Des Moines

The pilot of the Part 91 business flight filed an instrument-flight-rules (IFR) flight plan with the destination and alternate airports, both of which were below weather minimums. The pilot and
copilot departed from the departure airport in weather minimums that were below the approach minimums for the departure airport. While en route, the destination airport's automated observing system continued to report weather below approach minimums, but the flight crew continued the flight. The flight crew then requested and were cleared for the instrument landing system (ILS) 31 approach and while on that approach were issued visibilities of 1,800 feet runway visual range after changing to tower frequency. During landing, the copilot told the pilot that he was not lined up with the runway. The pilot reportedly said, "those are edge lights," and then realized that he was not properly lined up with the runway. The airplane then touched down beyond a normal touchdown point, about 2,800 feet down the runway, and off the left side of the runway surface. The airplane veered to the left, collapsing the nose landing gear. Both flight crewmembers had previous experience in Part 135 operations, which have more stringent weather requirements than operations conducted under Part 91. Under Part 135, IFR flights to an airport cannot be conducted and an approach cannot begin unless weather minimums are above approach minimums. The accident flight's departure in weather below approach minimums would have precluded a return to the airport had an emergency been encountered by the flight crew, leaving few options and little time to reach a takeoff alternate airport. The company's flight procedures allow for a takeoff to be performed as long as there is a takeoff alternate airport within one hour at normal cruise speed and a minimum takeoff visibility that was based upon the pilot being able to maintain runway alignment during takeoff. The company's procedures did not allow flight crew to depart to an airport that was below minimums but did allow for the flight crew, at their discretion, to
perform a "look-see" approach to approach minimums if the weather was below minimums. The allowance of a "look see" approach essentially negates the procedural risk mitigation afforded by requiring approaches to be conducted only when weather was above approach minimums.

During a landing approach, the pilot noted that the right engine remained at a high power setting, when he moved the power levers to reduce power. He executed a missed approach and had difficulty keeping the airplane straight and level. The pilot maneuvered for a second approach to land. After landing, he could not maintain directional control of the airplane and tried to go around, but the airplane went off the end of the runway and impacted the localizer antenna. The pilot did not advise ATC of the problem nor did he declare an emergency. The Pilot's Operating Handbook stated that for a power plant control malfunction, the affected engine should be shut down, and a single engine landing should be made. The power control cable was found disconnected from the anchoring point. A safety tab was broken off the housing, allowing it to unscrew. About one month before the accident, maintenance had been performed on the right engine to correct a discrepancy about the right engine power lever being stiff. The mechanic re-rigged the right engine power cable.

During flight, the airplane was cruising at flight level 210 in IFR conditions with turbulence and with the wind from about 255 degrees at 70 knots. The airplane drifted off course at about 1600 cst. At 1610:09, after about ten minutes of unrecognized heading changes, the pilot stated '. . . I've lost my gyro.' At 1610:15, the controller issued a no-gyro vector. At 1611:29, as the airplane was still turning (to a heading that would intercept the original course), the pilot stated 'we've lost aLL our instruments . . . please direct me towards VFR.' He was cleared to descend to 14,000 feet. At about that same time, he stated 'we're in trouble' and 'we've lost all vacuum,' then there was no further radio transmission from the airplane. The airplane entered a steep, downward spiraling, right turn. The left outer wing panel separated up and aft (in flight) from overload and impacted the left stabilizer. The airplane crashed, and parts that separated from the airplane were found over a four mile area. Investigation revealed evidence that the HSI heading card can fail without the HDG flag appearing. Although the pilot had reported the loss of instruments and vacuum, examination of the airplane revealed that the engine, flight controls, electrical system, pitot/static system and vacuum systems exhibited continuity. No malfunction was found that would have led to loss of pressurization or hypoxia.

The airplane was circling to land on runway 22 after executing a VOR/DME approach. The airplane impacted the ground approximately one quarter mile northeast of the runway 22 threshold. The wreckage path covered a distance of approximately 350 feet. Control continuity was established. Airframe, engine and navaid examination revealed no abnormalities. The left wing and horizontal stabilizer leading edges had approximately one-eighth inch of rime ice adhering to their leading edges. Two witnesses reported seeing the airplane rolling from the left to the right. The Eagle River AWOS was not available on a VHF radio frequency, due to radio frequency congestion at the O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.

