De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver

The Sound Flight DHC-2 float-equipped Beaver aircraft, N340KA, flew from Patricia Bay to Dodger Channel where the pilot planned to land. He set up an approach to land to the south in Dodger Channel, into the wind. On short final, the pilot noticed a shoal so he decided to overshoot, make a circuit, and land beyond the shoal. He applied power, established a climb and began a left turn. As the aircraft turned, it came into the lee of Diana Island. The aircraft encountered subsiding air and began to descend. The pilot was unable to arrest the descent. The aircraft struck the water and sank. All six occupants escaped without any injury but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The air taxi float-equipped airplane was the second of three airplanes on an air tour flight over a remote scenic area in southeast Alaska. As the flight of three airplanes flew into mountainous terrain, the first pilot reported low clouds, with rain and fog, which required him to descend to 700 feet msl to maintain VFR flight conditions. The pilot of the third tour airplane, which was about 5 minutes behind the accident airplane, stated that as he approached the area around the accident site, he encountered "a wall of weather" which blocked his intended flight route, and he turned around. The accident airplane's fragmented wreckage was discovered in an area of steep, tree-covered terrain, about 2,500 feet msl, near the area where the third airplane turned around. The NTSB discovered no mechanical problems with the airplane during postaccident inspections. An NTSB weather study revealed instrument meteorological conditions in the area at the time of the accident. Photographs recovered from a passenger's camera depicted deteriorating weather conditions as the flight progressed. A charter boat captain, who had seen numerous float-equipped tour airplanes operating in adverse weather conditions, called the local FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) 9 days before the accident, to report his sightings. According to the FAA, no specific tour operator could be identified during their ensuing investigation, and no enforcement actions or additional surveillance of any operators was initiated. According to the FSDO manager, the local FSDO had lost inspectors due to downsizing. He reported they had not attempted to observe operators' adherence to weather minimums via ground-based viewing locations along the heavily traveled tour routes, and noted that FAA inspectors used to purchase air tour tickets to provide en route, on-board surveillance, but had not done so for approximately the last 10 years. He noted that additional inspector assistance from other FAA offices was not requested

The pilot was conducting flights for the purpose of parachute operations; these flights are known colloquially as ‘lifts’. On the previous day, he had conducted 13 lifts, of which eleven were to an altitude of 12,000 ft and two to an altitude of 5,500 ft or less. On the day of the accident the pilot recorded that he took off for the first lift at 0927 hrs. The aircraft, with nine parachutists aboard, climbed to 12,000 ft and landed at 0946 hrs. There followed three flights of an average 18 minute duration, between each of which the aircraft was on the ground for no more than 7 minutes. The last of these flights landed at 1100 hrs, after which the aircraft uplifted 230 ltr of Jet A1 fuel. The aircraft utilised the main runway, Runway 29, for each of these flights. The surface wind had freshened from the south and the pilot requested the use of the shorter Runway 21. The air/ground radio operator refused this request because he believed that the pilot had not been checked out to use this runway, as required by the Headcorn Aerodrome Manual. Accordingly, the pilot approached a nominated check pilot who agreed to observe his next flight. The check pilot briefed the pilot of OY-JRR on the procedures for using the short runway, emphasising the need to make an early decision to abort the takeoff if necessary. The check pilot stated that the pilot of OY-JRR performed a thorough pre-takeoff check using the full checklist available in the cockpit and that the subsequent flight was entirely satisfactory. Following the check flight the aircraft took off again at 1148 hrs and flew a further five flights, each separated by periods that ranged between 7 and 36 minutes. The check pilot observed several of these flights, all of which were from Runway 21, and most appeared to proceed normally. He and another witness noticed that on one occasion the climb gradient after takeoff appeared shallower than normal, but they believed that the wind speed had decreased at this time. The pilot recorded that the aircraft was refuelled again after landing at 1443 hrs, this time uplifting 266 ltr of fuel. The next takeoff was at 1447 hrs and having climbed to 12,000 ft again the aircraft landed at 1521 hrs. The accident occurred on the pilot’s eleventh flight of the day. Prior to the flight the aircraft was refuelled with a further 100 ltr at 1555 hrs. Shortly before 1605 hrs the aircraft taxied to Runway 21. It appeared to accelerate normally but at no time was the tail seen to rise in its usual manner prior to becoming airborne. Onboard, the experienced jump-master noticed that the aircraft was passing the aerodrome refuelling installation and several aircraft parked close to the runway, beyond the intersection of Runway 21 with Runway 29. He was aware that the aircraft had now passed the point where it would normally become airborne. Almost simultaneously, he heard the pilot shout “Abort”. One of the parachutists shouted to the other occupants “Brace - Brace, everyone on the floor”. The aircraft stopped abruptly when its left wing and cockpit collided with a camouflaged F100 fighter aircraft which was parked as a museum exhibit to the left of the southern edge of Runway 21. The occupants of the cabin were able to vacate the aircraft with mutual assistance. Members of the aerodrome fire service extinguished a small fire, which had started in the area of the engine, and other witnesses helped the occupants to move away from the aircraft. The pilot, however, remained unconscious in the cockpit. He was attended subsequently by paramedics and taken to hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.

