Tampa

Prior to the accident flight, the pilot indicated that he was aware of the thunderstorm activity along his route of flight and that he anticipated deviating around the weather as necessary. While enroute to his destination, the pilot requested and was provided both weather information and pilot reports from other aircraft by air traffic control (ATC). Upon encountering an area of thunderstorm activity that extended east-to-west across the route of flight, the pilot reported encountering significant turbulence, and then downdrafts of 2,000 feet per minute. He then requested a course reversal to exit the weather before he declared an emergency and advised ATC that the airplane was upside down. There were no further transmissions from the pilot and radar contact with the airplane was lost. Review of radar data revealed that the pilot had deviated south and then southwest when the airplane entered a strong and intense echo of extreme intensity. Visible imaging revealed that the echo was located in an area of a rapidly developing cumulonimbus cloud with a defined overshooting top, indicating the storm was in the mature stage or at its maximum intensity. Two debris fields were later discovered near the area where the cumulonimbus cloud had been observed. This was indicative that the airplane had penetrated the main core of the cumulonimbus cloud, which resulted in an inflight breakup of the airplane. Near the heavier echoes the airplane's airborne weather radar may have been unable to provide an accurate representation of the radar echoes along the aircraft's flight path; therefore the final penetration of the intense portion of the storm was likely unintentional.

While in instrument meteorological conditions flying 800 feet above the airplane’s service ceiling (30,000 feet), with no icing conditions reported, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he, “...lost [his] panel.” With the autopilot most likely engaged, the airplane began a right roll about 36 seconds later. The airplane continued in a right roll that increased to 105 degrees, then rolled back to about 70 degrees, before the airplane entered a right descending turn. The airplane continued its descending turn until being lost from radar in the vicinity of the accident site. The airplane impacted in a nose-down attitude in an open field and was significantly fragmented. Postaccident inspection of the flight control system, engine, and propeller revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The flaps and landing gear were retracted and all trim settings were within the normal operating range. Additionally, the airplane was within weight and balance limitations for the flight. The cause of the pilot-reported panel failure could not be determined; however, the possibility of a total electrical failure was eliminated since the pilot maintained radio contact with the air traffic controller. Although the source of the instrumentation failure could not be determined, proper pilot corrective actions, identified in the pilot operating handbook, following the failure most likely would have restored flight information to the pilot’s electronic flight display. Additionally, a standby attitude gyro, compass, and the co-pilot’s electronic flight display units would be available for attitude reference information assuming they were operational.

The pilot stated that he was on a repositioning flight to Tampa, Florida. He was cruising at 11,000 feet msl when, with no warning or spool down time, the engine failed. The engine indications instantly went to zero. The pilot declared an emergency to the air traffic controller and was advised that the nearest airport was 29 miles away. He maneuvered the airplane toward the airport and went through the engine failure procedures. The attempts to restart the engine were unsuccessful. The pilot configured the airplane for best glide speed. After gliding for 22 miles, the airplane's altitude was about 300 feet msl. The pilot slowed the airplane to just above stall speed before impacting small pine trees pulling back on the yoke and stalling the airplane into the trees. The engine was examined at Pratt and Whitney of Canada, with Transportation Safety Board of Canada oversight. The engine compressor turbine blades were fractured at varying heights from the roots to approximately half of the span. Materials analysis determined the blade fractures to display impact damage and overheating. The primary cause of the blade fractures could not be determined. There were no other pre-impact anomalies or operational dysfunction observed to any of the engine components examined. Impact damage to the blade airfoils precluded determination of the original fracture mechanism.

