Oakland

The parked airplane was struck by a Lockheed L-749A Constellation registered N5595A and operated by International Aircraft Services that was towed at Oakland Airport. The circumstances of the occurrence remains unclear. There were no injuries but both airplanes were damaged beyond repair.

This was a nonscheduled flight originating at Burbank, California, for Oakland, California. There were 30 passengers and a crew consisting of Captain Joseph A. Bradsher, Copilot Keith C. Dutson, and Stewardess Utta Jorgensen. Company records indicated that takeoff gross weight was 26,089 pounds (authorized maximum was 26,200 pounds), and the center of gravity of the aircraft was located within prescribed limits. A Defense Visual Flight Rules flight plan was filed; the plane was loaded, taxied to the end of the runway, and its engines were run up. At 0751 the flight was cleared for takeoff from runway 15, to climb westward on top of haze and smoke. It executed a takeoff and climbed in a normal manner into smoke haze, which was more dense toward the south., and in which it was lost to view of observers at the airport. Approximately one minute 2 after takeoff (0752) Flight 24 called the tower and requested an emergency landing clearance. This was granted; runway 7 was suggested by the tower and accepted by the pilot. The airport was cleared of traffic and emergency equipment alerted. At 0755 the tower called repeatedly as the flight had not been sighted. At 0756 the flight called the tower and stated its intent to land on runway "31." Lockheed Air Terminal has no runway 31 but has a runway 33. About this time Flight 24 was sighted by the control tower operator an estimated one mile to the southwest proceeding in a nose-high attitude toward the airport but not aligned with any runway. Across the approach track being used was a powerline about 500 feet short of the airport boundary. As this line approached the nose-high attitude increased and immediately after passing this powerline the aircraft executed a slight left turn, banked 10 to 12 degrees. The left wing then struck a service powerline at the airport boundary. The aircraft stalled, its left wing collided with two parked Air Force C-54's, it cartwheeled, slid across the apron and struck Lockheed Service hangar No. 24, coming to rest in the open doorway of that hangar. The fuselage broke open at a point behind the wing and most of the survivors escaped or were rescued through this opening. Small fires started by the crash were quickly extinguished by personnel of Lockheed's plant protection organization, who also rescued survivors and rendered first aid most efficiently. This organization also guarded the scene and wreckage.

The four engine aircraft left San Francisco Airport at 2305LT on a VFR flight to Oakland, distant of 10 miles. At this time, weather conditions were considered as good. On approach to Oakland runway 27R, the pilot-in-command descended below the minimum safe altitude of 500 feet when the aircraft hit the water, exploded and sank into the Bay of Oakland. A stewardess and a passenger were rescued while eight other occupants were killed.

