Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The aircraft was overloaded and its centre of gravity was beyond the aft limit. The aircraft pitched up and stalled at an altitude that did not allow the pilot to execute the stall recovery manoeuvre.
2. The baggage was not secured. Shifting of the baggage caused the triple seat to pivot forward, propelling the 3 rear-seat passengers against the pilot and front-seat passenger during impact.
3. Although the design of the triple seat met aviation standards, it separated from the floor at the time of impact, principally due to the fact that the heavy cargo shifted.
4. The action taken by TC did not have the desired outcomes to ensure regulatory compliance; consequently, unsafe practices persisted.
Finding as to Risk:
1. Operating an aircraft outside the limits and conditions under which a permit is issued can increase the risk of an accident

Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot took off in weather conditions that were below the minimum for visual flight rules, and continued the flight in those conditions.
2. After a late decision to carry out a precautionary alighting, the pilot wound up in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Consequently, the visual references were reduced to the point of leading the aircraft to controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
3. The passenger at the rear of the aircraft was not seated on a seat compliant with aeronautical standards. The passenger was ejected from the plane at the moment of impact, which diminished his chances of survival.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The lack of training on pilot decision-making (PDM) for air taxi operators exposes pilots and passengers to increased risk when flying in adverse weather conditions.
2. In view of the absence of an ELT signal and the operator’s delay in calling, search efforts were initiated more than 3 ½ hours after the accident. That additional time lag can influence the seriousness of injuries and the survival of the occupants.

Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew who landed too far down the runway, reducing the landing distance available. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Excessive speed on approach (the IAS was 143 knots upon touchdown),
- The crew completed the approach in a too steep descent,
- Incorrect flare which caused the aircraft to land too dar down the runway,
- Insufficient landing distance available,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure.

The pilot's decision to use only a portion of the available takeoff area, which resulted in a collision with terrain during takeoff.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. After the take-off at reduced power, the aircraft performance during the initial climb was lower than that established at certification.
2. The right engine experienced a problem in flight that led to a substantial loss of thrust.
3. The right propeller was not feathered; therefore, the rate of climb was compromised by excessive drag.
4. The absence of written directives specifying which pilot was to perform which tasks may have led to errors in execution, omissions, and confusion in the cockpit.
5. Although the crew had the training required by regulation, they were not prepared to manage the emergency in a coordinated, effective manner.
6. The priority given to ATC communications indicates that the crew did not fully understand the situation and were not coordinating their tasks effectively.
7. The impact with the berm caused worse damage to the aircraft.
8. The aircraft’s upside-down position and the damage it sustained prevented the occupants from evacuating, causing them to succumb to the smoke and the rapid, intense fire.
9. The poor safety culture at Aéropro contributed to the acceptance of unsafe practices.
10. The significant measures taken by TC did not have the expected results to ensure compliance with the regulations, and consequently unsafe practices persisted.
Findings as to Risk:
1. Deactivating the flight low pitch stop system warning light or any other warning system contravenes the regulations and poses significant risks to flight safety.
2. The maintenance procedures and operating practices did not permit the determination of whether the engines could produce the maximum power of 1628 ft-lb required at take-off and during emergency procedures, posing major risks to flight safety.
3. Besides being a breach of regulations, a lack of rigour in documenting maintenance work makes it impossible to determine the exact condition of the aircraft and poses major risks to flight safety.
4. The non-compliant practice of not recording all defects in the aircraft journey log poses a safety risk because crews are unable to determine the actual condition of the aircraft at all times, and as a result could be deprived of information that may be critical in an emergency.
5. The lack of an in-depth review by TC of SOPs and checklists of 703 operators poses a safety risk because deviations from aircraft manuals are not detected.
6. Conditions of employment, such as flight hours–based remuneration, can influence pilots’ decisions, creating a safety risk.
7. The absence of an effective non-punitive and confidential voluntary reporting system means that hazards in the transportation system may not be identified.
8. The lack of recorded information significantly impedes the TSB’s ability to investigate accidents in a timely manner, which may prevent or delay the identification and communication of safety deficiencies intended to advance transportation safety.

Loss of power on the right engine for unknown reasons.

The pilot executed a belly “wheels up” emergency landing after the left main landing gear failed to extend.
Contributory Factors:
The new tyres installed on the main landing gear wheels were not in compliance with the instructions of the Fairchild Service Letter 226-SN-131.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot conducted a visual flight rules (VFR) flight into deteriorating weather in a mountainous region.
2. The pilot lost visual reference with the ground and the aircraft struck the rising terrain in level, controlled flight.
Findings as to Risk:
1. When an aircraft is not equipped with a functioning emergency locator transmitter (ELT), the ability to locate the aircraft in a timely manner is hindered.
2. Not applying current altimeter settings along a flight route, particularly from an area of high to low pressure, may result in reduced obstacle clearance.
3. Without a requirement for terrain awareness warning systems, there will be a continued risk of accidents of this type.