Hay River

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. An accurate take-off weight and balance calculation was not completed prior to departure, resulting in an aircraft weight that exceeded its maximum certified takeoff weight.
2. The right engine number 1 cylinder failed during the take-off sequence due to a preexisting fatigue crack, resulting in an engine fire.
3. After the right propeller’s feathering mechanism was activated, the propeller never achieved a fully feathered condition likely due to a seized bearing in the feathering pump.
4. The windmilling right propeller caused an increase in drag which, combined with the overweight condition, contributed to the aircraft’s inability to maintain altitude, and the aircraft collided with terrain short of the runway.
5. The operator’s safety management system was ineffective at identifying and correcting unsafe operating practices.
6. Transport Canada’s surveillance activities did not identify the operator’s unsafe operating practices related to weight and balance and net take-off flight path calculations. Consequently, these unsafe practices persisted.
Findings as to risk:
1. If companies do not adhere to operational procedures in their operations manual, there is a risk that the safety of flight cannot be assured.
2. If Transport Canada does not adopt a balanced approach that combines inspections for compliance with audits of safety management processes, unsafe operating practices may not be identified, thereby increasing the risk of accidents.
3. If cockpit or data recordings are not available to an investigation, this may preclude the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety.
Other findings:
1. Current Canadian Aviation Regulations permit a transport category piston-powered aircraft to carry passengers without a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder.
2. The crew resource management component of the flight attendant’s training had not been completed.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. Though icing conditions were encountered, the airframe de-icing boots were not cycled nor was the Vref speed increased to offset the effects of aircraft icing.
2. An abrupt change in aircraft configuration, which included a reduction in power to flight idle and the addition of 35° flap, caused the aircraft’s speed to rapidly decrease.
3. The aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall due to the decreased performance caused by the icing. There was insufficient altitude to recover the aircraft prior to impact with the runway.
Finding as to Risk:
1. The company had not incorporated the British Aerospace Notice to Aircrew into its standard operating procedures (SOP) at the time of the occurrence. Therefore, crews were still required to make configuration changes late in the approach sequence, increasing the risk of an unstabilised approach.

It was determined that the crew lost control of the airplane after the cargo shifted during initial climb. It is believed that the cargo was not properly stowed.

It was determined that the loss of control was the consequence of an excessive accumulation of ice on wings and fuselage. For unknown reason, the aircraft has not been deiced prior to takeoff.