Transocean Air Lines’ Flight 942 of March 20, 1953, departed Roswell, New Mexico, at 1211 for Oakland, California. On board were 30 military passengers and a crew consisting of Captain H. E. Hum, First Officer F. W. Patchett, Chief Pilot H. W. Rodgers and Stewardesses V. Sandridge and L. Chapman. The flight was for the purpose of transporting military personnel in accordance with the company’s contract with the United States Department of Defense. Prior to departure a DVFR (Defense Visual Flight Rules) flight plan was filed with ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control), indicating a flight to be flown at an altitude of at least 500 feet on top of clouds via Red Airway 88 to Albuquerque, New Mexico; Green Airway 4 to Palmdale, California; Blue Airway 14 and Amber Airway 1 to Bakersfield, California; Amber Airway 1 to Fresno, California; and Blue Airway 10 to Oakland, California. There was sufficient fuel on board for 10 hours and the flying time to Oakland was estimated to be six hours and 35 minutes. According to the company’s records the gross weight of the aircraft at the time of takeoff was 63,817 pounds, which was within the allowable gross weight of 73,000 pounds; the load was properly distributed. After departing Roswell the flight progressed in a routine manner and at 1451, when in the vicinity of Winslow, Arizona, the DVFR flight plan was changed to IFR (Instrument Flight Rules), still at least 500 feet on top of clouds. At 1732 the flight reported that it was over Fresno, California, at 1730, that it was cruising at 8,000 feet (at least 500 feet on top of clouds), estimating Los Banos, California, at 1740 and requested further clearance, At 1744 Flight 942 called the Fresno radio communications station and asked that the requested clearance be expedited, stating that it was now at 7,000 feet, at least 500 feet on top. At 1747, the following clearance was issued the flight: “ARTC clears Transocean 942 to the Newark radio beacon, maintain 8,000, contact Oakland Approach Control after passing Evergreen, no delay expected, report reaching 8,000.” Approaching Evergreen at 1809, the flight was advised to maintain 8,000 feet to Newark. One minute later, at 1810, Flight 942 reported over Evergreen at 8,000 and requested a lower altitude. This request was denied because of traffic at the 7,000-foot level. At 1819 the flight reported over the Newark, California, compass locator and fan marker (radio beacon) at 8,000 feet where it held for 11 minutes. At 1827, Oakland Approach Control cleared Flight 942 for a straight-in range approach, to descend in the holding pattern to cross the Newark compass locator at 3,500 feet and to report leaving each 1,000-foot level. Three minutes later, at 1830, the flight reported leaving 8,000 feet, and subsequently reported leaving each 1,000-foot level. At 1836, it reported being at 3,500 feet leaving the Newark compass locator inbound. This was the last known radio contact with the flight. At approximately 1838 the aircraft crashed in a barley field. Impact and fire destroyed the aircraft. There were no survivors. The Oakland weather reported at the time was: Measured ceiling 1300 feet broken, 1800 feet overcast, light rain, fog, visibility two and one-half miles, wind south-southwest 17 miles per hour, altimeter setting 30.09.

Overseas National's DC-4 took off from the Oakland Airport at 0820. Captain Marion Harvey Click, company cheek pilot, was in command and aboard were Captains Hammond Garrard and Warren Cecil Gessner who were to receive their six months DC-4 instrument competency cheeks. There were no other persons aboard. The aircraft had been refueled with 1,229 gallons of gasoline and 11 gallons of oil; the total load was within the certificated gross weight and was properly distributed. At 0925, this flight received a clearance from the Oakland tower to make a practice range approach and to remain above 1,500 feet on the final approach to the airport. At 0935, the California Eastern DC-4 3 took off from the Oakland Airport for the purpose of a six-month instrument competency check. Captain Ralph A. Shope, company chief pilot, was in command and occupied the right scat. Captain Winfield B. Kinner, receiving the cheek, was in the left seat. Louis Goldberg, an upholsterer and company mechanic, occupied a cabin seat and was on board only to sew some arm rests. The aircraft had been refueled with 1600 gallons of gasoline, and the total load was within the certificated gross weight and was properly distributed. According to accepted practice, both flights conducted their training cheeks in the "Bay area," with all maneuvers above 3,000 feet. Both aircraft were equipped with hoods, installed on the left side of each cockpit to prevent the pilots being checked from seeing outside. The cheek pilots in the right seats, also perform the duties of safety pilots, maintaining watch for other aircraft. There was also a third pilot on board Overseas who acted as an observer. Shortly before 1013, the approximate time of the accident, both aircraft approached the Oakland low frequency radio range station, which is 0.2 mile northeast from the approach end of Runway 15 of the Oakland Airport. Overseas was on a magnetic heading of approximately 124 degrees inbound on the NW leg of the range; and California was homing on the range on a heading of 75 degrees M 4 Both aircraft were at an altitude of 3,000 feet. Weather conditions were good in the San Francisco Bay area at the time. The U. S. Weather Bureau reported at 1016 (three minutes after the accident); ceiling 25,000 feet, thin broken clouds, visibility seven miles, wind south four mph at Oakland. The sun's bearing at 1015 was 153 degrees .JPG">, and its altitude above the horizon was 28 degrees and 27 minutes. During a short period prior to 1013, both aircraft were observed to converge without any apparent change in direction or altitude. Neither attempted to avoid collision but remained in straight and level flight, and collided approximately over the range station at an altitude of about 3,000 feet. California was at a slightly lower altitude than Overseas, and contact was made between the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer of California and the right side of the fuselage of Overseas just forward of the horizontal stabilizer. Shortly after the collision, Overseas crashed out of control on Doolittle Drive, the highway paralleling the north side of Oakland Airport. Its three pilots were killed at the time of impact with the ground. A number of persons driving on the highway close to the impact site received burns of varying degrees, and several automobiles were destroyed by fire. The top portions of the vertical stabilizer and rudder of California were torn off in the collision. The aircraft was still controllable at an air speed of 160 miles an hour. Immediately following the collision, Captain Shope had Captain Kinner remove the hood. As California was then south of the Oakland Airport at 2,500 feet, Captain Shops requested permission to land on Runway 9R, the longest runway, and to have emergency equipment stand by. However, since all fire equipment was then at the crash scene of Overseas, the flight was directed to the San Francisco Airport, 12 miles away, where an emergency landing was made at 1021.

Flight 5763, a military contract flight, originated in Oakland, California, with Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, as its destination. It was scheduled to depart Oakland, California, at 0200, November 5, 1951, but due to a mechanical delay, departure was not made until 0352. The crew consisted of Captain Alec S. Hamilton, Copilot Henry N. Ingram, and Stewardess Frances B. Reilly. There were 26 passengers on board. The IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flight plan filed with the CAA prior to departure indicated that the first intended landing would be Albuquerque, New Mexico, with Tucumcari, New Mexico, as the alternate. It showed a cruising altitude of 500 on top and an estimated time of Albuquerque of four hours and five minutes, with six hours and fifteen minutes of fuel on board. At the time of departure the aircraft weighed 38,939 pounds, which was within the allowable gross takeoff weight of 39,900 pounds; the load was properly distributed. The company maintains a dispatching office at Oakland to assist crews in planning flights, but it has no communications facilities for maintaining flight supervision. Company pilots are authorized to act as their own dispatchers, utilizing the CAA Communications facilities for the purpose of flight control. Captain Hamilton stated that prior to departure he was briefed by the U. S. Weather Bureau forecaster at the Oakland Airport on the an route weather and forecasts. Weather information available to the captain at this time indicated that there would be VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flying weather between Oakland and Albuquerque, at a cruising altitude of 11,000 feet, and that helping winds averaging 15 to 20 knots could be expected along the entire route. The forecast for Tucumcari, the alternate airport, indicated clear weather until 0500, followed by an overcast, with a ceiling of 800 feet and surface winds from the northeast at 15 miles per hour. The flight was routine and on reaching Acomita, New Mexico, at 0755, reported that it was 500 on top at 12,000 feet and was estimating Albuquerque at 0811. Following this report the flight asked to change its flight plan to Tucumcari with Amarillo, Texas, the alternate, and requested the latest Tucumcari weather which was: 0728, overcast, 1500 feet, visibility 20 miles, wind northeast 20 mph; Amarillo, 0728, broken clouds 1700 feet, overcast at 3500 feet, visibility 8 miles, wind north-northeast, 17 mph. The flight passed over Albuquerque under broken clouds in the clear at 12,000 feet NSL at 0813, whereupon the following clearance was given: “ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) Clears CAM 5763 to the Tucumcari Airport via Green Airway No. 4, to maintain 500 on top while in the control area.” This clearance was acknowledged. At 0831, the flight reported being over Anton Chico, New Mexico, at 13,000 feet, estimating Tucumcari at 0852. At this time the 0828 Tucumcari weather was given the flight as; coiling estimated 1,000 feet, overcast, visibility 3 miles, snow and fog. At approximately 0845, Tucumcari radio gave 5763 the following clearance: “ARTC clears 5763 to descend to 8,000 feet on the south course of Tucumcari range, maintain 11,000 feet until 2 minutes south, descend outbound, maintain 8,000, report leaving 9,000.” The following clearance was transmitted to the flight by Tucumcari radio at 0851: “ARTC clears 5763 to approach Tucumcari Airport en reaching 8,000 feet.” The flight next reported being over the Tucumcari range station at 0852, at 11,000 feet, descending to 8,000 feet, and at 0901 reported that it was at 9,000 feet outbound on the south leg of the Tucumcari range. At this time the special 0852 Tucumcari weather report was given the flight: “Ceiling 800 feet, overcast, visibility one mile, light snow and fog, wind north 20 miles per hour with strong gusts.” The reported surface visibility in this official weather report was loss than the CAA and company minimums of 11/2 miles for the Tucumcari Airport. At 0907 5763 was given the following clearance: “ARTC clears 5763 to make standard instrument approach.” The Amarillo weather was then given as: coiling estimated 1,000 feet, broken clouds, overcast 2,000 feet; visibility 5 miles, light snow and fog. The flight was asked if it wished to proceed to Amarillo and it replied that it had to land at Tucumcari. The flight continued its descent and at 0909 was advised by Tucumcari radio that the Tucumcari weather was then ceiling 800 feet, overcast, visibility 1/2 miles, light snow and fog, wind north 20 miles per hour. Two minutes later, at 0911, the flight reported it was outbound on the west leg at 8,000 feet, descending to 6,000 feet. Tucumcari radio again gave the flight the weather which had been given it at 0908. One minute after this transmission Tucumcari radio gave the flight the wind direction which was then north-northwest, variable to north-northeast, at 16 miles per hour, and advised that Runway 30 was the runway in use. 5763 immediately requested the bearing of this runway and this was corrected to 03, which was acknowledged by the flight. At 0915 5763 reported that it was at 6,000 feet and inbound on the west leg of the Tucumcari range. Immediately following this report, at 0916, Tucumcari radio asked the flight if it wanted ARTC to recommend an alternate airport closer than Amarillo. The flight acknowledged this and advised it would have to land at Tucumcari but asked where the alternate would be. The pilot was advised to stand by and, according to the communicator on duty, the aircraft was then seen to cross the field in a northwesterly direction at very low altitude. The pilot was quickly advised to pull up and answered that he was doing so. At 0925, the flight advised it was landing downwind. This was the last report received from the flight. After several passes over the airport at altitudes varying from 500 feet to as low as 50 feet, the aircraft crashed near the northeast end of Runway 21 at approximately 0929. A flash fire which occurred immediately after impact quickly subsided. Ten passengers were injured and another one was killed. The aircraft was destroyed.

