London-Gatwick

On 14 January 1969 the crew flew from Gatwick to Rotterdam and return, following which they departed on a scheduled international flight Gatwick-Genoa-Gatwick. For this flight Captain A occupied the left-hand seat as pilot-in-charge, Captain B the right hand seat as co-pilot and Captain C the centre supernumerary seat as pilot-in-command, ultimately responsible for the correct operation of the aircraft. Before leaving Gatwick Captain A briefed Captain B concerning the co-pilot duties assigned to him. Although Captain C, as pilot-in-command, did not himself formally brief Captains A and B there was no doubt that they were aware of their respective tasks. On the flight from Gatwick to Genoa the aircraft was forced, due to unfavourable weather conditions at Genoa, to divert to Milan-Linate Airport where it landed at 1430 hours. Before commencing the return flight to Gatwick the crew had to await the arrival of the passengers from Genoa. This took place at 1930 hours. During the five-hour waiting period on the ground, the aircraft APU was kept in operation to ensure cabin heating and air conditioning. While Captain C tried unsuccessfully to sleep in the aircraft, Captains A and B inspected the aircraft and found ice on the wings and tail unit. The aircraft was subsequently de-iced. Before boarding the aircraft, Captains A and B made another external inspection of the aircraft and established that there was no ice on any part of it. The result of this inspection was duly reported to Captain C. Captains A and B carried out the pre-flight checks in accordance with the company checklist and verified that the take-off weight and aircraft loading were within the permitted limits. The crew occupied the same positions as during the previous flight, Captain A being in the left-hand seat, Captain B in the right-hand seat and Captain C in the jump- seat. In view of the weather, temperature and runway conditions, the crew decided to use the 18O flap setting, Spey 2 thrust (full thrust), engine anti-icing and the APU for cabin air conditioning. V1 and Vr were established at 117 kt and V2 at 127 kt. At 2018 hours, after clearance from Linate ATC, the engines were started and engine anti-icing selected "ON". There was a considerable layer of snow along the sides of the taxiways and runway, but they themselves were clear and usable. In view of the isolated patches of slush or water on the runway, Captain A considered it essential for the engine igniter switches to be selected "ON" during the entire take-off. At 2028 hours the aircraft was cleared to enter runway 18 and, after receiving the latest information concerning visibility and wind, it was cleared for take-off at 2031 hours. Before the brakes were released, a check was made of engine P7 pressures and of the other engine instruments which were found to be normal. At about 80 kt Captain A took over the aircraft's control column. The airspeed indicators showed regular acceleration and Captain A stated that just before 100 kt the engine instruments were also registering normally. V1 and Vr were called and the aircraft was rotated into the initial climbing attitude; immediately after or during this manoeuvre, a dull noise was distinctly heard by all the crew members. This noise was variously described by them as: "not like a rifle shot, not like the slamming of a door or something falling in the aircraft but more like someone kicking the fuselage with very heavy boots, an expansive noise covering a very definite time span with a dull non-metallic thud". The bang was immediately associated by the crew with the engines. After looking at the TGT gauges, and observing that No. 1 engine was indicating a temperature 20°c higher than that of No. 2 engine, Captain C said: "I think it's number one" or wards to that effect, and after a brief pause "throttle it". On receipt of Captain C's comment Captain A closed the power level of No. 1 engine. During or just after the explosion, he had completed the rotation manoeuvre and the aircraft was climbing at 12O of pitch with reference to the flight director. As a precaution, after closing No. 1 power lever he reduced the angle of climb to 6O. At the same time the co-pilot (Captain B) who had reached for the check list and was looking for the page relating to an engine emergency, became aware of a sharp reduction in the aircraft's acceleration; he noticed that the undercarriage was still down and he retracted it immediately. According to the crew the aircraft reached a maximum height of 250 ft, after which a progressive loss of momentum became evident. A maximum speed of 1401145 kt was achieved immediately after rotation, but it fell to 127 kt after No. 1 engine had been throttled back, These figures were consistent with those subsequently derived from the flight recorder. The crew said that the stick-shaker operated three times between 125 and 115 kt. The co-pilot had a vague recollection that the stick-push and the warning klaxon operated during the critical phase before impact. The pilot-in-charge remembered vaguely that someone said "raise the flaps", but no crew member remembers doing so or making the re traction. On looking out of the aircraft the crew saw the ground and the obstructions close at hand and realized that contact of the aircraft with the ground was inevitable and imminent. Captain A controlled the aircraft extremely well during the touchdown; the aircraft slid along the snow-covered surface, passing over small obstructions, and came to a halt 470 m from the point of first contact with the ground (see Fig. 1-11. The co-pilot operated both engine fire-extinguishers and Captain C ordered the pilots to leave the aircraft immediately via the side windows. During the ground slide an orange glow was seen to light up the glass panels of the windows for a short time. There was no fire. After closing No. 1 power lever, Captain A remembered having ordered the shutdown drill for this engine but he could not say for certain whether this wae dme. It was established, however, that Captain B closed both the HP cocks at the first sensation of ground contact.