The airplane was on takeoff climb, about 400 feet above the ground, when the engine partially and then totally lost power. The pilot did a forced landing in a bean field. The flight occurred following maintenance to check a low manifold pressure condition. According to the pilot, a 'full' engine runup was done before takeoff. He stated: 'the takeoff was smooth, we rotated at an airspeed of slightly more than 80 knots. The climb for the first 350 (feet of altitude), airspeed was routine... I felt a power loss and noticed the manifold pressure dropping. At this point I felt I had enough power to return to the airport... as the turn was being completed, power went out completely.' The post-accident examination of the airplane did not disclose evidence of mechanical malfunction.

En route at FL240, the plane entered a left spiraling descent and subsequently experienced an inflight break-up at 7,000 feet with separation of outboard wings, tail sections and internal vinyl from the nose baggage door. There was no distress call. Witnesses heard the engines and an explosive sound, then they saw the plane in a spin, trailed by falling debris. Debris was strewn over a distance of about 3.5 miles. Light weight pieces including vinyl from the baggage door, wing skin, and tail skin pieces were among the 1st debris on the wreckage path. Tail sections were found about 2.5 miles from the main wreckage with evidence of overload failure; pieces of the wings were found with evidence of downward/overload separation. No preexisting airframe failure was found that would have led to loss of control, inflight breakup, loss of pressurization or hypoxia. The plane was inactive for about 2 years before being purchased 2 months before accident. Last annual inspection was on 6/8/92. Icing was forecast from 9,000 feet to 17,000 feet msl; turbulence was forecast below 8,000 feet msl. Both occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to cruise altitude, the pilot reported the left engine cowl assembly had come off. Witnesses observed the airplane at low altitude and noted that it was 'yawing, sputtering, and rocking back and forth.' They indicated the left engine was not running and that the airplane banked sharply to the right and disappeared behind trees before crashing. An investigation revealed the left propeller had not been feathered. The left engine cowling was found 1.8 miles from the accident site. The three primary (eyebolt) cowl fasteners on the outboard side of the left upper cowl were found unlocked & seven other cowl attaching studs (screws) were missing. The cowling had been removed 16 days before the accident to install an oil/air separator. This was the first flight since that work was performed. The mechanic, who did the work, said he noted several cowl stud fasteners were missing and that he had notified the pilot. The pilot was reported to have replied that he had some fasteners and would take care of the problem. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

On final approach, after being cleared to land, the pilot informed the controller that he might have to shut down an engine. He declined to declare an emergency or request assistance. On short final, the aircraft was observed to roll to the left and descent into the terrain. Subsequent examination revealed evidence that the left engine was not developing power, although the left propeller was not feathered. There was evidence that the right engine was producing high power during impact. No mechanical deficiency of the left engine or propeller was found. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on an ILS approach at dusk in IMC and icing conditions with the alternate air on. According to the pilot, he had just descended below an overcast, on final approach, when the engine lost power and would not respond to throttle application. A forced landing was made in a wooded area short of the runway and the aircraft was extensively damaged. During an exam of the engine, the turbocharger and wastegate transition pipes were found separated at the flange. Carbonaceous residue was found in the area of separation, but no heat damage was noted. The gasket, bolts, washers and self-locking nuts (for holding the pipes together) were not found. Later, the engine ran successfully during an operational check. During the investigation, 3 similar cases of pipe separation were identified, which involved another aircraft; these resulted in only partial losses of power. The right front seat passenger reported seeing a trace of ice on the wings as the aircraft was descending thru clouds. The pitot heat, stall warning heat, and ice light switch were fnd in the 'off' position. At 1650 cst, the temperature and dew point at the surface were 36° and 35° respectively. All three occupants were seriously injured.

The airplane was in a normal appearing climb after takeoff when it pitched up to a 70° to 80° attitude, stalled, dropped the right wing, then leveled the wings and hit the ground in a near-flat attitude. The weight and cg were within limits. No preimpact problems were found that could cause an inadvertent pitchup. Pilot's only memory is that he couldn't get the control column far enough forward to stop the pitchup. The pilot's seat was found in the full forward position with the right locking pin in the locking hole and the left pin 1/4th of an inch forward of the front locking hole. There were no visible marks on either of the locking pins. Deep scratches were found on the sides of the rail where the seat attachments normally slide back and forth when the seat is adjusted. Exam of the outboard side recessed surface near the aft end disclosed what appeared to be a fresh scratch. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured.