Grand Canyon-National Park

The pilot had a 25 minutes turnaround for the accident trip from the prior flight. No witnesses were found who observed the pilot preparing for the flight or performing a preflight inspection. Company procedures specify that the pilots are responsible for loading and unloading the baggage. The manifest for the prior flight showed 54 lbs of baggage in the nose compartment. Shortly after liftoff, the pilot told the local controller that the baggage door was open and he requested a 'go around.' The local controller told the pilot to make right traffic. Multiple witnesses saw the airplane in a nose high attitude during the initial climb after takeoff. They reported the pilot entered a right turn which continued until the airplane 'fell to the ground and hit nose first.' An airline pilot witness said that the airplane's actions were a 'classic VMC roll.' Other witnesses reported that the left nose baggage compartment door was open during the takeoff and initial climb. Evidence shows that the right eng was developing little or no power. All three occupants were killed.

The commuter flight was enroute to its home airport and over mountainous terrain when it encountered low ceilings and rain showers. The airplane was not certificated for ifr commuter flights. Instead of going to an alternate airport the pilot attempted to maintain visual conditions and requested and received a visual clearance into the tca and advised the controller that his altitude was 5,100 feet msl. His radio transmission became garbled during the clearance read back and shortly thereafter the controller observed the airplane's radar target turn left from its westerly track and disappear from his scope. There were no further communications between the pilot and the controller. When the aircraft failed to arrive at its destination an alnot was issued. Early the next morning the aircraft's wreckage was found impacted in a mountain approximately 10 miles south of course at an elevation of 4100 feet msl. The investigation revealed that the pilot had previously and successfully flown the accident airplane in ifr conditions.

The airplane crashed into a wooded area about 8 minutes after takeoff. Evidence at the wreckage site revealed that the airplane crashed through the trees at a glide angle of 8°. The glide angle for a power-off forced landing is 6° according to the pilot's operating handbook. The propeller did not exhibit rotational damage. Engine teardown revealed that the #1 cylinder had catastrophic detonation. All seven occupants were killed, among them two British, two German and two Swiss tourists, and the US pilot.

According to witnesses, the aircraft was about to touchdown from a normal approach to runway 21, when it encountered variable wind conditions and ballooned to about 70 feet agl. The pilot initiated a go-around. Shortly thereafter, witnesses observed a puff of smoke emanate from the aircraft, then the pilot transmitted that the flight was 'going down.' Subsequently, the aircraft collided with trees on wooded terrain about 1/2 mile from the departure end of the runway. An examination revealed a lack of power signatures on the propeller; evidence of sooting was found on the spark plugs (indicating a rich mixture). Testing of the turbo-controller revealed evidence that it had been adjusted to a low setting; the turbo would only produce a maximum air flow equal to high cruise power. The engine manufacturer reported that this situation could produce an over-rich mixture, particularly if the throttle and/or mixture controls were improperly manipulated. The pilot lacked experience in aircraft with turbocharged engines and he was not trained in accordance with the company training program.

On June 18, 1986, at 0855 mountain standard time, a Grand Canyon Airlines DHC-6, N76GC (Twin Otter), call sign Canyon 6, took off from runway 21 of the Grand Canyon Airport. The flight, a scheduled air tour over Grand Canyon National Park, was to be about 50 minutes in duration. Shortly thereafter, at 0913, a Helitech Bell 2068 (Jet Ranger), NGTC, call sign Tech 2, began its approximate 30-minute, on-demand air tour of the Grand Canyon. It took off from its base at a heliport adjacent to State route 64 in Tusayan, Arizona, located about 5 miles south of the main entrance to the south rim of the National Park. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The two aircraft collided at an altitude of 6,500 feet msl in the area of the Tonto Plateau. There were 18 passengers and 2 flightcrew members on the DHC-6 and 4 passengers and 1 flightcrew member on the Bell 206B. All 25 passengers and crew members on both aircraft were killed as a result of the collision. Because of the lack of cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders in both aircraft, as well as the lack of radar data, no assessment of the flight path of either aircraft could be made. As a result, the reason for the failure of the pilots of each aircraft to “see and avoid” each other cannot be determined. Consequently, the issues highlighted in this report concern primarily the oversight of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Grand Canyon-based scenic air tours or sightseeing flights and the actions of the National Park Service to influence these operations. Because of an exemption to 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, local scenic air tours were conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. This investigation revealed that there was no FAA oversight on the routes and altitudes of Grand Canyon-based scenic air tour operators. This was contrary to the intent of Safety Recommendation A-84-52. Further, the National Park Service, through its authority under a 1975 law, was conducting a study to determine the effects of aircraft noise on the Grand Canyon and, at the same time, influencing the selection of air tour routes. The routes of the rotary-wing operators were ‘moved as a noise conservation measure to where they converged with those of Grand Canyon Airlines at the location of the accident. Other safety issues concern the lack of regulations to limit flight and duty times of pilots conducting scenic air tour flights, and the lack of a requirement for the pilots of such flights to use intercoms or public address systems when narrating during the flights. All 20 occupants of the Twin Otter were killed, among them 11 citizen from The Netherlands and two Swiss.

The single engine airplane departed Grand Canyon-National Park Airport on a local touristic flight with six passengers and one pilot on board. Few minutes after takeoff, the engine failed. The pilot attempted an emergency landing when the airplane crash landed in a field near Tusayan. The aircraft was destroyed and all seven occupants were seriously injured.

On November 16, 1979, Nevada Airlines, Inc., Flight 2504, a Martin 404 (N40438), was a chartered flight from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Grand Canyon National Park Airport, Tusayan, Arizona, and return. About 0935 / Flight 2504 departed Las Vegas to carry a French tour group to the Grand Canyon for a sightseeing tour. There were 41 passengers and a crew of 3 aboard for the roundtrip. The crew and passengers reported that the trip from Las Vegas to Tusayan was routine. After a scenic flight over the Grand Canyon, a landing was made at Tusayan after about 1 hr 10 min of flight time. No fuel, oil, or antidetonate (ADI) fluid was taken on, and no baggage was placed aboard at Tusayan. Takeoff for the return flight was started at 1450 from runway 3. The copilot was to make the takeoff from the right seat. The weather was clear, visibility unlimited, and winds were from 040° at 15 kns. The crew stated that all pretakeoff checklist items were completed and that the takeoff roll was normal. The captain said that he checked the engine instruments at V speed, takeoff safety speed, as the aircraft was rotated for takeoff and "everything was normal." He said he raised the landing gear and, almost immediately thereafter, sensed a loss of power from the left engine. He said he took control of the aircraft from the copilot and noticed that the left engine autofeather light was illuminated and the feather button depressed. About 1451:20, the tower local controller stated, '...do you want to come back?" The captain-said he told the copilot to advise the tower that the flight had lost an engine and was returning to the airport. At 1451:50, the copilot told the tower, '... we're (sic) lost an engine and we want to come back around." The local controller cleared the aircraft as requested. There was no reply from Flight 2504. The captain stated that he noticed a 200-fpm rate of climb when the aircraft reached the departure end of the runway. He said that after passing the runway the aircraft encountered a downdraft and turbulence which overcame the single engine climb performance of the aircraft. He said that, as the engine failure emergency checklist was being accomplished, he made a slight left turn to avoid a radio tower along the flightpath. The copilot stated that the aircraft passed to the left of and below the top of the tower; the top of the tower is 6,739 feet, about 100 feet above the ground. Even though she was aware of an engine problem, the flight attendant stated that she was not aware that an engine had failed. She said she was not warned by the cockpit crew about the impending crash. The passengers recalled hearing no unusual noises during the takeoff; however, several of them saw the left propeller stop shortly after the aircraft left the ground. Several passengers stated that, once the aircraft was airborne and after the left engine had failed, they experienced a "rocking" movement of the aircraft. One passenger, a pilot who was seated at the front of the cabin, said he was aware that the left propeller had been feathered and that, immediately thereafter, the aircraft began to descend. None of the passengers interviewed, were aware that the aircraft was going to crash until they heard the noise of a tree strike. They said there was no warning given by the crew. Several witnesses on the ground stated that they saw the aircraft flying low with the left propeller stationary. Some reported that the landing gear was up. No witnesses reported smoke, fire, or any other problems with the aircraft before impact. The airport tower personnel stated that they saw the left propeller stop when the aircraft was abeam of their position in the tower and slightly below the top of the tower. The tower is located about 6,000 ft from the beginning of Flight 2504's takeoff roll. Tower personnel stated that the aircraft never climbed over 100 ft above the ground level. They said the aircraft banked slightly to the left and descended into the trees. They activated the crash notification circuit when they realized an accident was inevitable. The captain stated that he "was making it except for the downdrafts," and he noticed that the airspeed had decreased to 105 knots; V2 was about 101,5 knots. He said that when he saw that the temperature of the right engine cylinder head was rising rapidly toward the maximum limit, he reduced the manifold pressure about 2 inHg to avoid engine failure. However, he said the inability of the aircraft to climb and the proximity of the terrain required that he return the right engine to full power and select a forced-landing area. The captain stated that, since terrain surrounding the airport was heavily wooded, he headed for the clear area north of the field. He said that when he realized that he would not clear two tall trees before reaching the clear area, he lowered the nose slightly and "flew through the trees." The cockpit struck one of the trees, shattering the captain's windshield. The captain said the aircraft lost about 20 kns of airspeed when it struck the trees and the aircraft began to roll to the left; minimum control speed with the left engine inoperative was about 91 kns. He further reduced the power on the right engine, rolled the wings level, and rotated the aircraft so that it would strike the ground in a nose-high altitude. Both pilots said they hit the ground three times, with each impact becoming progressively more severe. The aircraft came to rest about 850 ft beyond the point where the first trees were struck. The crashpath was oriented on a heading of 355°, and the fuselage came to rest on a heading of 070°. A fire broke out on the right side of the aircraft as it slid to a stop. The fire originated near the cockpit, which had twisted to the left about 120°. Three crew members and seven passengers were seriously injured while 34 other occupants escaped with minor injuries. The aircraft was written off.

On final approach to Grand Canyon-National Park Airport, the right engine partially failed and the pilot feathered its propeller. The airplane lost height then crashed on a plateau located few miles from the airport. The pilot and four passengers were killed while four others were seriously injured.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 21 at Grand Canyon-National Park Airport, while in initial climb by night, the crew initiated a right turn when the airplane struck tree tops and crashed in flames. The airplane was totally destroyed and all five occupants were killed.