Boeing 727-200

Flight Royal Jordanian 600 departed Amman for a flight to Doha and Muscat. With the first officer as the handling pilot the aircraft, called "The City of Petra", left Amman at 21:55. Contact was established with Doha at 23:08 at a range of 45 miles when weather information was received, which included: wind 090° at 17 knots, visibility 10 km in thunderstorms, 1/8 CS at 2500 feet, 3/8 at 3000 feet, and QNH 1008. The controller added that the thunderstorm appeared to be building up over and to the north west of the airfield. The pilot requested runway 16 and was cleared for a visual approach to that runway or for a NDB/VOR approach if visual contact with the airfield was not established. The aircraft reported approaching the overhead position for a NDB/VOR procedure at 23:17. On the airfield rain was falling quite heavily and the controller informed the aircraft of this. The NDB then tripped, presumably as a result of a lightning strike but was back in the air again at 23:22. At 23:25 the aircraft reported procedure turn complete and was cleared to land. At 23:29 the aircraft reported that it had not seen the runway, and initiated a missed approach, requesting and receiving clearance to make an ILS approach to runway 34. At 23:30 a wind was reported 290°/14 knots in heavy rain. At 23:35 the aircraft reported procedure turn complete and field in sight. Landing clearance was given with a wind of 180°/06 kt. During the next 2 minutes of the final approach the controller reported winds of 150° at 13 kt, 150° at 15 kt, and 140° at 17 knots. Because of the increasing tail wind component and difficulties in maintaining the glide slope the crew decided before reaching decision height, that a missed approach was necessary and this was initiated at 23:37:19 at a height of about 300 feet agl. The pilot then requested clearance to Dhahran and the controller cleared the aircraft to climb straight ahead to FL 80. Go around power was applied and 25° flaps was selected, the undercarriage was raised. The aircraft climbed to 750 feet with the indicated airspeed falling to approximately 140 knots. The aircraft then began to descend at an increasing rate until it struck the ground with a vertical speed of 4200 ft/min., with the IAS increasing rapidly to approximately 170 kt in the last 5 seconds. The aircraft struck the left hand edge of the runway, 2050 m from the threshold with the nose approximately 10° above the horizon and with the left wing 5° down. The aircraft bounced off the first impact and turning left, rolled to the right to an inverted position and then slid, tail first, into the Fire Station garage some 800 m from the first impact point and 270 m from the runway edge. The fuselage broke into three main sections during the process. Four crew members and 41 passengers were killed while 19 other occupants were injured.

The crew was completing flight PS182 from Sacramento to San Diego with an intermediate stop in Los Angeles. While descending to San Diego-Lindbergh Field runway 27, the crew was informed about the presence of a Cessna 172M registered N7711G and operated by the Gibbs Flight Center. The single engine airplane just departed San Diego Airport for a local training mission with one student pilot and one instructor on board. At 0901:47, at an altitude of 2,600 feet and 3 NM northeast of San Diego Airport, both airplane collided. Out of control, they dove into the ground and crashed into several houses and the 805 highway located between the districts of Altadena and City Heights. Both aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 137 occupants in both aircraft were killed as well as seven people on the ground. Nine other people on the ground were seriously injured as dozen houses were destroyed.

Flight 193 operated as a scheduled passenger from Miami to Pensacola, FL, with en route stops at Melbourne and Tampa, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile. About 21:02 CDT the flight departed Mobile on an IFR flight plan to Pensacola and climbed to the cruising altitude of 7,000 feet. At 21:09, the crew were told that they would be vectored for an airport surveillance radar (ASR) approach to runway 25. At 21:13, the radar controller told National 193 that it was 11 nm NW of the airport and cleared it to descend and maintain 1,700 feet. At 21:17 flaps were selected at 15° and two minutes later the flight was cleared to descend to 1,500 feet and shortly after that further down to the MDA (480 feet). As the aircraft rolled out on the final approach heading, the captain called for the landing gear and the landing final checklist. At 21:20:15, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) whooper warning continued for nine seconds until the first officer silenced the warning. Nine seconds later the 727 hit the water with gear down and flaps at 25°. It came to rest in about 12 feet of water. The weather at the time of the accident was 400 feet overcast, 4 miles visibility in fog and haze, wind 190°/7 kts. Three passengers were killed while 55 other occupants were rescued, among them 11 were injured.

While descending to runway 24 on an NBD approach, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility to 3 km, clouds down to 1,500 feet and rain falls. Unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the pilot-in-command initiated a go-around. Few minutes later, while on a second attempt to land, the crew landed too far down, about 2,060 feet past the runway threshold (runway 24 is 5,000 feet long) at a speed of 148 knots. Immediately after touchdown, the crew activated the thrust reversers and deployed the spoilers but unable to stop on a wet runway, the airplane overran. It went down a steep embankment, collided with a stone bridge, broke into several pieces and eventually came to rest in flames on a beach located about 40 meters below airfield elevation. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Six crew members and 125 passengers were killed while 33 other occupants were seriously injured.

The airplane departed Istanbul-Yeşilköy Airport at 2245LT on a scheduled flight to Antalya, carrying 146 passengers and a crew of eight. After passing over the Afyon VOR at an altitude of 25,000 feet, the crew requested the permission to descend to 13,000 feet. A 2311LT, the captain reported Antalya city lights in sight and started the descent to runway 36. At this time, the real position of the aircraft was about 100 km north of Antalya. Four minutes later, while descending by night under VFR mode at an altitude of 3,700 feet, the airplane struck the slope of Mt Karakaya (1,371 metres high) located south of Isparta. The airplane disintegrated on impact and debris were found at an altitude of 1,130 metres. All 154 occupants were killed.

The takeoff from Denver-Stapleton Airport was completed from runway 35L in poor weather conditions. At that time, a thunderstorm with associated rain showers was moving over the northern portion of the airport. The Thunderstorm was surrounded by numerous other thunderstorms and associated rain showers but none of these were in the immediate vicinity of the airport. After liftoff, the airplane reached an altitude of 100 feet then lost about 41 kt of indicated airspeed in 5 seconds. The aircraft struck the ground 11.6 seconds after the airspeed began to decrease. The aircraft first hit the ground 387 feet south of the departure end of runway 35L and 106 feet to the right of the runway centerline. The aircraft continued northward to a second impact area about 135 feet north of the end of the first area. The main portion of the second area was 55 feet long and 4 feet wide. The aircraft slid northward from this area and came to rest about 1,600 feet north of the departure end of runway 35L and about 160 feet to the right of the extended runway centerline. All 131 occupants were evacuated, 15 of them were injured.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 727-225 operated as a scheduled passenger flight from New Orleans to New York-JFK. The flight departed New Orleans about 13:19. It proceeded on an IFR flight plan. Eastern 66 arrived in the New York City terminal area without reported difficulty, and, beginning at 15:35:11, Kennedy approach control provided radar vectors to sequence the flight with other traffic and to position it for an ILS approach to runway 22L at the Kennedy airport. The automatic terminal information service (ATIS) reported: "Kennedy weather, VFR, sky partially obscured, estimated ceiling 4,000 broken, 5 miles with haze... wind 210° at 10, altimeter 30.15, Expect vectors to an ILS runway 22L, landing runway 22L, departures are off 22R... " At 15:52:43, the controller transmitted, "All aircraft this frequency, we just went IFR with 2 miles very light rain showers and haze. The runway visual range is---not available, and Eastern 66 descend and maintain four thousand, Kennedy radar one three two four." Eastern 66 acknowledged the transmission. At 15:53:22, the flight contacted the Kennedy final vector controller, who continued to provide radar vectors around thunderstorms in the area, to sequence the flight with other traffic, and to position the flight on the localizer course. The flight crew then discussed the problems associated with carrying minimum fuel loads when confronted with delays in terminal areas. One of the crewmembers stated that he was going to check the weather at the alternate airport, which was LaGuardia Airport (LGA). Less than a minute later, one of the crewmembers remarked, "... one more hour and we'd come down whether we wanted to or not." At 15:59:19, the final vector controller transmitted a message to all aircraft on his frequency that "a severe wind shift" had been reported on the final approach and that he would report more information shortly. Eastern Air Lines Flight 902, a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, had abandoned its approach to runway 22L earlier. At 