The ski-equipped aircraft took off around 1130 eastern standard time from Mirage Outfitter, located 60 miles east of La Grande-4 Airport, Quebec, with a pilot and four passengers on board, to locate caribou herds. About 40 minutes after departure, the engine stopped as a result of fuel starvation. The pilot was not able to regain power and made a forced landing on rugged ground. The aircraft was heavily damaged and two passengers were seriously injured. The pilot used a satellite telephone to request assistance. First-aid assistance arrived by helicopter about 1 hour 30 minutes after the occurrence. The aircraft fuel system had been modified after the installation of wings made by Advanced Wing Technologies Corporation.

The airline transport pilot was departing to the north from a narrow stream in a float-equipped airplane with lodge guests aboard, on a Title 14, CFR Part 91 flight. Northerly winds between 25 and 35 knots, were reported at the time of the accident. The accident pilot reported that after departure, he turned left, and a strong downdraft "threw the airplane to the ground." The passengers said that the airplane started its takeoff run directly into the strong winds, but shortly after becoming airborne, the pilot made a steep turn to the left, about 150 feet above the ground. The passengers indicated that as the airplane continued to turn left, it began to shudder and buffet, then abruptly descended nose low into the marsh-covered terrain. During the impact, the right wing folded, and the airplane's fuselage came to rest on its right side. One of the occupants, seated next to the right main cabin door, was partially ejected during the impact sequence, and was pinned under the fuselage and covered by water. Rescue efforts by the pilot and passengers were unsuccessful. In the pilot's written statement to the NTSB, he reported that there were no pre accident mechanical anomalies with the airplane, and during the on-site examination of the wreckage by the NTSB investigator-in-charge, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The private pilot and the sole passenger were in the first of two airplanes of a flight of two, operating as a personal flight under Title 14, CFR part 91. The pilot of the second airplane reported that both airplanes were in radio contact, and the accident airplane was about one mile ahead as they entered a mountain pass along the intended flight route. As the flight progressed, both airplanes descended due to deteriorating weather conditions as they neared the narrowest part of the pass. The second pilot said that visibility deteriorated to a point that it was difficult to discern topographical features, and he told the accident pilot that he was uncomfortable with the lack of visibility and was turning around. The second pilot stated that the accident pilot responded by saying, in part: "Turn around if you can... I am not able to." The second pilot indicated that the last time he saw the accident airplane was as it entered a cloudbank. During the accident pilot's final radio transmission, prompted by the second pilot's inquiry about how he was doing, he responded that he was just trying to get through the pass. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. There was no ELT signal, and the search for the airplane was unsuccessful until three days later. The wreckage was located at the 3,100-foot level of the mountain pass, in an area of steep terrain. Impact forces and a post crash fire had destroyed the airplane. During the IIC's on-site examination of the wreckage, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The aircraft, owned by the German operator Himmelsschreiber Azur GmbH, was planned to make a sightseeing tour over Hamburg. This was a present from a father for his son aged 12. Less than 2 minutes after takeoff from the Hamburg-Norderelbe Seaplane Base, in the city center, the engine lost power and caught fire. The pilot elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft lost height, collided with a wagon and crashed on a railway road located in a marshalling yard about 2 km south from the departure point, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire. Four passengers were killed while the pilot and a fifth passenger were seriously injured. The pilot died the following day.

The commercial certificated pilot was departing a remote bay with five passengers in an amphibious float-equipped airplane on the return portion of a Title 14, CFR Part 135 sightseeing flight. The pilot began the takeoff run toward the north, with the wind from the north between 15 to 20 knots, and 4 to 6 foot sea swells. When the airplane had climbed to about 10 to 15 feet, the pilot said a windshear was encountered, which pushed the airplane down. The airplane's floats struck a wave, missed about 4 to 5 swells, and then struck another wave, which produced a loud "bang." The company guide, seated in the right front seat, told the pilot that the right float assembly was broken and displaced upward. The airplane cleared a few additional swells, and then collided with the water. Both float assemblies were crushed upward, and the left float began flooding. The guide exited the airplane onto the right float, and made a distress call via a satellite telephone. All occupants donned a life preserver as the airplane began sinking. The pilot said that after about 15 minutes, the rising water level in the airplane necessitated an evacuation, and all occupants exited into the water, and held onto the right float as the airplane rolled left. The airplane remained floating from the right float, and was being moved away from shore by wind and wave action. The pilot said that one passenger was washed away from the float within about 5 minutes, and two more passengers followed shortly thereafter. Within about 5 minutes after entering the water, the pilot said he lost his grip on the float, and does not remember anything further until regaining consciousness in a hospital. He was told by medical staff that he had been severely hypothermic. U.S. Coast Guard aircraft were already airborne on a training mission, and diverted to rescue the occupants. About 1320, a C-130 flew overhead, and began dropping inflatable rafts. The company guide was the only one able to climb into a raft. When the helicopters arrived, they completed the rescue using a hoist and a rescue swimmer. The passengers reported that they also were unable to hold onto the airplane after entering the water, became unconscious, and were severely hypothermic upon reaching a hospital. The airplane was not equipped with a life raft, and was not required to be so equipped.

The float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (registration C-FODG, serial number 205) departed the outfitter base camp at Squaw Lake, Quebec, at 0925 eastern daylight time, with a passenger and a few supplies on board, for a round-trip visual flight rules (VFR) flight to two wilderness camps, Camp 2 and Camp Pons. The weather in Squaw Lake was suitable for visual flight at the time of take-off but was forecast to deteriorate later in the day. The pilot completed the flights to the two camps and on the way back to Squaw Lake, the weather forced the pilot to make a precautionary landing on Elross Lake, 15 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Squaw Lake. At 1630, he reported to the company via high frequency (HF) radio that he intended to take off from Elross Lake, as there seemed to be a break in the weather. Rescue efforts were initiated in the evening when the aircraft did not arrive at the base camp. The aircraft was located at 1230 the following day, 4 nm from Elross Lake. The aircraft was destroyed by a post-impact fire. The pilot sustained fatal injuries.

The single engine aircraft departed Campbell River on a night flight to Knight's Inlet with four passengers and one pilot on board. As it failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were initiated by RCAF & RCMP but no trace of the airplane and its occupants was found. On 15 of July 2005, the wreckage was found at a depth of 260 metres of Quadra Island by the families of the victims. TSB did not proceed to any investigations for this occurrence.