Las Vegas-Harry Reid (McCarran)

About 2 minutes after takeoff, the pilot declared an emergency, stating that he had lost an engine and needed to return to the airport. The airplane descended into rough, brush-covered terrain and then struck a large dirt berm, about 1-1/2 miles northeast of the departure airport. Examination of the engines did not reveal any obvious mechanical malfunction. The fuel was correct. Combustion chamber signatures indicated that the engines were operated at a lean or mild detonation condition. The flaps were extended about 30 degrees and the landing gear was retracted. The surviving passenger could not recall any dramatic engine problems, only that the airplane could not maintain altitude. The pilot and front seat passenger were not wearing shoulder harnesses.

The non-instrument rated pilot obtained an abbreviated weather briefing for a flight from Las Vegas to Elko, Nevada. He was advised of mountain obscuration, icing and turbulence, and was told that VFR flight was not recommended. A VFR flight plan was filed and activated. The airplane departed Las Vegas at 1414 pdt. The last radio communications with the plane was at 1545 pdt, about 14 miles south of Elko. Several local residents reported a thunderstorm was passing through the area at that time. The airplane was located the next morning about 10 miles southwest of Elko Airport near Grindstone Peak at about 6,000 feet msl. An exam of the airframe and engine at the accident site did not disclose any mechanical problems. During a toxicology test, 4.8 mg/kg of diphenhydramine (an antihistamine) was detected in the pilot's liver tissue. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot had a 25 minutes turnaround for the accident trip from the prior flight. No witnesses were found who observed the pilot preparing for the flight or performing a preflight inspection. Company procedures specify that the pilots are responsible for loading and unloading the baggage. The manifest for the prior flight showed 54 lbs of baggage in the nose compartment. Shortly after liftoff, the pilot told the local controller that the baggage door was open and he requested a 'go around.' The local controller told the pilot to make right traffic. Multiple witnesses saw the airplane in a nose high attitude during the initial climb after takeoff. They reported the pilot entered a right turn which continued until the airplane 'fell to the ground and hit nose first.' An airline pilot witness said that the airplane's actions were a 'classic VMC roll.' Other witnesses reported that the left nose baggage compartment door was open during the takeoff and initial climb. Evidence shows that the right eng was developing little or no power. All three occupants were killed.

In preparation for a cross country flight with takeoff occurring during a snow storm, the aircraft was loaded in the hangar and towed out by fbo personnel. Following the tow, the torque link was not properly connected and separated during the takeoff run. Due to a loss of nose wheel steering, the takeoff was aborted. The aircraft departed the side of the runway during the abort and the nose wheel was sheared off causing damage to both engines, wings, the fuselage, and landing gear. All four occupants escaped uninjured.

Pilot began takeoff on a 5,200 feet dirt runway (upslope to the south, elevation 4,775 feet) with wind from the south at 18-20 knots, density altitude about 7,250 feet. Witnesses observed the aircraft taking off, with the landing gear retracting as it passed their position. Soon thereafter, the pilot transmitted he had 'a problem.' Aircraft was then seen about 200-300 feet agl in right turn, which progressed into a dive. Aircraft impacted in flat attitude 1/2 mile south of runway 17. Passenger video tapes revealed props went out of sync about 6 seconds after takeoff. About 15 seconds later, right prop slowed until blades could be seen turning. Video showed one engine fuel flow at about 90 gph, other engine at minimum setting (about 3 psi), 5° increase in pitch attitude. Exam revealed right engine driven fuel pump drive coupling was scored and only partially engaged. SB ME88-3 complied with; auxiliary fuel pump switches found in low position. Right propeller blades found at fine pitch, lacking rotational damage. Landing gear found up, but unlocked; flaps extended 15°. Emergency procedure training did not replicate high density altitude and max gross weight performance. All 10 occupants were killed.

No record could be found showing the pilot received a weather briefing prior to takeoff. Unfavorable weather was in the vicinity. Several times the pilot had difficulties understanding and complying with instructions from clearance delivery, ground control, and departure control. After takeoff the pilot requested and received an IFR clearance. During the last five minutes of flight radar returns showed the airplane changing heading from 45° to as much as 180° about 10 times and descending or ascending several times from altitudes ranging from 4,500 feet msl to 11,500 feet msl. The altitude and heading changes were not directed by controllers. About 3 minutes before the accident departure control asked the pilot if he had a problem. The pilot indicated that he did and 'we're trying to get straight.' One minute later, the pilot said 'we're all right.' Shortly afterwards, radar data showed a loss of control. Radar and communications were lost and an on ground explosion was observed as the accident occurred. An FAA flight surgeon reviewed the pilot's medical records. Within one year of the accident the pilot had 3 physical conditions and was taking 3 separate prescriptions which would have prevented him from being medically qualified to pilot an aircraft. All seven occupants were killed.

A Piper PA-46-310P loss engine power and collided with a telephone pole during the forced landing. The pilot contacted the tracon and informed the facility he had a partial power loss. The airplane was about two miles east of the airport at about 3,500 feet msl heading in a southwesterly direction. The tracon instructed the pilot to turn 150° for radar vectors to runway 33. The pilot did not turn to the 150° heading, but continued on a southwesterly course. The airplane flew past the approach ends of two runways. The airplane continued westbound and crashed 2.5 miles west of the airport. The pilot indicated the airplane had 300 pounds (about 50 gallons) of fuel on board at takeoff. The pilot operating handbook for the Piper PA-34-310P is about 16 gallons per hour. The duration of the flight was about one hour. There was no evidence of fuel in the airplane's fuel system or any evidence of fuel spillage from either of the wings after the accident.

The flight crew reported to the tower controller that they were over the airport and requested a right downwind circling approach to runway 15. The tower controller and other witnesses observed the airplane in a steep right bank on base leg. The airplane overshot the extended runway centerline. The tower controller observed the airplane entering a steeper right bank to correct back to the runway centerline. The controller stated that he observed the airplane "flutter" and then crash right-wing first, about one mile north of the runway threshold. Other witnesses reported a variety of indications consistent with a loss of control. The last recorded transmission was "Oh no you're (stall…)." The ( ) indicates that the word was questionable text. Both engines were producing about 1,700 pounds of thrust (2,561 pounds available). A snow squall had just passed over the airport and was obscuring mountains to the east. The terrain was snow covered. The accident occurred about eight minutes before official sunset. The approach procedure is not authorized at night or for category D airplanes. Minimums for the approach were three miles visibility with an MDA of 10,840 feet. Airport elevation is 7,815 feet. Both pilots were rated in the airplane. It could not be determined which pilot was at the controls at the time of the accident.

The pilot was operating an on-demand air taxi passenger flight to Santa Ana, CA. The accident occurred during descent, when the aircraft collided with a mountain at 2,060 feet msl. The pilot had received a preflight weather briefing in which he was advised of low ceilings and reduced visibility in the Los Angeles basin, surrounding mountains obscured by clouds, and that VFR flight to Santa Ana was not recommended. He departed VFR. While en route, the pilot was advised that Santa Ana was reporting 1,400 feet overcast with 5 miles visibility. A videotape recorded by a passenger showed mountain peaks protruding through a solid cloud layer and showed the aircraft descending into the clouds. Witnesses described a low cloud ceiling near the crash site and cloud tops at 5,000 feet. Examination of the wreckage revealed evidence of powered flight and no evidence of preimpact control or engine malfunction. Records indicated that the pilot had encountered IMC on only one flight in the previous 9 months. He was director of operations for the operator. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 10 occupants were killed.