The accident occurred on a scheduled passenger flight from Frankfurt when the aircraft was making an ILS approach for a night landing on Runway 27 at Gatwick Airport. The weather was clear except that freezing fog persisted in places including the Gatwick area. The runway visual range (RVR) at Gatwick was 100 metres. The approach was commenced with the autopilot coupled to the instrument landing system (ILS) but after the glide-slope had been captured the commander who was at the controls, disconnected the autopilot because the "stabiliser out of trim" warning light illuminated. At the outer marker the flap setting was changed from 1° to 30° and shortly afterwards the rate of descent increased and the aircraft descended below the glide-slope. Some 200 feet from the ground the pilot realised that the aircraft was too low and initiated a missed approach procedure. The aircraft began to respond but the descent was not arrested in time to avoid a collision with trees and a house that destroyed both the aircraft and the house and set the wreckage on fire. 48 occupants as well as two people in the house were killed. 14 others were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

After a touch-and-go landing at Gatwick Airport, the right main gear didn't lock up. The gear was recycled and the pilot then checked the gear visually and the gear appeared to be fully retracted. On gear extension for the next landing, the right main gear warning light remained on. The gear was recycled several times, but without success. Other attempts (high g turns, using the hand pump, and touching the runway) also failed. It was then decided to make a wheels-up landing on a foam carpet at Manston.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a ferry flight from Nice to London-Gatwick. While descending to Gatwick Airport in VFR mode, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and turbulences. While flying in clouds, he lost control of the airplane that plunges into the earth and crashed in a field. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

Flight 316 was a scheduled international flight from Beauvais, France to Gatwick, England. It took off from runway 23 at Beauvais at 1948 hours GMT. At 2009 hours it contacted London Airways reporting over Abbeville, with an estimated time of arrival at the Paris/London FIR boundary of 2020 hours. At 2030 hours at the request of London Airways the aircraft reported 2036 as its estimated time of arrival at Lydd, whereas taking the wind into account it should have been 2040 hours. In fact the aircraft reported over Lydd at 2040 hours and, on the basis of the radar observations of London Airport which followed the aircraft from 2036 hours onwards, the aircraft probably flew over this point at 2041 hours or 2042 hours. At 2040 hours the aircraft reported its estimated time of arrival at Mayfield as 2058 hours, a dead reckoning calculation which this time allowed for the wind. At 2040 hours London Airways asked the flight to confirm its estimated time of arrival at Mayfield. It was when the co-pilot began the VHF transmission to reply to this query that he first noticed that his transmitter was not working, then that the No. 2 VHF, the ILS receiver, the radio compasses, the starboard generator and the two inverters had also failed. The aircraft lighting, however, was still working. The pilot-in-command handed over the controls to the co-pilot and went to inspect the main electrical panel. As he did not have the necessary tools, he was unable to remove the main radio fuse in order to inspect it. He checked the circuit breakers on the radio electrical panel and found that they were in the normal position. He also noted that the inverters were no longer working. On returning to his seat he asked the co-pilot to make the same checks. The co-pilot changed some fuses but he also was unable to remove the main fuse which he found was very hot. As he had no means of radio communication or navigation, the pilot-in-command considered that he could not continue on his route to Gatwick without incurring a collision risk and, more particularly, that it would be dangerous for him to try to descend to within visual reference of the ground, in view of the cloud bases of 120 to 200 m in the meteorological forecasts. He therefore decided to turn on to a southerly heading in order to descend below cloud over the sea and then to determine his position by identifying a town on the south coast of England. At 2053 hours, London Radar observed the left-hand turn of approximately 90' made by the aircraft. According to the pilot-in-command, the aircraft maintained a magnetic heading of 2000 for 15 minutes, which corresponds to a true track of 1710. At about 2108 hours the aircraft, which was then about 20 miles from the English coast south of Hastings, went on to an easterly heading and came down to 2 000 ft using the Beauvais QNH (1 012 mbs). After flying for 5 minutes on this heading, the pilot-in-command was still without any visual contact with the ground and he returned to a southerly heading, considering that the cloud base over France would be appreciably higher than over England. He came down to 1 000 ft and finally saw the lights of a ship and then the lights of a town (Le Tréport) which he failed to identify. The aircraft arrived in the vicinity of Le Tréport at 2140 hours. After flying over the town a number of times the crew fired Very lights but saw no response on the ground, although local authorities and members of the aero club went to En-Mers/Le Tréport airport and illuminated the landing strip with car headlights. During this time the pilot-in-command saw a beach lit up by the lights of a promenade and suitably orientated for a landing, taking into account the direction of the wind at the time. The pilot-in-command then decided that unless he could determine his position with certainty and therefore be able to reach Beauvais in absolute safety, it was preferable to attempt an emergency landing on such a beach rather than run the risk of landing, short of fuel, in the open in the French countryside without any visual reference to the ground and with the danger of colliding with some unknown obstruction. After having flown up and down the coast, in an attempt to determine his position, he finally decided to land when the starboard engine showed signs of fuel failure. He immediately switched the starboard engine on to the port main tank, which contained about 20 gallons more than the starboard main tank. He made his last circuit at about 500 ft, with the landing lights on and the undercarriage up, and came in to land on a WSW heading in the area lit up by the promenade lighting, as near as possible to the shore. The landing was relatively soft, although at the end of the run the port wing tip struck a concrete groyne. The accident occurred at 2240 hours GMT. The location of the beach was 50° 04 N 01° 23 E. All 33 occupants were evacuated and five of them were slightly injured.

