United Arab Emirates

At the time of the accident, weather conditions were not bad but the presence of clouds and reduced visibility by night hampered the crew in their ground recognition. The use of a flight plan with errors and outdated information or a misreading of the weather radar settings or the combination of both allowed the crew to start the descent prematurely, causing the aircraft to approach below the prescribed minimum altitude. A succession of errors within the crew during the descent also allowed the aircraft to be too far to the north from the approach path as the wreckage was located 33 kilometers north to the runway 30 approach path. The fact that pilots visually mistaken the cities of Fujairah and Dubai remained a contributing factor.

Investigations were not able to determine the exact cause of the loss of control.

Due to lack of evidences, investigations were unable to determine the exact cause of the accident. It can only be a matter of conjecture as the wreckage was not located. All possible factors were explored, but none appeared plausible. Absence of radio communication between the aircraft and Sharjah after the initial contact and the absence of any distress call might have led to the tentative conclusion that the aircraft had met with a catastrophic disaster while still over the sea. However, the interception of a radio call from the aircraft at about its expected time of arrive at Sharjah and the considerable tailwind on the route seem to indicate the possibility that the aircraft overflew Sharjah under conditions of poor visibility. It is noteworthy that the ETA given by the aircraft as 0642 did not allow for any appreciable tailwind component which was indicated by the evidence of the Heron pilot. Not accounting for this factor could have resulted in the aircraft's descent on its ETA into high ground to the east of Sharjah. It may also explain the inability of Sharjah, to receive any message which may have been transmitted on VHF. However, the NDB at Sharjah was fully operational during the period of the subject flight and should have indicated to the pilot that Sharjah had been overflown unless the ADF system in the aircraft was mishandled or suffered a multiple failure.

The accident resulted from a loss of control of the aircraft by the first officer shortly after taking off on a dark night when instrument flying was necessary. This loss of control was due to the inability of the first officer to fly on instruments. The responsibility for the accident is attributed to the captain for failing to supervise the piloting of the aircraft by the first officer.