Russia

The cause of the accident without casualties to the plane An-2 RA-81514 was a violation of the established safe obstacle clearance in the performance of aviation-chemical works, which led to a collision with the lightning protection wire transmission line and the ground. A contributing factor was the performance of an incomplete flight crew. According to the An-2 Flight Manual the minimum crew for aerial chemical works is the commander of the aircraft and a copilot.

Erroneous actions on part of the crew, especially by applying brake pedal pressure just before rotation as result of a wrong foot position on the pedal during the takeoff run. This led to braking forces on the main gear requiring additional time for acceleration, a nose down moment preventing the crew to establish a proper rotation and preventing the aircraft to reach a proper pitch angle for becoming airborne, overrun of the runway at high speed with the elevator fully deflected for nose up rotation (producing more than double the elevator forces required to achieve normal takeoff rotation). The aircraft finally achieved a high rate of nose up rotation, became airborne 450 meters past the runway end and rotated up to a supercritical angle of attack still at a large rate of pitch up causing the aircraft to stall at low altitude, to impact obstacles and ground, break up and catch fire killing all but one occupants.
Contributing factors were:
- serious shortcomings in the re-training of the crew members with regards to the Yak-42, which did not take place in full, was spread out over a long period of time and took place while the crew remained in full operation on another aircraft type (Yak-40), which led to a negative transfer of skills, especially a wrong position of the foot on the brake pedal on the Yak-42,
- Lack of supervision of the re-training,
- errors and missed procedures by the crew in preparation and execution of the takeoff,
- inconsistent, uncoordinated actions by the crew in the final stages of the takeoff.

The accident was caused by a loss of engine power because the aircraft has been refueled with fuel dedicated to automobile.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The pilot's lack of knowledge about the flight area and the layout of cultivated fields,
- The pilot failed to brake properly during the emergency landing,
- The absence of a copilot on board,
- The Operator certificat was revoked 3 days prior to the accident.

The probable causes of the crash were:
Following the inflight shut down of engine number one and feathering of the number one propeller the longitudinal (roll) control of the aircraft was lost due to load-bearing properties of the left wing and possible damage to the left hand aileron control wiring resulting in the aircraft's uncontrolled excessive roll to the left and subsequent impact with terrain. The fire started in the tail section of the #1 engine nacelle and spread forward and onto the wing. The fire was most likely fed by fuel leaking from a fuel line connection to the low pressure fuel pump at engine #1, the fuel most likely ignited due to contact with hot engine parts. Due to the disintegration of the aircraft and fire damage it was not possible to establish the location of fuel leaks and the cause with certainty. The inability of the fire suppression system to extinguish such a fire in its early stages as well as the lack of checklists/guidelines in the aircraft's flight manual for fuel leaks inside the engine nacelle contributed to the delay of more than 2 minutes to shut the engine down. The mountainous terrain underneath the aircraft, low level overcast cloud and lack of time due to continued fire did not permit the crew to select a proper site for an emergency landing.

The probable causes of the accident were the failure of the crew to go around and the descent well below decision height without visual reference to landmarks when the aircraft approached the airfield in weather conditions below the captain's, aircraft's and airfield's minima and in dangerous/adverse weather phenomena like thunderstorm, heavy rain and severe turbulence as well as the lack of appropriate response and required actions following terrain awareness warning system alerts resulted in a controlled flight into terrain, collision with obstacles and the destruction of the aircraft.
Contributing factors:
- the crew underestimated the weather conditions at the destination airport thus taking an erroneous decision to attempt an approach in thunderstorm and heavy rain showers,
- unsatisfactory meteorological support of the flight, the dispatcher and later air traffic control provided information about visibility, cloud and wind data that did not correspond to actual conditions that were significantly worse than minimums required,
- clearance for the approach by air traffic control despite the presence of dangerous weather phenomena (thunderstorm, heavy rain) at the aerodrome, which did not correspond to the standard operating procedures at Blagoveshchensk,
- inadequate staffing with a first officer who was performing his first flight after a prolonged leave without proper preparation and training,
- unsatisfactory crew interaction and the failure to adhere to standard operating procedures, especially the call outs of approaching decision height, the absence of a decision by the commander to continue the landing or go-around and the lack of action to recommend/initiate a go around by the first officer.