Crash of a Reims/Cessna F406 Caravan II in Sasakwa

Date & Time: Jan 2, 2017
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5H-WOW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
406-0060
YOM:
1991
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While taking off from runway 12/30 at Sasakwa Airfield, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed, bursting into flames. All six occupants were injured, some seriously, and the aircraft burnt out.

Crash of an Avro RJ85 in La Ceja: 71 killed

Date & Time: Nov 28, 2016 at 2158 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CP-2933
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Santa Cruz - Medellín
MSN:
E.2348
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
LMI2933
Country:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
73
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
71
Captain / Total flying hours:
6692
Captain / Total hours on type:
3417.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6923
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1474
Aircraft flight hours:
21640
Aircraft flight cycles:
19737
Circumstances:
The aircraft was performing a charter flight from Santa Cruz-Viru Viru to Medellín-José María Córdova (Rionegro) Airport, carrying members of the Chapecoense Real soccer team from Brazil who were traveling to Medellín to play against Atletico Nacional for a Copa Sudamericana game. The descent to Medellín was started by night and in good weather conditions when it seems that the encountered electrical problem. At 2156LT, while descending to FL155, the four engine aircraft hit tree tops and crashed in a wooded area located on the slope of a mountain located in the Cerro Gordo, near the city of La Ceja, about 17 km south from runway 01 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact but there was no fire. Six (two crew member and four passengers) were injured and evacuated while 71 other occupants were killed. According to first investigations, the crew encountered electrical problems and the aircraft may have suffered a fuel exhaustion. Due to the combination of several factors and findings that were detected during initial investigations, it was determined that the primary cause of the accident may have been a fuel exhaustion. The board of investigation was then in a process to determine the exact circumstances of the occurrence and to understand the course of events and the exact behavior and flight supervision (instruments, fuel jauges, flight preparation, operations, permission, ground assistance) on part of the flight crew and the operator. On December 2, the Civil Aviation Authority of Bolivia revoked with immediate effect the Air Operator Certificate of LAMIA. All flights have been suspended since.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the accident was the consequence of an inappropriate planning and execution of the flight, since the amount of fuel required to fly from the airport of destination to an alternate airport was not considered, nor was the amount of reserve fuel, nor the contingency fuel, nor the minimum landing fuel, quantities of fuel required by aeronautical regulations for the execution of the type of international flight that the aircraft CP-2339 was performing. The following factors were considered as contributing:
- Loss of situational awareness,
– Premature configuration of the aircraft for landing,
– Latent deficiencies,
– Lack of operational supervision and control of part of Operator,
– Organizational and operational deviation on the part of the Operator (non compliant to standard procedures).
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Moorhead