Flight 355 took off from London for a flight to Singapore via Istanbul. The first approach to Istanbul runway 24 was abandoned because the pilot-in-command couldn't see the runway lights. Heavy rain continued as the pilot approached for the second time. VHF communications were lost during a short period of time because of a power failure in the tower transmitter and was restored when the plane was in the procedure turn. Lightning and heavy turbulence were reported during the descent and the runway was sighted when descending to 500 feet. The pilot made a slight correction to the right and ordered full flaps and power reduction to 20" boost. The plane sank quickly just short of the runway and more power was ordered, but the left main gear had struck the ground in line with the runway, 72 m short of the threshold. The plane bounced and touched down again 14 m further on. The left main gear as well as nose gear collapsed, causing the no. 1 and 2 engines to break off, followed by the entire left wing. The fuselage skidded 260 m down the runway and a fire developed.

While on approach to Marville AFB, the airplane crashed in the Montmédy forest, few km north of the runway 12 threshold. Eight occupants were killed while three others were seriously injured.

After a flight of some two hours, made for the purpose of testing radio navigation equipment, the aircraft returned to London-Gatwick Airport, U.K.. Before, and during, the flight, undercarriage operation was normal, as was the functioning of the undercarriage light and horn warning system. During the approach, the undercarriage extended normally, and the green lights indicated that it was locked down. Some 50 yards after touch down, the aircraft began to sink on the starboard side and the captain noticed that the starboard green light was no longer showing. There were, however, no reds, and the horn was not sounding. The starboard main undercarriage leg eventually retracted and the aircraft swung off the runway to the right, on to the grass.

The aircraft left London-Gatwick Airport at 2013LT on a charter flight to Perpignan with 36 passengers and a crew of four on board. At 2315LT, the crew was cleared to continue direct to Perpignan maintaining the altitude of 9,500 feet. At 0008LT, the crew was cleared by Marseille Control to descend to FL65 and then FL55 seven minutes later. While approaching Perpignan, the crew was informed about the poor weather conditions at destination with thunderstorm activity. At this time, the crew informed ground that the radiocompas settings were inexploitable due to the violent storm. While cruising in low visibility, the airplane struck trees and crashed on the Roc de Planes, in the massif of the Mottes-Rouges, near the village of Py. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all 40 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found some 48 km southwest of Perpignan-Rivesaltes Airport at an altitude of 1,810 meters.
Crew:
Max-Marie Dunoyer de Lescheraine, pilot,
Léopold Marold, copilot,
Émile-Lucien Jamin, navigator,
Muriel Tiberghain, stewardess.

The aircraft was coming from Gatwick, England, and after reporting over Toulouse at about 0030 hours GMT it headed directly for Perpignan, France, at flight level 75. It was expected over the aerodrome at about 0112, and it was seen shortly before 0100 by various witnesses in the Prades area, during intermittent rain and wind of variable force. It struck the mountain side in level flight in the Canigou Massif at about 0100 hours. The wreckage, located at an elevation of 2 200 m at 1350 on the same day by a Search and Rescue Constellation, was destroyed by the impact and by fire. There were no survivors. Three crew and 31 passengers were aboard the flight.