University-Oxford

The airplane was being flown to another airport for maintenance work on the autopilot system. Before the flight, the pilot and an avionics technician discussed a roll issue with the airplane’s autopilot and the pilot was advised not to use the autopilot until the issue was resolved. The avionics technician further advised the pilot to wait for good weather to make the flight, but the pilot reportedly had a function back home that he wanted to attend later, on the day of the accident. Recorded flight track data indicated that most of the flight was uneventful until the airplane began its descent toward the intended destination. During the descent, the airplane encountered overcast clouds that continued to the end of the flight. The pilot was subsequently cleared for an instrument approach to the destination airport. While maneuvering on the approach, the airplane descended below its assigned altitude and the controller issued a low-altitude alert to the pilot. The airplane briefly climbed before it entered a descending right turn that continued to the end of the recorded data. Calculations based on recorded flight data revealed the airplane was descending over 15,000 feet per minute shortly before impact. The airplane impacted the ground near the final recorded flight track data point, in a near vertical attitude, and was fragmented. Examination of the airplane, engines, and systems did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal flight. Based on the available information, the pilot likely was not using the autopilot due to the known issue with the system and, as a result, was hand flying the airplane during the instrument approach. The pilot likely was accustomed to flying the airplane with the automation that the autopilot provided rather than by hand in single-pilot instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Based on the recorded flight path, it is likely that the pilot became spatially disoriented and lost control of the airplane while intercepting the final approach course for the instrument approach. In addition, the pilot allowed his self-imposed pressure to influence his decision to complete the flight in less-than-ideal weather conditions without a functional autopilot. Although ethanol was detected in liver and muscle tissue, it is likely that some, or all, of the detected ethanol was from postmortem production. Thus, it is unlikely that ethanol contributed to the accident. Tadalafil, salicylic acid, famotidine, atenolol, and irbesartan were detected in liver and muscle tissue, but it is unlikely that these substances contributed to the accident.

Two instrument-rated commercial pilots and one passenger were conducting a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions when they began discussing an electrical malfunction; they then reported the electrical problem to air traffic control. The airplane subsequently made a descending right turn and impacted wooded terrain at a high speed. Most components of the airplane were highly fragmented, impact damaged, and unidentifiable. Based on the limited discussion of the electrical problem on the cockpit voice recorder and the damage to the airplane, it was not possible to determine the specific nature of the electrical malfunction the airplane may have experienced. While it was not possible to determine which systems were impacted by the electrical malfunction, it is possible the flight instruments were affected. The airplane's descending, turning, flight path before impact is consistent with a system malfunction that either directly or indirectly (through a diversion of attention) led to the pilot's loss of awareness of the airplane's performance in instrument meteorological conditions and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.

The private pilot and five passengers departed on a day instrument flight rules cross-country flight in the multiengine airplane. Before departure, the airplane was serviced to capacity with fuel, which corresponded to an endurance of about 5 hours. About 1 hour 45 minutes after reaching the flight's cruise altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported a failure of the right engine fuel pump and requested to divert to the nearest airport. About 7 minutes later, the pilot reported that he "lost both fuel pumps" and stated that the airplane had no engine power. The pilot continued toward the diversion airport and the airplane descended until it impacted trees about 1,650 ft short of the approach end of the runway; a postimpact fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The propellers of both engines were found in the unfeathered position. All six of the fuel pumps on the airplane were functionally tested or disassembled, and none exhibited any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. Corrosion was noted in the right fuel boost pump, which was likely the result of water contamination during firefighting efforts by first responders. The airplane was equipped with 4 fuel tanks, comprising an outboard and an inboard fuel tank in each wing. The left and right engine fuel selector valves and corresponding fuel selector handles were found in the outboard tank positions. Given the airplane's fuel state upon departure and review of fuel consumption notes in the flight log from the day of the accident, the airplane's outboard tanks contained sufficient fuel for about 1 hour 45 minutes of flight, which corresponds to when the pilot first reported a fuel pump anomaly to air traffic control. The data downloaded from the engine data monitor was consistent with both engines losing fuel pressure due to fuel starvation. According to the pilot's operating handbook, after reaching cruise flight, fuel should be consumed from the outboard tanks before switching to the inboard tanks. Two fuel quantity gauges were located in the cockpit overhead switch panel to help identify when the pilot should return the fuel selectors from the outboard fuel tanks to the inboard fuel tanks. A flight instructor who previously flew with the pilot stated that this was their normal practice. He also stated that the pilot had not received any training in the accident airplane to include single engine operations and emergency procedures. It is likely that the pilot failed to return the fuel selectors from the outboard to the inboard tank positions once the outboard tanks were exhausted of fuel; however, the pilot misdiagnosed the situation as a fuel pump anomaly.

During a night approach to Oxford-University Airport, the visibility was reduced and the copilot-in-command failed to realize his altitude was too low. The aircraft struck the ground short of runway threshold, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.