Billings

While on the return leg of a non-scheduled 14 CFR Part 135 VFR cross-country flight, the airplane collided with mountainous terrain at approximately 9,100 feet above mean sea level. Prior to the accident, the pilot informed air traffic control that he was VFR and level at 8,500 feet MSL. Dark night conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The aircraft crashed on the south-facing slope of the 9,100-foot mountain near the last recorded radar position. Wreckage and impact signatures at the crash site were indicative of high energy and shallow impact with the terrain. The investigation revealed no evidence of any aircraft mechanical problems.

During climbout, the airplane encountered an area of freezing rain resulting in rapid airframe ice accretion and loss of climb capability. The pilot informed ATC that he was unable to maintain altitude and requested and received clearance back to Great Falls, the departure airport. ATC radar showed that the airplane then began a right turn over mountainous terrain extending up to 8,309 feet prior to loss of radar contact (lower and relatively flat terrain, down to less than 5,000 feet, was located to the left of the aircraft's track.) During the last minute of radar contact, the aircraft was in a right turn at a descent rate of about 400 feet per minute; the aircraft passed less than 1/2 mile from the 8,309-foot mountain summit just prior to loss of radar contact, at an altitude of 8,400 to 8,500 feet. The aircraft crashed on the southwest flank of the 8,309-foot mountain about 1/2 mile south of the last recorded radar position. Wreckage and impact signatures at the crash site were indicative of an inverted, steep-angle, relatively low-speed, downhill impact with the terrain. The investigation revealed no evidence of any aircraft mechanical problems.

While flying a night visual approach, the co-pilot flared too high above the runway. As the aircraft floated down the runway, the speed decreased, and the pilot-in-command took control. Because he felt the aircraft was approaching a stall, he initiated a go-around. During the attempted go-around, the pilot-in-command found it necessary to keep both hands on the control wheel due to the fact that the aircraft had been trimmed to the full nose-up position during the landing flare. Even with both hands on the control wheel, the aircraft became very difficult to control. Although the co-pilot moved the throttles to maximum power and began retraction of the flaps, the pilot-in-command's remedial action had occurred too late to successfully execute the go-around. It was later discovered that during the operator's initial training, both crew members had been taught to apply full nose-up trim after crossing the runway threshold and reducing the power to idle. This action, which the operator eliminated from the landing sequence procedure after this accident, was inconsistent with the instructions in the Beech 99 Pilots Operating Manual.

The pilots obtained a complete weather briefing for their IFR flight. Before landing at their destination, they attempted to obtain an airport advisory on Unicom, but received no response. They landed on the runway in low visibility with the runway lights visible. After touchdown, the left main landing gear contacted a berm or snowbank on the left side of the plowed area, and the pilots were unable to maintain directional control. The aircraft drifted off the left side of the runway and came to rest on a reverse heading. The runway, which was 100 feet in width, had been plowed to about 45.5 feet width along the centerline. No notams had been filed concerning the partially plowed condition of the runway. The second officer (commercial pilot) noted that during the weather briefing, the pilot-in-command had been advised of thin, loose snow on the runway.

While en route on a night IFR cargo flight, the pilot requested and was cleared for a descent from an IFR cruise altitude of 16,000 feet to proceed VFR-on-top. The last transmission from the aircraft was at 2106 when the pilot acknowledged that he was familiar with the terrain along the route. At 2121:51 mdt, radar contact was lost after the aircraft made an approximately 360° left turn and descended thru 13,800 feet. Shortly after that, the controller tried to call the pilot to inform him that radar contact was lost, but was unable to make radio contact. Later, wreckage of the aircraft was found where it had crashed about 2 miles southwest of were radar contact was lost. The wreckage was scattered over an area of more than one mile. An investigation revealed the left wing and right horizontal stabilizer had separated upward from overload. No pre-accident fatigue or part failure/malfunction was found. Weather reports and pireps indicated moderate turbulences and towering cumulus clouds in the area. Approximately 60 miles west at Pocatello, ID, snow showers were reported; 2 to 3 inches of snow fell on the wreckage overnight. Both pilots were killed.

While on an IFR flight plan in IMC, the pilot executed a missed approach after flying a localizer back course 27 approach. During a subsequent ILS runway 09L approach, radio and radar contact with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft wreckage was located on the inbound approach course 1/2 mile east of the Saige locator outer marker. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post impact fire. The autopsy and medical history of the pilot led to a conclusion that he was incapacitated at the time of impact. The pilots flight time was not reported and his logs were not located. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot was making a short (35 minutes) local flight to 'check N333AA over' before turning it over to its new owner. The aircraft collided with the ground in a steep descent, wings level, attitude during an entry into the traffic pattern at Billings, Montana. VMC prevailed at the time. Witnesses said the engines were operating and there was no apparent attempt by the pilot to avoid the crash. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot said that when he called on the radio prior to the approach for an altimeter setting the reply was '30.11 or 30.12, something like that.' The aircraft altimeter was found after the accident set at 30.22 inches of mercury. The visibility was described as 1 and 1/2 miles in snow showers. He continued the approach 'because minimums are one mile.' He descended outbound to 4,500 feet. Minimum procedure turn alt is 4,700 feet msl. The pilot then descended to 3,700 feet msl as he approached the VOR. Power was reduced to 17-18 inches of manifold pressure and airspeed reduced to 120 knots. As the VOR was crossed he glanced at the altimeter and 'the hands were in the two o'clock position.' Landing gear was extended and approach flaps set. The pilot said all seemed normal. He looked out the window and saw 'wispy clouds going by rapidly. Then there were the sounds of impact.' The next thing remembered was the sound of dripping gasoline. The pilot said he crawled out of the cockpit window and wandered 'for a couple hours trying to chase down the searchlights.'

While in cruising altitude, the twin engine airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in flames near Farson. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

While descending to Boise International Airport by night and marginal weather conditions, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck a mountain located 10 miles northeast of the airfield. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both pilots were killed.