The flight departed San Francisco at 1042, operating as "United Trainer 7030." Flight Manager Frederick S. Angstadt was captain and was being given his semi-annual instrument check by Assistant Flight Manager Hugh C. Worthington, who served as copilot. Flight Engineer Charles K. Brogden was the third crew member. In addition to the foregoing instrument check, consideration had been given to investigating the feasibility of using the Oakland, California, Municipal Airport for certain phases of crew training in this type aircraft for a new class of pilots and flight engineers which was to convene that afternoon. Captains Angstadt and Worthington were to supervise this training. United Air Lines' officials stated that Captains Angstadt and Worthington intended to make this determination during the flight. Captain Angstadt was given the 0928 sequence weather reports for the local area prior to completing a clearance form at the UAL dispatcher's office. Pertinent weather was as follows: stratus clouds in the Bay area with tops at approximately 1,600 feet; San Francisco and Oakland - 800 foot ceiling, overcast, visibility three miles, haze and smoke; ceiling and visibility at Fresno and Sacramento unlimited. The forecast for the Bay area indicated scattered clouds by 1100 PST. Clearance was issued for local flight under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), confined to a 100-mile radius from San Francisco and under 10,000 feet. The load was properly distributed with respect to permissible center of gravity limits. Gross weight of the aircraft at takeoff was 114,886 pounds with 4,700 gallons of fuel, well under the maximum permissible gross takeoff weight. After reporting on top of the broken scattered clouds to the San Francisco tower at 1046, the flight proceeded to Oakland. The Oakland tower approved a simulated Instrument Landing System approach; this and a missed approach procedure were performed. The flight again reported on top at 1136. Another simulated ILS approach was requested of the Oakland tower but the flight was advised that there would be a delay due to other traffic. In view of this, the pilot decided to return to San Francisco. The flight changed frequency from the Oakland tower to San Francisco Approach Control at 1137. At 1139, the flight was cleared for an ILS approach to the San Francisco Airport, but did not acknowledge the clearance on the 119.1 megacycle Approach Control frequency. Following two attempts to contact the flight, the controller heard the aircraft make an unreadable call on 121.9 megacycles, and instructed the flight to listen on 119.1. This transmission was followed by further instruction for the flight to hold VFR, and stand by. The frequency change was apparently accomplished by the flight and the pilot again requested permission to make a simulated ILS approach. The request was granted, with instructions to report upon leaving the ILS outer marker inbound. This message and one other were not acknowledged by the flight. No emergency call was received from the aircraft. The crash was reported to the U. S. Coast Guard Air Station at 1046 by the manager of a nearby airport.