15:59:40, Eastern 902 re-established radio communications with the Kennedy final vector controller, and the flight crew reported, "... we had... a pretty good shear pulling us to the right and... down and visibility was nil, nil out over the marker... correction... at 200 feet it was... nothing." The final vector controller responded, "Okay, the shear you say pulled you right and down?" Eastern 902 replied, "Yeah, we were on course and down to about 250 feet. The airspeed dropped to about 10 knots below the bug and our rate of descent was up to 1,500 feet a minute, so we put takeoff power on and we went around at a hundred feet." While Eastern 902 was making this report, the captain of Eastern 66, said, "You know this is asinine." An unidentified crewmember responded, "I wonder if they're covering for themselves." The final vector controller asked Eastern 66 if they had heard Eastern 902's report. Eastern 66 replied, "...affirmative." The controller then established the flight's position as being 5 miles from the outer marker (OM) and cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 22L. Eastern 66 acknowledged the clearance at 16:00:54, "Okay, we'll let you know about the conditions." One minute later, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, called for completion of the final checklist. While the final checklist items were being completed, the captain stated that the radar was, "Up and off... standby." At 16:02:20, the captain said, "...I have the radar on standby in case I need it, I can get it off later." At 16:02:42, the final vector controller asked Eastern 902, "..would you classify that as severe wind shift, correction, shear?" The flight responded, "Affirmative." The first officer of Eastern 66 then said, "Gonna keep a pretty healthy margin on this one. An unidentified crewmember said, "I...would suggest that you do" the first officer responded, "In case he's right." At 16:02:58, Eastern 66 reported over the OM, and the final vector controller cleared the flight to contact the Kennedy tower. The first officer requested 30° of flaps and the aircraft continued to bracket the glideslope with the airspeed oscillating between 140 and 145 knots. At 1603:12, the flight established communications with Kennedy tower local controller and reported that they were, "outer marker, inbound." The Kennedy tower local controller cleared Eastern 66 to land. The captain acknowledged the clearance and asked, "Got any reports on braking action...?" The local controller did not respond until the query was repeated. The local controller replied, "No,none, approach end of runway is wet... but I'd say about the first half is wet--we've had no adverse reports." At 1603:57.7, the flight engineer called, "1000 feet" and at 1604:25, the sound of rain was recorded. The flight was nearly centered on the glideslope when the flight engineer called, "500 feet." The airspeed was oscillating between 140 and 148 knots and the sound of heavy rain could be heard as the aircraft descended below 500 feet. The windshield wipers were switched to high speed. At 16:04:40, the captain said, "Stay on the gauges." The first officer responded, "Oh, yes. I'm right with it." The flight engineer reported, "Three greens, 30 degrees, final checklist," and the captain responded, "Right." At 16:04:52, the captain said, "I have approach lights," and the first officer said, "Okay." The captain then again said, "Stay on the gauges," and the first officer replied, "I'm with it." N8845E then was passing through 400 feet, and its rate of descent increased from an average of about 675 fpm to 1,500 fpm. The aircraft rapidly began to deviate below the glideslope, and 4 seconds later, the airspeed decreased from 138 kts to 123 kts in 2.5 seconds. The Boeing 727 continued to deviate further below the glideslope, and at 16:05:06.2, when the aircraft was at 150 feet, the captain said, "runway in sight." Less than a second later, the first officer said, "I got it." The captain replied, "got it?" and a second later, at 16:05:10, an unintelligible exclamation was recorded, and the first officer commanded, "Takeoff thrust." The airplane contacted the top of the No. 7 approach light tower at an elevation of 27 feet above the mean low-water level and 2,400 feet from the threshold of runway 22L. The aircraft continued and struck towers 8 and 9. The aircraft’s left wing was damaged severely by impact with these towers--the outboard section was severed. The aircraft then rolled into a steep left bank, well in excess of 90°. It contacted the ground and the fuselage struck five other towers. The aircraft then continued to Rockaway Boulevard, where it came to rest. The approach light towers and large boulders along the latter portion of the path caused the fuselage to collapse and disintegrate. A fire had erupted after the left wing failed.