Cargo was not weighed and weight and balance calculations were not performed. The airplane was about 321 pounds over gross. While taxiing, a witness reported seeing black smoke trailing the left engine which had been worked on the night before the accident. Two cylinders were worked on and a fuel injector nozzle was cleaned. The climb after takeoff was 'low and slow' during which the airplane rolled left, pitched nose down, and impacted the ground coming to rest adjacent to a house. Examination of each engine revealed no evidence of internal mechanical failure or malfunction. Heat damage precluded testing of the magnetos, turbocharger components, and fuel servos of each engine. Examination of each propeller revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The fuel nozzles from the left engine were examined which revealed that they were blocked in various places due to contaminants. After the accident the faa performed a focused inspection of the operator revealing that the cargo was not being weighed, the chief pilot of the company was in name only, and load manifests were not being kept by the company. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Witnesses described the takeoff as a long ground roll, slow climb, and engines not sounding normal. The airplane then settled into trees. Teardown of the left engine revealed water present in the fuel injector lines of #1, #3 and #5 cylinders. #3 nozzle plugged. Intake valves dark and sooty. Pistons 1, 3 and 5 had considerable amounts of dark carbon deposits. Teardown of right engine revealed extensive carbon buildups throughout. An engine test run was performed by the director of maintenance day before accident. Personnel formerly employed by the operator provided written statements of allegations pertaining to the general condition of company airplanes, falsification of maintenance records, and improper maintenance procedures being performed on company airplanes. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft was completing a flight from Tampa to Detroit on behalf of the Detroit City Police. After landing on runway 15 at Coleman A. Young Airport, the airplane encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During arrival, flight was vectored for NDB runway 06 approach, and advised Raleigh-Durham weather was 500 feet overcast, visibility 3 miles with fog, wind from 140° at 12 knots, altimeter 30.01. After clearance for approach, aircraft crossed final approach fix (faf) at 2,100 feet msl. Radar service was terminated and frequency change was approved. When aircraft did not arrive, search was initiated. The wreckage was found about 2.5 miles southwest of runway 06, where aircraft hit trees and crashed. Elevation of crash site was about 600 feet msl. MDA for approach was 1,160 feet msl (with local altimeter setting; 1,260 feet with Raleigh-Durham setting). Exam revealed aircraft hit trees, while on runway heading in wings level attitude; configured for landing. No preimpact part failure/malfunction was found. Toxicological check of pic's blood showed 0.10 mg/l of diazepam and 0.09 mg/l of nordiazepam. Check of his urine showed metabolite of marijuana (11- nor-delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol-9-carboxylic acid) at level of 0.117 mg/l. After surgery for malignant lymphoma (feb 89), pic was restored to flight status on 8/9/89 and cleared for pic duty one week later. He continued flying tho he received maintenance chemotherapy and associates noted that he tired easily. Both occupants were killed.

Witnesses stated seeing the aircraft enter a left downwind approach to runway 16, turn base to final normally then veer to the left of the runway in a nose high attitude and disappear behind a line of trees and crash approximately 500 feet east of runway 16. Post crash examination of the aircraft revealed the left engine was not producing power at the time of impact. Further examination revealed that the left engine fuel servo fuel mixture and idle speed settings were misadjusted. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

At 18:12, flight 1039 was cleared for takeoff from runway 31. At 18:13, while over the departure end of the runway and climbing through 600 feet, the crew acknowledged a frequency change. Thirty seconds later, the airplane was seen in a steep a descent near the extended centerline of the runway. The Bandeirante struck the ground 7,800 feet beyond the departure end of runway 31 and 85 feet to the right of the extended runway centerline in an inverted nose down attitude, after which it caught fire and burned. Before ground impact, the horizontal stabilizer, including bulkhead No. 36, had separated from the fuselage. Both elevators and elevator tips, the tail cone assembly, and the aft portion of the ventral fin also had separated in flight. All 13 occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff, both engines lost power and a wheels up landing was made in an open field. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire. An investigation revealed that the aircraft had been refuel with Jet-A fuel rather than 100 low lead avgas. The lineman had inadvertently used the Jet-A fuel truck which was identical to the Avgas truck except for a decal, appx 4' by 16', which identified the type of fuel. The lineman stated that his training consisted of approximately 30 minutes of reading the company maintenance manual on how to refuel the different company aircraft, then was given on-the-job training for a brief time. When he went to refuel N89PB prior to the accident flight, he went to the parking space where the Avgas truck was normally parked, but on that occasion, the Jet-A fuel truck was there.