Date & Time: Nov 23, 2016 at 1759 LT
Registration:
N80RT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Baudette - Moorhead
MSN:
BB-370
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5630
Captain / Total hours on type:
89.00
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand passenger flight at night in instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near straight-in approach minimums for the runway. The pilot flew the approach as a non precision LNAV approach, and he reported that the approach was stabilized and that he did not notice anything unusual. A few seconds after leveling the airplane at the missed approach altitude, he saw the runway end lights, the strobe lights, and the precision approach path indicator. He then disconnected the autopilot and took his hand off the throttles to turn on the landing lights. However, before he could turn on the landing lights, the runway became obscured by clouds. The pilot immediately decided to conduct a missed approach and applied engine power, but the airplane subsequently impacted terrain short of the runway in a nose-up level attitude. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely the pilot lost sight of the runway due to the visibility being at/near the straight-in approach minimums and that the airplane got too low for a missed approach, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. A passenger stated that he and the pilot were not wearing available shoulder harnesses. The passenger said that he was not informed that the airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses or told how to adjust the seats. The pilot sustained injuries to his face in the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to attain a positive climb rate during an attempted missed approach in night instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near approach minimums, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna T207A Turbo Stationair 8 near Uchuquinua: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 9, 2016 at 0900 LT
Operator:
Registration:
OB-1936-P
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Trujillo - Pucallpa
MSN:
207-0767
YOM:
1984
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Trujillo to Pucallpa, carrying two pilots and pilot. While cruising over the Cajamarca Province, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. He modified his route and was able to continue under VFR mode in good weather conditions. Nevertheless, he continued at an insufficient altitude when the aircraft impacted ground and crashed in a mountainous area. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all three occupants were killed. There was no fire.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a loss of situational awareness of the pilots, by not making a continuous surveillance during the VFR flight in good weather conditions, not determining timely the corrections of direction or altitude, which finally led them to fail to fly over the ground of the new route adopted in flight, generating a probable aerodynamic loss at the limit of the performance of the aircraft, occurring a CFIT accident.
Contributing factors:
- Limited or poor use of the available GPS Terrain Proximity Warning system.
- Poor or erroneous appreciation of the weather conditions at the beginning of the flight, which led them to vary the route to fly over terrain with higher elevation.
- Limited appreciation of terrain height on the new route in relation to the selected cruising altitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in San Antonio de Prado: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 30, 2016 at 1204 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
HK-3804
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Medellín – Juradó
MSN:
208B-0315
YOM:
1992
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
3534
Captain / Total hours on type:
335.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6378
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1245
Aircraft flight hours:
2867
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Medellín-Enrique Olaya Herrera Airport on a charter flight to Juradó, carrying nine passengers and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff, the crew encountered difficulties to gain sufficient altitude and apparently attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted a hill and eventually crashed into trees. The copilot and three passengers were killed and seven others occupants were injured, some seriously. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- Execution of a take-off with a weight approximately 17% higher than the maximum gross operating weight (MTOW) established for the C208B aircraft.
- Limited climb rate with signs of lift loss due to the low performance given by the overweight during the initial climb phase.
- Forced landing in mountainous terrain due to loss of lift caused by overweight during the initial climb.
- Absence in the identification of the risks associated to an overweight operation of the aircraft.
- Lack of supervision by the Aircraft Operator in relation to the dispatch of aircraft operating from the outside at the main base of operation.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver I off Lopez Island

Date & Time: Sep 30, 2016 at 0837 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N6781L
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kenmore – Roche Harbor
MSN:
788
YOM:
1955
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
25000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1630.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7395
Circumstances:
While maneuvering at low altitude for a water landing, the commercial pilot of the float equipped airplane encountered low visibility due to ground fog. The pilot initiated a go-around, but the airplane impacted the water, bounced, and impacted the water a second time before coming to rest upright. The airplane subsequently sank, and all four occupants were later rescued. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The operator further reported that other company pilots who were flying on the day of the accident stated that the low visibility conditions were easily avoided by a slight course deviation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to land in an area of low visibility and ground fog, which resulted in collision with water.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Iliamna

Date & Time: Aug 8, 2016 at 1651 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N95RC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Crosswind Lake - King Salmon
MSN:
970
YOM:
1956
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9780
Captain / Total hours on type:
535.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7632
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot of the float-equipped airplane was attempting a takeoff with the load of passengers that he had flown to the lake earlier in the day. The pilot's calculated takeoff distances for the water run and over a 50-ft obstacle were 1,050 ft and 2,210 ft, respectively. The pilot did not add a safety margin to his takeoff distance calculations. The approximate shore-to-shore distance of the takeoff path was 1,800 ft. During taxi, the pilot retracted the wing flaps, where they remained for the takeoff. GPS data showed that the airplane attained a speed of about 49 knots before impacting terrain just beyond the shoreline. The airplane's stall speed with flaps retracted was about 52 knots. Postaccident examination revealed that the left wing flap was in the fully retracted position; the right wing flap assembly was damaged. The airplane flight manual takeoff checklist stated that flaps were to be selected to the "TAKE-OFF" position before takeoff. Additionally, the takeoff performance data contained in the flight manual was dependent upon the use of "TAKE-OFF" flaps and did not account for no-flaps takeoffs. Even if the pilot had used the correct flap setting for takeoff, the calculated takeoff distances were near the available takeoff distance, and it is likely that the airplane would still not have been able to avoid a collision with terrain. The pilot stated that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure with the airplane, and he should have "done the right thing," which was to conduct two flights, each with a half load of passengers.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to perform the takeoff despite calculations showing that the distance available was inadequate, which resulted in impact with terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Bangkok: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 1, 2016 at 1605 LT
Operator:
Registration:
HS-FGB
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Nakhon Ratchasima – Bangkok
MSN:
31-7652156
YOM:
1976
Flight number:
TRB106
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
While descending to Bangkok-Suvarnabhumi Airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a swamp and came to rest against a wood bridge. The wreckage was found about 15 km from the airport, along the borders of Nong Chok and Min Buri districts. The captain was killed while three other occupants were injured.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-505 Phenom 300 in Houston