Flight NW6231 departed New York-JFK at 19:14 for a ferry flight to Buffalo and was cleared by departure control to climb to FL140. At 19:21 the flight was cleared to climb to FL310. The aircraft began to climb 2,500 fpm at an airspeed of 305 knots. As the aircraft climbed through FL160, both the airspeed and the rate of climb began to increase. Reaching FL230, the airspeed had reached 405 knots and the rate of climb had exceeded 6,500 fpm. The overspeed warning horn sounded a little later, followed 10 seconds later by a stick shaker stall warning. The aircraft then leveled at 24800 feet with a speed of 420 knots until it turned rapidly to the right, 13 seconds later. The airplane started to descend out of control, reaching a vertical acceleration of +5g until it struck the ground in a slightly nose down and right wing-down attitude. The aircraft had descended from 24000 feet to 1090 feet in 83 seconds.

Trans World Airlines Flight TW514 was a regularly scheduled flight from Indianapolis, IN (IND), to Washington-National Airport, DC (DCA), with an intermediate stop at Columbus-Port Columbus International Airport, OH (CMH). Flight 514 departed Indianapolis at 08:53 EST and arrived in Columbus at 09:32. The Boeing 727 departed Columbus at 10:24, eleven minutes late. There were 85 passengers and 7 flight crew members aboard the aircraft when it departed Columbus. At 10:36, the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) informed the crew of Flight 514 that no landings were being made at Washington National Airport because of high crosswinds, and that flights destined for that airport were either being held or being diverted to Dulles International Airport (IAD). At 10:38, the captain of Flight 514 communicated with the dispatcher in New York and advised him of the information he had received. The dispatcher, with the captain's concurrence, subsequently amended Flight 514's release to allow the flight to proceed to Dulles. At 10:42, Cleveland ARTCC cleared Flight 514 to Dulles Airport via the Front Royal VOR, and to maintain FL290. One minute later, the controller cleared the flight to descend to FL230 and to cross a point 40 miles west of Front Royal at that altitude. Control of the flight was then transferred to the Washington ARTCC and communications were established with that facility at 10:48. In the meantime, the flightcrew discussed the instrument approach to runway 12, the navigational aids, and the runways at Dulles, and the captain turned the flight controls over to the first officer. When radio communications were established with Washington ARTCC, the controller affirmed that he knew the flight was proceeding to Dulles. Following this contact, the crew discussed the various routings they might receive to conduct a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles. At 10:51, the Washington ARTCC controller requested the flight's heading. After being told that the flight was on a heading of 100 degrees, the controller cleared the crew to change to a heading of 090°, to intercept the 300° radial of the Armel VOR, to cross a point 25 miles northwest of Armel to maintain 8,000 feet, "...and the 300° radial will be for a VOR approach to runway 12 at Dulles." He gave the crew an altimeter setting of 29.74 for Dulles. The crew acknowledged this clearance. The pilots again discussed the VOR/DME approach At 10:55, the landing preliminary checklist was read by the flight engineer and the other crewmembers responded to the calls. A reference speed of 127 kts was calculated and set on the airspeed indicator reference pointers. The altimeters were set at 29.74. The crew then again discussed items on the instrument approach chart including the Round Hill intersection, the final approach fix, the visual approach slope indicator and runway lights, and the airport diagram. At 10:59, the captain commented that the flight was descending from 11,000 feet to 8,000 feet. He then asked the controller if there were any weather obstructions between the flight and the airport. The controller replied that he did not see any significant weather along the route. The captain replied that the crew also did not see any weather on the aircraft weather radar. At 11:01, the controller cleared the flight to descend to and maintain 7,000 feet and to contact Dulles approach control. Twenty-six seconds later, the captain initiated