Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

On 1 July 2002 at 21:35:32 hrs a Tupolev TU-154M on its flight from Moscow-Domodedovo /Russia to Barcelona/ Spain and a Boeing B757-200, which was on a flight from Bergamo /Italy to Brussels /Belgium, collided near the town of Ueberlingen (Lake Constance) in a dark night; the in-flight visibility at the flight level concerned was 10 km and more. Both airplanes impacted the ground north of the town of Ueberlingen. A larger number of witnesses had become aware of the accident by explosive noises, a prolonged roaring and rumbling as well as reflections of fire. Many of them saw pieces of debris burning while falling from the sky. The histories of the flights were reconstructed on the basis of the evaluation of the airborne flight data recorders (FDR) and cockpit voice recorders (CVR) and of the TCAS data stored in the airplanes, the radio communications between the Swiss Air Traffic Control Centre (ACC Zurich) and the crews of the Tupolev TU-154M and the Boeing B757-200 stored on the ground and the ground radar data recorded by the Swiss Air Navigation Services.
Boeing B757-200:
During the whole month of June 2002 both pilots, the pilot-in-command (PIC) and the copilot, had flown together as a crew. Several times they flew the route Bahrain - Bergamo - Brussels -
Bahrain. The last flight prior to this flight cycle was conducted on 28 June 2002 on the route Brussels – Bahrain. Prior to this flight the crew was off duty for 75 hours. They checked in at 11:50 hrs in Bahrain. At 13:30 hrs the airplane departed from Bahrain airport (OBBI) for a cargo flight to Brussels EBBR) with one intermediate stop at Bergamo (LIME). Only the two pilots were aboard the aircraft. The landing at Bergamo airport took place at 19:10 hrs after a flight time of 05 hours 40 minutes. In Bergamo, the airplane was refuelled, unloaded and reloaded with cargo. Take-off to continue the flight to Brussels was at 21:06 hrs. The airplane was flown by the copilot (PF). The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR). The flight plan (FPL) included the following information relevant to the flight: Aerodrome of departure: LIME, scheduled time of departure: 21:00 hrs, cruise speed: 463 kt, cruise level: FL 360, flight route: ABESI-UN851-TGO-UL608-LAMGO-UZ738-ANEKI-UZ917- BATTY, aerodrome of destination: EBBR, estimated flight time: 01:11 hrs, alternate aerodrome: EDDK (Cologne). At 21:21:50 hrs, the PIC contacted ACC Zurich on the frequency 128.050 MHz at FL 260 and in direct approach to the waypoint ABESI. At 21:21:56 hrs, the transponder code 7524 was assigned. With the identification of the airplane a clearance for a direct approach to the TANGO VOR as well as for a climb from FL 260 to FL 320 was given. The PIC requested to climb to FL 360, which was approved approximately four minutes later at 21:26:36 hrs. At 21:29:50 hrs the airplane reached this flight level, without the pilots reporting it. At 21:34:30 hrs the copilot handed over the control of the airplane to the PIC in order to go to the lavatory installed in a cubicle at the rear of the cockpit. At 21:34:31 hrs the PIC confirmed that he had taken over. At 21:34:42 hrs the airborne TCAS alarmed the crew about possibly conflicting traffic by a Traffic Advisory (TA): “traffic, traffic". After the TA the CVR recorded clicking noises. 14 seconds later (21:34:56 hrs) TCAS issued a Resolution Advisory (RA) “descend, descend". Approximately two seconds later the autopilot (AP) was switched off, the control column pushed and the thrust of the engines reduced. FDR data shows that the pitch was reduced from 2.5° to approximately 1.5° and the vertical acceleration lowered from about 1.0 g to 0.9 g. According to the FDR and the TCAS recordings the airplane had reached a rate of descent of 1500 ft/min 12 seconds after the autopilot had been switched off. At 21:35:05 hrs the CVR recorded via the cockpit area microphone the remark of the copilot “traffic right there“ which was confirmed by the PIC with “yes“. At 21:35:10 hrs, i.e. 14 seconds after the RA “descend, descend“, TCAS issued the advisory to increase the descent (“increase descent, increase descent“). At this time the copilot had returned to his work station and put on his headset. His reaction to the RA was recorded as "increase". Following this RA, the rate of descent was changed and reached approximately 2600 ft/min 10 seconds later. During the descent the pitch angle decreased to –1° and the powerplant thrust was reduced to approximately 1.2 (EPR). According to the CVR at 21:35:14 hrs a Master Caution Aural Warning is heard for two seconds. According to the FDR the autothrottle was switched off by the crew at 21:35:18 hrs. At 21:35:19 hrs the crew reported the “TCAS descent“ to ACC Zurich. Subsequently the copilot requested the PIC twice to descend. Once with the word “descend“ (21:35:26 hrs) and then by saying “descend hard“ (21:35:30 hrs). Approximately two seconds prior to the collision the control column was pushed fully forward. At 21:35:32 hrs the airplane flying a northern heading (MH = 004°) with a pitch angle of approximately – 2° and no bank angle collided with the TU154M at 34 890 ft.
