runway conditions, the airplane's landing distance required exceeded the available runway by more than 8,000 ft. Airport personnel had not issued a NOTAM regarding the icy runway conditions. The airport manager stated he was not at the airport at the time of the accident, and that he was still trying to learn the new digital NOTAM manager system. The employee who was at the airport was authorized to issue NOTAMs, but had not yet been trained on the new system.

The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.

According to the pilot, during the landing roll, the airplane "began to drift sharply to the left." The pilot reported that, although there were no wind gusts reported, he felt as though a wind gust was pushing the airplane to the left. He attempted to maintain directional control with rudder pedal application, and he applied full right aileron. The airplane continued to drift to the left, and the pilot attempted to abort the landing by applying full throttle and 25° of flaps. He reported that the airplane continued to drift to the left and that he was not able to achieve sufficient airspeed to rotate. The airplane exited the runway, the pilot pulled the throttle to idle, and he applied the brakes to avoid obstacles. However, the airplane impacted the runway and taxiway signage and came to rest in a drainage culvert. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The published METAR for the accident airport reported that the wind was from 290° at 15 knots, and wind gusts exceeded 22 knots 1 hour before and 1 hour after the accident. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 20. The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane was 17 knots. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The private pilot obtained a full weather briefing before departing on a long cross-country flight. The destination airport was forecast to be under visual meteorological conditions, but there was an AIRMET and Center Weather Advisory (CWA) issued for low instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions later that day. The briefer told the pilot to check the weather again en route to see if the AIRMET and CWA had been updated. At the time the pilot stopped for fuel, another CWA was issued for low IFR conditions at his destination airport; however, there were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained this information during the fuel stop or after departing on the last leg of the flight. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that, about 10 minutes before arriving at the airport, the pilot reported that he had obtained the current weather conditions at his destination airport. The most recent observation, about 1 hour before the accident indicated good visibility; however, the weather reporting equipment did not provide ceiling heights. It is unknown if the pilot obtained weather information from nearby airports, which were reporting low instrument meteorological conditions (visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile and ceilings 200-300 ft above ground level [agl]). Additionally, three pilot reports (PIREPs) describing the poor weather conditions were filed within the hour before the accident. The controller did not relay the PIREPs or the CWA information to the pilot, so the pilot was likely unaware of the deteriorating conditions. Based on radar information and statements from witnesses, the pilot's approach to the airport was unstabilized. He descended below the minimum descent altitude of 440 ft, and, after breaking through the fog about 100 ft agl, the airplane reentered the fog and completed a 360° right turn near the approach end of the runway, during which its altitude varied from 100 ft to 300 ft. The airplane then climbed to an altitude about 800 ft before radar contact was lost near the accident site. The airplane came to rest inverted, consistent with one witness's statement that it descended through the clouds in a spin before impact; post accident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument experience could not be established. The circumstances of the accident, including the restricted visibility conditions and the pilot's maneuvering of the airplane before the impact, are consistent with a spatial disorientation event. It is likely that the pilot experienced a loss of control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin.

Shortly after takeoff from Lanseria Airport Runway 07, en route to Bazaruto Island in Mozambique, the pilot encountered engine problems. He contacted ATC and was cleared for an immediate return and landing on runway 25. On short final, the single engine airplane hit the perimeter fence and crashed near the runway threshold, bursting into flames. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire. Built in 1975, this Cessna 402B was equipped with a new turbo engine and redesigned as a single engine Cessna (DMI) Falcon 402 (the C402 is usually a twin engine aircraft).

The commercial pilot of the jet reported that he initially requested that 100 lbs of fuel be added to both fuel tanks. During the subsequent preflight inspection, the pilot decided that more fuel was needed, so he requested that the airplane's fuel tanks be topped off with fuel. However, he did not confirm the fuel levels or check the fuel gauges before takeoff. He departed on the flight and did not check the fuel gauges until about 1 hour after takeoff. He stated that, at that time, the fuel gauges were showing about 900-1,000 lbs of fuel per side, and he realized that the fuel tanks had not been topped off as requested. He reduced engine power to conserve fuel and to increase the airplane's flight endurance while he continued to his destination. When the fuel gauges showed about 400-500 lbs of fuel per side, the low fuel lights for both wing fuel tanks illuminated. The pilot reported to air traffic control that the airplane was low on fuel and diverted the flight to the nearest airport. The pilot reported that the airplane was high and fast on the visual approach for landing. He misjudged the height above the ground and later stated that the airplane "landed very hard." The airplane's left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed and the airplane veered off the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The twin engine aircraft departed Madrid-Cuatro Vientos Airport on a private flight to Cascais, Portugal, carrying three passengers and one pilot. One of the reasons for the flight was to repair the weather radar at a Portuguese maintenance center that specialized in this equipment. The pilot had to delay the takeoff until 1557LT due to bad weather conditions. The aerodrome of Cuatros Vietnos was in instrument conditions (IMC), which forced its closing from 0900LT until 1444LT. At 1615LT, the aircraft was en route, climbing from flight level 190 to its authorized cruise level of 210. Moments later, according to a detailed analysis of the data taken from the radar, there was a yaw to the left, and the aircraft started to turn in this direction and suddenly lose altitude. After this event, the airspeed fell quickly and gradually until the aircraft stalled. The aircraft went into a spin, which after some time turned into a flat spin. As the airplane descended out of control, and with the spin fully developped, loads were placed on the horizontal tail that exceeded the design loads, causing the tail to break up in flight into five parts before the aircraft impacted the ground. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the impact and sibsequent fire, and its four occupants were killed in the accident.