a conversation with Dulles approach control and reported that the aircraft was descending from 10,000 feet to maintain 7,000 feet. He also reported having received the information "Charlie" transmitted on the ATIS broadcast. The controller replied with a clearance to proceed inbound to Armel and to expect a VOR/DME approach to runway 12. The controller then informed the crew that ATIS information Delta was current and read the data to them. The crew determined that the difference between information Charlie and Delta was the altimeter setting which was given in Delta as 29.70. There was no information on the CVR to indicate that the pilots reset their altimeters from 29.74. At 11:04, the flight reported it was level at 7,000 feet. Five seconds after receiving that report, the controller said, "TWA 514, you're cleared for a VOR/DME approach to runway 12." This clearance was acknowledged by the captain. The CVR recorded the sound of the landing gear warning horn followed by a comment from the captain that "Eighteen hundred is the bottom." The first officer then said, "Start down." The flight engineer said, "We're out here quite a ways. I better turn the heat down." At 11:05:06, the captain reviewed the field elevation, the minimum descent altitude, and the final approach fix and discussed the reason that no time to the missed approach point was published. At 11:06:15, the first officer commented that, "I hate the altitude jumping around. Then he commented that the instrument panel was bouncing around. At 11:06:15, the captain said, "We have a discrepancy in our VOR's, a little but not much." He continued, "Fly yours, not mine." At 11:06:27, the captain discussed the last reported ceiling and minimum descent altitude. concluded, "...should break out." At 11:06:42, the first officer said, "Gives you a headache after a while, watching this jumping around like that." At 11:07:27, he said, "...you can feel that wind down here now." A few seconds later, the captain said, "You know, according to this dumb sheet it says thirtyfour hundred to Round Hill --- is our minimum altitude." The flight engineer then asked where the captain saw that and the captain replied, "Well, here. Round Hill is eleven and a half DME." The first officer said, "Well, but ---" and the captain replied, "When he clears you, that means you can go to your ---" An unidentified voice said, "Initial approach, and another unidentified voice said, "Yeah!" Then the captain said "Initial approach altitude." The flight engineer then said, "We're out a --- twenty-eight for eighteen." An unidentified voice said, "Right, and someone said, "One to go." At 11:08:14, the flight engineer said, "Dark in here," and the first officer stated, "And bumpy too." At 11:08:25, the sound of an altitude alert horn was recorded. The captain said, "I had ground contact a minute ago," and the first officer replied, "Yeah, I did too." At 11:08:29, the first officer said, "...power on this.... " The captain said "Yeah --- you got a high sink rate." "Yeah," the first officer replied. An unidentified voice said, "We're going uphill, " and the flight engineer replied, "We're right there, we're on course." Two voices responded, "Yeah!" The captain then said, "You ought to see ground outside in just a minute -- Hang in there boy." The flight engineer said, "We're getting seasick." At 1108:57, the altitude alert sounded. Then the first officer said, "Boy, it was --- wanted to go right down through there, man," to which an unidentified voice replied, "Yeah!" Then the first officer said, "Must have had a # of a downdraft." At 1109:14, the radio altimeter warning horn sounded and stopped. The first officer said, "Boy!" At 11:09:20, the captain said, "Get some power on." The radio altimeter warning horn sounded again and stopped. At 11:09:22, the sound of impact was recorded. After the aircraft left 7,000 feet, the descent was continuous with little rate variation until the indicated altitude was about 1,750 feet. increased about 150 feet over a 15-second period and then decreased about 200 feet during a 20-second period. The recorded altitude remained about 1,750 feet until the airplane impacted the west slope of Mount Weather, Virginia, about 25 nmi from Dulles, at an elevation of about 1,670 feet (509 m). The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 92 occupants were killed.