Tupolev TU-154M:
The crew was off duty for 24 hours before take-off for the charter flight to Barcelona (LEBL). They checked in at 17:30 hrs. At 18:48 hrs the airplane departed from the airport Moscow-Domodedovo (UUDD). Nine crew members and 60 passengers were aboard the airplane. The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) in accordance with the flight plan (FPL) filed. The FPL included the following information relevant to the flight: Aerodrome of departure: UUDD, planned time of departure: 18:30 hrs, cruise speed: 880 km/h, cruise level: 10 600 m, flight route: KLIMOVSK-KAMENKA-ZAKHAROVKA-R11-YUKHNOVB102-BAEVO/cruise speed: 470 kt, cruise level: FL 360, flight route: UL979-MATUS-UM984-BOLMU-UT43-STOCKERAU-UR23-SALZBURG-UL856-TRASADINGEN-Z69-OLBEN-UN869-OLRAK-UN855-PERPIGNAN-UB384-GIRONA-UB38-SABADELL, aerodrome of arrival: LEBL, estimated flight time: 04:20 hours, alternate aerodrome: LEGE (Girona). Five flight crew members were in the cockpit. The commander (under supervision) - who was the PF (Pilot flying) on this flight - occupied the left-hand seat in the cockpit. The right-hand seat was occupied by an instructor, who as a PNF (Pilot non flying) also conducted the radio communications. He was also the pilot-in-command (PIC). The seat of the flight navigator was between and slightly behind the pilots. The work station of the flight engineer was behind the instructor. A further pilot (copilot), who had no function on this flight, was on a vacant seat behind the commander. At 21:11:55 hrs - near Salzburg still over Austrian territory - the crew received the clearance from Vienna radar for a direct approach to the Trasadingen VOR at FL 360. At 21:16:10 hrs, the airplane entered German airspace and was controlled by Munich Radar. At 21:29:54 hrs, the crew was instructed by Munich to change over to ACC Zurich on 128.050 MHz. At 21:30:11 hrs and at FL 360 the PNF contacted ACC Zurich. At 21:30:33 hrs, ACC Zurich assigned the transponder code 7520 to the airplane, which was acknowledged 6 seconds later. For the time between about 21:33:00 hrs and 21:34:41 hrs the CVR recorded crew discussions concerning an airplane approaching from the left which was displayed on the vertical speed indicator (VSI/TRA) which is part of the TCAS. All flight crew members with the exception of the flight engineer were involved in these discussions. These recordings suggest that the crew strived to localize the other airplane as to its position and its flight level. At 21:34:36 hrs, the commander stated: “Here it is in sight“, and two seconds later: “Look here, it indicates zero“. During the time from 21:34:25 hrs to 21:34:55 hrs, the airplane turned at a bank angle of approximately 10° from a magnetic heading (MH) of 254° to 264°. At 21:34:42 hrs, TCAS generated a TA (“traffic, traffic“). The CVR recorded that both the PIC and the copilot called out “traffic, traffic“. At 21:34:49 hrs - i.e. seven seconds later - ACC Zurich instructed the crew to expedite descent to FL350 with reference to conflicting traffic (“...... descend flight level 350, expedite, I have crossing traffic“). While the controller was giving the instruction - the radio transmission took just under eight seconds - the PIC requested the PF to descend. At 21:34:56 hrs, the control column was pushed forward, the autopilot (pitch channel) was switched off and the powerplant thrust reduced to approximately 72 % (N1). FDR data shows a reduction of the pitch angle of the airplane from 0° to approximately –2.5° as well as a reduction of the vertical acceleration from approximately 1 g (normal acceleration of the earth near the airplane centre of gravity) to 0.8 g. The instruction to descend was not verbally acknowledged by the crew. At the same time (21:34:56 hrs) TCAS generated an RA (“climb, climb“). At 21:34:59 hrs, the CVR recorded the voice of the copilot stating: “It (TCAS) says (говорит): “climb“. The PIC replied: “He (ATC) is guiding us down“. The copilot's enquiring response: “descend?“ At 21:35:02 hrs, (six seconds after the RA “ climb, climb”) the PF pulled the control column. As a result, the rate of descent ceased to increase. The vertical acceleration rose from 0.75 g to 1.07 g. The engine thrust remained unchanged in conjunction with this control input (refer to Appendix 5a). At 21:35:03 hrs, the engine throttles were pulled back further. The discussion between the crew members was interrupted at 21:35:03 hrs by the controller instructing the crew once again to expedite descend to FL 350 (“... descend level 350, expedite descend“).This instruction was immediately acknowledged by the PNF. The controller then informed the crew about other flight traffic at FL 360 in the 2 o’clock position (“...Ya, … we have traffic at your 2 o’clock position now at 3-6-0“) and the PIC asked: “Where is it?“, the copilot answered: “Here on the left side!“. At the time, the rate of descent was approximately 1 500 ft/min. The voice of the flight navigator can be heard on the CVR saying:" It is going to pass beneath us!" while the controller was giving his last instruction. At 21:35:04 hrs the roll channel of the autopilot was switched off. At 21:35:05 hrs, the PF pushed the control column again and the rate of descent increased to more than 2 000 ft/min. From 21:35:07 hrs to 21:35:24 hrs the aircraft heading changed to the right from 264° to 274° MH. At 21:35:24 hrs TCAS issued an RA “increase climb“. The copilot commented this with the words: “It says ‘climb”! At the time of the RA „increase climb“, the FDR recorded a slow movement of the control column nose down leading to a change in pitch angle from –1° to approximately –2° and in a reduction in vertical acceleration. The descent rate was approximately 1800 ft/min (refer to Appendix 5b). Five seconds before the collision the control column was pulled back, associated with a minor increase of thrust levers setting. One second prior to the collision the pitch angle reached –1° and the vertical acceleration 1.1 g. During the last second before the collision the control column was pulled back abruptly and the thrust levers were pushed fully forward. At the time of the collision the pitch angle was 0°; the vertical acceleration was 1.4 g but the airplane was still in a descent. The airplane collided with a heading of 274° and a bank angle to the right of 10° with the Boeing B757-200 at 21:35:32 hrs at a flight level of 34 890 ft. After the collision, the TU154M rolled with increasing rate about the longitudinal axis to the left. Simultaneously with this rolling movement the extension of the aileron-spoiler on the right wing was recorded. Within approximately two seconds after the collision the pitch angle changed from 0° to -6° and the cabin differential pressure decreased within one second from 0.6 kg/cm2 to a value close to 0 kg/ cm2.