Air Route Traffic Control (ARTC) cleared Flight 615 on an instrument flight plan from Chicago to Oakland, and from Oakland to San Francisco in accordance with Visual Flight Rules (VFB). Altitude was to be 18,000 feet man sea level (MSL) via Red Airway 4, Creen Airway 3, and Red Airway 6 from Chicago to Denver, direct to Milford, Utah, and thence direct to Oakland. Flight between Oakland and San Francisco was to have been via Green Airway 3 at 500 feet. Routine radio contacts were made en route. At 0354, August 24, while approaching the Oakland area, Flight 615 was cleared to the Newark, California fan marker, with instructions to descend to 6,000 feet, maintain that altitude, and contact Oakland Approach Control over Altamont, California. At 0411, the flight reported over Stockton, California, at 9,500 feet, descending. At this time the flight was given, and acknowledged, the Oakland altimeter setting of 29 88 inches. Flight 615 reported over the Altamont Intersection at 0416, and made initial contact with Oakland Approach Control one-half minute later. Clearance of the flight into Oakland was now vested in Approach Control, and no further radio contacts were made with company communications. The flight was cleared by Approach Control to the Oakland radio range station to maintain at least 500 feet above the tops of the clouds. The pilot followed this contact with a request for clearance direct to Newark and a straight-in range approach. The Newark fan marker and compass locator lie on the southeast leg of the Oakland radio range This request was granted, with instructions to maintain an altitude of 500 feet on top of the cloud layer between Altamont and Newark. At 0422, the flight reported approaching the Hayward, California, compass locator, which is between Newark and Altamont, and requested a second modification to clearance instructions by asking for a straight-in ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach 2. Approach Control advised it to stand by due to another aircraft in the area. Flight 615 shortly thereafter advised Approach Control that it was approaching Newark and to disregard the request for an ILS approach. At 0425 Flight 615 was cleared for a straight-in approach on the southeast course of the Oakland radio range from Newark. At 0427 the flight reported leaving Newark inbound to Oakland. This was the last radio contact. A minute later, the four engine aircraft struck the Tolman peak (985 feet high) located about 14,6 miles southeast of Oakland Airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all 50 occupants were killed.

The flight departed Burbank, California, at 1420, bound for Oakland and Sacramento, with a crew consisting of James S. Garnett, pilot, Joseph Dillon, copilot and Susan DeVore, stewardess. Takeoff was accomplished from Oakland at 1656 at which time the aircraft carried six passengers, out no cargo. Total aircraft weight was within the certificated limits and the load was properly distributed. The aircraft carried fuel sufficient for a flight of two hours and thirty minutes and the estimated flight time to Sacramento was thirty minutes. Following take off, the flight cruised five miles northwest of the Oakland Airport for seven minutes while waiting for receipt of an instrument flight clearance which provided for a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet to Sacramento. The flight then proceeded on course, and at 1708 reported over the Richmond Radio flange Intersection, 16 miles northwest of Oakland, stating that it would be over the Fairfield Radio flange Station, 41 miles northeast of Richmond, at 1723. Since there was no routine mention of altitude, Air Route Traffic Control immediately requested the information, and the flight replied that at was at 4,000 feet. This was the last communication received from the flight. Approximately one hour after the position report over Richmond, CAA Communications received a report that the flight had crashed six miles east of Vallejo. All occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew was engaged in a local training sortie in Oakland Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the right engine suffered a loss of power. The captain informed ATC and elected to return for an emergency landing but the aircraft stalled, hit tree tops and crashed in a wooded area located in Alameda, north of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were injured.