Flight 114 was an international scheduled service from Tripoli to Bahrain with intermediate stops in Benghazi and Cairo. On board were 104 passengers and a crew of nine, five from Air France, among them the captain, Mr. Jacques Bourgès, aged 42. Normally, the Benghazi – Cairo route was flown eastwards along the Libyan coast until reaching the city of Sidi Barrani in Egypt, where the airway turned inland to the VHF omnidirectional range (VOR) and Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) area located west of Lake Qarun. The entry to the Cairo terminal area was made on a north-easterly heading over a 71-nautical-mile (131 km) long path that separated Lake Qarun from the Cairo VOR. At 13:45 the Cairo traffic control (CTC) saw the aircraft approaching from the west. Permission was granted to land in runway 23. CTC surprisingly saw the Boeing heading eastward towards the Suez Canal at 13:50. Evidence from both the recovered Boeing 727 voice recorders and the Israeli authorities' flight data recorder later showed that the Libyan aircraft was likely to had been already off course when it reported its position over Qarun, probably due to strong westerly upper-level winds associated to a low level sandstorm. The crew was forced to rely on instrument navigation because of this sandstorm. Both instrument and navigational error caused the aircraft to go off course, entering airspace dominated by Israel when flying over the Sinai Peninsula. By this time the aircraft had been lost from the Egyptian air traffic control. The crew believed they were close to the destination airport and started the descent. At 13:55 the aircraft was detected in the radar by the Israelis as it was entering Israeli airspace; it was located south-east of Suez at an altitude of 15,000 feet (4,600 m). Two Israeli Air Force Phantoms were sent to intercept the then unidentified aircraft. Following the re-establishment of communications with CTC the pilot of the Libyan aircraft looked through the cabin's port window and saw the fighters, but he mistook them for Egyptian MiGs. The Libyan aircraft continued flying deeper into the Sinai at a speed of 325 miles per hour (523 km/h), but it suddenly veered to the west. It was at that time that the Boeing's crew realised they were having problems with their instruments. The Israeli fighter pilots attempted to make visual contact with the passenger airliner's crew, and tried to communicate to them by signaling with their hands and dipping their wings. The 727 crew's response was interpreted as a denial of that request. The 727 adopting a westward course was interpreted by the Israeli pilots as an attempt to flee. The Israeli Phantom pilots fired bursts from their 20 mm M61 cannons, severely damaging the airliner's control surfaces, hydraulic systems, and wing structure. Flight 114 attempted an emergency landing in an area covered with sand dunes, but crashed, with an explosion near the right main landing gear. Four passengers and the copilot survived while 108 other occupants were killed. The copilot later said that the flight crew knew the Israeli jets wanted them to land but relations between Israel and Libya made them decide against following instructions. In direct contradiction to the co-pilot's own account, the Libyan government stated that the attack occurred without warning. Israel's air force perceived Flight 114 as a security threat, and that among the possible tasks it could have been undertaking was an aerial spy mission over the Israeli air base at Bir Gifgafa. The Israeli government also revealed that LN114 was shot down with the personal authorization of David Elazar, the Israeli Chief of Staff. Israel's argument was that the heightened security situation and the erratic behaviour of the jet's crew made the actions taken prudent. The United Nations did not take any action against Israel. The 30 member nations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) voted to censure Israel for the attack. The United States did not accept the reasoning given by Israel, and condemned the incident. Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, called it an "error of judgment", and Israel paid compensation to the victims' families.