The single engine aircraft departed Lake Cojibo with two passengers, one pilot and a full load of freight, destined for a fishing camp. Weather conditions were good but the OAT was high. After takeoff, the aircraft encountered difficulties to maintain a proper rate of climb due to the high temperature and the weight it was carrying. The pilot entered a valley and while trying to gain height to clear rising terrain, the aircraft struck the top of a mountain and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The aircraft was on an instrument flight rules flight from Gunisao Lake, Manitoba, to Winnipeg. One pilot and six passengers were on board. At 0913 central daylight time, KEE208 began an instrument landing system approach to Runway 13 at Winnipeg International Airport. The captain flew the approach at a higher-than-normal approach airspeed and well above the glide path. When the aircraft broke out of the cloud layer, it was not in position to land safely on the remaining runway. The captain executed a missed approach at 0916 and, after switching to the approach frequency from tower frequency, requested an expedited return to the airport. The approach controller issued instructions for a turn back to the airport. Almost immediately, at 0918, the captain declared a 'Mayday' for an engine failure. Less than 20 seconds later the captain transmitted that the aircraft had experienced a double engine failure. The aircraft crashed at a major traffic intersection at 0920, striking traffic signals and several vehicles. All seven of the aircraft passengers and several of the vehicle occupants were seriously injured; one passenger subsequently died of his injuries. The aircraft experienced extensive structural damage, with the wings and engines tearing off along the wreckage trail. There was a small post-crash fire in the right wing and engine area.

On May 31, 2002, about 1315 Atlantic standard time, an Aero Commander 500-B, N78336, registered to Bevins Air Service Inc., operating as a 14 CFR Part 135 air-taxi passenger/cargo flight ditched into the Atlantic Ocean, near Roseau, Dominica. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a VFR flight plan was filed. The airplane has not been located and is presumed to be destroyed. The commercial pilot has not been located and is presumed to be fatally injured. The deceased passenger was recovered from the Atlantic Ocean on June 4, 2002. The flight originated from Melville Hall Airport, Roseau, Dominica, at 1240. According to Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) the pilot informed Guadeloupe Air Traffic Control that the airplane was experiencing engine problems and that he was returning to Dominica. The airplane was last observed on radar about six miles north of Dominica.

The twin-tubofan airplane overran the runway during an aborted takeoff, impacting two fences before coming to rest. The pilot reported experiencing no anomalies with the airplane during the preflight inspection and taxi portion of the flight. During takeoff roll, at V1 (103 knots), the pilot began to pull aft on the control yoke. The pilot noticed the nose landing gear was not coming off of the runway and at 120 knots, with full aft control input, elected to abort the takeoff. He pulled the power to idle and applied maximum braking. Upon seeing the localizer antennas approaching the airplane at the departure end of the runway, the pilot veered the airplane to the right of centerline. The airplane departed the runway surface and impacted the fences. Post-accident examination of the runway revealed tire skid marks on the runway that led to the airplane's final resting place. The tire skid marks measured 1,765 feet in length. Examination of the wreckage revealed no pre-existing brake system anomalies that would have hindered the airplane's braking capability. Examination of the elevator trim system revealed it was 12 degrees out of trim in the nose down direction. The airplane underwent a Phase B and Phase 1 through 5 inspections approximately 5 months prior to the accident. The manufacturer's inspection manual indicates the elevator system should be examined every Phase 5 inspection. The aircraft's flight manual informs the pilot that the right elevator and trim tab should be inspected during the exterior inspection to ensure the elevator trim tab position matches its indicator.

After a visual approach to the 3,975 foot long by 50-foot wide runway, the turbojet airplane touched down about 2,100 feet beyond the landing threshold, and overran the departure end of the runway. The 5,600 hour pilot in command (PIC) reported that the approach speed and descent rate were "normal," and the aircraft was on short final over the trees at the "desired speed." Once the trees were clear, the aircraft descended to the runway at idle power. During the descent the PIC noticed a 16-knot increase in speed above reference. The PIC elected to continue "because the aircraft was close to the runway" and the PIC thought he had "extra landing distance to work with beyond what was required." The PIC reported that the aircraft "floated beyond the desired touchdown point," and "at this point [the pilots were] committed to stopping the aircraft." Passing the last third of the runway, the aircraft turned to the right "without" input from the pilots, overran the departure end, and collided with trees. Once the aircraft left the runway, the PIC stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to shut down the engines. Due to the "violent ride," the PIC managed to shut down one engine. A post-impact fire consumed the aircraft after the crew assisted to evacuate the occupants. No mechanical or maintenance anomalies were discovered with the aircraft. According to the flight manual, based on 29.74 inches HG, 1,808 PA, 30 degrees Celsius, zero wind, and an aircraft landing weight of 14, 500 lbs, the calculated total stopping distance (air and ground distance) at reference speed (Vref), was estimated at 2,955 feet. According to the flight manual, the "total distance" is based on full flaps, speed brakes after touchdown, Vref at 50 feet over the runway threshold, idle thrust when crossing the threshold, and no thrust reverse.

The twin engine aircraft departed San Miguel de Tucumán-Teniente Benjamin Matienzo Airport at noon on a positioning flight to a private airstrip located in Estancia La Juliana, 75 km from there. Before departure, the crew was unable to add more fuel in the tanks because they did not have sufficient cash. At Estancia La Juliana, the crew waited for two hours before the owner of the farm was taken to another of his property in Estancia El Descanso, about 70 km from there. Again, the crew waited for two hours before the final flight back to San Miguel de Tucumán. The return flight was completed under VFR mode at an altitude of 3,500 feet. While approaching San Miguel de Tucumán-Teniente Benjamin Matienzo Airport, the crew declared an emergency after both engines stopped. In a flaps and gear up configuration, he attempted to make an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted a tree and crashed in an open field located near El Chañar, about 13 km northeast of the runway 20 threshold. All three occupants were injured, two seriously, and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was chartered to transfer groups of prisoners from Medellín to Popayán on behalf of the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute. Fifty prisoners just disembarked at Popayán Airport when the crew departed on a ferry flight to Medellín for a second similar rotation. Popayán Airport is located at an altitude of 1,733 metres and its runway is 1,906 metres long. For unknown reasons, the crew decided to start the takeoff procedure from the intersection, reducing the available takeoff distance to 910 metres. Also, the flaps were deployed to an angle of 25° instead of 15° and the engine power was set at 95% instead of 100% as stipulated in the company procedures for airport located above the altitude of 1,400 metres. During the takeoff roll, at a distance of 150 metres from the runway end, the pilot realized he could not make it so he rejected the takeoff procedure and started an emergency braking manoeuvre. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, struck trees and came to rest, broken in two. Three passengers were killed while five other occupants were injured.

During the takeoff roll from a dirt strip (3,900 feet long) at Ngerende, an impala crossed the runway. To avoid a collision, the crew pulled up the control column and started the rotation. Because the airspeed was insufficient, the pilot-in-command put the nose down to gain speed when the aircraft struck the ground and crash landed in a field. All 17 occupants were rescued, among them a passenger was slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the flight from Skukuza to Pilanesberg the aircraft developed a hydraulic problem, resulting in a complete hydraulic failure. However, a safe landing was carried out at Pilanesberg on Runway 23. Shortly after the landing the pilot shut down both engines, but maintained the runway heading for approximately 2000m, before the aircraft veered off to the left of the runway where it entered a ditch, 75m from the runway edge, where it finally stopped. There were no injuries, but the aircraft sustained extensive damage and substantial damage was caused to the perimeter fence around the airport. Both the pilot and the co-pilot were correctly licenced and type rated on the aircraft. Apart from the CVR, which was inoperative at the time of the accident and a leaking L/H hydraulic pump, it would appear that the aircraft was correctly maintained. Fine weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The pilot informed Pilanesberg ATC of a complete hydraulic failure, but did not declare an emergency. The pilot failed to switch off the Nose Wheel Steering after touchdown and also shut down both hydraulic cut-off switches. The Emergency Checklist does not provide for a complete hydraulic failure.