The airline transport pilot, who was the pilot flying, and commercial pilot, who was the pilot not flying and was acting as a safety pilot and was not expected to know the airplane's systems, limitations, or characteristics, were preparing to depart for a personal flight with eight passengers on board. When the pilot arrived at the airport, he determined that the airplane had 900 lbs of fuel onboard. He instructed the lineman to fuel the airplane with 211 gallons of fuel (1,413.7 lbs) for a fuel total of 2,313.7 lbs. The pilot reported that he was aware that the total weight of the eight passengers, their bags, and the fuel caused the airplane to be overweight but that he did not complete a weight and balance form or determine the expected takeoff performance before the flight. He informed the other pilot that the flight would be heavy, but he did not tell him how much the airplane exceeded the airplane's maximum gross takeoff weight. After the accident, the pilot determined that the airplane was 623 lbs over the maximum gross takeoff weight. The pilot reported that the airplane's flight controls and engines were operating normally during the pretakeoff check and that the elevator pitch trim was positioned in the "green" range. The pilot taxied the airplane onto the runway and applied the brakes and increased the throttles to takeoff power before releasing the brakes for the takeoff roll. However, he did not confirm the power settings that he applied when he advanced the throttles. The airplane did not accelerate as quickly as the pilot expected during the takeoff roll. When the airplane was about halfway down the runway, the airspeed was 80 kts, so the pilot continued the takeoff roll, but the airplane was still not accelerating as expected. He stated that he heard the other pilot say "redline," so he decreased the power. At this point, the airplane had reached the last third of the runway, and the pilot pulled back on the control yoke to lift the airplane off the runway, but the stall warning sounded. He lowered the nose, but the airplane was near the end of the runway. He added that he did not get "on" the brakes or put the propellers into reverse pitch and that the airplane then departed the runway. The pilot veered the airplane right to avoid the instrument landing system antenna, which was 500 ft from the end of the 5,500-ft-long runway, but the left wing struck the antenna, the left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed, and both propellers contacted the ground. The airplane then skidded left before stopping about 680 ft from the end of the runway. The pilot reported that the airplane did not have any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures. The evidence indicates that the pilot decided to depart knowing that the airplane was over its maximum gross takeoff weight and without determining the expected takeoff performance. During the takeoff roll, he did not check his engine instruments to determine if he had applied full takeoff power, although the acceleration may have been sluggish because of the excess weight onboard. The other pilot was not trained on the airplane and was not able to provide the pilot timely performance information during the takeoff. Neither the pilot nor the other pilot called out for an aborted takeoff, and when they recognized the need to abort the takeoff, it was too late to avoid a runway excursion.

The commercial pilot was conducting a cross-country flight to a family residence in the turbinepowered, single-engine airplane. The pilot was familiar with the route, which traversed a mountain pass and remote terrain. Before departing on the flight, the pilot communicated with a family member at the residence via text messages and was aware the weather was windy but that the mountain tops were clear. There was no record of the pilot obtaining a preflight weather briefing from an official, accesscontrolled source, and the pilot indicated to a friend before departure that he had not accessed weather cameras. Weather forecast products that were available to the pilot revealed possible turbulence at low altitudes and icing at altitudes above 12,000 ft along the route of flight, and weather cameras along the planned route and near the destination would have indicated deteriorating visibility in snow showers and mountain obscuration starting about 1.5 hours before departure. The airplane departed and proceeded toward the destination; radar data correlated to the accident flight indicated that the airplane climbed from 4,600 ft to 14,700 ft before turning west over the mountains. Text messages that the pilot sent during the initial climb revealed that the mountain pass he planned to fly through was obscured, and he intended to climb over the mountains and descend through holes in the clouds as he neared the destination. Radar data also indicated that the airplane operated above 12,500 ft mean sea level (msl) for about 30 minutes, and above 14,000 msl for an additional 14 minutes before entering a gradual descent during the last approximate 20 minutes of flight. Review of weather information indicated that cloud layers over the accident area increased during the 30 minutes before the accident, and it is likely that the airplane was operating in icing conditions, although it was not certified for flight in such conditions, which may have resulted in structural or induction icing and an uncontrolled loss of altitude. The airplane wreckage came to rest on the steep face of a snow-covered mountain in a slight nose-down, level attitude. The empennage was intact, the right wing was completely separated, and the forward fuselage and cockpit were partially separated and displaced from the airframe with significant crush damage, indicative of impact with terrain during forward flight. Page 2 of 10 ANC17FA004 There was no indication that the airplane was equipped with supplemental oxygen; pilots are required to use oxygen when operating at altitudes above 12,500 ft for more than 30 minutes, and anytime at altitudes above 14,000 ft. It could not be determined if, or to what extent, the pilot may have experienced symptoms of hypoxia that would have affected his decision-making. The airplane wreckage was not recovered or examined due to hazardous terrain and environmental conditions, and the reason for the impact with terrain could not be determined; however, it is likely that deteriorating enroute weather and icing conditions contributed to the outcome of the accident.

The pilot of the multi-engine tailwheel-equipped airplane reported that during the landing roll, after the tailwheel had touched down, the airplane veered sharply to the left. The pilot further reported that the airplane was close to the left runway edge, so he allowed the airplane to continue off the runway, in effort not to overcorrect to the right. During the runway excursion, the right main landing gear collapsed in soft terrain. The right wing sustained substantial damage. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.