Date & Time: Jul 26, 2016 at 1510 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N362FX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Scottsdale - Houston
MSN:
500-00239
YOM:
2014
Flight number:
LXJ362
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9246
Captain / Total hours on type:
1358.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
11362
Copilot / Total hours on type:
962
Aircraft flight hours:
1880
Circumstances:
The pilot executed an instrument approach and landing in heavy rain. The airplane touched down about 21 knots above the applicable landing reference speed, which was consistent with an unstabilized approach. The airplane touched down near the displaced runway threshold about 128 kts, and both wing ground spoilers automatically deployed. The pilot reported that the airplane touched down “solidly,” and he started braking promptly, but the airplane did not slow down. The main wheels initially spun up; however, both wheel speeds subsequently decayed consistent with hydroplaning in the heavy rain conditions. When the wheel speeds did not recover, the brake control unit advised the flight crew of an anti-skid failure; the pilot recalled an anti-skid CAS message displayed at some point during the landing. The pilot subsequently activated the emergency brake system and the wheel speeds decayed. The airplane ultimately overran the departure end of the runway about 60 kts, crossed an airport perimeter road, and encountered a small creek before coming to rest. The wings had separated from, and were located immediately adjacent to, the fuselage. The pilot reported light to moderate rain began on final approach. Weather data and surveillance images indicated that heavy rain and limited visibility prevailed at the airport during the landing. Thunderstorms were active in the vicinity and the rainfall rate at the time of the accident landing was between 4.2 and 6.0 inches per hour. About 4 minutes before the accident, a surface observation recorded the visibility as 3 miles. However, 3 minutes later, the observed visibility had decreased to 3/8 mile. A review of the available information indicated that the tower controller advised the pilot of changing wind conditions and of better weather west of the airport but did not update the pilot regarding visibility along the final approach course or precipitation at the airport. The pilot stated that the rain started 2 to 3 minutes before he landed and commented that it was not the heaviest rain that he had ever landed in. The pilot was using the multifunction display and a tablet for weather radar, which showed green and yellow returns indicating light to moderate rain during the approach. He chose not to turn on the airplane’s onboard weather radar because the other two sources were not indicating severe weather. The runway exhibited skid marks beginning about 1,500 ft from the departure end and each main tire had one patch of reverted rubber wear consistent with reverted rubber hydroplaning. The main landing gear remained extended and both tires remained pressurized. The tire pressures corresponded to a minimum dynamic hydroplaning speed of about 115 kts. The airplane flight manual noted that, in the case of an antiskid failure, the main brakes are to be applied progressively and brake pressure is to be modulated as required. The emergency brake is to be used in the event of a brake failure; however, the pilot activated the emergency brake when the main brakes still functioned; although, without anti-skid protection.
Probable cause:
The airplane’s hydroplaning during the landing roll, which resulted in a runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s continuation of an unstabilized approach, his decision to land in heavy rain conditions, and his improper use of the main and emergency brake systems. Also contributing was the air traffic controller’s failure to disseminate current airport weather conditions to the flight crew in a timely manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Akobo

Date & Time: Jun 3, 2016 at 1000 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-JLL
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Akobo - Juba
MSN:
208B-2158
YOM:
2009
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On 3 June 2016, a Cessna 208B of registration 5Y-JLL and serial number 2158 was conducting a charter passenger flight from Akobo Airstrip to Juba with 4 passengers and one flight crew member on board. According to the operator, during takeoff from Akobo Airstrip at approximately 10 a.m. Local Time, the pilot executed a premature takeoff due to animal incursion on the runway. The airplane's right main landing gear clipped the Airstrip perimeter fence and the aircraft crash-landed onto grass-thatched houses and trees near the end of the runway. Damage was substantial with no reported injuries. The runway was reported to have been wet at the time of occurrence.
Final Report: